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LEADERSHIP VIEWS ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE.

5. (UNCL) THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD ASSIST AIT IN FURTHERING OUR NON-PROLIFERATION INTERESTS.

TAIWAN'S NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

-- TAIWAN JOINED THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT) ON JANUARY 27, 1978. THIS TREATY OBLIGATION REPRESENTS A FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT UNDERTAKING AND OBLIGATION TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

-- TAIWAN'S ATOMIC ENERGY ACT STATES THAT ALL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES ON TAIWAN ARE DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO PEACEFUL PURPOSES. (NB. THE SPECIFIC WORDING OF THIS LAW IS NOT AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON.)

-- IN AGREEMENTS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), TAIWAN HAS ARRANGED FOR ALL ITS NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND FACILITIES TO BE PLACED UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS.

-- TAIWAN OFFICIALS HAVE CONSISTENTLY REAFFIRMED TAIWAN'S NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS.

-- ON SEPT 23, 1975, THEN PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO STATED IN THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN, "WE HAVE BOTH THE FACILITIES AND THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT WHEN I BROACHED THE IDEA WITH THE LATE PRESIDENT (CHIANG KAI-SHEK), HE REJECTED IT FLATLY ON THE GROUND THAT WE CANNOT USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO HURT OUR OWN COUNTRYMEN."

-- CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S STATEMENT REFLECTS A MORAL AND HUMANITARIAN REVULSION AGAINST USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST FELLOW CHINESE.

-- MORE RECENTLY, VICE FOREIGN MINISTER JOHN CHANG REAFFIRMED IN THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN ON APRIL 2 THAT TAIWAN IS COMMITTED NOT TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS TAIWAN IS A PARTY TO THE NPT.

FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS

-- WITH OVER 130 PARTIES, THE NPT IS THE MOST WIDELY SUPPORTED ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, A FACT THAT REFLECTS THE BREADTH OF THE GLOBAL CONSENSUS AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- MANY COUNTRIES WHICH FACE REGIONAL THREATS, INCLUDING GERMANY AND KOREA, HAVE RECOGNIZED LIKEWISE THAT THEIR SECURITY WOULD BE ENHANCED BY RENOUNCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ADHERING TO THE NPT.

-- THE INF AGREEMENT AND REAGAN/GORBACHEV COMMITMENTS TO SEEK A FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS REFLECT THE MAJOR POWERS' COMMITMENT TO REDUCE THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. THIS HISTORIC MOVE TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS HAS BEEN UNIVERSALLY WELCOMED.

-- JAPAN, WHICH IS TAIWAN'S NEAREST NEIGHBOR AND A COUNTRY WITH WHICH TAIWAN WISHES TO STRENGTHEN ITS TIES, HAS PERHAPS THE DEEPEST AVERSION TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ANY COUNTRY.

-- WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PRC, ALL OF TAIWAN'S IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS IN EAST ASIA, INCLUDING JAPAN, KOREA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES, ARE NPT PARTIES AND WOULD BE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY ANY CHANGE IN TAIWAN'S NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS.

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FROM AIT WASHDC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, MHUC, TV
SUBJECT: TAIWAN, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION

1. (CONF) THE DISAPPEARANCE OF COL. CHANG HSIEN-YI, THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INER, HAS PROMPTED THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION ON TAIWAN IN MANY YEARS. SOME RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH AIT OFFICERS AND CONSULTANTS INDICATE, NOT SURPRISINGLY, THAT THE UNDERSTANDING OF NUCLEAR ISSUES IN TAIWAN IS NOT VERY SOPHISTICATED. A QUICK PUBLIC OPINION POLL BY ONE LOCAL PAPER INDICATED THAT ABOUT ONE THIRD OF RESPONDENTS FAVORED TAIWAN'S ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A ROUGHLY EQUAL PROPORTION OPPOSED IT.

2. (CONF) THE US HAS A MAJOR INTEREST IN PREVENTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN BUTTRESSING TAIWAN'S OWN NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE AT THIS POINT THAT THE RENEWED DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WARRANTS A MAJOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT BY AIT. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT FOR AIT OFFICERS TO REFLECT A CONSISTENT SET OF VIEWS IN ANY PRIVATE

DISCUSSIONS OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES. TO THIS END, WE HAVE PREPARED THE FOLLOWING POINTS THAT MAY BE DRAWN ON IN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WHY TAIWAN'S ADHERENCE TO ITS NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS IS IN TAIWAN'S OWN INTERESTS.

3. (CONF) WHILE A DECISION TO PURSUE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION WOULD FORCE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN US RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN, WE BELIEVE IT WISE TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF DICTATING OR THREATENING TAIWAN. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD FOCUS DISCUSSIONS ON TAIWAN'S OWN INTERESTS. CONSEQUENTLY, THESE POINTS DO NOT ADDRESS BILATERAL ASPECTS SUCH AS ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES, NRC LICENSING OF US NUCLEAR EXPORTS, US ARMS SALES, AND POLITICAL SUPPORT THAT WOULD BE AFFECTED BY ANY DEVIATION FROM TAIWAN'S NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY.

4. (CONF) MAINTAINING PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR TAIWAN'S NPT OBLIGATIONS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES. WE WOULD APPRECIATE INFORMATION ON HOW SENIOR PARTY AND ADMINISTRATION LEADERS VIEW THE INDICATIONS OF SOME PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR A NUCLEAR OPTION AND ON HOW THEY WOULD PLAN TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE. AIT SHOULD KEEP WASHINGTON CURRENTLY INFORMED ON PUBLIC AND

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-- THE COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC, WITH WHICH TAIPEI IS SEEKING TO EXPAND ITS RELATIONS, ARE FIRMLY OPPOSED TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS IS REFLECTED IN THEIR RECENT ADOPTION OF A SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE.

-- TAIWAN'S DESIRE TO BREAK OUT OF WHAT IT PERCEIVES AS ITS DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION AND TO REJOIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD BE FUNDAMENTALLY SET BACK SHOULD TAIWAN DEVIATE FROM ITS FIRM COMMITMENT TO NON-PROLIFERATION. THE SETBACK WOULD PROBABLY RESULT BOTH FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S OPPOSITION TO PROLIFERATION AND FROM A CHANGED PRC ATTITUDE TOWARD TAIWAN.

TAIWAN-MAINLAND ASPECTS

-- TENSIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS ARE AT THEIR LOWEST LEVEL IN MANY DECADES. THE REDUCED TENSIONS CONTRIBUTE TO TAIWAN'S SECURITY AND PROSPERITY.

-- FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS, BEIJING HAS BEEN EMPHASIZING A PEACEFUL APPROACH TOWARD TAIWAN. IT IS NOT IN TAIWAN'S INTEREST TO PROVOKE BEIJING INTO A MORE MILITANT POSTURE WHICH WOULD SUBSTITUTE FRICTION, TENSION, INSTABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY FOR THE CURRENT FAVORABLE CONDITIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS.

-- THERE IS A BROADLY BASED DESIRE BY PEOPLE ON TAIWAN TO LOWER TENSIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS AND TO INCREASE PRIVATE CONTACTS AND TRADE WITH THE MAINLAND. SOME PEOPLE GO BEYOND THIS TO SPEAK OF DEVELOPING A PEACEFUL MODUS VIVENDI WITH BEIJING. CONTINUED REJECTION OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION IS A NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR THESE DEVELOPMENTS TO OCCUR.

SECURITY AND DETERRENCE

-- TAIWAN'S CURRENT POLICY OF MAINTAINING STRONG, CONVENTIONAL AND NON-PROVOCATIVE DEFENSIVE FORCES BEST PROTECTS TAIWAN'S OWN INTERESTS AND HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PEACE AND PROSPERITY TAIWAN NOW ENJOYS.

-- AS THE PRC HAS NOT THREATENED THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST TAIWAN, TAIWAN'S PURSUIT OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION COULD EXPOSE TAIWAN TO RISKS IT DOES NOT NOW FACE. RATHER THAN DETERRING A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD LIKELY PROVOKE A CONVENTIONAL BUILD-UP ACROSS THE STRAITS, THUS INCREASING THE CONVENTIONAL THREAT, AND CREATE A NUCLEAR THREAT, BY RAISING THE PROSPECT OF MASSIVE NUCLEAR RETALIATION AGAINST TAIWAN.

-- WHILE SOME MAY ENVISAGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A KIND OF ULTIMATE BARGAINING CARD OR DETERRENT FOR TAIWAN,

STRATEGIC MILITARY PLANNERS WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR POSSESSION WOULD ON THE CONTRARY EXPOSE TAIWAN TO MUCH GREATER MILITARY RISK AND DANGER.

-- TAIWAN'S POTENTIAL THREAT COMES FROM THE PRC, WHICH HAS A SUBSTANTIAL NUCLEAR FORCE AND A VARIETY OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS. TAIWAN DOES NOT POSSESS EITHER SUCH WEAPONS OR THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND COULD NOT EXPECT TO MATCH PRC CAPABILITIES UNDER ANY FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCE.

- IN GEOGRAPHIC TERMS, TAIWAN IS A RELATIVELY SMALL ISLAND WHOSE VERY DENSE POPULATION AND CONCENTRATED MILITARY FACILITIES WOULD BE EXTREMELY VULNERABLE TO NUCLEAR THREAT OR ATTACK IN A CONFRONTATION WITH A CONTINENTAL NUCLEAR POWER.

-- WITH THESE DECISIVE STRATEGIC AND GEOGRAPHIC DISADVANTAGES, TAIWAN WOULD HAVE NO SAME, RATIONAL USE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A CONFLICT WITH THE PRC.

-- DURING THE PERIOD IN WHICH EVEN THE FIRST NUCLEAR WEAPON WITH SOME FORM OF DELIVERY SYSTEM WAS BEING PRODUCED, TAIWAN WOULD EXPOSE ITSELF TO THE THREAT OF A CONVENTIONAL PREEMPTIVE STRIKE, SUCH AS THAT CONDUCTED BY ISRAEL AGAINST IRAQ'S NUCLEAR FACILITY IN 1981.

- IN A SOCIETY WHICH DOES NOT HAVE AN ESTABLISHED AND TESTED TRADITION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER MILITARY DECISIONS, THE PROSPECT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACQUISITION WOULD RAISE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND REQUIRE THE CREATION OF RELIABLE CONTROL PROCEDURES TO ENSURE CIVILIAN CONTROL.

ENERGY SECURITY AND NUCLEAR COMMERCE

-- TAIWAN'S SIX NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SUPPLY ABOUT 45 PERCENT OF TAIWAN'S TOTAL ELECTRICITY GENERATION.

-- TAIWAN DEPENDS ON FOREIGN SUPPLIERS FOR ITS REACTORS, FOR THE ENRICHED URANIUM TO FUEL THEM AND FOR SPARE PARTS TO MAINTAIN THEM.

-- TAIWAN'S NPT ADHERENCE AND THE APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS TO ALL ITS NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND FACILITIES ARE ESSENTIAL TO TAIWAN'S ACCESS TO THE NUCLEAR FUEL AND EQUIPMENT IT NEEDS FROM ABROAD.

- WHILE US FIRMS HAVE BEEN THE MAJOR SUPPLIERS, FIRMS FROM MOST OF THE OTHER MAJOR WESTERN SUPPLIERS, INCLUDING FRANCE, JAPAN, WEST GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UK AND CANADA, HAVE ALSO SUPPLIED NUCLEAR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES TO TAIWAN.

-- ALL OF THESE COUNTRIES (AND ALSO SOUTH AFRICA) REQUIRE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AS A CONDITION FOR THEIR NUCLEAR EXPORTS.

- WERE TAIWAN TO DEVIATE FROM ITS NPT COMMITMENTS OR VIOLATE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AS WOULD BE UNAVOIDABLE IN PRODUCING EVEN ONE WEAPON, NONE OF THESE COUNTRIES NOR ANY OTHER NPT PARTY WOULD ENGAGE IN NUCLEAR COMMERCE WITH TAIWAN.

-- A VIOLATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUE, SUBJECT TO REPORTING BY THE IAEA TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

-- REGARDLESS OF WHOSE MATERIAL TAIWAN USED FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPON, NO SUPPLIER WOULD HAVE ASSURANCE THAT ITS SUPPLIES WOULD NOT BE MISUSED. THE PRC WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY EXERT ITS INFLUENCE TO REINFORCE THEIR OPPOSITION TO NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO TAIWAN.

-- EVEN AN AMBIGUOUS SITUATION WHICH RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT TAIWAN'S ADHERENCE TO ITS NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS WOULD CAUSE SUPPLIERS TO QUESTION THE WISDOM OF CONTINUED NUCLEAR COMMERCE WITH TAIWAN AND THREATEN TAIWAN'S ELECTRICITY SUPPLY.

SIGNED LAUX. SHULTZ

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