



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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BY BAKERS ON 10/19/05

13 October 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of  
Declared War

1. One of the two tasks which constituted the basis for my temporary detail to your office was an examination of the Army's performance in the field of Sublimated War. Behind the assignment of this task lay your conviction, shared I understand by the Chief of Staff, that the Army's potential capability far exceeded currently programmed or planned utilization. My survey had, therefore, a dual purpose: first, isolation of the basic reasons for the gap between the feasible and the actual level of activity; and second, suggestions as to how the Army's contribution might be materially increased.

2. The activities of the U. S. Army in Sublimated War - or the equivalent, Cold War - are legion. Its strength, combat stance, mobility, capacity for expansion, staying power, assistance to and compatibility with Allied ground forces - to name but a few - are all assets in the power conflict; and any measurable change in these categories either advances or slows the attainment of national policy objectives. Consequently, to reduce the scope to manageable proportions, I have arbitrarily limited my inquiry to the significant but largely unexploited functions enunciated by General Decker in his brilliant address at the Army War College on 8 June 1961. The Chief of Staff raised the sights of military assistance by outlining imaginative and imminently practical ways of improving capability of local armed forces, Allied and neutral alike, to insure internal defense and deter external aggression. It is significant that the President himself has repeatedly shown marked interest in this subject.

3. In essence, General Decker envisaged the employment of selected military personnel and units as a "transmission belt" - communicating, at the grass roots, Army know-how and community of aims. Three major purposes to be served by U. S. military

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CSA 319.1 Counter-Insurgency Operations Course & Related Matters 10-13-61 FM 10-6-61

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elements working alongside and guiding their indigenous counterparts were:

a. To give impetus to the employment of military talent and resources in ways contributing to the political stability, economic betterment and social progress of the country concerned - subject to the proviso that capability to perform assigned combat missions not be degraded. (The public works of Bolivian engineer units are representative of this category.)

b. To heighten the effectiveness of indigenous military and paramilitary forces in insuring against the development of dissident factions; or in dealing with armed insurgency, should it erupt. (Programs undertaken in Laos and proposed in South Vietnam are examples.)

c. As the complement to the foregoing, to accelerate the development of indigenous military and paramilitary capabilities, to include support mechanisms, for conducting subversion or guerrilla activities, in contiguous Communist territory. (We have already developed such units in Taiwan and South Korea.)

4. I have spent the better part of the past three weeks acquainting myself with what is underway and what is projected in these areas both within and without the Department of Defense, but primarily the Department of the Army. Even as delimited, the field is both wide and complex; the initiatives are numerous, occur at many levels and are overlapping. I do not pretend to have explored the subject in full. Moreover, I have been aware throughout that there are many officers in the Pentagon whose competence in these fields and whose knowledge of current developments therein outstrip my own. It is, therefore, possible that facts not unearthed, and others misinterpreted, could invalidate certain conclusions emerging from this imperfect survey.

5. Two major premises have conditioned the findings.

a. The first is that the activities under survey (the unconventional, unorthodox, paramilitary, military assistance by another name, or whatever) are simply auxiliary weapons within the total array of U. S. power resources and that they are effective only when applied in coordination with those other resources. The articulate

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proponents thereof notwithstanding, they represent a complementary rather than an alternative means. Moreover, as is the case with all other power resources, they can be properly applied only in the wake of a prior enunciation of clear and constant objectives sought vis-a-vis any area or country.

b. The second is that it is the operative policy of the Executive Branch to exploit fully the potential of the U. S. Army to improve the overall capability of indigenous armed forces to deal with problems of internal defense. This premise is consistent with the demonstrable, indeed urgent, needs of the world situation today; it is likewise consistent with the statements of our Chief Executive. If the premise is erroneous, then the proposals for gearing for a substantially higher level of activity are meaningless; the difficulties which have been attributed to growing pains may in fact be deliberate roadblocks; and the shortcomings noted within the Army are of no significance.

c. The corollary to the second premise is that the Army can divert appreciable numbers of its best personnel to these activities without derogation of its other missions and functions. Only individuals of exceptional skill, motivation and leadership ability can properly perform the training, guidance and related tasks involved - in an alien environment and remote from supervision. Our rolls, of course, include such personnel aplenty but they are filling key positions elsewhere. My unsupported estimate is that they can be released from current assignment, as required; and that our training system can spawn adequate replacements.

4. From the outset, I have been assisted by three extremely capable officers. Lt. Colonels Ralph Kinnes, Special Warfare Division, and John L. Mohl, War Plans Division, were kindly made available by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. Lt. Colonel Jesse G. Ugalde has been on temporary duty from Headquarters, Fort Carson. All three have displayed high professional competence, complete cooperation and amazing industry. They have helped immeasurably.


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This is not, however, a team product. The findings and recommendations are unilaterally mine; so also is the responsibility for the defense thereof.

5. The original of my report is attached hereto; and, per your instructions, a copy has been transmitted to the Chief of Staff.

  
RICHARD G. STILWELL  
Brigadier General, USA

Incl

Army Activities in Underdeveloped  
Areas Short of Declared War

CC: Chief of Staff, USA

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ARMY ACTIVITIES IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

SHORT OF DECLARED WAR

REPORT BY:

Brigadier General Richard G. Stilwell

Lt. Colonel Ralph Kinnes

Lt. Colonel John L. Mohl

Lt. Colonel Jesse G. Ugalde

13 October 1961

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PURPOSE AND SCOPE

On 11 September, the Secretary of the Army assigned me two concurrent tasks.

a. One was to evaluate and make recommendations with respect to the Counter-Insurgency Operations Courses presented by the Army's Special Warfare Center and by instrumentalities of three Unified Commands, as well as matters pertinent thereto; report in the premises was filed on 6 October.

b. The second was to make an independent survey of how the Army was discharging a series of generally related tasks, targeted on the less developed nations of the Free World and with the common objective of strengthening the capability of national military and paramilitary contingents to insure the internal defense of their respective countries. Should the survey disclose areas where performance could be improved, appropriate recommendations were to be formulated.

Time constraints required that the survey focus on activities of major import only. Consequently, examination concentrated on the three areas enumerated by the Chief of Staff in his major policy address at the Army War College on 8 June 1961 and specifically:

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a. The employment of selected Army personnel or units in underdeveloped countries and in direct working contact with national military contingents to further the latter's effectiveness as the guarantor of internal security and as an instrument of economic and social progress. On 5 September, the Secretary of Defense underlined the importance of this functional area and charged the Department of the Army with Executive Agent responsibilities therefor.

b. As a variant of the above, in high intensity situations, actions to improve the capability of indigenous military and paramilitary contingents to deal with dissident factions, below or above the level of armed insurrection, externally supported or not. The Army's Counter-Insurgency concept and program approved by the President on 28 March provides the framework for actions under a. and b.

c. Finally, the encouragement, guidance and support of indigenous capabilities for the conduct of covert and cross-border operations into contiguous Communist territory with the minimum objective of strengthening internal defense and the larger objective of eroding the stability of the Sino-Soviet orbit. The provisions of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) 56 and 57 are directly applicable.

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Examination of the foregoing necessarily involved some exploration of:

- a. Extent and adequacy of policy guidance
- b. Status of plans and actions within the Army staff, the Joint staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and, as feasible and appropriate, within State and CIA
- c. Cognizant staff elements and machinery for intra-Defense and interdepartmental planning and coordination
- d. Terms of reference and functioning of Army staff elements
- e. Status of Army operational assets
- f. Roles and activities of Unified Commanders, of U. S. country teams and MAAGs/Missions.

The report is not a complete record of the survey work. Given the fact that circulation will be limited to those already knowledgeable of what has transpired and is transpiring, it is essentially a compilation of findings with minimum background to provide a frame of reference.



REPORT

ARMY ACTIVITIES IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS  
SHORT OF DECLARED WAR

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RECOMMENDATIONS

The Framework: Broad Conclusions

1. The U. S. Army - by virtue of tradition, experience, adaptability to any land environment, and range and diversity of tactical and technical skills - can make signal contributions to the internal defense of the underdeveloped areas of the Free World; and, primarily, through improving the effectiveness of the indigenous Armed Forces in the several roles of protector of exposed frontiers, guarantor of internal security and instrument of economic and social progress.

2. The capabilities which the Army can quickly harness for this effort, without derogation of its other missions, far exceed the level of utilization which has thus far been approved, for programming or planning, within or without the Department of the Army.

3. The very considerable gap between feasible and currently planned level of activity is attributable to a variety of shortcomings.

a. On the one hand, there is much that the Army can do, unilaterally, to insure greater and more effective exploitation of its vast assets. Subsequent recommendations deal mainly with

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remedial action in this category.

b. In another category are shortcomings with interdepartmental implications. These include not only specific deficiencies but matters of approach and philosophy as well. Clearly, these problems can only be attacked and surmounted by collective action; equally clearly, however, the Army influence can be material.

4. The principal shortcomings in the second category are these:

a. Lack of appreciation and acceptance, throughout the Executive Branch generally, of the extent and diversification of Army assets, of the propriety of employing these assets in non-combat environments, and, to a lesser extent, of their applicability to the problems at hand.

To an indeterminable degree, the Army bears a responsibility for this state of affairs by failure to evolve simple and dynamic doctrine; by failure to stress that its proposals are a new and essential dimension of military assistance and are designed exclusively for implementation through indigenous Armed Forces; and by failure to convince the Executive Departments and Agencies of the efficacy of both doctrine and programs.



b. Lack of agreed requirements, developed at the U. S. Country Team level and successively refined by higher echelons, as the condition precedent for packaging and projecting Army assets.

It is indisputable that requirements have more authenticity and are likely to rally more support, when generated in the field and when sponsored by both the Ambassador and the Chief of MAAG/Mission. But such action presupposes a knowledge of the potential contribution of Army assets and of the availability of those assets. The educational process has yet to be undertaken.

c. Lack of adequate interdepartmental machinery for coming to grips with the vital task of anticipatory planning for the internal defense needs of those countries where the insurgent threat is still latent. Internal defense being a national problem, effective planning must provide for coordinating and coalescing the total array of indigenous power resources, and all categories of U. S. aid, on the multiple objectives of political stability, economic betterment, social advance, control of subversion, national dignity and international cooperation.

The Department of the Army bears no responsibility



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for the lack of such machinery; likewise, its organizational position renders inappropriate any initiatives in the premises. On the other hand, the cognizant Army staff element is not now geared to participate effectively in coordinated interdepartmental planning should the machinery therefor be established.

5. The foregoing conclusions serve as a frame of reference for the several, loosely connected recommendations which follow. In areas where gearing up is a function of education, rearrangement of priorities or complementary actions by several Departments, no specific recommendations are advanced; the body of the survey may, however, have some relevance in suggesting the tack to take. Conversely, the list of recommendations is extended by several extracted from the companion report and starred (\*) for identification. They have been restated because of their pertinence to this paper.

It is recommended:

As to Basic Approach

6. That the Department of the Army take additional steps, both through informational/educational channels and its school systems, to intensify the indoctrination of all ranks with the tremendous potential of the U. S. Army to further foreign policy objectives, short of declared

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war - and, primarily, by increasing the effectiveness of indigenous military forces of the underdeveloped nations in the discharge of their several roles; and that these steps include, as a minimum:

a. Elaboration of the theme that, in this kind of war, the Army has the key military role; that the initiatives open to the Army are unlimited; and that we possess the requisite skills to meet any requirements.

b. Widest possible dissemination of the relevant portions of the Chief of Staff's address of 8 June as the doctrinal basis for the Army position.

c. Refinement, expansion and approval of the Command and General Staff College's draft manual, "Army Activities in the Cold War"; paralleled by action to insure that the full flavor of its contents is reflected in appropriate derivative training literature.

7. That the Department of the Army give serious consideration to suppressing the terms "civic actions" and "U. S. FLAG", given the ever present possibility that these terms, and the initiatives planned thereunder, will be misconstrued; and, that, instead, stress be placed on the relationships of such programs to the MAP, as consistent with and in extension of long accepted concepts of military assistance.

8. That, as a matter of priority, the Army staff assemble,



groom and dispatch highly competent, senior level teams to Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa, under the joint auspices of ISA and JCS, for the purposes of expounding Army capabilities, experience, plans and preparations to U. S. Country Teams and the command and staff of the Unified Commands concerned, and of stimulating field requirements for Army teams tailored to any task.

9. That the Army staff elements concerned with the fields of activity under study strengthen their informal channels of contact with the pertinent offices and officers of OSD, State, CIA, ICA (AID) and USIA for the several purposes of:

a. Establishing professional and personal rapport with opposite numbers dealing with counter-insurgency, psychological, covert and related operations ~~problems~~

b. Educating these individuals on the extent, variety and flexibility of the Army's capabilities to strengthen the internal defense of the underdeveloped nations in both low and high intensity situations

c. Stressing the overall need for anticipatory planning on a coordinated, interdepartmental basis.

10. Because the less than comprehensive and reactive





approach of the Government has been inadequate to past challenges and augers to be no more effective in the future; that whenever and wherever possible, the Secretary of the Army and the senior members of the Army staff support, vis-a-vis the policy making elements of the Executive Departments and Agencies, all reasonable initiatives directed toward the establishment of interdepartmental machinery for stimulating coordinated, forward national planning for the defense and strengthening of the Free World.

As to Army Mechanisms for Planning and Coordination

11. That the Secretary of the Army establish the position of Special Assistant for Paramilitary and Psychological Operations, and relieve the Deputy Under Secretary of the related responsibilities with which the latter heretofore has been charged; that a qualified staff officer, of appropriate grade, be detailed to the Special Assistant; that, within his area of competence, the Special Assistant monitor the Army's actions, maintain liaison with pertinent elements of OSD and other Executive Departments and Agencies, provide timely information and advice to the Secretary and Under Secretary, and carry out such related duties as the Secretary may direct.

12. That the cognizant element of the Army General Staff be given stature and personnel resources commensurate with its

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ever increasing responsibilities; more specifically that:

a. The Special Warfare Division, currently part of the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, be made a separate Directorate within DCSOPS

b. The title of the Directorate reflect its responsibilities for both paramilitary (counter-insurgency, denied area, covert support, unconventional warfare) and psychological operations

c. The functions, internal organization and manning level of the Directorate conform generally to the proposals at Annex A.

13. That the new Directorate be charged with and expected to undertake - without derogation of present activities - immediate and concentrated work in the following major fields assigned by Presidential or Secretary of Defense directive but currently unattended:

a. Planning envisaged in National Security Action Memorandum No. 56 and involving on a country by country basis: analysis of existing indigenous paramilitary assets; determination of levels of strength and effectiveness to which those, or other paramilitary assets, should be raised; development of plans and programs for meeting requirements; and participation, at the expert level, in joint DOD-State-CIA planning in relation thereto

b. Detailed planning and collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency envisaged by National Security Action Memorandum No. 57 and involving, at both Washington and field levels, development of flexible arrangements for reciprocal operational and logistic support, cross-training, exchange of personnel and change-over policies

c. Development of Army positions on military portions of national level country counter-insurgency plans, world wide

d. Development of master plans and programs, on a five year projection, for Africa south of the Sahara, under the aegis of the MAP and exploiting the Army Staff's role as a Unified Command therefor. Such programs should have as their central objectives the development of effective native military leadership and maximum utilization of military and paramilitary resources on nation building projects, both stimulated and guided by highly qualified U. S. Army personnel.

As to Strengthening the Assets

Special Warfare Center

14. Given the specialized nature of the Special Warfare



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Center's activities and support requirements (paralleling those of the Army Intelligence Center) as well as its relationship with the Regional Counter-Insurgency Schools, that the Special Warfare Center be designated as a Class II activity for specified functions of which the following are representative: operational direction, academic guidance and support, research and development, funding and personnel.

15. To insure that the Command, Staff and Faculty have maximum scope to concentrate their talents and efforts on those tasks central to the role of a Center, that the Commanding General's operational involvements be reduced, either by establishment of alternate command arrangements at Fort Bragg, by unit deployments to Unified Command areas (as, for example, the 7th Special Forces Group) or both.

16.\* That arrangements be made to provide the Center a direct liaison and informational link with the Combat Developments Test Center operative in South Viet Nam, with the field research office planned for Thailand under the auspices of DDRE, and with other such installations as may subsequently be established to investigate the counter-insurgency field.

17.\* That the Commanding General, Special Warfare Center,



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be directed to develop a plan for a special, classified counter-insurgency course, of three-four weeks duration, to be attended by representatives of all Executive Departments and Agencies normally represented on U. S. Country Teams; and that, concurrently, Department of Defense be requested to seek faculty and other support for this course from State, CIA, ICA (AID) and USIA.

18. \* That the Commanding General, Special Warfare Center, be directed to design a new course of instruction for specially talented foreign nationals and covering both the offensive and defensive aspects of insurgency, blending the three courses (Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Counter-Insurgency Operations) now offered at the Center.

Army Aviation Support

19. To accelerate and intensify the collaboration now developing between the Army Aviation and Special Warfare Centers, and to speed field testing, that the CG, CONARC be directed to determine, as a matter of priority, the role and responsibilities of Army aviation in support of paramilitary and psychological operations, offensive and defensive, in war and short thereof.

20. \* Further, that a senior Army aviator be assigned to

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the Center to, among other duties, assist in determining the capabilities and limitations of Army aviation in support of subject operations.

Non-Materiel Research

21. As a first step toward strengthening the non-materiel research support of paramilitary, psychological and related operations, that the work program and organization of the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) be reviewed against current and predictable research requirements, to determine whether that Office has the capability, not now evident, to provide effective and balanced service to the Army staff and the Special Warfare Center; and, should the review disclose significant shortfalls, that alternative or additive contractual arrangements be sought, to include the possibility of SORO's absorption by larger Defense research organizations.

U. S. Personnel

22. To insure that the present and programmed manning requirements of Special Forces and Psychological Operations are filled expeditiously and with personnel of specified quality, that the Department of the Army detail outstanding officers and noncommissioned officers to these duties, to the full extent required.



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23. Given the magnitude of contingent demands, world wide, for counter-insurgency/counter guerrilla training and operational assistance, that the Special Forces now be considered an ancillary, rather than primary, source for meeting such requirements; that henceforth the Army as a whole, in which individuals with the requisite skills and leadership abound, be considered the main reservoir; and that detailed planning initiate now as regards the modalities of selection, organization into and training as teams, equipping and readying for deployment.

Role of MAAGs

24. To gear fully for the scale of Sublimated War effort likely to be demanded in the immediate future, that advisory, tactical training and operational aid to indigenous foreign military and paramilitary contingents be viewed as a major, continuing function of the Military Assistance Program; and that:

a. The mission statement of MAAGs/Missions be expanded, in all cases appropriate, to include advice and operational assistance to host countries on counter-insurgency and other paramilitary, as well as psychological operations

b. Chiefs of MAAGs/Missions, as well as principal

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staff members, be thoroughly indoctrinated and briefed on U. S. concepts and capabilities, in order to insure effective discharge of their responsibilities, both in relation to their indigenous military counterparts and as key members of the U. S. Country Team.

c.\* That the Tables of Distribution of MAAGs/ Missions in those countries where insurgency is an actual or potential threat be examined by the Army staff to determine minimum requirements for counter-insurgency instruction at either the Special Warfare Center or a Regional School; and that, for individuals so specified, attendance be mandatory.

25.\* That the currently effective criteria for selection of foreign military personnel to attend courses of instruction in the U. S. be modified to downgrade the importance of English language proficiency and to establish as primary considerations: military experience, intelligence and motivation, growth potential.

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PRESENT PATTERNS AND TRENDS

The Low Intensity Area

1. As indicated in the scope, the first functional area examined is related generally to the employment of tailored power packages of U. S. Army leaders, specialists and, occasionally, units alongside the indigenous military forces in underdeveloped countries with the object of increasing the latter's effectiveness and contributions in both combat and noncombat roles. What is envisaged is the utilization of indigenous military resources to improve the economic and social fabric of the nation, in ways acceptable to the governing authorities and the people and compatible with continued readiness for the assured performance of emergency combat tasks. The role of the U. S. elements is stimulus, training and guidance. The possibilities inherent in such programs have been stressed in important studies over the past few years; for example, one complete annex and the major portion of a second of the report of the Draper Committee (1959) were devoted to this subject. Prior to 1961, the Army developed and launched several individual projects, particularly in Latin America. The general concept was enunciated and included as an integral part of the Army's basic Counter-



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Insurgency program, approved for implementation by the President in his budget message to Congress on 28 March 1961. This category of activity looms large in the U. S. FLAG proposals developed in the wake of General Decker's address. Recently, the concept was given further impetus by a directive of the Secretary of Defense, under date of 5 September, designating the Department of the Army as Executive Agent for programs of this genre; and pointing to Colombia, Thailand, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Iran as logical starting points.

2. However, the impressive evidence of high level support notwithstanding, implementing action has been minimal. The original U. S. FLAG study met difficult going in the Army staff; and the headquarters elements contemplated for activation in FY 1963 (a year later than originally proposed by the planners) were deleted from the Army program by the Secretary of Defense. Only the specially tailored group for the Colombia "laboratory" is under active consideration above the Department of Army level. *(This had been postponed by authority above D/A level)*

3. The reasons for this dismal record appear to be several. One is lack of understanding or acceptance of the legitimacy or propriety of this role. As General Taylor recently remarked, the dimensions of potential military capability for support of national policy in an

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essentially noncombat environment is not broadly appreciated inside the Pentagon or without. Personnel in other Executive Departments tend to view the prospects with considerable suspicion and some alarm, perhaps rooted in our own tradition of the non-involvement of the military in domestic political affairs. Nor is the average military man accustomed to thinking within the conceptual framework outlined by the Army Chief of Staff. A vigorous educational program, both inside and out of the Executive Branch, is a must; and the basic text for such program could well be the Chief of Staff's speech.

4. In retrospect, it might have been better, as the first step, to have stumped for acceptance of the concept outside the Department of the Army rather than concentrate on development of a large, specially organized and theoretically balanced task force. Significantly, General Decker's broad philosophy was obscured, within the Army staff itself, in the detailed planning of a prototype organization. As indications of the narrowed view, one can cite the fierce intrastaff arguments which developed, and still remain extant, over the size and composition of the various blocks on the organizational chart. The Civil Affairs staff questions the overall orientation; the Engineer

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feel that construction capabilities should predominate; and others argue that it should be composed primarily of Special Forces personnel. All this has dampened what should have been strong and universal enthusiasm, swelling up from the Army staff and overwhelming the rest of the Pentagon. The real point should have been - and should be now - that the U. S. Army has such extensive and diverse capabilities that it can tailor and field task elements to meet any conceivable requirement. This should be the precept of the educational process.

N.B. ✓

5. In my opinion, progress will be directly proportional to the formulation of demonstrable requirements against which capabilities can be matched. If the Colombian task force moves ahead - and there is reason to believe that it will - it will be because there is a concrete, thrice-enunciated requirement which the task force has been designed to meet. Conversely, one can speculate that the four 600-man headquarters have not been approved because they can not be equated with a specific requirement. In any case, these headquarters are not an absolutely essential planning element; that function could be assumed by Theater Army Headquarters, once indoctrinated.

6. The key task is to assist and accelerate the development of requirements. Such requirements must be reflected in MAP and



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hence must be generated at the country team level and endorsed by the Unified Commanders. Overriding importance therefore attaches to projects designed to brief the field headquarters; to "sell" the basic concept plus the ability of the U. S. Army to translate that concept into vital action programs; and to insure understanding that what is involved is merely the next logical phase of military assistance. This would represent at long last the first Washington initiative promised the country teams in the joint State DOD-ICA circular message numbered 976975 and dated 10 May 1960.

7. Several other circumstances have been contributory to the lack of forward progress:

a. The term "civic action" has long been used as a kind of shorthand to describe programs of this nature. Unfortunately, it can be misinterpreted. And it has been misinterpreted, unintentionally or otherwise. Henceforward, it is probably better to forego brevity in favor of a more definitive title which spells out clearly that the concept relates to <sup>the</sup> complementary tasks for military units which exist, in any case, to fulfill a primary role in combat; that the transmissions are exclusively military to military; that in most underdeveloped countries the military represent the strongest, most talented and most conservative power element; and that their dual function as a protector of the



populace and conscience of the government is unique.

b. In extension of a above, the Army statement of certain functions which could be performed by U. S. FLAG elements have been poorly worded in that they have not stressed that such advice and proposals would be channeled solely through indigenous military counterparts. One can read into these statements the possibility of psychological and political actions targeted directly on the local civilian populace. This is, of course, not intended.

c. The average Foreign Service Officer thinks in sophisticated and qualitative rather than quantitative terms, in selective individual rather than group operations. Because he is conscious of the importance of language, and of adequate knowledge of native culture, mores and prevailing political strata, he can be expected to be reserved and questioning when confronted with proposals for a massive organization targeted on an entire region, and presumably poised to meet the special needs of any and all countries therein.

The business of the qualitative approach has merit. A single highly competent, dedicated American with the right sort of empathy can exert phenomenal influence over a widening circle--as the record will bear witness. Conversely, a group, containing



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within its ranks one poor specimen, may have only zero or a net loss to show for its efforts. The answer, of course, is to have the flexible capability to dispatch a quality operator where special requirements dictate; and adequate numbers where the task is big but straightforward.

#### The High Intensity Area

8. The difference in U. S. and foreign military actions in high, as opposed to low, intensity areas is in relative emphasis only. A single concept embraces both: optimizing the overall potential of indigenous military and paramilitary forces to insure the internal defense throughout the spectrum of Sublimited War situations. Counter-insurgency operations are integral to both areas--so is the nation building role, which may well predominate in low intensity situations. What moves an area from low to high intensity is the eruption of guerrilla activities (as, for example, in Colombia and Vietnam) or open combat between regular military establishments (as may happen again in Laos). The main focus of military effort is adjusted accordingly.

9. Prior to 1961, the Army took a number of initiatives in the counter-insurgency areas to include deployment of Special Forces personnel in quantity as unit advisors, at the low tactical

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level, to the Royal Laotian Army; dispatch of individual and/or small groups of Special Forces personnel to other countries as trainers of elite units; and intensive preparations for the Counter-Insurgency Operations Course which opened this Spring at Fort Bragg under Special Warfare Center auspices.

10. The major surge forward followed President Kennedy's approval of the 3,000 man increase in the Army's counter-insurgency forces in FY 1962; and the relevant budget message which stressed the need for a greater ability to deal with the threat to the Free World posed by Communist inspired or directed subversion, insurrection and guerrilla forces. In the past few months, major activity has centered on the buildup of the Special Warfare Center and of the three reduced strength Special Forces Groups; on the activation of a fourth Group (5th SF); on the development of Civil Affairs, Military Intelligence, Army Security Agency, Engineer, Signal and Medical teams provided for in the strength increase; and on the improvement of the Counter-Insurgency Operations Courses in being and the launching of others. Additional requirements for Special Forces advisors to train local forces in counter guerrilla operations have grown out of the deteriorating situation in Laos and South Vietnam; these requirements have been met or are in the process of being fulfilled.

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11. It is important to note that the authorization for substantial increase in Special Forces' strength is not easily or quickly translated into augmented operational capability. The austere manning level imposed upon Special Forces over the past several years has caused the pool of trained personnel to atrophy. Strength of the pool is roughly equal to present requirements, and many of those in the pool have lost much of their former lustre. Volunteers, without prior Special Forces background, must undergo a rigorous seven months program before being pronounced operationally ready for team deployment. Meanwhile, essential shifts in the contingent war-time mission of the First and Seventh Special Forces Groups have resulted in waste of the previously acquired area capabilities of some operational detachments, and have generated proportionally great new training requirements.

12. The problem, then, is not that Special Forces have today a large unused reservoir of operational assets. The point is that, thanks to inspiring leadership and the dedicated efforts of all key personnel, a sizable reservoir will soon be developed. At the present rate of progress, this will occur long before requirements for the employment thereof will have been foreseen, developed, coordinated and approved. Attention aplenty is focused - at the Washington, Unified Command and country



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team level - on the areas of extreme criticality (notably Southeast Asia). But there is no evidence of detailed forward planning for those countries where the threat of insurgency is latent but already very real. The Special Warfare Division in DCSOPS is undermanned to the point where it can scarcely stay atop current actions let alone make any measurable progress towards the development of Army contributions to country counter-insurgency plans. At the higher levels, there is no active mechanism to spur planning interdepartmentally, the only sound basis for development of programs which must coalesce the total resources of the host country and all forms of U. S. aid. In a comprehensive, forward looking paper (3 March), the JCS recommended that the Secretary of Defense attempt to secure interdepartmental agreement for coordinated country counter-insurgency planning and clarify the responsibilities of the various departments and agencies in advising and assisting foreign governments with respect to counter-insurgency programs and operations. The Secretary of Defense has taken no action thereon. Actually, it is within State's province to invoke such planning; there are stirrings in the Policy/Planning Staff in this direction but no indications of early action.

13. Meanwhile, National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 56, dated 28 June 1961, imposes new planning and preparatory

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responsibilities in this general area. In this memorandum, the President requested that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency, make a survey of the paramilitary assets in the U. S. Armed Forces, consider areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous paramilitary forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we should set in this field. Having determined the assets and possible requirements, it would then become a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit. As a first step, the JCS have completed a world wide consolidation of existing indigenous paramilitary forces for use by the Secretary of Defense in discussions with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (The latter having long since tabled his inventory). The report forwards, without comment or analysis, recommendations by the Unified and Specified Commanders for support, by way of qualitative improvement or expansion, of indigenous paramilitary forces in their respective areas.

14. In its present form, the JCS submission does not provide an adequate basis for the second step (determination of requirements), let alone the third (deficit planning). The Joint Staff has no in-house capability for either step. Thus far, by reason of preoccupation



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with other duties, the cognizant staff element (Special Warfare Division) in the Army has done no planning in this regard, although our interest is primary. There is a clear requirement for the Army staff to analyze the report, including field commanders' recommendations, in detail; to develop, country by country, support requirements in terms of equipment, financing, U. S. advisory personnel and the like; evolve programs for meeting these requirements; and participate, at the expert level, in coordinating planning with State and CIA. The task is immense and immensely important.

The indigenous paramilitary assets in question are in the main, utilizable only within the framework of counter-insurgency programs. Some, however, will have a latent offensive capability as well; and prudence may dictate the husbanding of a select few as denied area resources exclusively. In the past, CIA had exclusive jurisdiction over any offensive operations involving the last two categories. Henceforward, by the terms of NSAM No. 57, that interest will be shared with DOD - as will be elaborated in a following section.

15. It is reasonable to assume that General Taylor will chair the top level interdepartmental meetings explicit in this planning requirement. The working level meetings, also interdepartmental,

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can be expected to extend over considerable time; to examine countries individually, in some depth and in order of criticality. Since strength or weakness of paramilitary forces can only be assessed within the overall framework of the dissident threat and the total power resources of the friendly country concerned, it is obvious that the basis for coordinated counter-insurgency planning may be at hand. It could be the breakthrough for efforts to establish machinery for coalescing the efforts of the several Executive Departments and Agencies on forward country planning; and may explain General Taylor's extremely keen interest in this project, its substantive merits aside.

Covert/Denied Areas ✓

16. From 1948, when an empowering NSC directive was issued, through the ill-fated Cuban invasion, the control and direction of covert operations within the geographical expanse of the Soviet orbit were exclusively the jurisdiction of the CIA. The sole condition under which DOD agencies were authorized to participate in such operations (unless invited in on CIA initiative) was when circumstances dictated the activation of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) directly subordinate to the Unified Commander concerned. No JUWTF has ever been activated although such action was contemplated by CINCPAC on several occasions.



17. As an outgrowth of the work of the Presidential Committee which reviewed in detail the planning for and support of the Cuban operation, the President issued NSAM No. 57 (28 June 1961) which in effect tempered the exclusivity of the original CIA mandate.

The operative sentences of NSAM No. 57 stated, in substance:

- a. Proposals for paramilitary operations will be presented to the 5412 Committee (the group chaired by General Taylor) for consideration and Presidential approval.
- b. The Committee will assign primary responsibility to the Executive Branch element best qualified to handle the operation.
- c. Overt operations will normally be assigned to the DOD, covert to CIA if within its in-house capabilities.
- d. Large operations, covert in part or full, beyond CIA resources in qualified personnel, equipment or experience will be the primary responsibility of DOD, with CIA in support.

In essence, this directive established a threshold beyond which the responsibilities heretofore carried by CIA would pass to the DOD.

18. From the wording of the directive, it is evident that there can be no prior determination of the threshold, and that each case will be assessed on its individual merits. Nonetheless, horizons



have opened which have, in the past, been beyond the ken of Defense agencies. Curiously, there have been no CIA-DOD substantive conversations to develop the full implications of the directive, or its impact on both parties; and since paramilitary operations are always conducted in a ground environment, the implications for the Army are most pronounced. It is one thing to be authorized or directed to assume responsibility; it is quite another matter to be adequately prepared to discharge that responsibility without disruption of the tempo or continuity of operations.

19. I have discussed NSAM No. 57 and its import with Mr. Richard Bissell (the Deputy Director of CIA, seized with these matters). He agrees that the directive permits a new order of inter-agency collaboration, flexibility and mutual support; he agrees likewise that much work needs to be done in order to earn these dividends. I believe that he may initiate discussions, through appropriate channels, with the Army staff; I am confident that he will be highly receptive to Army overtures. Among the areas which should be explored, with a view to implementing action, are the following:

- a. The introduction of selected Army personnel into the operational chain of those current CIA paramilitary operations which conceivably could pass, at some stage, to DOD. By this means,





the Army would build a reservoir of personnel sufficiently well acquainted with subject operations to be able to step in and perform competently, when and if required. The support rendered to the operation during the officers' tour of duty therewith would, in turn, be a measurable gain to CIA.

b. Along the same lines, but for a differing primary purpose, the release to CIA of specially qualified individuals (normally Special Forces) should be authorized to plug a CIA hole. CIA has had only limited success in stockpiling highly qualified paramilitary personnel against contingent needs. It is patently uneconomical to do so; we should be prepared to help in crises.

c. There are a number of MAP controlled paramilitary organizations abroad (as for example in Pakistan, Korea, Taiwan and Greece) which contain select elements qualified for the conduct of covert operations. In the national interest, our working relationships with CIA should be of such nature as to permit CIA exploitation of these capabilities. The reverse is equally true.

d. It is important that there be early agreement by the military on one fundamental premise: i. e., that the modus operandi, when control of operations passes, will in effect involve the superimposition of Defense resources on CIA control and support





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mechanisms, and not the ejection of the latter. In most instances, the rapport between CIA case officer and principal agent is developed and cemented over a period of years. Such intimacy is unattainable under the rotation procedures characteristic of our own Armed Forces. It would be folly to disrupt that kind of operational continuity.

20. Some time ago, the JCS recommended that control, direction and support of the Meo tribesmen in the denied areas of Laos and North Vietnam should immediately pass to CINCPAC. The Secretary of Defense has not submitted this recommendation to the 5412 Committee for there are countervailing considerations. First, CINCPAC is content with present arrangements, which suffice for the level of activity authorized by the President. CINCPAC is, incidentally, influenced, and properly so, by the intimate cooperation existing between the Special Forces personnel and CIA operatives as well as the responsiveness of the CIA logistic mechanism (CAT). Second, CIA-DOD agreement has been reached on the basis for turnover of responsibility, this is geared to international political developments and seems eminently sound. The Army would be incapable of continuing control if provisions of a Laotian political settlement invited the MAAG out, moreover, the scale of Meo guerrilla activities will be necessarily proportional to the military stance of the Royal Laotian Army..

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21. Pertinent to this section are the possibilities arising from the planning due to take place under the previously discussed provisions of NSAM No. 56. This again should further collaboration as between CIA and the Army, both at the Washington and field levels. Noteworthy among the offensive capable paramilitary organizations are the South Korean and Chinese Nationalist Special Forces units trained by our own personnel.

How well we do in the field of joint planning and mutual reinforcement vis-a-vis CIA is in large measure a function of the qualified people who can be harnessed to this task. Such individuals are not now on hand.

ORGANIZATIONAL ADEQUACY  
PLANNING/COORDINATION/SUPPORT


National Level

22. The present administration abolished the Operations Coordinating Board; substituted an informal luncheon group for the NSC Planning Board ; and convenes the full membership of the NSC but rarely. These actions reflect dissatisfaction with the functioning of mechanisms which loomed large in the Eisenhower



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Administration. For these have been substituted the dynamism of a vigorous President who prefers to plan direct with his principal Cabinet members; who is ready to make the hard decision; and who empowers his Secretary of State with pre-eminent authority in foreign policy.

23. So far as the direct influence of the President can penetrate, these arrangements are quite satisfactory. There are, however, limitations which no human can surmount. The President is taxed beyond belief with current problems of global significance requiring immediate decision; and with the establishment of guidelines for short range operational policy and plans. Reflective of this concept of the exercise of command, operational planning vis-a-vis the areas of highest criticality is exercised, at the national level, through the medium of several Department of State chaired Task Forces. At times of peak pressure, these Task Forces direct the implementation of coordinated interdepartmental plans with reasonable success. Major deficiencies lie elsewhere.

24 The planning gap exists in all time frames except that of the short term future; And the latter marks the limit of direct Presidential influence; even the President's strong words on the subject

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of improving counter-insurgency capabilities has not led to coordinated planning for low intensity areas. The reality of this planning void has been affirmed with near unanimity by senior level career civil servants and military planners. They point to the fact that the concept of the NSC Planning Board and the OCB was absolutely sound and their existence essential. Most are emphatic that the real fault of these mechanisms, and in particular of the OCB, were the terms of reference; and that even when the planning product was ineffectual, they still constituted a permanent forum for interdepartmental contact and exchange of views. In their absence, no machinery exists for coming to grips with the vital task of anticipatory, forward planning.

25. Parenthetically, attempts to generate positive, coordinated forward plans may continue to flounder as they have in the past by reason of running counter to the American character. As a nation we are adept at dealing with specific, concrete, one-time issues; we have the greatest of difficulty gearing ourselves to problems which are open-ended as to time, obscure as to issue and substantively of less than critical importance. Coupled with this is a general lack of appreciation of the implications of the Communist operational doctrine; and thus a failure to recognize the Cold War for what it really is. We can



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only hope that we shall learn that the Cold War must be fought with the same coordination, precision and ruthlessness that characterize military operations; that the aim is to secure a decisive advantage over the opponent; and that this entails being at least one campaign ahead in plans and preparations.

26. Yet the void must be filled. It must be filled to establish contact among interdepartmental planners on the kind of regular basis which promotes reciprocal understanding; to make representatives defend their views away from the parochial atmosphere of parent organization, or temper position on the basis of hard critique; and, most important, to force a look ahead. The little things can be implemented by individual clearance but a large program pointed to the future, will not get by unless backed by an overall plan, approved at the highest level.

27. There are straws in the wind. The JCS has several times recommended, with an increasing note of urgency, the creation of interdepartmental machinery; thus far the proposals have gone unheeded. Voices in the Policy/Planning Staff of State argue persistently that that Department must invoke its mandate to rally others to the task of forward planning, given the vital importance of preventive





action in areas where the potential insurgent threat is significant. Meanwhile there is some hope of such machinery, albeit truncated, growing out of the NSAM No. 56 planning exercise discussed above; or possibly the Executive Branch regional institutes proposed in the companion report. The precise form of the machinery is not critical; what count are the terms of reference and the handling on its output.

28. Experience indicates that the terms of reference and modus operandi of interdepartmental planning machinery capable of formulating dynamic policy and plans should meet several tests. Its members should be empowered to speak for their parent organizations. They should be under no compulsion to reach agreed solutions but rather should be instructed to serve up opposing points of view to the highest authority for decision. By the same token, no individual member should be able to veto an unpalatable solution. Departments with only tangential interest in any given planning problem should be denied the right of participation as well as vote. Ruthless action should be taken to insure that the number of conferees is minimal. The group should approach its tasks sequentially, in order of importance and criticality.

29. A theoretically ideal Sublimited War Planning Group would operate on the basis of the foregoing ground rules; would draw





support from the permanent secretariat of the NSC, and would be chaired by a nationally respected official answering directly to the President. The group's primary function would be advance planning: the projection of tough forward strategy, concepts, priorities and order of magnitude costs. These would not be mere statements but would be developed in requisite detail to serve, once debated and approved by the President, as the reference points for effective central guidance and coordination of the overall effort. The group and supporting staff, drawn from those Executive Departments and Agencies with major foreign operations, would be kept to minimum size. However there would have to be built-in capability to analyze supporting plans to assure harmony with the national guidelines established; and to spawn task forces to develop master country plans, on a priority basis, from which would derive a series of specific country programs staffed at lower echelons. The group would not have operational authority. Direction of the national effort must vest in the President and be implemented through established lines of authority.

If supported by the President and by a vigorous national climate, the mechanism would assure the development and approval of forward looking national plans/programs so sadly lacking now,



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and the timely evolution of coordinated supporting plans. Moreover, it would be uniquely positioned to secure decisions on divergencies, to recommend measures to promote flexibility, and to monitor progress of implementing programs. It could lead to the development of a new order of cooperation and collaboration at all levels of the Executive Branch.

Defense Level

30. The cognizant elements of the Joint staff (principally the Joint Subsidiary Activities Division of J-5, plus portions of J-3 for contingency planning) maintain close and harmonious working relations with the Special Warfare Division of the Army staff. JCS papers in the counter guerrilla and related fields have been consistent with Army positions; and, had the recommendations been implemented, would have given impetus to interdepartmental planning and program action.

31. The Joint staff utilizes, as necessary, Service planners to supplement in-house resources. Therefore, the adequacy of manning levels is not easily assessed. To date, the Joint staff has not bottlenecked Army actions. On the other hand, failure to initiate concentrated work on NSAM No. 57 and to move beyond the compilation aspect of NSAM No. 56 suggests either personnel shortage or inattention to the implications of those documents.

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32. An Assistant to the Secretary of Defense has cognizance of the entire field under survey and is the principal CIA contact for policy and support matters as well. By virtue of the Secretary's close personal control of Defense plans and operations, coupled with the confidence that both the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary repose in him, the Assistant is an extremely important cog in the policy and program approval mechanism. He is an action type, with firm belief in the importance and efficacy of operations of this category. Consequently close working relationships with the Assistant are most desirable. Such rapport does not exist between his Office, on the one hand, and the Joint and Army staffs on the other; the reasons for this are chargeable to both. Personal contact and follow-up between these Offices are well nigh non-existent - a circumstance which has led to misunderstandings and perceptible retardation of the pace of events. Remedial action is a must. In my estimate, the Army has much to gain by repairing the breach.

33. Given the MAP implications of the major areas discussed, the Office of International Security Affairs also looms important. Close working contact therewith should be assiduously cultivated. For example, there should have been a comprehensive briefing of the pertinent

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elements of that Office on the background and import of the Colombia project before, or immediately after, ISA assumed action responsibility therefor.

Office of the Secretary of the Army

34. No staff officer reports to the Secretary on Army programs, actions and responsibilities in the paramilitary and psychological operations or related fields of Sublimated War activities. The Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs acts for the Under Secretary of the Army on all matters relating to Special Warfare. The function is further delegated to his Deputy Office Chief, a Colonel, who is responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence and internal security matters of higher priority. Consequently, he has had difficulty staying abreast of the fast-moving and expanding activities of the past several months. Certainly, he has been unable to exercise any positive influence at the DOD level or with other governmental agencies.

35. Close study of operative channels and the decision process has convinced me that there is a demonstrable need for a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, preferably civilian, to monitor the discharge of the Army's responsibilities in Sublimated War. This individual should be adequately versed in paramilitary and psychological

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activities and the working organization of the Department of Defense. He must, in the first instance, know the personnel of the Army staff element and the details of their work; to this end, two way contact should be close, continuous and, importantly, informal. He should develop excellent rapport with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, key officials in ISA (Planning Staff, Regions and MAP), and pertinent offices in State, CIA and USIA. While essentially a monitor, he should be prepared to step in when trouble spots surface above the Department of the Army level; in this sense, he would act as the communications link -- to explain, promote, negotiate or follow-up as appropriate -- between the Army staff and policy elements. He should have direct access to both the Secretary and the Under Secretary and keep them fully informed. He should have no other duties, nor should the officer assistant who needs be provided.

Army Staff

36. In June 1958, the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare was abolished and reorganized as a directorate in DCSOPS. The reorganization order contained the following statement, "The importance of special warfare, its present state of development, and the necessity to retain emphasis in these matters make it desirable that



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your office continue as a separate agency." Three months later, the Directorate was downgraded to a Division in the Plans Directorate of DCSOPS and part of its personnel assets transferred. In this connection, it was decided that other concerned Directors in DCSOPS would assume the special warfare functions falling within their province. Such has never really been the case.

It is pertinent that in 1958 the Special Warfare Staff was almost exclusively hot war oriented. Except for certain psychological operations, its involvement in plans and programs for activities short of declared war was minute.

37. The Special Warfare Division continues to exist today in the same organizational framework except that a Deputy Director is positioned in the Office of the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy. The basic Division mission remains: "Over-all staff supervision and coordination of plans and policy functions of the Army relating to psychological operations and unconventional warfare." Additionally, the Special Warfare Division is the designated office for coordination with the Joint Staff and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to Army support of CIA operations in peacetime. Thirteen officers are authorized and manning level has usually been eleven.

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38. During the past year, its responsibilities have multiplied several times. As a result of increased emphasis on paramilitary operations throughout the underdeveloped areas, the Special Warfare Division has become the focal point and action agency in the Army staff for all matters relating to counter-insurgency, counter guerrilla operations, covert operations, and "civic actions"; and has performed staff actions in the functional areas of concepts, plans, policy, training, organization and operations. Under the leadership of Colonel W. H. Kinard, Jr., the Deputy Director for Special Warfare, and Colonel W. M. Higgins, Jr., the Chief of Special Warfare Division, it developed the Army's counter-insurgency concept and staffed the 3,000 man increase which followed approval thereof; prepared the original US FLAG concept and implementing plan; and developed the operational plans for the employment of Special Forces and associated personnel in Laos, Vietnam and Colombia. It has also discharged primary Army Staff responsibility for the support of the rapid build-up of the Special Warfare Center and its units, to include the multitudinous accompanying problems.

39. The Division, has tackled its ever widening scope of current actions, without any augmentation of strength. Thanks to the high professional competence and dedication of the officers concerned, it has

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managed to keep abreast of immediate requirements and has done a very creditable job in most areas. But others, for want of people, are uncovered. Foremost among these latter is the field of planning, to which almost no attention can now be given. There loom the massive tasks associated with NSAM's 56 and 57; there is the contingent requirement for the military portions of country counter-insurgency plans, on which anticipatory work should have begun; there is the requirement for reorientation of the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), planning of its new programs and close monitoring of its future work. There is the entire field underscored by the Secretary of Defense's directive of 5 September on the employment of indigenous forces in nation building and related roles. There are numerous new planning responsibilities explicit in the increased deployments of psychological operations personnel and an urgent requirement for re-establishment of liaison with USIA. In the field of support, work load will grow apace with increase in the Special Warfare Center's level of activity.

40. Aggravating the personnel shortage of the Division is the reluctance of other staff sections to perform duties which are properly theirs. One reason is that some action officers have little understanding or knowledge of operations of this type and, consequently,

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need considerable guidance by way of explanation of requirements and the like. A second is preoccupation with more "normal" Army functions. In any case, designation of the Division as holding primary responsibility for the Special Warfare Center funnels off much effort on follow-up. For example, one officer spends the bulk of his time on personnel matters. Doctrine responsibility is assigned to ODCSOPS (CD) in name only; the expertness is in the Special Warfare Division.

41. In my opinion, the premise that led to the abolition of the Directorate in 1958 has proved to be invalid, the more so in light of the tremendous augmentation of scope and weight of activity. Aside from being undermanned, the Division Chief is at too low a level for the responsibilities formally and informally assigned him, particularly in a Directorate of necessity predominantly attuned to Joint as opposed to Army matters. If the total programs are to be effectively and expeditiously handled, if adequate preparations are to be made for the likely upward surge of activities, certain measures seem indicated. One is to double the strength of the staff; another is to give it Directorate status and assign thereto the new tasks it now handles anyway; and still another is to attach to the Directorate, ad interim, qualified members of other General and Special Staff Sections to expedite planning and coordination while developing the know-how which can be carried back to the Sections concerned.

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42. Continued use of the term "Special Warfare" to describe the staff element charged with the array of functions discussed above is inappropriate. The term "Paramilitary" is more descriptive for as used today, it encompasses activities in combat and noncombat environments, defensive and offensive operations, in Cold War and Hot. Moreover, it should be recognized that military psychological operations are on the increase; and that, in time of war, the cognizant Army staff element would grow to tremendous proportions, probably attaining independent status. The resultant "Paramilitary/Psychological" seems a fitting alternative to "Special Warfare." It does not follow that the names of either the Center or the Groups should be changed; the Army staff element has wider functions than either.

CERTAIN MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE ASSETS

Special Warfare Center

43. The companion report included a series of recommendations for improving the quality and impact of the Counter Insurgency Course presented by the Special Warfare School; and for heightening the stature and professionalism of the Special Warfare Center as the main repository of skills and knowledge in the field of military action.





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against insurgency. These recommendations, and the analyses from which they were distilled, are incorporated by reference.

44. The Center is suffering some growing pains as the natural consequence of the sudden and extensive increases in mission; the stringent time schedules which have had to be met; the rapid turnover of key personnel by reason of new unit activations and urgent operational commitments; and the very business of being subjected to close scrutiny, however sympathetic, by an unending succession of highly placed visitors. Fortunately, the Center is in the hands of a remarkable soldier, the brilliant and imaginative Brigadier General William P. Yarborough. With any reasonable amount of assistance, he will insure that the Center reaches the standards desired and discharges effectively the several roles envisaged. His needs are straight forward: achievement of a reasonable degree of stability so that main attention can be focused on the most important matters rather than those most immediately critical; personnel of the highest quality obtainable; and full understanding and support from above.


45. Even for a man of Yarborough's caliber, the span of control is excessive, as a result of recent assignments and activations. The problem will be further aggravated if he is to command the first

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US FLAG, as now contemplated. The key concern is that the several subordinate units have widely differing orientations: the school complex has one; the Groups another; the FLAG components still a third; and so on. Heavy involvement with operational problems cannot but dilute the effort which the command group and key staff personnel should place on primary tasks of advancing and perfecting doctrine, concepts, policies and techniques, of becoming, in fact, the fount. Consideration should therefore be given to reducing the number of units assigned the Center. The Latin American FLAG elements might be brigaded with the 7th Special Forces Group (also targeted on Latin America) and both assigned to CINCARIB, with station in Panama or as close thereto as feasible.

Center/Army Staff Relationship

46. At the moment there are only two foci of expert knowledge of paramilitary and psychological operations within the Continental U. S.; the Special Warfare Division of the Army staff and the Special Warfare Center itself. Moreover the high level attention which has been and will continue to be riveted on counter-insurgency actions of very modest scale but of considerable operational significance (as, for example, deployments to Southeast Asia) leads

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to unusually detailed planning by the Army staff and requires quick reaction by the Center. Many problems which the Center continues to confront in meeting commitments world wide must be resolved ultimately by direct communication with the Department of the Army. Because of other agency interests, minute decisions (should Special Forces personnel take boots on initial entry into Laos) have to be passed to the Washington Level. Given the specialized nature of operations and the lack of a broad base of competence, the intermediate headquarters, for the most part, merely act as relays on substantive matters.

47. For the foregoing reasons, there appear to be considerable advantages to establishing the Center as a Class II activity for specified functions. Such functions would logically include operational direction, doctrinal guidance and other academic support, research and development (to include nonmaterial), personnel and special funding. The Center should, of course, remain satellited on Fort Bragg for common support functions.

Such an arrangement would provide a direct command line from the Army staff to the Special Warfare Center, reducing reaction time and eliminating a considerable staff effort now imposed



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on the Continental Army Command, 3d Army and Headquarters, Fort Bragg. It would also increase the work of what is now Special Warfare Division, as the staff element with primary responsibility, but not to an inordinate degree. The work load would be quite manageable if the Army Special Warfare staff were given the Directorate status and strength proposed and if the other staff sections would do their fair share.

#### Psychological Operations

48. Though not as well publicized as Special Forces activities, the scope and effectiveness of U. S. psychological operations (Psy Ops) abroad have been significant. For example, since 1955 in the Pacific Command alone, more than 100 mobile training teams have assisted in developing indigenous Psy Ops capabilities in seven countries. These efforts have been undertaken with the concurrence and under supervision of the Country Teams, and in close coordination with the local representatives of USIA, CIA and State. United States Psy Ops teams have supported Counter-Insurgency and consolidation efforts primarily through their indigenous military counterpart units.

49. The augmentation of personnel for Counter-Insurgency forces, authorized by the President, led to a much needed improvement

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of capabilities in the Psy Ops field. Moreover, three ready reserve units have been or are being called to active duty to bolster the existing two psychological warfare battalions.

50. In the future, the Army, with limited Psy Ops resources can expect to be called upon to conduct Psy Ops, simultaneously, in many and diverse areas of the world. Cultural and language barriers, political implications, remoteness from U. S. support resources, and personnel economy will dictate primary attention to the development and use of indigenous Psy Ops assets. Effective utilization of these assets is dependent on extensive preparatory and supervisory efforts on the part of U. S. Psy Ops specialists.

51. To meet future demands, Army Psy Ops organization must keep abreast of changes and advances in specialized operational techniques, personnel proficiency, material development, and technological advances. The Army is adopting a cellular-type organization which should prove to have the required responsiveness, flexibility and mobility to discharge its supporting role. United States Psy Ops suffer the same problems as do Special Forces with regard to the selection and retention of qualitatively superior personnel, especially officers.

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52. To insure that Psy Ops are planned and executed to support fully the overall Army efforts in Sublimited War, certain requirements must be met. One is a major equipment modernization program; a second is the location and assignment of highly qualified personnel, on a detail basis if necessary; and a third is the activation of a fourth Psy War battalion to provide a truly world wide capability. Likewise, close liaison and coordination should be maintained with other government agencies concerned with Psy Ops.

Army Aviation Support

53. The concept for employment of USAF aircraft in support of wartime Unconventional and Psychological Operations is sound, for deep penetrations are the planning norm. However, the world situation has led to operations short of war - primarily counter-insurgency but also including penetrations of denied areas. This has generated a requirement for air support for relatively shallow operations. The what, where and how of the Army aviation role in such operations has not been explored, though capabilities are manifest. Certainly tests should be conducted to ascertain the possibilities for mutual support as between Army aviation and para-military forces. This requires a practical marrying up of the "low

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and slow" Army aircraft with Special Forces personnel, at Ft. Bragg or elsewhere, to develop doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. Field testing would be expedited if CG CONARC would define the specific responsibilities of the Army Aviation Center vis-a-vis the Special Warfare Center on the matter of Army aviation support for special warfare and Counter-Insurgency operations.

54. The Special Warfare Center does not have Army aviation support responsive to its needs; nor does it have personnel prepared to advise and assist on Army aviation matters. This should be remedied. Assignment of a senior, Special Forces qualified aviator, who could command either an aviation or Special Forces unit, would be a step in the right direction.

In this general connection, CG, CONARC is understood to have recommended the assignment of a Sky Cavalry Troop to the Special Warfare Center. Obvious merit attaches thereto.

55. The close collaboration envisaged between the Army Aviation and Special Warfare Centers by no means precludes a similar cooperation with the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron at Eglin AFB. The latter (nickname "Jungle Jim") represents Air Force short range capabilities which are being developed for use in guerrilla,

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counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency, and related fields. Working level contact and liaison with the 4400th CCT should be established and maintained for exchange of information on operational techniques and procedures which should prove to be of mutual benefit.

Special Operations Research Office (SORO)

56. SORO is a non-governmental agency operating under contract between the Department of the Army and American University. It is responsible for the conduct of such nonmateriel research as will support the Special Warfare Staff's mission to develop psychological and unconventional warfare plans for the Department of the Army.

57. SORO has prepared excellent country studies, entitled Special Warfare Area Handbooks. <sup>HRAF</sup> These are eagerly sought by USIA, ICA (AID) and others. Thus, there is the anomaly of a small research organization, with a very special orientation, using its funds to develop a product applicable throughout the U. S. government community. Moreover, the work involved can not properly be classified as research. It can be argued that the final compilation of the materials required for Special Forces operational detachments should be accomplished under the direct supervision of the Special Warfare Center.

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SORO is also engaged in studies of such transcendent magnitude as to require a massive national effort to insure successful results. One such study is entitled "Exploit-USSR" with the stated objective of researching methods of exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities. It is apparent that SORO has assumed tasks beyond its capabilities.

58. It is my belief that the SORO program of work, and the priorities attached thereto, are not meshed with the current missions of the Special Warfare Division and Special Forces units; the weight of effort is now in support of psychological operations whereas the reverse should be true. In addition, there is some doubt that SORO, as presently staffed, can shift gears rapidly and effectively. The advantages of SORO's absorption by large research organizations are worth investigation.

#### Personnel

59. The basic Army power package for denied areas operations is a highly skilled Special Forces detachment of 2 officers and 10 sergeants trained and equipped to organize, guide, control and supply up to 1,500 indigenous personnel and to conduct guerrilla warfare in denied areas. This detachment contains specialists in light and heavy weapons, demolitions, basic surgery and communications.

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All personnel in the detachment are cross-trained in specialties, and language qualified. They are, without question, elite troops.

It was quite appropriate, from 1959 forward, to look to these "war reserves" to train, adapt, and guide foreign military contingents in operations against insurgent forces. The teams moved into the field, provided their own communications, did what they were trained to do, and moved out when ordered. Because it was akin to their contingent war missions, the experience was professionally profitable and sharpened their edge.

60. The demands for Special Forces personnel to assist in high intensity counter-insurgency situations continue to grow. In Laos alone, the overall figure is set at 512; some 400 have been requested for South Vietnam; in a year that will consume over 1800 in just two countries out of many possible claimants. Meanwhile there are conflicting requirements. While there is merit in keeping substantial numbers of Special Forces personnel deployed for such operations, the Groups have contingent wartime tasks for the execution of which constant preparation is required. Furthermore, collaborative arrangements with CIA, under the provisions of NSAM No. 57, may require considerable numbers of fully trained Special Forces personnel and detachments.

61. That there are finite limits on the numbers of Special Forces personnel who can be deployed on Counter-Insurgency tasks in underdeveloped areas is not in itself significant. Given their characteristics, they are admirably effective in this role. But others can do the job. Well-trained and motivated Infantry officers and non-commissioned officers - or comparable ranks from other combat branches who have had Ranger training - can acquire a smattering of the native language, be provided with good communications, develop smooth internal teamwork, live in the field, and train, guide and influence indigenous combat organizations. Our pride in our Army reflects our confidence that men of this caliber are to be found everywhere. We have individuals with the special skills to meet any conceivable requirement. The omens are that we will need them in large quantities. Planning and preparation should begin now on the ways and means of selection, training, organization, equipment and readying for operational deployment.

62. The foregoing gives emphasis to a theorem postulated earlier in this report, in the context of whether the specially designed FLAG organizations were essential or merely administratively convenient. The requirements which counter-insurgency situations generate for U. S. trainers to live and work with the indigenous military

forces have been considered special. But they are special only to the extent that they differ from the terms of reference and modus operandi of the average MAAG officer today. Stated otherwise, the Army's counter-insurgency concept envisages transformation, in whole or in part, of the functions of the MAAGs and establishment of new criteria for MAAG personnel. In one sense, it is a return to the Van Fleet mission in Greece in the late Forties, or KMAG in the early Fifties. It is a significant change; it is also a very healthy one. The concept of Americans rolling up their sleeves, sharing the same privations and working as equals alongside their Allies can not but help to develop new understanding and identity of interests. This is a long cry from the pure "advisor"; but that word and the concept behind it appear to have outlived their usefulness.

63. One of the criteria of Special Forces operational types is that they be volunteers. Unfortunately, application of this criterion is not helping the rapid build-up to newly authorized strength. The number of volunteers has recently been just adequate to meet incremental requirements; their cross section is below desirable standards; therefore, the Center has no flexibility in selection; and large numbers have to be eliminated during the early training phases. There are, of course, many outstanding young officers and NCO's



who would be real assets to the operational detachments. These individuals are, for the most part, both airborne and ranger qualified and have the motivation and resourcefulness demanded. They would require minimal additional training. Since the real goal is to maintain the high caliber of Special Forces personnel across the board, there is every reason to supplement the volunteer program with a policy of detailing personnel to Special Forces. One goes and does as one's country dictates.

OTHER ROUTES OF ADVANCE

What follows has been touched upon in several places during the report. Because of the value I attach thereto, the points are re-emphasized.

Communication

64. During the course of the survey, note was taken early of limitations on working level contact with opposite numbers in other Departments or Agencies. Some years back, extensive and effective liaison was a characteristic of the Army staff. For reason of pressure of duties, strict adherence to formal liaison channels, stated policy, animosity or whatever, informal airing of views, coordination and follow-up is conspicuously rare today - except with the Joint Staff and, as appropriate, with the



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other two Services. Although I saw more of the Army staff than the other three military elements, I gather the identical situation obtains. At the same time, there is some tendency to assess, without qualification, total responsibility for failure or inaction or rebuff to this agency or that; to apply a single evaluation to the entire personnel of a Department or major office; to assume the worst reply without checking how a project is going. One can hear the same things in the halls of State and CIA.

"...even the most contradictory word preserves contact; it is silence which isolates."

A failure in communications can be at the root of many problems.

65. It would be presumptuous to suggest the transcendent importance of personal contact at the working level. This is how business gets done, how the misinterpretation of the written phrase is corrected, how staff actions are accelerated. Most significantly, it is how one learns that the human cross section elsewhere in government has essentially the same thought processes, same sense of dedication, same foibles and same desire to whip the Communists.

66. Precisely because we are the senior Service, we can afford to meet the others halfway. We are certainly more intent that

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the job get done, than in who gets the byline. If we believe in our product - and it won't sell itself in a competitive market - we should be prepared to go to great lengths to see that it is sold. If action on a proposal is overlong in coming, we should assuredly find out why.

67. The informal channels of contact with the pertinent elements of OSD, State, CIA and USIA should be strengthened as one means of speeding the march forward. The Army's interest in effective counter-insurgency operations is vast; so is State's; and therefore a firm basis for contact exists. NSAM No. 57 opens new paths for CIA-Army collaboration. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense is interested in the maximum of action programs; he can help the Army in many ways; he should be cultivated.

#### Education

68. Referring to his initial Pentagon briefings on military activities in the Cold War, General Taylor remarked that only one presentor had 'a sparkle in his eye.' The point was apt, for large segments of the Army assess military participation in the Cold War in purely negative terms; how much is detracted from optimum readiness for limited or general war? The fact that we could be bested without fighting either kind of war is not generally appreciated. There is a marked lack of understanding of and enthusiasm for the several Army initiatives of the current year; or their potential for stabilizing the

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Free World periphery. Perhaps one of the reasons is that since the price in men and money is insignificant, the results must be similarly circumscribed. The fact that this is not true is unimportant; what is significant is that many believe it to be so.

69. The need for a comprehensive informational/educational program throughout the Army is evident; and it might well start by the Army staff studying General Decker's speech and the doctrinal guidance contained therein; that this is war; that in this kind of war the Army, by virtue of tradition and capabilities, has a key role; that, in lieu of standing idly by, the initiatives outlined permit Army elements to come to physical grips with the enemy, to cope with Communist inspired insurgency and to extend the fight into the enemy's homeland, there to use against him his own resources; that this is attack not defense.

70. The Command and General Staff College has recently produced, on its own initiative, a draft manual, "Army Activities in the Cold War." An excellent text, and consistent with the Chief of Staff's speech, its refinement and approval should be expedited so that it may serve as the basis for the derivative training literature required to develop a responsive Army attitude toward Sublimited War. The hope is that the Army's role and contribution can be vividly and

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dynamically portrayed and that one can drive home the linkage between the Special Forces detachment with the Meo tribesmen, the movement of the 18th Infantry to Berlin, and the Psy Ops specialist in Guatemala.

The MAP Tie-In

71. In examining Counter-Insurgency programs and FLAG concepts, the relation thereof with the current MAP was a recurring question. The former were projected as military to military; they did involve advisors; some degree of MAP financing was implicit; a key objective, as with the MAP, was to stabilize and strengthen the internal security of the indigenous countries concerned. Yet the relevant papers, the briefings and indeed the approval channels muted or omitted reference to the long established, massive and unilateral vehicle for military assistance to the non-Communist nations of the Free World.

72. Conceptually, these new Army programs are alien to the MAP as it exists today. The average MAAG unit centers in the capital city; the administrative and logistic aspects of the aid program predominate; liaison is principally at the ministerial and senior officer level; and the scale of living accords with that of the diplomatic community. Grass roots contact is minimal or non-existent. The

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MAAG observes but stands aside from the local military problems.

73. The counter-insurgency concept, as discussed earlier, is that the advisor or trainer will be operationally oriented, will live where his counterpart lives, will shun protocol, will be directly involved in the problems the unit faces. Grass roots contact is the norm. In a word, the new programs have the coloration of the country MAAG but operate in the area that MAAGs do not penetrate.

74. Programmatically, the two are essentially identical. The MAP finances the attendance of foreign military at the Counter-Insurgency Courses. The expenses of special Forces personnel in Laos are defrayed by the MAP. Except where contingency funds are used (as in Southeast Asia) the Counter-Insurgency operational requirements must be proposed by the country MAAG, accepted for programming and funding. The dependence of deployments upon needs generated by the field is clear.

75. Concentration on the operational aspects of the Counter-Insurgency and related programs, which are laudably new approaches, has obscured the importance of attention to arrangements to insure that capabilities could be fielded and utilized. Planning actions have been limited to Army channels; neither Unified Commanders nor country

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teams have been made officially aware of the concepts, the evolving capabilities nor the scheme of operations.

76. The need to close a circuit is evident but implementing actions have yet to be taken. The operational plan for the Colombian task force was processed to the Secretary of Defense without any concurrent action to signal the field for support or comment, yet the first move of DOD was to secure the views of CINCARIB and the country team as a condition precedent to further action.

77. This sequence points up the essentiality of informing the Chiefs of MAAG/Missions, the Ambassadors and the Unified Commanders concerned, together with their respective staffs, of the contribution that Army assets can make to the internal defense of the underdeveloped areas, of the arrangements in train to harness these assets, and of their availability. This is a task for the most competent, senior-level briefing team that can be mustered. If the team is convincing, the long awaited requirements may begin to emerge from country teams.

Africa South of the Sahara

78. The Secretary of the Army has been made responsible for the MAP in Africa south of the Sahara. Two MAAGs are now operative with four more likely to be positioned this year; a total of

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\$25 million has been programmed for FY 1962 and the estimate for next year approaches \$100 million. In the absence of other command arrangements, the Army staff will in fact be the Unified Commander for MAP functions, commanding the MAAGs, controlling allocation of funds as among countries and exercising major influence over country programs.

79. The Army is thus presented a magnificent opportunity to project its resources and to make a major contribution to U. S. security interests in a vital - long neglected area; and under conditions which assure maximum control and flexibility of planning and programming for the area as a whole. The long sought basis for coordinated forward country planning for low intensity areas has been provided; the Army's challenge is to exploit it fully.

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ANNEX A

Terms of Reference for the Paramilitary/Psychological Warfare Directorate

The term paramilitary operations as used herein, refers to the employment of Army resources to stimulate, train, advise and support indigenous forces in counter-insurgency operations and other activities contributing to internal defense, as well as in covert/denied area operations, and to wartime unconventional warfare activities for which the Army has primary responsibility.

The Director of the Paramilitary/Psychological Warfare Directorate discharges DCSOPS responsibility for the overall staff supervision and coordination of the functions of the Army relating to Paramilitary Operations, (as defined above) and Psychological Operations. More specifically he

- a. Formulates concepts and policies for paramilitary and psychological operations
- b. Develops plans, requirements and programs for Army paramilitary and psychological operations
- c. Develops the military portion of country counter-insurgency plans
- d. Provides staff coordination and supervision of

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Army paramilitary and psychological operations

e. Prepares the Army position on JCS, Unified and Specified Commanders' plans relating to paramilitary and psychological operations

f. Develops requirements for and supervises materiel and non-materiel research and development relating to paramilitary and psychological operations

g. Maintains liaison with governmental and non-governmental departments and agencies having related interest in the fields of paramilitary and psychological operations.

h. Maintains liaison with the U. S. Army Special Warfare Center and discharges primary Department of the Army responsibility for matters affecting the Special Warfare Center

i. Insures that approved concepts, plans and programs relating to Army paramilitary and psychological operations are forwarded to Army Component Commanders, CG CONARC and to Chiefs of U. S. Army MAAGs/Missions in order to insure a coordinated Army effort.

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PROPOSED ORGANIZATION CHART

PARAMILITARY/PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE  
DIRECTORATE

Unconventional War Div

Plans Br  
 Units & Activities Br  
 (SWC)  
 Support Br

Psychological War Div

Plans & Operations Br  
 Support Br

Counter-Insurgency  
Plans Div

Country Plans  
                   SE Asia  
 Country Plans  
                   L America  
 Country Plans  
                   Africa/ME

Covert/Denied  
Areas Div

Plans Br  
 Operations Br  
 CIA Liaison & Support Br

STAFFING REQUIREMENTS

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Action</u> <u>Civilians</u>	<u>Adminis-</u> <u>trative</u>
New Directorate	28	5	12
Special Warfare Division	<u>13</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>
Requirement	15	2	6
	3		

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