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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: October 24, 1967

SUBJECT: ADMS on Turkish-Soviet Border

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, USSR
Deputy Under Secretary Foy D. Kohler

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I lunched with Ambassador Dobrynin today at his invitation and had a general discussion lasting from 1:15 to 3:15 p.m.

During the conversation, the Ambassador referred to his approach to me on October 2 with respect to the question of ADMS on the Turkish-Soviet border. He said the Soviet officials were somewhat at a loss to know who had taken the initiative or who was approaching whom on this matter. He said we seem to indicate that it was the Turks, and the Turks had plainly indicated to the Soviets that they were being pushed by the Americans. He could tell me for my private information that the Turkish Desk of the Soviet Foreign Ministry had prepared a strong demarche to be made to the United States protesting against this and charging us with full responsibility. The American section had not wanted to clear this proposed demarche but was having difficulty in resisting it. Fortunately, the Ambassador had arrived there at about that time and was able to discuss the question at a higher level in the Foreign Office.

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Priority NND 969000B NARA Date 1/27

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He had said that he was not a defender of American policies but that it was not at all clear to him that in this instance it was the Americans who were mainly responsible. As a result, higher level decision had been that the responsibilities were distributed at least 50-50 and that, therefore, the Turkish Desk's proposal had not been approved.

I told the Ambassador that I did not wish to engage in any controversy involving an ally like the Turks. However, I said that any objective observer, who had followed American nuclear policy within the NATO Alliance, should have known in understanding that our policy had been to keep control of nuclear weapons ourselves within the Alliance and not to proliferate them, even when we were discussing such questions as the MLF and the ANF which had been so vigorously attacked by the Soviet Government and by Soviet propaganda. The Ambassador agreed that this was a valid observation and said he was sure we fully understood that their policy within the Warsaw Pact was the same. The only difference, he commented, was that the United States felt so impelled to give a public impression of sharing, a problem which they had not had to face.

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