

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

18 October 1978

11

Memo For Mr. Duncan

DEP SEC. HAS SEEN

Charles:

Attached is a paper prepared by Walt Slocombe in response to your request of yesterday. I agree with it fully.

*Stan*

Stanley R. Resor

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 03 2017

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Launch on Warning

One sometimes hears the argument that one of our options for responding to the threat to [redacted] is adopting a [redacted] or [redacted] strategy. Because I believe that is not an option, I am addressing it separately here.

It is useful to remind the [redacted] that if they were to contemplate an [redacted] they could not count on [redacted] when the attack arrived. I -- and others in the Administration -- have given such reminders.

[redacted] and the [redacted]

At the same time, I believe it would be dangerous, wrong, and ineffective for us to plan to [redacted] instead of merely [redacted] on our not doing so.

-- By definition, a [redacted] No matter how much we "proved" technically that any [redacted] was foolproof, the people would, rightly distrust a policy which required that the [redacted]

-- It is a principle of our planning, especially in this Administration, [redacted] will be able to make the real decisions in a [redacted]

-- Finally a [redacted] has serious [redacted] because it depends on the [redacted] The temptation for the [redacted]

[redacted] We would not want a policy that forced [redacted]

In short, it is useful to remind the [redacted] of the possibility and to do certain things to make it feasible, but reliance on [redacted] as a substitute for a [redacted] is not an acceptable option militarily, technically, politically -- nor, I believe, morally.

DIR STT

10 Oct 85

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