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AMB:JGDEAN

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1. DCM:GLSTREEB, 2. POL:EMANAK

AMB-5

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

EXDIS

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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MASS, MNUC, PTER, IN, CE, PK, UR, US

SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ' MEETING WITH PRIME  
- MINISTER GANDHI, MAY 28

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON MAY 28, I ACCOMPANIED CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ TO A MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER GANDHI. THE MEETING, WHICH LASTED EXACTLY ONE HOUR, WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY RAJIV GANDHI'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, AMBASSADOR GHAREKHAN. THE ONE-HOUR-LONG CONVERSATION WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE BEST MEETING I HAVE EVER ATTENDED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER SINCE MY ARRIVAL HERE NINE MONTHS AGO. I ALSO FELT THAT GANDHI SENSED HE WAS SPEAKING TO A GOOD FRIEND OF INDIA AND HE WAS THEREFORE MORE FORTHCOMING AND PERHAPS MORE HONEST WITH SOLARZ THAN HE WOULD NORMALLY BE. I HAVE THEREFORE REPORTED AT LENGTH ON THIS CONVERSATION.

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THE PAKISTANI DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE

3. CONGRESSMAN STEPHEN SOLARZ ASKED RAJIV GANDHI TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF BENAZIR BHUTTO'S RETURN ON THE PAKISTAN POLITICAL SCENE. SPECIFICALLY, SOLARZ ASKED IF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN WAS REALLY IN INDIA'S INTEREST.

4. RAJIV REPLIED THAT INDIA WOULD PREFER THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY TO PAKISTAN BUT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS INDIA WILL NOT GET HERSELF INVOLVED IN THE INTERNAL PAK DOMESTIC SCENE. RAJIV SAID THAT THE PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN ARE POSITIVE TOWARDS THE PEOPLE OF INDIA AND THIS FEELING ON THE WHOLE IS RECIPROCATED BY THE PEOPLE OF INDIA. THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY TO PAKISTAN WOULD FACILITATE THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONSHIP. THE PRIME MINISTER CONTINUED SAYING THAT AUTHORITARIAN MILITARY REGIMES HAVE THEIR OWN NEEDS WHICH STIFLE THIS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONSHIP.

5. RAJIV SAID THAT SINCE HIS TAKING ON THE PREMIERSHIP, HE HAD SEVEN MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT ZIA. AT THESE MEETINGS, RAJIV SAID THE TWO LEADERS HAD DECIDED TO WORK TOGETHER TOWARD IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THEIR TWO COUNTRIES. LAST DECEMBER THEY DREW UP A SIX-STEP PROGRAM BUT THE PRIME MINISTER FEELS THAT THIS PROGRAM, DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD THAT GOAL, HAS BEEN SLOWED DOWN BY THE PAKISTANIS. WHEN RAJIV RECENTLY SAW THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN AND ASKED HIM ABOUT THE STATUS OF THAT SIX-STEP PROGRAM, PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO AGREED THAT THE PROGRAM HAD RUN INTO TROUBLE. AT THAT MEETING WITH HIS COUNTERPART, GANDHI HAD MENTIONED "THAT IF YOU WISH TO GET THE PACE BACK TO WHERE IT USED TO BE LAST YEAR, LET US KNOW." SO FAR THE INDIANS HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE, ACCORDING TO RAJIV. RAJIV CONTINUED THAT THE ROAD FROM MILITARY DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY IS NOT EASY AND THERE ARE MANY OBSTACLES IN ZIA'S PATH. IN ADDITION, BENAZIR MAY ALSO CAUSE SOME PROBLEMS FOR ZIA.

6. RAJIV THEN NOTED THAT SOME OF THE TENSIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA ARE SELF-INFLICTED. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME OF THE STATEMENTS ZIA MADE ABOUT KASHMIR DO NOT HELP TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. WHEN THIS HAPPENS ON THE PAKISTAN SIDE (PRESUMABLY FOR

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DOMESTIC PAKISTANI REASONS), INDIA MUST SOMEHOW REACT AND THIS IN TURN FURTHER DAMAGES THE RELATIONSHIP. SPECIFICALLY, EVER SINCE LAST JULY THE INDIANS HAVE CALLED THE ATTENTION OF THE PAKISTANI LEADERSHIP TO THE TWO MILLION RUPEES THAT ARE BUDGETED IN THE PAKISTAN BUDGET FOR "THE LIBERATION OF KASHMIR." RAJIV OBSERVED THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY DONE FOR PAKISTANI DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS AND THE MONEY ITSELF IS A PITTANCE (ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS). NONETHELESS, IT CAUSED THE GOI A PROBLEM IN PARLIAMENT WHERE THIS WAS CITED AS AN EXAMPLE OF PAKISTAN'S DEVIOS INTENTIONS.

7. SOLARZ THEN CONVEYED ZIA'S AND YAQUB KHAN'S MESSAGES THAT BOTH MEN PROFESS THE WILL TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH INDIA. BOTH MEN CHARACTERIZED THE NEED FOR AN IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS AS A "STRATEGIC DECISION" BY THE PAKISTANI LEADERSHIP AND THEY WANTED SOLARZ TO CONVEY THIS MESSAGE TO RAJIV. BENAZIR HAD TAKEN THE SAME LINE IN THE COURSE OF HER MEETING WITH SOLARZ BUT ADDED THAT "THE AFFINITY OF GENERATION" WOULD HELP HER TO UNDERSTAND BETTER THAN ZIA THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN INDIA. SOLARZ ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR BENAZIR TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH INDIA THAN FOR ZIA.

8. GANDHI REPLIED THAT THE INDIAN LEADERSHIP DID NOT KNOW BENAZIR WELL ENOUGH. HE THOUGHT THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD BE DONE EQUALLY WELL WITH EITHER ZIA OR BENAZIR. BUT GANDHI DOUBTED THAT ZIA WILL LET BENAZIR COME TO POWER. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE "OVER ZIA'S DEAD BODY." GANDHI OPINED THAT BENAZIR IS "NOT PULLING EVERYBODY WITH HER." SO FAR SHE ONLY HAS THE FULL SUPPORT OF "HER GROUP." GANDHI THOUGHT THAT BENAZIR WOULD HAVE TO CHANGE HER APPROACH. IF SHE CAN GAIN BROADER SUPPORT IN PAKISTAN, GANDHI THOUGHT THAT BENAZIR COULD MAKE A "GOOD LEADER."

#### U.S.-PAK RELATIONS

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9. SOLARZ THEN NOTED THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT WITHOUT INFLUENCE IN PAKISTAN. HE THOUGHT THAT THE U.S. HAD THREE OPTIONS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PAK DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEM: (1) PURSUE A POLICY OF BENIGN NEGLECT; (2) ENCOURAGE THE PAK GOVERNMENT TO AVOID CHAOS, PREVENT CONFRONTATION AND AGREE TO EARLY ELECTIONS; (3) PERSUADE BENAZIR TO SLOW DOWN HER

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CURRENT CAMPAIGN AND WAIT FOR HER CHANCE IN 1990.

10. GANDHI ASKED WHETHER PAKISTAN COULD REALLY HAVE CLEAN ELECTIONS. SOLARZ REPLIED THAT THE RECENT ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN, WHILE THEY WERE NOT ON A PARTY BASIS, APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN CLEAN. BOTH ZIA AND PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO PROMISED THAT IN 1990 THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE ON A PARTY BASIS. GANDHI RESPONDED THAT THE ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN WOULD PROBABLY BE "ALONG THE LINES OF THE RECENT BANGLADESH ELECTION." (THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT THEY WERE RIGGED.) GANDHI ALSO ASKED WHETHER BENAZIR WOULD AVENGE HER FATHER IF SHE EVER CAME TO POWER. SOLARZ STATED THAT IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH BENAZIR, SHE HAD FORESWORN VENGEANCE AND THAT THIS APPLIED ALSO TO ZIA AND HIS ENTOURAGE.

11. SOLARZ ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ENCOURAGE EARLY ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN, I.E., BEFORE 1990. GANDHI REPLIED WITHOUT HESITATION, "YES."

U.S. ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN  
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12. SOLARZ THEN STEERED THE CONVERSATION TO U.S. ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE EXPECTED THE ADMINISTRATION TO SUBMIT THE PROGRAM TO CONGRESS EARLY NEXT YEAR. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT AS LONG AS THERE ARE 120 THOUSAND SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN, THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT TURN ITS BACK ON PAKISTAN. THIS IS A POLITICAL FACT OF LIFE WHICH EVERYBODY SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. SOLARZ ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER WHETHER IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF IN THE AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION CONGRESS WOULD INCLUDE SOME LANGUAGE THAT THE ARMS PROVIDED ARE DESIGNED TO HELP PAKISTAN AGAINST THE THREAT FROM ITS WESTERN BORDER AND THE ARMS SHOULD THEREFORE BE DEPLOYED IN THAT PART OF THE COUNTRY.

13. GANDHI REPLIED THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE PAST PERFORMANCE, THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT U.S.-SUPPLIED WEAPONS ARE LARGELY DEPLOYED ON THE INDO-PAK BORDER, AND NOT ON THE PAK-AFGHAN BORDER. FURTHERMORE, IF THE INTENTION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IS TO HELP PAKISTAN DETER SOVIET OR AFGHAN AGGRESSION, WHY PROVIDE PAKISTAN WITH THE HARPOON MISSILE WHICH IS MOUNTED ON NAVAL VESSELS? WHY PROVIDE THE PAKS

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WITH THE LATEST ADVANCED TANKS WHICH CANNOT BE USED IN THE MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN ON THE AFGHAN-PAK BORDER? GANDHI EVEN QUESTIONED WHETHER THE F-16 WAS THE APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT TO BE USED IN THE MOUNTAINS ON THE AFGHAN BORDER. WOULDN'T THE A-10 BE A BETTER AIRCRAFT FOR THAT PURPOSE? GANDHI THEN SAID THAT ACCORDING TO ONE NEWSPAPER STORY THE PAKS HAD DEPLOYED STINGERS ON THE SIACHIN GLACIER.

14. I INTERVENED AT THIS STAGE AND POINTED OUT THAT THE STINGER STORY HAD BEEN VIGOROUSLY DENIED BY THE PAK AUTHORITIES IN AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT. (ISLAMABAD 11764) GANDHI NOTED MY OBSERVATION.

15. SINCE U.S. AID IS PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO HELP THE PAKS AGAINST THE SOVIET-AFGHAN THREAT, GANDHI ASKED WHETHER SOMETHING COULD BE DONE TO GET THE RUSSIANS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN QUICKER THAN THE CURRENT EFFORT. SOLARZ REPLIED THAT TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE THE UN MEDIATOR HAD REVEALED THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW OVER A PERIOD OF THREE AND ONE-HALF YEARS: DOWN FROM THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL OF FOUR YEARS. GANDHI STRESSED THAT THE PERCENTAGE OF SOVIET TROOPS TO BE WITHDRAWN DURING THE FIRST YEAR WAS AS IMPORTANT AS THE TIME PERIOD. SPECIFICALLY, A DRASTIC REDUCTION OF, FOR EXAMPLE, 50 PERCENT THE FIRST YEAR AND THEN PHASING DOWN THE REST OVER THE REMAINING TIME FRAME WOULD BE DESIRABLE. SOLARZ REPLIED THAT WHAT REALLY MATTERS IS THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. SOLARZ OPINED THAT A THREE AND ONE-HALF YEAR WITHDRAWAL PERIOD WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

16. IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF THE TIME PERIOD FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, SOLARZ OPINED THAT THE PAK SUGGESTION OF THREE TO SIX MONTHS WAS PROBABLY TOO SHORT TO BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED BY THE SOVIETS BUT THAT SOMEWHERE BETWEEN ONE AND ONE-HALF YEARS MIGHT BE AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE. SOLARZ STRESSED THAT THIS WAS STRICTLY HIS PERSONAL VIEW. HE ALSO MENTIONED AGAIN THAT AS LONG AS THE SOVIET TROOPS REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN THE MOOD IN CONGRESS WAS TO CONTINUE U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN.

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17. THE CONVERSATION THEN REVERTED TO SOLARZ' EARLIER QUESTION WHETHER THE INCLUSION OF LANGUAGE IN THE CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION REGARDING THE U.S. INTENT IN PROVIDING ARMS TO PAKISTAN WOULD MITIGATE AND ASSUAGE INDIAN CONCERNS. SOLARZ SAID THAT IF, FOR EXAMPLE, SUCH LANGUAGE WERE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NEW APPROPRIATIONS, AND IF CONFLICT WERE TO OCCUR BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA, IT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE U.S. TO DENY RESUPPLY TO THE PAKS, HENCE INCLUSION OF SUCH LANGUAGE IN THE LEGISLATION MIGHT BE A BRAKE ON INITIATING HOSTILITIES. GANDHI REPLIED THAT HE DIDN'T THINK THAT THIS LANGUAGE WOULD MAKE "THAT MUCH DIFFERENCE." HE THOUGHT THAT THE TYPE OF WEAPONS WHICH ARE PROVIDED TO THE PAKS IS OF GREATER IMPORTANCE BECAUSE EVERY TIME NEW WEAPONRY WAS INTRODUCED INTO THE PAK ARSENAL, INDIA WOULD HAVE TO KEEP PACE. THIS WOULD MEAN GREATER EXPENDITURES BY INDIA ON ARMS AND DIVERTING SCARCE RESOURCES AWAY FROM MORE ESSENTIAL INDIAN REQUIREMENTS. GANDHI'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, AMBASSADOR GHAREKHAN, NOTED THAT IN THE LATEST PAK AID PROGRAMS, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH NO LONGER USED THE THREAT FROM AFGHANISTAN AS LEITMOTIF IN JUSTIFYING THE DOLS FOUR BILLION REQUEST.

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THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION  
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18. SOLARZ THEN BROUGHT THE CONVERSATION TO THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE OF INDIA'S RELUCTANCE TO SIGN THE NPT BUT ADHERENCE TO THE NPT REMAINED USG POLICY. SOLARZ THEN ASKED WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT ABOUT A FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT TO WHAT GANDHI HAD PROPOSED IN DECEMBER OF NEITHER COUNTRY ATTACKING THE OTHER COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES. SOLARZ THOUGHT THIS WAS A GOOD FIRST STEP BUT WOULD INDIA CONSIDER ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SUCH AS AN AGREEMENT ON NO NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS OR FORESWEARING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. GANDHI REPLIED THAT "WE CAN THINK ABOUT IT."

19. GANDHI SAID THAT HE HAD IT FROM "SOME HIGH SOURCE IN THE UNITED STATES" THAT PAKISTAN HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD MAKING THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THAT THE USG HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO PREVENT THIS DESPITE ALL THE ASSURANCES WHICH PAKISTAN HAD GIVEN.

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20. SOLARZ SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY BELIEVES PAKISTAN IS NOT MAKING WEAPONS BUT HAS MADE PROGRESS IN PRODUCING ENRICHED URANIUM WITH WHICH THEY CAN -- IF THEY SO CHOOSE -- BUILD A WEAPON ONE DAY. THERE APPEARED TO BE AGREEMENT BETWEEN GANDHI AND SOLARZ THAT THE PAKS HAD ACHIEVED AN ENRICHMENT LEVEL WHICH WOULD PERMIT THEM TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL BY THE END OF THIS YEAR TO MAKE A WEAPON IF THEY WISH TO DO SO. GANDHI NOTED THAT HE HAD NO FIRM EVIDENCE TO THAT EFFECT BUT THAT CONCLUSION APPEARS TO BE SHARED BY ALL THOSE WHO ARE CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE PAK NUCLEAR PROGRAM. SOLARZ NOTED THAT IF THE PAKS SHOULD EXPLODE A NUCLEAR WEAPON, CURRENT LEGISLATION WOULD FORBID THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE AID TO PAKISTAN. GANDHI ASKED WHY THE WAIVER OF THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT NEEDS TO BE RENEWED. SOLARZ REPLIED THAT U.S. LEGISLATION HAD NOT STOPPED THE PAKS FROM ACTIVELY PURSUING A NUCLEAR PROGRAM. ON THE OTHER HAND, STOPPING THE U.S. AID PROGRAM TO PAKISTAN WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO PURSUE OUR POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN. SOLARZ THOUGHT THAT THE REFERENCE TO "EXPLODING A NUCLEAR DEVICE" IN THE CURRENT LEGISLATION AND THE CUTOFF OF AID WHICH WOULD FOLLOW IF A COUNTRY FLAUNTED THIS PROVISION HAD BEEN A MAJOR OBSTACLE DETERRING COUNTRIES FROM EXPLODING SUCH WEAPONS. SOLARZ AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS PARTICULAR PROVISION DOES NOT STOP PAKISTAN FROM ENRICHING URANIUM AND STOCKPILING IT. GANDHI SAID THAT "WE DON'T WANT TO GET INTO THIS KIND OF A RACE" AND SOLARZ ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT COULD BE DONE TO AVOID IT.

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21. GANDHI SAID THAT SOME YEARS AGO INDIA HAD SOME FISSILE MATERIAL -- PLUTONIUM -- STOCKPILED BUT THAT THIS MATERIAL HAD BEEN USED UP IN THE FACILITIES WHICH HAVE JUST BEEN BROUGHT ON LINE (THE FAST BREEDER). SOLARZ QUESTIONED THE PRIME MINISTER MORE CLOSELY, POINTING OUT THAT INDIA DID HAVE FACILITIES WHICH COULD TURN OUT UNSAFEGUARDED FISSILE MATERIAL AND HENCE WE ASSUME INDIA HAS ENOUGH TO BE USED IN A WEAPONS PROGRAM IF IT SO CHOOSES. GANDHI DENIED AGAIN THAT INDIA AT THE PRESENT TIME HAS SUCH A SURPLUS. HE REPEATED AGAIN THAT INDIA HAD "CONSUMED WHAT WE HAD." THIS GAVE SOLARZ ANOTHER OPENING TO ASK GANDHI WHETHER THIS WASN'T A GOOD TIME FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO ENTER INTO A BILATERAL AGREEMENT SINCE THE PAKS DON'T YET HAVE OR ARE JUST BEGINNING TO MAKE FISSILE MATERIAL AND INDIA HAS JUST CONSUMED THEIRS. GANDHI SAID THAT "WE HAVE TRIED TO FIND A WAY BUT SO FAR HAVE NO SOLUTION." SOLARZ ASKED WHETHER INDIA COULD PRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD CONSUMED ITS STOCKS OF PLUTONIUM AND HAD NO FISSILE MATERIAL ON HAND IN A STOCKPILE. GANDHI REPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES, BETTER THAN ANYBODY ELSE, SHOULD KNOW HOW MUCH PLUTONIUM INDIA GOT FROM THE UNITED STATES AND FROM FRANCE, AND HOW LONG THE INDIAN REACTORS HAVE BEEN FUNCTIONING. WITH THIS INFORMATION THE U.S. SHOULD BE ABLE TO CALCULATE HOW MUCH FISSILE MATERIAL INDIA HAD ON HAND AND FROM THIS FIGURE DEDUCT THE AMOUNT USED UP IN THE NEW FAST BREEDER FACILITY. THIS SHOULD PROVE THAT THERE IS NO UNSAFEGUARDED PLUTONIUM PRESENTLY STOCKPILED.

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22. SOLARZ NOTED THAT IN HIS CONVERSATIONS IN DELHI, THE INDIAN OFFICIALS HAD ALSO BROUGHT OUT THE NUCLEAR THREAT OF CHINA. SOLARZ SUGGESTED THAT IF INDIA WORKED OUT A BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH PAKISTAN THAT NEITHER COUNTRY WOULD STOCKPILE FISSILE MATERIAL, IT WOULD NONETHELESS LEAVE INDIA THE OPTION OF GETTING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT IF THE CHINESE SHOULD MAKE SERIOUS THREATS. THIS KIND OF AN ESCAPE CLAUSE COULD WELL BE WRITTEN INTO A BILATERAL AGREEMENT. GANDHI APPEARED NOT OVERLY RESPONSIVE AND MERELY NOTED THAT "LET'S LOOK AT IT."

U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS  
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23. THIS TIME IT WAS GANDHI WHO CHANGED THE SUBJECT FROM INDIA-PAK NUCLEAR RELATIONS TO U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS. GANDHI COMPLAINED THAT GORBACHEV "IS RUNNING AWAY WITH THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECT ON U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS." GORBACHEV IS CONTINUOUSLY MAKING NEW OFFERS AND WHATEVER THE DELHI SIX ARE PUTTING FORWARD IS IMMEDIATELY ENDORSED BY THE SOVIETS. WHY COULDN'T THE U.S. TAKE A MORE POSITIVE STANCE?

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24. SOLARZ THOUGHT THAT MUCH OF WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE ADVANCING IS PURE PROPAGANDA. GANDHI URGED THAT THE U.S. NOT LEAVE PUBLIC RELATIONS TO GORBACHEV AND INSTEAD PUT FORWARD POSITIVE IDEAS WHICH COULD BE EMBRACED BY THE DELHI SIX. THE U.S. APPROACH WAS TOO NEGATIVE AND TOO DEFENSIVE, GANDHI THOUGHT. IT APPEARED TO GANDHI THAT GORBACHEV HAS THE INITIATIVE -- AT LEAST THAT IS HOW IT IS PERCEIVED BY THE OUTSIDE WORLD -- AND HE URGED THE USG TO TAKE STEPS TO PUT THE SOVIETS MORE ON THE DEFENSIVE.

INDO-U.S. RELATIONS  
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25. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION BY SOLARZ, THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT THAT THE INDO-US BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IS "FAIRLY GOOD." THERE ARE "SOME ROUGH SPOTS HERE AND THERE" BUT ON THE WHOLE HE THOUGHT THAT THERE TH\*\*WAS A "POLITICAL WILL BOTH BY HIS ADMINISTRATION IN DELHI AND BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON TO IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP." NONETHELESS, GANDHI SAID, THE GOI WAS UPSET OVER THE LIBYAN INCIDENT. GANDHI MADE IT CLEAR THAT INDIA HAS "NO LOVE FOR QADHAFI." AS A MATTER OF FACT, HE CLAIMED THAT LIBYA HAD BEEN HELPING PAKISTAN IN CERTAIN AREAS. THERE WAS ALSO NO DOUBT ABOUT QADHAFI'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM. WHAT WORRIED THE GOI WAS THE "INDEPENDENT U.S. ACTION." THIS HAD ISOLATED THE UNITED STATES FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD, A SITUATION HE CHARACTERIZED AS "TREMENDOUSLY DANGEROUS." GANDHI STRESSED THAT HIS PROBLEM WAS NOT FIGHTING TERRORISM BUT THE METHOD USED BY THE U.S. IN LIBYA. SOLARZ ASKED WHAT WE SHOULD DO WHEN WE ARE FACED WITH CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT A COUNTRY OR ITS LEADER IS INVOLVED IN TERRORISM. (I USED THIS OPPORTUNITY TO HAND THE PRIME MINISTER A ONE-PAGE SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE WE HAD ON LIBYA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BERLIN NIGHT CLUB BOMBING INCIDENT.)

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26. GANDHI REPLIED BY ASKING ANOTHER QUESTION. HOW DOES MRS. THATCHER HANDLE TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND? ATTACKING A COUNTRY AS WAS DONE IN LIBYA WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY INVOLVED IN SPONSORING TERRORISM WAS NOT THE RIGHT WAY, GANDHI REPLIED. IN HIS OPINION TERRORISM SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH LAW AND ORDER MEASURES AND BY POLITICAL ACTION.

27. SOLARZ SAID THAT IF THERE IS IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE FOR STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM, WOULD AN EMBARGO HELP? HOW ABOUT SEVERING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS? WHAT ABOUT A BOYCOTT OF LIBYA'S CIVIL AIRLINES? GANDHI REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH ANY OF THESE SUGGESTIONS PROVIDING THAT THESE SANCTIONS WERE APPLIED TO ALL CULPRITS AND NOT JUST A SELECTED FEW.

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PAK SUPPORT FOR SIKH SEPARATISTS IN THE PUNJAB  
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28. SOLARZ THANKED THE PRIME MINSITER FOR THE EXCELLENT MEETING HE HAD EARLIER IN THE DAY WITH MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE ARUN SINGH. AT THAT MEETING ARUN SINGH HAD TALKED ABOUT THE EVIDENCE THE GOI HAS ON PAK SUPPORT FOR THE TERRORISTS IN THE PUNJAB. SOLARZ ADDED THAT THE PAKS HAVE VIGOROUSLY DENIED ANY COMPLICITY. SOLARZ REPORTED THAT ARUN SINGH HAD MENTIONED THAT ABOUT 40 TO 50 PEOPLE (I.E. INFILTRATORS) HAD BEEN INTERROGATED BY THE INDIANS AND THAT ON THE BASIS OF THESE INTERROGATIONS THE INDIANS HAVE EVIDENCE OF PAK SUPPORT FOR THE TERRORISTS IN THE PUNJAB. SOLARZ THOUGHT IT WAS IN INDIA'S INTEREST TO SHARE THIS INFORMATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. IF THE INFORMATION IS SUBSTANTIATED, AT A MINIMUM WE WOULD ASK THE PAKS TO STOP WHATEVER THEY ARE DOING IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS IN THE PUNJAB. IT COULD EVEN GO AS FAR AS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS FOR THE PAK PROGRAM IF PAK COMPLICITY WITH THE TERRORISTS WAS PROPERLY DOCUMENTED. SOLARZ REPEATED THAT THE GOI HAS EVERYTHING TO GAIN BY MAKING THIS EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AND HAVING AMERICANS INTERVIEW EITHER THE INTERROGATORS OR THE PERSONS INTERROGATED TO ASSURE THAT THE CONFESSIONS WERE NOT OBTAINED UNDER DURESS.

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29. GANDHI SAID THAT HE PREFERRED TO GIVE THIS EVIDENCE TO SOLARZ DIRECTLY DESPITE SOLARZ' SUGGESTION THAT THE INDIAN AUTHORITIES SHARE THIS INFORMATION ALSO WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE CONVERSATION TURNED TO HOW THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE PASSED TO SOLARZ WHO SUBMITTED THAT THE EMBASSY MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN RELAYING THE INFORMATION TO HIM. THE PRIME MINISTER, HOWEVER, CLEARLY PREFERRED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE GIVEN TO SOLARZ THROUGH ONE OF HIS OWN MEN. SOLARZ REITERATED HIS REQUEST THAT ONE OF HIS CONFIDANTS BE GIVEN ACCESS TO THE INDIAN OFFICIALS WHO INTERROGATED OR TO THOSE WHO WERE INTERROGATED AND HENCE WERE THE SOURCE OF THE EVIDENCE OF PAKISTAN INVOLVEMENT. GANDHI SAID THAT "WE HAVEN'T DONE THIS BEFORE. WE WILL HAVE TO LOOK AT THIS ASPECT." AS FOR THE DOCUMENTS, WHICH PRESUMABLY ARE THE INTERROGATION REPORTS, IT WAS AGREED THAT ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THEY WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO SOLARZ EITHER BY HIS SENDING SOMEBODY TO DELHI TO PICK THEM UP OR THROUGH THE INDIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. IT WAS AGREED THAT SOLARZ WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE INDIAN EMBASSY WITHIN A WEEK OR SO TO FOLLOW UP.

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SRI LANKA

30. SOLARZ SAID HE PLANNED TO BE BACK EITHER IN NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER TO GET A FIRST-HAND UNDERSTANDING OF THE SRI LANKA PROBLEM. HE THEN ASKED GANDHI ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

31. GANDHI REPLIED THAT JAYEWARDENE HAS "REFUSED TO TAKE A POSITIVE DECISION." GANDHI SAID THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST LEAD TO SOMETHING WHICH COULD HELP HIM AND HIS ADVISORS TO "SELL THE AGREEMENT TO THE TAMILS IN INDIA." HENCE, GANDHI THOUGHT THE KEY WAS AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH "OUR TAMILS" CAN ACCEPT. "ONCE THIS WORKS, THE TAMIL MILITANTS IN SRI LANKA WILL ALSO FALL INTO LINE." GANDHI THEN RELATED HOW THE CHIDAMBARAM MISSION HAD RETURNED FROM COLOMBO WITH HIGH HOPES BUT THAT AT THE LAST MINUTE JAYEWARDENE HAD STEPPED BACK ON THE LAW AND ORDER ISSUE. THIS IN TURN HAD BEEN A SERIOUS SETBACK FOR WHATEVER HAD BEEN ACHIEVED DURING CHIDAMBARAM'S APRIL 29 MISSION. THE GSL ATTACKS ON JAFFNA HAD MADE IT DIFFICULT TO RESUME THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT HE REMAINED CONFIDENT THAT IF JAYEWARDENE CAME UP WITH THE PROPER TERMS, THE STALLED NEGOTIATIONS COULD RESUME AT A LATER STAGE.

32. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN SPONTANEOUSLY ASSURED SOLARZ THAT THERE ARE NO TRAINING CAMPS FOR THE MILITANTS IN THE TAMIL NADU. "IF ANYBODY CAN FIND ONE, WE WILL IMMEDIATELY CLOSE IT DOWN." AS FOR THE FLOW OF ARMS TO THE MILITANTS, GANDHI SAID "SHORT OF A BERLIN WALL, WE CANNOT STOP THAT FLOW." GANDHI SAID THAT JAYEWARDENE NEEDS TO TALK TO "HIS TAMILS" AND HE IS NOT DOING ENOUGH OF THAT.

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33. IN VIEW OF THE IN-FIGHTING AMONG THE MILITANT TAMILS IN SRI LANKA, THE QUESTION AROSE WHETHER THE EPNLF, WHICH INCLUDES THE MOST MILITANT ELEMENTS OF THE TAMILS, WOULD ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WORKED OUT BY TULF. GANDHI SAID THAT HE HAS RECEIVED WORD THAT IF TULF ACCEPTS AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SRI LANKAN AUTHORITIES THE EPNLF WILL "GIVE IT A TRY FOR ONE YEAR."

MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES  
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34. IN REPLY TO SOLARZ QUESTION, GANDHI OPINED THAT THE PUNJAB COMMISSION REPORT WHICH HE EXPECTS TO BE ISSUED IN JUNE OR JULY SHOULD HELP TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION THERE CONSIDERABLY. (TIME WOULD NOT PERMIT A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION.)

35. WITH REFERENCE TO INDIA'S POSITION ON SOUTH AFRICA, SOLARZ TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE THOUGHT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WOULD PASS LEGISLATION SOMETIME IN JUNE WHICH WOULD HELP TO BREAK DOWN APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS VERY HAPPY TO HEAR THIS BECAUSE HE FELT THAT FAILURE TO BRING ABOUT FORWARD MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA WOULD HURT THE CAUSE OF THE MODERATES. THE CURRENT LEVEL OF PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA IS INSUFFICIENT TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE FAST ENOUGH TO AVOID A DISASTER, GANDHI SAID. DEAN##

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