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Authority: NSD 959230  
By: SPB/NARA DMS 1/17/96

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*RF file?*  
*Let's be sure*  
*& return*  
*in defense of the*  
*Department to*  
*be used*  
*in coming*  
*then*

American Embassy, SHAPE/L,  
Paris, France,  
January 11, 1961.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL  
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Dear Russ:

I returned from a brief but delightful holiday in Berchtesgaden and environs in time to catch only the last stage of General Norstad's review of the staff paper prepared in answer to the questions posed by Congressman Holifield and Mr. Ramey. I hope that the information sent from this office on the manner of handling these inquiries has been sufficient to enable the Department to assert its prerogatives in joining with Defense to determine the propriety of releasing the information contained in the responses.

The preliminary memorandum of your December 29 conversation with JCAE members and staff, thoughtfully pouched to us by Jake, arrived in time to be of considerable help in the final polishing of General Norstad's report. At several points, the responses were sharpened by virtue of awareness of the Committee's current thinking. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum by Bill Hamilton that will indicate some of the General's preliminary reactions to the uncleared record of this meeting. You will be especially interested in the final paragraph, and I feel sure that the need for great discretion in its use will be immediately apparent.

I assume that your query of December 27 concerns the transcript of the JCAE meeting with General Norstad at SHAPE. The recent evidence that State and Defense

Russell Fessenden, Esquire,  
Director, Office of  
European Regional Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington.

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are sharing the same problems with respect to meeting the Committee's desires has removed General Norstad's early objection, and General Loper has acknowledged Norstad's request that a copy be passed to you.

Sincerely,

Raymond L. Thurston

Enclosure:

As stated. ✓

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This document is

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January 10, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: General Norstad's Comments on December 29  
State-JCAE Meeting

I passed the uncleared memorandum of conversation covering the December 29 meeting between State Department officials and members in the staff of the JCAE to General Norstad for his personal use, in advance of his review of the staff papers prepared in response to the questions posed to him by the Committee following the recent European tour. The General read out extracts of this memorandum at the first of two meetings held to review staff papers, which took place on January 5. Present were Generals Moore, Johnson, Coiner and Bondley (EUCOM); Colonels Downey and Taylor (EUCOM); and myself.

General Norstad stated that he was disposed to answer directly and "crisply"--though politely--the questions put to him by the Committee, attempting to deal both with specific points and with evident misunderstandings. He instructed Colonel Taylor to deal with the Committee on this basis during his forthcoming consultation in Washington. During the review session, General Norstad indicated that several of his changes in the staff papers stem directly from the record of the December 29 meeting. These related to Question 1 in the JCAE requests, in response to which he added a section designed to illustrate the reality of the European contribution to NATO; Question 3, the response to which was sharpened; and Question 4, for which he directed the substitution of a direct statement in place of the rather elaborate circumvention of the issue in the staff presentation.

General Norstad commented on the difficulties of satisfying all members of the Committee and its staff, as evident from various passages in the record of the December 29 meeting. For example, he noted that within the space of two pages NATO had changed from having "zero capability" (in the mind of one member) to being over-armed (in the view of another). He observed that the complaints about inadequate flow of restricted data represented a complete reversal of the Committee's original intent at the beginning of the tour, which had been to determine that there was laxness in the security system.

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A number of the specific incidents, reported by the staff in its account of the European trip, need not have disturbed the Committee, in the SHAPE view, had it been in possession of complete or correct facts. Colonels Bonnot and Taylor, who served as escort officers during the trip and who are being called to Washington to consult with the Committee in the preparation of its final report, are familiar with these incidents and, in most cases, have the information necessary to give a complete explanation of the circumstances. For example:

1. The allegation (page 10 of the record) that a U.S. custodian at a British Canberra base was unaware of his instructions. The individual in question was a guard, not a custodian, and when Colonel Bonnot and one member of the JCAE staff tested his reaction by attempting to stroll casually toward the loaded plane, they were immediately stopped.
2. The allegation that two young guards at a site near the Bulgarian border recently went out of their heads (page 11). The only possibly related occurrence which EUCOM can identify was the recent transfer of two guards on medical grounds, as a preventive measure when a review of records disclosed possible neurotic tendencies.
3. The allegation (page 12) that at the time of the Turkish coup General Norstad had twice almost ordered the evacuation of atomic weapons. The fact is that the Committee, while in Turkey, had asked what precautionary measures had been taken at the time of the coup, and was informed matter of factly that the routinely prepared contingency plans for such an evacuation had been reviewed in routine fashion to make sure that they were up-to-date. General Norstad had neither ordered nor been aware of this review.
4. General Norstad had not been aware of the Italian refusal to permit a Turkish familiarization visit to sites in Italy (page 14). He commented that he was sure such a visit could have been arranged had he known of the request and had the proposal been handled properly.

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General Norstad indicated some unhappiness with two statements attributed to State representatives in the record of the December 29 meeting. The first is the assertion that procurement of 100 additional missiles by the allies was a condition of our offer to commit the five Polaris submarines (page 5). It is General Norstad's interpretation that although the permanent commitment of the five submarines would be conditional on such additional procurement, the December offer of the initial allocation was not so conditioned. Secondly, he is unhappy over the statement (page 5) that the additional deployment of MRBMs would be sea-borne. He commented that he felt this was the blind spot in the Polaris program. He considers the proposal for mixed crews infeasible and, since it is the U.S. intention to leave to SACEUR the determination of feasibility, that issue is in effect dead. He observed further that he does not like the idea of too many Polaris submarines wandering about the ocean area. He considers it preferable to leave the submarines essentially under U.S. command and, believing that the missiles are "safer on the ground", he remains opposed to confining our thinking solely to a sea-borne deployment.

Drafted by:  
William C. Hamilton:SHAPE/L:djm

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Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, [nsarchiv@gwu.edu](mailto:nsarchiv@gwu.edu)