



Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

31 JUL 1986

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence

This is an assessment I requested shortly after the crisis at Chernobyl. I believe our sensor performed pretty well considering the national priority afforded targets of this type. For your information PFIAB has expressed an interest in any collection critique done on Chernobyl.



Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND WEAPONS RESEARCH

**Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency**

29 July 1986

NOTE TO: DDI

This is the evaluation of Chernobyl collection you requested. I prepared this memo with many crucial inputs from CRES. Although the memo has taken longer than anticipated, I literally let the smoke clear a little before drafting it. From my standpoint this was the right decision. I think all of us now feel better about the adequacy of our collection than we did immediately after the crises.


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[Redacted]

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Cy 6 of 14
31 July 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: [Redacted]
Deputy Director of Scientific and Weapons Research

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SUBJECT: Collection on Chernobyl Disaster [Redacted]

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1. Action Requested: For your information only. We are taking action to implement the recommendations [Redacted] to improve Intelligence Community responsiveness in future crises like the Chernobyl event, which we believe by and large was effective:

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[Redacted]

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Nevertheless, we need to pursue the possibility of enhanced IR tipoff, manage our collection requirements better, and improve our communications with US Government agencies outside the Community on this type of catastrophe. [Redacted]

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2. Background: The characteristics of the Chernobyl reactor were well known before the incident. The Soviets have published extensively on the RBMK, and we have followed the construction of all such reactors in the Soviet Union. Ironically, in February the Soviets published a slick public relations article on the Chernobyl reactor complex in SOVIET LIFE touting the reactors' design safety features. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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SUBJECT: Collection on Chernobyl Disaster [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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4. **Event Reporting:** Our first indication of the disaster came [Redacted] on Monday, 28 April, which indicated a possible leak of radioactive material at a Swedish facility. Later Swedish authorities determined that the radioactivity was coming from the east. Based on these reports, the Air Force was asked to use weather data to attempt to determine the source of the radioactivity. Spurred by the Swedish announcement and international concern the Soviets announced there had been an accident at the Chernobyl reactor. This announcement was monitored by FBIS at about 1200 EDT on 28 April and promptly reported. This was the first report giving the location of the event. [Redacted]

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

30 July 1986

NOTE TO: DD/OSWR

Bob:

This is a good job. I hate to make you redo the piece, but I don't think it is necessary for the Director to approve the actions you have recommended. I would rather say that this memo is for his information and we will implement the actions outlined [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] I would also lead off by saying that we will take the necessary actions to implement the following and then list the three tics. 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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