

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
Secretary's Fourth Restricted Session with Shevardnadze

TIME: 2:30 to 8:10 pm, Wednesday, March 23, 1988  
PLACE: Secretary's Outer Office

SUBJECTS: Ministerial Dates, Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan, Other  
Regional Issues, Working Group Reports, Joint  
Statement

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

U.S.S.R.

THE SECRETARY  
Gen. Powell

FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE

Under Secretary Armacost  
Amb. Ridgway

Amb. Bessmertnykh  
Amb. Adamishin  
Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov  
Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko

EUR/SOV Director Parris  
(Notetaker)  
Mr. Zarechnak  
(Interpreter)

Soviet MFA Notetaker  
Mr. Palazhchenko  
(Interpreter)

Ministerial Dates

SHEVARDNADZE said it had been a good meeting with the President. It was good to have the question of a summit date resolved.

THE SECRETARY agreed. Having a date would allow work to begin on the details -- both in terms of arrangements and substance. Setting dates was a way of saying we were serious. For the same reason, it might be a good idea in the joint statement to be issued after the ministers met to give the dates for their April meeting, and to indicate they would meet in May as well.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, noting that the best time for him in April would be April 25. But he understood that was a problem for the Secretary.

THE SECRETARY said he thought agreement had been reached on the dates April 21-22 for the Secretary's discussions in Moscow, with some travel outside Moscow the following weekend. The Secretary had to be back in Washington the evening of April 25.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the April meeting should be April 21-25. As for May, the middle of the month would be best for him. THE SECRETARY agreed that the statement would say "mid-May," with precise dates to be determined later.

SHEVARDNADZE observed that the ministers seemed to have said as much as was necessary on the Middle East that morning. If their experts came up with something in the meantime, it could be reflected in the joint statement. Shevardnadze continued to believe that there ingredients of a common approach. Perhaps these could be discussed in greater detail in April, during the Secretary's Moscow visit.

THE SECRETARY said that the statement should say that the two sides had discussed the Middle East and would continue to do so. But we would have to say that our respective concepts of an international conference and how to go about it were quite different.

#### Iran-Iraq

SHEVARDNADZE said that the ministers needed to finish their discussion of Afghanistan.

The Foreign Minister had already dealt with the Iran-Iraq war. In the spirit of the understanding the ministers had, Shevardnadze could confirm that, after the Secretary General had completed his consultations with the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq, the Soviet Union would be able to act in the Security Council.

THE SECRETARY welcomed this. The U.S. proposed to return to the U.K. draft without the modifications which the two sides had considered in Moscow for a suspension period during which the Secretary General could seek implementation of the first resolution. Perez de Cuellar was already, in effect, doing this.

SHEVARDNADZE was not sure about such an approach. The Soviet Union had agreed in principle to work on the basis of the U.K. draft, but since then many amendments had been attached to it. The time before the Secretary General's meeting with the Iranians and Iraqis should be used to work on the text.

THE SECRETARY asked Shevardnadze if he would be willing to say publicly what he had said to him in private.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, for public consumption, it might be better to state simply that, if the Secretary General's consultations produced no results, the U.S. and Soviet Union would favor "strong action." The two sides had already decided that this meant voting for a second resolution.

THE SECRETARY agreed that the phrase "strong action" should be recorded in the joint statement. If asked what this meant, the U.S. would say it referred to voting a second resolution. If asked what about the Soviet view, we would suggest putting the question to the Soviet Union. The Secretary remarked that the President's comments at the White House made clear how deeply he had been moved by recent reports of chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war.

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood. He appreciated the need for a resolution, even though it would give him a "big headache" with Iran after the vote.

THE SECRETARY reemphasized that a decision was needed. IF there were a subsequent need for further follow-up, the two sides could consult.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled that the current U.S. proposal called for the 30 day suspense period the ministers had discussed in Moscow.

THE SECRETARY repeated that the idea in February had been to enable the Secretary General to use the suspense period to seek Iranian compliance with Resolution 598. Time had passed since then, and the consultations which had been foreseen were happening. This argued for going back to the original U.K. draft.

SHEVARDNADZE said he felt the suspense period should be retained. Implementation should be based on whatever situation prevailed at the time.

THE SECRETARY said that, if the modification were retained, the suspense period should be very short.

### Afghanistan

SHEVARDNADZE asked about Afghanistan.

THE SECRETARY said it was hard. He asked to review the bidding to be sure he understood the Soviet position, laying aside for the moment the question of arms supplies.

The Soviet side agreed, he recounted, that half its troops would leave in the first three months. If the Geneva accords were signed, the withdrawal would be over by the end of the year. The Soviet Union and the parties agreed that Cordovez could in a private capacity mediate efforts to reach agreement on an Afghan interim government acceptable to all parties. We assumed that was something the Soviet side would be prepared to make public. (Shevardnadze shook his head in the affirmative when the Secretary asked, "Right?").

The Secretary recalled that the Soviet side had suggested that, as far as it was concerned, the U.S. could say it would continue to support those we had supported in the past. The Soviet Union would reserve the right to complain about this, but would not claim that the Geneva accords were being violated.

The most sensitive issue, the Secretary said, had to do with Pakistan, because there was no other realistic route for transporting supplies to the resistance. Any U.S. statement of its right to deliver arms, if it chose to do so, had to be credible. As a practical matter, we hoped this would not be necessary. We would say we would observe restraint if the Soviet Union did. If the Soviet side showed restraint, so would we. We would say this publicly.

The Secretary said he would like to have from Shevardnadze some indication as to how the Soviet Union would comment on Pakistan's position in light of such a statement by the U.S. If, for example, the U.S. said it would continue arms supplies, and Moscow said that Pakistan would be in violation of the accords if they transited that country, that would be too contentious for us.

There were a number of factors to consider in this context, the Secretary emphasized. One was an actual supply operation by the U.S. Then there was the question of what the Soviet Union would say under those circumstances. We needed to understand what kind of position Pakistan would be in if we accepted the Soviet proposal. The U.S. would make a statement -- and be ready to act on it. But under the withdrawal timetable that Shevardnadze had described of seven months or so it was not at all clear that the U.S. would deliver any supplies. We would, however, reserve the right to do so. These were the kinds of considerations the Secretary would like to get Shevardnadze's feel for.

SHEVARDNADZE said it would not be possible to just invent something here in Washington. The Soviets had no desire to criticize the U.S.'s discharge of its obligations to Pakistan. As for American military assistance to groups opposing the Kabul government, that Moscow would criticize. The U.S. frequently criticized Soviet military assistance. The ministers could discuss this kind of thing. But to go beyond that and decide what might happen if Pakistan supplies the resistance would lead nowhere.

THE SECRETARY said he had asked a different question. Pakistan would not supply anything. The U.S. would provide any assistance. But since it was most practical for U.S. aid to go through Pakistan, questions would emerge in response not to what the U.S. did, but what it said, if we accepted the formula the Soviet side had proposed. It would be one thing for Moscow to criticize the U.S. It would be another if Pakistan were criticized. It would help for Shevardnadze to say the Soviet Union would say nothing, at least not until an actual act of supply had occurred.

After a lengthy pause, SHEVARDNADZE said that if there were no actual act of supply, there would be no reason for Moscow to invent one.

THE SECRETARY said, "Thank you."

SHEVARDNADZE added, "If there is no supply." The document the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were to sign made no reference to arms supplies. The issue was simply not covered.

ARMACOST pointed out that the instrument of guarantee in Geneva committed the guarantors to respect the undertakings of the high contracting parties. That was why the U.S. had to be concerned about Pakistan's position. A lawyer would argue that, to the degree the contracting parties have undertaken not to supply, the guarantors were involved. That was why the U.S. was suggesting a moratorium.

ADAMISHIN asked for a clarification. It was his understanding that the Soviet side was being asked not to criticize not a statement, but only actual provision of supplies. His question was: "Whose statement?"

THE SECRETARY asked what if the U.S. were to say it would support "as needed" those it had supported.

ADAMISHIN said that would be a U.S. statement, not the Pakistani statement.

THE SECRETARY speculated that Pakistan might say that it had noted the U.S. statement, and supported the U.S. in that statement.

ADAMISHIN posed a second question: would the statements be made before or after signing? And, in the second case, would the statements be seen as an interpretation of the Geneva accords? Obviously, if the statements were made before signing in Geneva, it would sound one way; if after, another.

THE SECRETARY asked Adamishin to explain. ADAMISHIN said it would make a difference in how Moscow responded.

THE SECRETARY explained that if the U.S. did what he had described, and it would be difficult for us to do so, we would say that we intended to act as a guarantor of the Geneva accords. We would say further that we felt that continuing support for those we had been supporting was consistent with our role as guarantor. So the question of a violation would not arise. If asked, we would say that the people we supported were not covered by the accords' definition of "mercenaries," etc, since they were fighting for the freedom of Afghanistan.

ADAMISHIN interrupted to comment that, from what the Secretary was saying, it appeared that such a statement would be made before signature.

THE SECRETARY said that, when the U.S. said it would sign, it would make a statement about what it intended to do. We had major problems on this issue with Congress. The Secretary had just gotten off the phone with Sen. Byrd, who had expressed concern that the Secretary was going to give away Afghanistan. So we needed a posture we could defend. As he had said at the outset, however, the Secretary was talking about how to present what was taking place, not what would really be taking place.

POWELL observed that, if the U.S. signed and the accords were in place, the first question from Congress would be, "Does that mean we will stop aid?" We would say, "Only if the Soviet Union does." If the Soviet Union continued, we would continue. The Soviet side, Powell speculated, would criticize the U.S. statement, but not allege a violation of the Geneva accords.

The next questions would be, "If the U.S. continues arms supplies, or has to resume supplies, and if U.S. aid can only go through Pakistan, what will the Soviet reaction be if Pakistan agrees to allow such aid to transit its territory?" It was Powell's understanding that the Soviet Union would not only criticize such a decision by Pakistan, but would allege a violation.

BESSMERTNYKH clarified that the formula discussed by Armacost and Adamishin did not provide for symmetry between U.S. and Soviet obligations. The concept was not appropriate, because the situations were not analagous. To try to say that the U.S. would supply the opposition if the Soviet Union supplied the government of Afghanistan would be to add a new element to the formula. The Soviet formula contained no linkage to supplies.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the U.S. was talking about a unilateral statement. We would say we were prepared to resume supplies, and that our readiness to take that step would be affected by what the Soviet Union did. That implied no undertaking by the Soviet side. It was a unilateral view.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the discussion had shown there were only two ways to resolve the problem.

The first was based on the fact that the Geneva accords imposed no obligations on guarantors not to supply arms. There was thus no need for the U.S. and Soviet Union to discuss the matter. If the U.S. wanted to supply the resistance, it should do it. The Soviet side would not be "consultants" as to how that should be done. It was not in Soviet interests for the aid to continue. How the U.S. provided aid was its business. For public opinion purposes, the U.S. could simply point out that Geneva did not deal with arms supplies by guarantors.

A second option was for the U.S. to refrain from signing in Geneva. This was a bad option, but could not be ruled out. A document signed in Geneva on a three-way basis would involve the Soviet Union only insofar as it addressed troop withdrawals. This was clearly a less satisfactory approach. These were the two options. There was no other way.

THE SECRETARY recalled that Shevardnadze had earlier seemed to suggest that there were circumstances under which it would not allege that Pakistan had violated the Geneva accords, if the U.S. had stated its intentions along the lines the Secretary had described, and Pakistan had endorsed that statement. The Secretary asked if Shevardnadze could elaborate on that, emphasizing that he was trying to distinguish between how the Soviets would react to statements on one hand, and an actual flow of arms on the other.

SHEVARDNADZE responded somewhat testily that he wanted the Secretary to know Moscow was not tied to the Geneva process. If an agreement were signed, that would be good. If not, it would mean that the process of reaching a settlement in Afghanistan would take a different path. But Shevardnadze said he felt that the two sides had come very close to a meeting of the minds. There were still a few days in which to give legal force to something they had been discussing for many years.

Shevardnadze said he had the impression that the U.S. and Pakistan had obtained what they had most wanted from this process -- dates for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Now the U.S. was trying to get more. This tactic would not work. Moscow could have not set dates and continued to bargain. Instead, it had sought to convince the U.S. and Pakistan that it was serious, that it would withdraw. So dates had been set.

The U.S., Shevardnadze alleged, had not really believed that the Soviet Union would get out of Afghanistan. As a result, it had not adequately studied the drafts when they were being prepared in Geneva. It was too late for second thoughts. To try now to nullify the accords would lead nowhere. If the U.S. wanted to continue to supply the resistance, it could go ahead, since this was not covered by the Geneva documents. In practical terms, how the U.S. did this was its problem. The Soviets knew how to get their troops out of Afghanistan. How the U.S. got arms in was up to it. But the question had to be settled today, now. That was the direction Shevardnadze thought their conversation in Moscow -- and previous conversations -- was leading.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that there had been a lot of discussion on Afghanistan. That discussion had included the need for a balanced outcome. We welcomed the steps which had been taken thus far. We wanted to see the Geneva process come to fruition. But we also wanted to be in a position to avoid political turmoil here which would have an adverse impact on that process. Were we to say that nothing in the accords prevented us from continuing to support those we had supported, and that we intended to do so, we would expect the Soviet Union to criticize that statement, but not to charge that it violated the accords.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet Union would not invoke the accords under such a scenario.

THE SECRETARY said that there also had to be clarity when the question was asked as to how this affected Pakistan. If Pakistan were to state that they supported our statement, and would cooperate with us if it were necessary to resume aid, we understood that, to use Shevardnadze's words, the Soviet Union wouldn't have to "invent" anything. In effect, Moscow would criticize Pakistan's statement, but not say Pakistan had violated the accords.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Pakistan was bound by the accords not to supply the opposition. That did not apply to the guarantors. It was up to the U.S. to decide what intermediaries it used to supply aid to the resistance. But it should realize there would be efficient monitoring mechanisms, including UN inspectors, to ensure Pakistan did not supply arms. That, however, had no relation to the U.S.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to recognize that the Soviet Union had already made very substantial concessions. General Secretary Gorbachev himself had said that the U.S. should cut off supplies to the resistance once the Soviet Union had made its decision to withdraw. Shevardnadze did not want to dwell on the matter, but this was an important statement by the leader of the Soviet Union. Now the Soviet position was quite different: the U.S. could supply the opposition, and the Soviet Union would not claim a violation, although it would criticize such action.

THE SECRETARY suggested a caucus. He moved to his private office, accompanied by Powell, Armacost, Ridgway and Parris.

After a ten-minute break, the Secretary and his advisors returned. THE SECRETARY outlined the U.S. position in light of the previous discussion.



The U.S. welcomed, he said, the steps which had been taken toward a settlement of situation in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country. We felt there was a clear understanding that these objectives were close to being achieved. We also believed, however, that any negotiated outcome must provide for a balance of obligations among its signatories. It was also most important that conditions be created during the withdrawal period and thereafter which would ensure the safe and honorable return to Afghanistan of refugees. In this context, the U.S. welcomed the agreement under which Cordovez would work in a private capacity to mediate among the various Afghan parties on interim government arrangements.

Under these circumstances, the Secretary continued, the U.S. felt it important for all parties -- the U.S., Soviet Union, and others -- to agree to a moratorium on arms shipments. The moratorium would initially run for the period during which Soviet forces would be withdrawn, and for three months thereafter. It could be extended if, as all the Afghan parties had called for, agreement could be reached on a neutral status for Afghanistan.

The U.S. side had proposed such a moratorium during the course of the morning's discussion. The Soviet side had said it could not agree. Our proposal remained on the table. Under the circumstances the Secretary had described, the U.S. was prepared to assume the responsibility of guarantor of the Geneva accords. In the absence of such arrangements, we would not be able to undertake those obligations.

ARMACOST added that acceptance by either side of the U.S. moratorium proposal would be without prejudice to its rights to supply arms to parties in Afghanistan.

THE SECRETARY said this was an important point. Acceptance of a moratorium would be without prejudice to any rights held by either side. It would be an act designed with the best interests of Afghanistan in mind.

The Secretary said that, while he could not speak for Pakistan, he knew that the Pakistanis, like ourselves, wanted to see Geneva signed.

After a lengthy pause, SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the ministers move on to the next regional issue. "On the basis which you have indicated, it will not be possible to reach agreement."

After a further pause, Shevardnadze asked what the consequences of such an arrangement would be. The negotiations in Geneva were between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They could continue. Everything that had to do with the Soviet Union had already been stated, and declared acceptable by Pakistan and Afghanistan. If Pakistan was prepared to sign, the accords could be concluded without guarantors. There was nothing tragic about that. If there was no signature at all, that, too, would not be so terrible.

### Central America

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze wished to take up Central America. SHEVARDNADZE said that the ministers had discussed the basic elements of that issue Monday evening.

THE SECRETARY offered to describe the situation as the U.S. saw it. Over the previous seven or eight years there had been steady movement toward more openness and democracy among most of the governments of the region. The U.S. had welcomed this trend. All of the countries involved were relatively poor. Their traditions were more feudal than militaristic.

In Nicaragua, there was a different pattern, although we saw some prospect for positive change. Nicaragua was like its neighbours in being a small, poor country. It was unique in that its government was seeking to develop a centralized, more totalitarian form. That government was putting into place a military force triple the size of any other country in the region. The ultimate scope of Nicaragua's military plans had been revealed by a senior defector and, incredibly, confirmed by Nicaragua's Defense Minister. All of this was taking place against a backdrop of massive Soviet military support -- support which remained at a level of a quarter billion dollars this year, despite the conclusion of the Guatemala City agreement. This was a massive sum by Central American standards, and there was no sign that the flow of supplies was decreasing.

In the Guatemala City accords, Nicaragua had committed itself to a pattern of internal development consistent with an open, democratic society. The standards set in these accords were frankly higher than those prevailing in the Soviet Union today, despite words like glasnost.

Unfortunately, the trends in Nicaragua seemed to be retrogressing, particularly in the wake of the House of Representatives' cut-off of aid to freedom fighters. Nicaragua had recently moved 1,500-2,000 troops into Honduras in an apparent effort to wipe out the freedom fighters and their supply sources. The attempt had failed, because the freedom fighters had given a good account of themselves, because of the outrage the action had provoked in the region, and because the U.S. had responded to Honduras' request for a show of support. As the Secretary had indicated on Monday, our forces would probably begin returning home over the weekend.

It had not escaped our notice that the Soviet Union maintained an aircraft in Nicaragua -- ostensibly for mapping purposes. We knew, however, that that aircraft was being used for aerial reconnaissance to provide tactical intelligence for Sandinist counterinsurgency operations. Such activities by the Soviet Union on the eve of ceasefire talks between the freedom fighters and Managua was hardly in keeping with Soviet calls for reduction of tension in the region and implementation of the Guatemala City accords -- one feature of which was the ceasefire talks. Those talks were continuing, and the initial reports were positive. But there was never an agreement until there was an agreement. We would await the results.

The policy of the U.S. was to support the Guatemala City accords; to support the ceasefire negotiations; to join other countries in insisting that Nicaragua meet its obligations under the accords; and to be ready for direct talks with Managua in a regional setting.

When Gorbachev had been in Washington, he had said that the Soviet Union also supported the Guatemala City accords. He had also said something which apparently he had repeated to Senator Nunn and others when they were in Moscow -- that the Soviet Union was prepared to reduce military assistance to Nicaragua to the level of police weapons if the U.S. did not supply arms to the freedom fighters. If the Soviet side were really interested in such an undertaking, we would welcome the opportunity to explore it. It was an observable fact that the U.S. was not currently providing assistance to the fighters.

In short, the Secretary concluded, the U.S. wanted to see Central America removed from the list of trouble spots, an area of greater stability, whose citizens would be free to get about the business of improving their economic well-being. He could assure Shevardnadze that in the context of implementation of the Guatemala City accords, and with the behaviour Moscow had volunteered, we were prepared to talk to the Nicaraguans in a regional setting, and to work with the nations of the region, including Nicaragua, to improve economic conditions.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled that the Soviet delegation had made clear during the Washington summit its support for the Contadora process, later the Contadora group and its support group, and finally the Guatemala City agreement. Moscow felt that these efforts provided the right basis for a settlement of the problems of Central America.

Unfortunately, not everything resolved in Guatemala City had been implemented. And this was not the fault of Nicaragua. Shevardnadze recalled the steps already taken by the Sandinist government: it had taken the initiative to engage in negotiations on a ceasefire; it had been the first in the region to establish a commission on national reconciliation. Looked at objectively, much had been done to advance democratization in Nicaragua. The media had been opened to the opposition on an equal basis. Nicaragua had taken the initiative at the UN to ask for monitoring/inspection of the Nicaragua - Honduras border.

Nicaragua's "solid" military forces, Shevardnadze explained, were a function of its needs. If a country did not feel threatened, it would obviously prefer to devote scarce resources to its economic development. The situation around Nicaragua was such that it did not have this luxury, and this was largely the result of U.S. policy. The U.S. appeared to be "organically incompatible" with the Sandinist regime. This was totally inappropriate. What did the U.S. have against Nicaragua's government? How were they a threat to the U.S.? Did Nicaragua need Honduran territory? No. Were it not for the bands of extremists fighting the current government, the countries of Central America would have found a solution to these problems long ago.

Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary that he had already said the U.S.'s despatch of troops to Honduras was inappropriate. But the decision was America's. It was not for Moscow to order the U.S. about. But the action was totally unjustified and had caused alarm not only in the region, but around the world. But the U.S. appeared to think that this was its personal hemisphere and it could do what it wanted.

But where was the solution?, Shevardnadze asked. The U.S. could not strangle the Nicaraguan revolution. It was the people's struggle. It was bigger than Nicaragua. The only way out was to engage in direct dialogue with Nicaragua -- and Cuba, too. Unfortunately, it appeared that some Administration officials still hewed to the old, notorious policy of trying to establish an order acceptable to the U.S. in every country and in every region of the world. The U.S. had complained about Soviet shipment of arms to Nicaragua. On what basis did the U.S. ship arms to Pakistan? The U.S. did not even stop at shipping arms to governments close to the Soviet Union's borders. It aided groups fighting legitimate government all over the globe. Why should the Soviet Union not supply a government which was represented in the UN and was universally recognized.

THE SECRETARY asked to interject some comments on the U.S.'s relations with the government of Nicaragua. When the Sandinist revolution took place, the U.S. had supported it. We had welcomed Somoza's ouster. We were quick to provide economic assistance to the new regime, assistance which, on a per capita basis, had been the highest of any of our aid programs. But the revolution had gone sour. The proof of that was that many of the people who had made the revolution left Nicaragua, or were forced to leave. So we had to shift our policy.

Even then, some years later, in response to recommendations by many countries, but notably Mexico, the President had authorized the Secretary to go to Managua and talk to Ortega. Bilateral talks had been set up to support the Contadora process. There were a series of meetings in Manzanilla. But we soon found that Nicaragua was going to other governments and saying that it would not deal with them because it was working directly with the U.S. We had been forced to break off talks,

although we said we would resume them in a regional context. We had reaffirmed that position with the conclusion of the Guatemala City accords. We wanted to encourage the success of the accords, and of the ceasefire, so that the region could focus on economic development.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that that was needed. But he felt the Secretary was ignoring one fundamental issue -- neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union could tell Nicaragua or any other people how they should live. This was what the U.S. was trying to do. It did not like the Managua government, so it kept raising additional requirements. The Nicaraguan people had established an order of their own.

As for Soviet arms supplies, the General Secretary had told the President that both countries should refrain on a mutual basis from providing arms. That offer remained on the table. If the U.S. was prepared to stop supplying arms to all Central American countries, so was the Soviet Union. The only exception would be police-type arms, which could continue to be provided. If the U.S. were interested, the idea could be explored further.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the U.S. had long-standing relationships with the countries of Central America, some of which involved the supply of military assistance for purposes of keeping order. The most obvious case was El Salvador, where there was a guerilla movement supported by Nicaragua and Cuba. This forced the Salvadoran government to maintain a larger military than they would like. We could not cut off those who were simply seeking to maintain order in their country in the face of a challenge from Nicaragua and Cuba.

As for Nicaragua, there was no U.S. assistance flowing to those opposed to the government. Even over the past few years, what aid had been provided was relatively little.

SHEVARDNADZE said the Secretary's logic was odd. The Secretary called those fighting against the Nicaraguan government "freedom fighters." He used the same term to describe those opposed to the governments of Afghanistan and Angola. Those who opposed the regimes he liked were bad people. There was an inconsistency here.

As for arms supplies, if Gorbachev's proposal was acceptable, why not get down to discussions on that basis? If it was not, the Soviet Union would meet the obligations it had to Nicaragua, just as the U.S. met its obligations to many of the Soviet Union's neighbours. Moscow didn't complain about that. Why should the U.S. The U.S. had ringed the Soviet Union with bases -- big bases, and lots of them. Yazov had shown Carlucci a map the week before. When Shevardnadze had seen the map, it had frightened him.

THE SECRETARY said that all our forces were for defensive purposes. Besides, the Soviet Union was so big, it was hard not to surround it.

SHEVARDNADZE said it would cost the U.S. a lot to do so. But there were some good trends that the two sides should try to take advantage of. That was why Shevardnadze had raised the question of limiting naval activities the day before.

SHEVARDNADZE said Moscow really had no desire to arm Nicaragua if that country were not threatened. He proposed the two sides discuss the matter and see whether some mutually acceptable solution could not be found. He assured the Secretary that Moscow was not getting rich by providing weapons to Managua. It would welcome the opportunity to stop.

THE SECRETARY noted that there was now a good rationale -- the U.S. was no longer sending arms to those we had formerly supported in Nicaragua. That should remove the need for Soviet arms supplies.

SHEVARDNADZE asked what about Honduras.

THE SECRETARY said that was a different question. Honduras was not invading Nicaragua.

SHEVARDNADZE asked where the contras were based. How were they armed, trained? Honduras was not rich enough to do that. There was a need for mutuality.

THE SECRETARY underscored that there was no aid going to the freedom fighters, wherever they were. Honduras was indeed in no shape to supply anyone. It was a poor country.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Honduran weapons were good, modern. Some said they looked much like American weapons. But there was no need to get specific.

### Regional Dialogue

Recalling a point Shevardnadze had made on an earlier occasion, THE SECRETARY said he sometimes thought our regional dialogue with the Soviet Union would be more productive if there were a different approach. Some headway had been made as a result of experts discussions on the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, and Afghanistan.

SHEVARDNADZE interrupted to say with some feeling that there had been no progress on Afghanistan. If asked at the conclusion of their meeting what had been achieved on that subject, Shevardnadze would say that it had been impossible to find common language, that no positive elements had emerged from the discussion.

THE SECRETARY replied that what he had in mind was to try to focus on what we would like to see in certain regions in, e.g., 1995 or 2000. It would not be too difficult to define emerging trends. It would be interesting and potentially fruitful to discuss their implications for U.S. - Soviet relations.

Following further elaboration by the Secretary of this concept, SHEVARDNADZE agreed that such an approach might have merit, but pointed out that certain problems had to be addressed now. Otherwise any plans which might be developed would be in vain.

Apparently in this context, Shevardnadze said he was reminded of the relationship between the problems of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. The Soviet Union had been true to its word in both cases. The Soviets had said what they would do, and had made clear they would follow through on any obligations they had assumed, even where it would be difficult for them. But, on Afghanistan, the U.S. had pulled back from its commitments. It had not been as good as its word. This was not a tragedy, but the point had to be made.

The Secretary in his comments on improving the regional dialogue had referred to the Soviet Union's providing missiles to Iraq. It was a fact that Moscow provided arms to Iraq. No one complained about it because it was done on a legal basis.

THE SECRETARY said he had not meant to complain about Soviet arms supplies to Iraq. He only wanted to make the point that ballistic missile proliferation was occurring.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, even if the Soviet Union voted for an embargo on arms to Iran, it was not certain the U.S. would not itself arm Iran. That was the way things were in the U.S. The Secretary of State said one thing; other members of the Administration did something else.

THE SECRETARY said that the earlier U.S. attempt to provide arms to Iran was a misguided enterprise. Its scale was inconsequential. It would not be repeated.

SHEVARDNADZE said there was no guarantee of this. The whole administration had been involved. This was not just a private firm. One of Powell's predecessors had been intimately involved.

THE SECRETARY said that the discussion was going downhill. If the ministers started down this path it would lead nowhere.

SHEVARDNADZE protested that there was a fundamental question involved. When the Soviet Union was considering what to do about a second UN resolution on the Gulf war, one reason for its delay was uncertainty as to whether the U.S., or some private firm sponsored by the U.S., would not supply arms to Iran. Shevardnadze was still not sure.

THE SECRETARY said that, under the circumstances, he could not believe Shevardnadze was saying this.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had believed the Secretary until that afternoon, until they had discussed Afghanistan. Now his confidence was shaken. There were certain norms in any business, including "this one." But Shevardnadze would drop the subject.

Afghanistan

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. had played it straight on Afghanistan. We had made known our concerns on what we called "symmetry" for some time. This was not a new idea.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that the U.S. wanted the Soviet Union to abandon its friends, friends to whom Moscow was linked by legitimate relations. The U.S. wanted to equate the government of Afghanistan to fundamentalist bands. "We can't accept that. You have put forward demands that are unacceptable."

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. had listened carefully to the concerns the Soviet side had expressed, just as, we hoped, Shevardnadze had listened to us. We had tried to put out an idea which got to the Soviet problem. The Secretary did not see why it would be so difficult for Moscow to supply Kabul with what it needed before an agreement entered into force. We had tried to respect the Soviet need to preserve the right to be able to supply the Kabul regime. We had not challenged that. We had tried to come up with a solution consistent with that. We had tried to work with Adamishin's formula. We had not been able to find language which did the job. We were still ready to seek formulae which could describe what both sides wanted to see happen.

SHEVARDNADZE said his conclusion was that the U.S. would remain outside the Afghan settlement process. The U.S. would not be able to give orders to Pakistan. The Soviets knew the Pakistanis would make their own decisions. It was up to the U.S. to say what it would do.

THE SECRETARY confirmed that Pakistan would make its own decisions. The U.S., for its part, was ready to sign in Geneva, but subject to finding a formula which would be workable. We had tried to fit such a formula into Adamishin's proposal. We had tried out the idea of a moratorium. The Soviet Union traditionally favored moratoria. What was wrong with one in this case?

SHEVARDNADZE replied that he could give the Secretary a long list of Soviet moratorium proposals that the U.S. had derided.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Shevardnadze offer one on Afghanistan. Or perhaps the Kabul government, which had stated its desire that Afghanistan be neutral, could, with the comfort provided by Soviet weapons provided prior to entry into force of the Geneva accords, might itself call for a moratorium. The Soviet Union and the U.S. could honor that appeal.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had come to Washington well prepared to deal with this issue. He had had extensive consultations with those dealing with Pakistan and Afghanistan on Afghanistan questions. If he saw options other than those he had proposed, he would have given them to the Secretary.



But there was no need to dwell on the question. Shevardnadze understood that the U.S. would not act as a guarantor for the Geneva accords. Accordingly, the Soviet Union would not either. The process would proceed on a different basis. There was no need to add new language; it was simply a matter of deleting. So, what was next, Shevardnadze asked.

#### Cambodia/Korea

THE SECRETARY suggested Cambodia. Sihanouk was an asset with respect to a settlement there, because he was someone the people could rally around. The key, however, remained for Vietnam to leave Cambodia.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that there were certain positive elements. The dialogue between Sihanouk and Hun Sen was very important. Sihanouk certainly supplied a certain prestige. He was occasionally ridden by doubts and hesitations, but who wasn't? The situation was complicated, but the issues of a political settlement and national reconciliation were proceeding in a positive way in the context of the Sihanouk - Hun Sen dialogue.

As for Vietnam, its course was clear. By 1990 it would have withdrawn its troops. The process was already underway; a substantial number was already out. The Vietnamese had their own plan. There was no reason for anyone else to interfere. Sihanouk himself, Shevardnadze speculated, might have an interest in seeing certain issues resolved before the Vietnamese left. Among them: questions relating to Cambodia's governmental and national structure; relations between the opposing parties; and China's attitude. Until China's attitude were clear, one could not speak with confidence on prospects for a settlement.

ASEAN was also playing an important role, Shevardnadze said, particularly Indonesia. The Vietnamese dialogue with Thailand was less fruitful, although Shevardnadze had heard some interesting things in his talks with the Thai foreign minister. Perhaps there were prospects in this area as well.

So, Shevardnadze concluded, there were some positive trends. But much depended on how the Afghanistan problem turned out. Afghanistan was the first time there was a real opportunity for the U.S. and Soviet Union to resolve a major regional issue. If national reconciliation proved to be an effective basis for a settlement, it would have a positive impact on prospects for solutions to the problems of Cambodia, southern Africa and elsewhere. Shevardnadze knew first-hand that the leaders of Afghanistan and Cambodia considered the trends in their two countries to be related.

Shevardnadze emphasized that it was the task of the great powers to encourage national reconciliation. This was sometimes difficult. But the choice boiled down to encouraging national reconciliation or encouraging civil wars. Afghanistan was the touchstone.

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