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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

JOSS-423-01



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: A Strategic Analysis of the Impact of the Acquisition by Communist China of a Nuclear Capability (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have had prepared a strategic analysis of the impact of the acquisition by Communist China of a nuclear capability. A copy of this analysis is attached.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. The attainment of a nuclear capability by Communist China will have a marked impact on the security posture of the United States and the Free world, particularly in Asia.

b. The United States should use the time that is still available to counter this impact through coordinated political, psychological, economic, and military actions.

3. The military impact of this capability will continue to be reflected in appropriate strategic plans. Because of the scope and importance of the problem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. This analysis be referred to the Department of State for consideration of the nonmilitary points in the required actions.

b. A combined State-Defense-Central Intelligence Agency-United States Information Agency Plan be developed to insure that appropriate, timely and coordinated national action is taken with respect to this problem.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LUSHKINA
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

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Tab B

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By MAD NAFV Dair 2/04
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APPENDIX

A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE
ACQUISITION BY COMMUNIST CHINA OF A
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

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Appendix

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SUMMARY OF THE APPRAISAL

1. The attainment of a nuclear capability by Communist China will have a marked impact on the security posture of the United States and the Free World, particularly in Asia.
2. The United States, and her Allies, should use the time that is still available to counter this impact through coordinated political, psychological, economic, and military actions.
3. Specifically, action should be taken now (prior to 1962) to:
 - a. Postpone the attainment of a nuclear capability by Communist China as long as possible.
 - b. Prepare to lessen the psychological impact on Asia and Africa of news of the first nuclear detonation.
 - c. Strengthen Western alliances in Asia.
 - d. Strengthen the pro-Western orientation of non-alliance countries.
 - e. Develop an active "Atoms for Peace" program in India.
 - f. Assist Japan in the peaceful application of nuclear knowledge.
 - g. Accelerate the over-all economic development of the non-communist, under-developed countries.
 - h. Cause the uncommitted people to recognize communism as a basic threat to their security and enhance their will to defend themselves against it.
 - i. Strengthen the internal security of non-communist Asian nations.
 - j. Exploit Sino-Soviet differences.
 - k. Discourage the development of "Nth Country" nuclear weapons capabilities in Asia.
 - l. Exploit the weakness of the Chinese Communist regime.
4. Plans and programs should be initiated now to attain the following military objectives in the mid-range period (approximately 1962-64 to 1968-70):

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- a. Strengthen the US nuclear capability in Asia and the Western Pacific. 1
- b. Strengthen the air defense capability in the area. 2
- c. Strengthen the nonnuclear capabilities in the area. 3
- d. Provide certain selected Asian allies in the area with a potential nuclear delivery capability. 4
- 5. The following additional objectives are required in the long-range period (1968-1970 to well within the 1970 decade): 5
- a. Complete a cohesive alliance, or alliances, which will form the center of anti-CHICOM resistance in the area. 6
- b. Strengthen the US base complex in the area. 7

A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE
ACQUISITION BY COMMUNIST CHINA OF A
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

I - THE PROBLEM

1. To:

- a. Develop a strategic analysis of the impact of the acquisition by the CHICOMS of a nuclear capability on the United States and Free World security posture and deployments with particular respect to Free Asia and Africa.
- b. Determine actions which should be taken in order to counteract the impact of Communist Chinese achievement of a nuclear capability.

II - BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

2. This study does not consider the impact of arms control or nuclear weapons control measures. A meaningful agreement in this area involving Communist China would change the results of this analysis, but the type and extent of such measures cannot be assessed at this time.

III - TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON THIS PROBLEM

3. Nuclear Weapons

- a. Communist China may be able to test a nuclear device between 1952-1964. These dates could be moved up or back depending on the tempo of Soviet aid.*
- b. Six months or so after detonating a nuclear device, they could have a crude fission weapon deliverable by the BULL bomber** which the USSR has already made available to Communist China. However, at least two years would probably be required after the first test to produce a small stockpile of elementary weapons, at which time a limited capability

* NIE 1-61, paragraph 22; on file in Joint Secretariat
** NIE 100-4-50, paragraph 3; on file in Joint Secretariat

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would exist with an aircraft which could reach Japan, 1
 Taiwan, Okinawa, South Korea, and South Vietnam as well as 2
 additional areas in Southeast Asia. In addition, by 1965 3
 they may have a substantial number of jet medium bombers, 4
 assuming continued Soviet assistance.* 5

c. A substantial growth in the capacity of the CHICOMS 6
 to produce and assemble complex military equipment is likely.**7
 Accordingly, during the five year period after detonation of 8
 a device, a capability could be developed for nuclear weapons 9
 carried by fighter-type aircraft and used as warheads for 10
 unguided, relatively short-range rockets. The rate of tech- 11
 nological advance will, of course, be highly dependent on 12
 USSR assistance. Even furnishing proven designs would materi-13
 ally aid the CHICOM effort. Providing intricate machine 14
 tools would further accelerate the rate of advance. Con- 15
 versely, withdrawal of USSR assistance would retard the 16
 CHICOM's program, but would not eliminate their ability to 17
 produce nuclear weapons at a later date. 18

4. Guided Missile Systems. The Communist Chinese missile 19
 program is estimated now to be in the early research and develop-20
 ment phase.*** They will certainly move as rapidly as they are 21
 capable towards the development of ballistic missiles, probably 22
 concentrating initially on a missile with a range of 200-500 nm 23
 and capable of carrying a fission warhead. They could develop 24
 such missiles by the 1968-1970 period, or with considerable 25
 Soviet assistance, much earlier.*** The Communist Chinese 26
 could not, by themselves, produce the ICBM necessary to give 27
 them a capability against the United States until well after 28
 1970.** 29

* NIE 13-60, paragraph 61; on file in Joint Secretariat
 ** NIE 1-61, paragraph 22; on file in Joint Secretariat
 *** NIE 13-60, paragraph 62; on file in Joint Secretariat

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IV - IMPACT OF THE ACQUISITION OF A NUCLEAR
CAPABILITY BY COMMUNIST CHINA

5. This section contains a brief summary of the impact 1
on Asia, Africa and Latin America that may result if Communist 2
China acquires a nuclear capability. In addition, the possible 3
effect of Communist China emerging as a world power is discussed. 4

6. Impact on Asia. 5

a. A primary goal of Communist China is to be the acknowl- 6
edged leader of Asia and to extend Communist control through- 7
out Asia. The Communist Chinese view the United States as 8
the major obstacle to her attainment of this objective. The 9
US position in Asia is based on political and economic co- 10
operation with our Allies, the maintenance of Free World 11
armed strength in Asia and the ocean areas contiguous thereto, 12
and related efforts that will convince the people of Asia 13
that resistance to Communism, and alliance with the Free World, 14
offer a better future than that offered by Communist China. 15
Thus, the United States is engaged in a long-term contest 16
with Communist China throughout Asia. 17

b. The first impact on Free Asia of Communist China's 18
acquisition of a nuclear capability would occur as soon as 19
the first device is detonated. We should expect the CHICOMS 20
to voluntarily announce their accomplishment and exploit the 21
occasion to the fullest through propaganda. The impact of 22
this propaganda cannot be over-estimated. Even though the 23
initial propaganda might emphasize the peaceful aspects of 24
nuclear power, the military effect will be immediately 25
obvious to the countries on Communist China's periphery. 26
The dominant reaction would be a fear that the chances of 27
war had increased and there would be stronger pressures for 28
full acceptance of Communist China as a member of the world 29

community. While some countries in Asia would increasingly
 look to the United States to provide a counterbalance to
 Communist China's military strength, there would also be a
 heightened inclination toward accommodation with Peiping.

c. Once Communist China detonates a nuclear device, and
 particularly when it attains a nuclear weapons capability,
 its foreign policy will become more truculent and militant.*
 She will attempt to exaggerate constantly her actual capa-
 bility. To a great extent, the Western oriented peripheral
 nations (Nationalist China, Philippines, Thailand, South
 Vietnam, South Korea and Malaya) have considered that a
 rough sort of balance exists between China's manpower on
 the mainland and US military power deployed in Asia and
 the Western Pacific. The CHICOMS may be expected to make
 every effort to convince these pro-Western peripheral nations
 that this balance no longer exists and that the United States
 can no longer protect countries located close to China and
 far from the United States.

d. During this initial period, while Communist China is
 building up a small stockpile of nuclear weapons and depend-
 ing on manned aircraft for the sole delivery means, the
 propaganda and political advantages of becoming a nuclear
 power would outweigh the actual military advantage gained
 by the CHICOMS. US Military power assigned to PACOM, and
 available for deployment to the Asian periphery, will remain
 superior, at least through the first two years of the period.
 The requirement for convincing the pro-Western peripheral
 nations that this superiority exists would, however, become
 increasingly more difficult. Increased requests for indigen-
 ous air defense capabilities must be anticipated. In sum-
 mary, the price and difficulty of maintaining a pro-Western
 orientation of non-communist nations would go up; politically
 economically, psychologically and militarily.

* NIE 13-60, paragraph 90; on file in Joint Secretariat

e. Within three to five years after acquiring a nuclear capability, the CHICOMS will be capable of developing an appreciable stockpile of weapons deliverable by a variety of aircraft, possibly including some supersonic fighter types. The actual military balance of power in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia will then start to swing toward Communist China, unless the United States and her Asian Allies increase their military posture in the area.

f. CHICOM military power would be considerably augmented by the acquisition of a medium-range missile with a nuclear warhead, possibly in the 1968-1970 time period. A 500 nm missile based in China, North Korea or North Vietnam, will provide complete coverage of Okinawa, Formosa and Southeast Asia as well as partial coverage of Japan and the Philippines. The problem of maintaining US alliances and the pro-Western orientation of free Asian nations during this period will be most complex. None of the peripheral nations has the technical or economic ability to maintain a missile defense system. Only Japan and India have the capability of developing an offensive missile capability to function as a partial deterrent, and the neutralist tendencies in each of these countries is too strong to warrant placing much reliance at this time on their military efforts in the missile - nuclear field.

7. Impact on Africa and Latin America.

a. Communist China has been giving great attention to Africa and Latin America. In Africa, it has given strong support to the Algerian revolutionary regime, concluded several agreements with Guinea, and sent trade and cultural

delegations to many new African countries. The CHICOMS 1
 undoubtedly estimate that the confusion, inexperience, 2
 anti-colonist sentiment, and racialism which exist in 3
 Africa can be exploited not only for Communist, but for 4
 Chinese Communist benefit. CHICOM activities have been 5
 greatly stepped up in Latin America. Peiping will almost 6
 certainly further increase its activities in Latin America 7
 and may well exert a growing appeal, due in part to Communist 8
 China's rapid economic progress from an under-developed status.* 9

b. The acquisition of a nuclear capability by the 10
 CHICOMS would have political, psychological or propaganda 11
 implications in these areas rather than military. The 12
 attention of the under-developed, and/or politically immature 13
 nations would be directed to the superior accomplishment of 14
 an Asian communist nation vis-a-vis such non-communist 15
 countries as India and Japan. Promises of technological 16
 assistance in the nuclear reactor field will probably be 17
 made. Even though the CHICOMS cannot make any substantial 18
 contribution in the reactor area before the latter part of 19
 the decade, they could begin to advance an image of techno- 20
 logical leadership. This image would increase the attrac- 21
 tiveness of extensive economic and educational agreements 22
 with the under-developed nations of the world. 23

8. Impact on Communist China's Role as a World Power. 24

Communist China is determined to be accepted as a major world 25
 power. Her acquisition of a nuclear capability could have a 26
 particular bearing in the following areas: 27

a. Relations with the USSR. The exact relations that 28
 will exist between these two nations in the future cannot 29
 be determined with any degree of finiteness at this time. 30

* NIE 13-60, paragraph 86 and 88; on file in Joint Secretariat

Although openly Allies, it is believe that the Soviets 1
 have provided technical assistance in the nuclear area at 2
 a deliberate pace, hoping to postpone the attainment of a 3
 native Chinese nuclear weapons capability as long as 4
 possible.* Acquisition of her own nuclear capability would 5
 increase Communist China's freedom of action both politically 6
 and militarily. This freedom of action, coupled with an 7
 aggressive CHICOM policy in Asia and Africa might possibly 8
 produce a number of specific instances where the objectives 9
 of Communist China are in conflict with the objectives of the 10
 USSR. A united, aggressive, foreign policy of the USSR 11
 and Communist China, when both are nuclear powers, would 12
 pose an increased danger to the Free World. On the other 13
 hand, a militant, unilateral CHICOM policy in Asia alone 14
 can pose dangers to the US position in Asia which would 15
 have serious long-range implications. 16

b. Relations with the United Nations. The acquisition 17
 of a nuclear capability would increase Communist China's 18
 status as a world power, particularly in the eyes of the 19
 new countries of Africa and Asia. This reaction could in- 20
 crease existing pressures for admitting her to the United 21
 Nations. 22

c. Arms Control. Even before the explosion of a nuclear 23
 device, Peiping's military power and potential may increas- 24
 ingly complicate the international disarmament problem. 25
 If Western disarmament negotiations with the USSR make sig- 26
 nificant progress, international pressures will probably 27
 grow greatly for Communist China's participation. Peiping's 28
 leverage with respect to disarmament will become even 29
 greater once China has become a nuclear power. Peiping will 30

* NIE 13²-2-50, paragraph 1; on file in Joint Secretariat

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exploit this situation in an effort to enhance its international status, but at the same time may attempt to prevent the conclusion of any disarmament agreement, at least until it becomes a nuclear power.*

V - UNITED STATES ACTION REQUIRED TO
COUNTERACT THE IMPACT OF A COMMUNIST CHINA
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

9. Three time periods are considered in this analysis. Inasmuch as they are determined by advances in Communist Chinese technology, their limits are not precise. They do, however, correspond generally to the short-range, mid-range and long-range planning periods of the Joint Program for Planning.

a. The first time period begins now and ends with the detonation by the Communist Chinese of a nuclear device, probably in the period 1962-1964.

b. The second time period begins with the detonation of a nuclear device. It extends through the date when the first weapons are produced and stockpiled and will end when the primary delivery vehicle changes from the airplane to the guided missile. Development of a 500 nm missile is possible by the end of the decade, i.e., 1968-1970.**

c. The third time period begins with the advent of a missile capability. It extends through the date when Communist China will produce an appreciable number of short or medium-range guided missiles with nuclear warheads. This period will terminate at such time as the CHICOMS acquire a long-range attack capability through ICBM's, some time well after 1970.**

d. The above dates are subject to change according to the degree of technical assistance given to the CHICOMS by the USSR. The most extreme, although not agreed, view,

* NIE 13-60, paragraph 91; on file in Joint Secretariat
** NIE 13-60, paragraph 62; on file in Joint Secretariat

is that the second period could begin with the detonation of
 a nuclear device as early as late 1961.* The third period
 might then begin as early as 1965-1966 if the USSR increased
 her assistance, particularly by furnishing precision parts
 and assemblies.

10. Short-range period. (Now until 1962-1964). The following
 actions should be initiated now in order to minimize the impact
 of the first CHICOM nuclear detonation.

a. Postpone the Attainment of a Nuclear Capability by
 Communist China as Long as Possible. The United States,
 together with appropriate Free World Allies, should take all
 feasible overt and covert actions now to postpone attainment
 of this capability as long as possible. Concerted efforts by
 appropriate US governmental agencies in conjunction with those
 of Free World allies should be directed towards accomplishment
 of this mutual objective.

b. Prepare to lessen the psychological impact on Asia and
 Africa of news of the first nuclear detonation. The United
 States must use the one or two years available to weaken
 drastically the psychological impact of the first CHICOM
 nuclear detonation. This event has potential repercussions in
 Asia far exceeding the impact of the first USSR space satellite.
 Available intelligence should be used in preparing a coordinated
 information and psychological warfare plan for immediate
 execution by the Department of State, Department of Defense,
 Central Intelligence Agency and United States Information
 Agency. The plan should provide for actions at all echelons
 of government, diplomatic and military, which will simul-
 taneously advance a common point; i.e., the acquisition by
 Communist China of a nuclear capability does not change the

* NIE 13-2-60, paragraph 7, and footnote 1; on file in Joint
 Secretariat

balance of power in Asia and the Western Pacific in her favor; does not change US policy toward our Asian Allies or our determination to support them; but does prove the emphasis in Communist ideology on armed aggression and arms development at the expense of measures that could be taken to advance the well-being of the people.

c. Strengthen Western Alliances in Asia. The foreseeable impact of a Communist Chinese nuclear capability provides new urgency to strengthen the political, economic, and military aspects of our Asian Alliances. Peripheral Asia is going to experience considerably greater stresses and strains before the end of this decade than have been experienced in the past and the United States should act now while our military power in the area is still demonstrably superior. Although this area is not now susceptible to a NATO type of alliance, the United States must work for a solidarity of non-Communist Asia that is considerably stronger than that which now exists. Positive steps should be taken to insure that these countries are not susceptible to nuclear blackmail. Present bilateral (e.g., Japan) and multilateral (e.g., SEATO) treaties should be used as starting points for increased solidarity.

d. Strengthen the pro-Western Orientation of Nonalliance Countries. This task is as urgent as the above for certain of the "neutralist" countries occupy important positions second only to those countries with which the United States maintains specific alliances. These nations must be brought into the Free World community, primarily through political and economic actions.

e. Develop an Active "Atoms for Peace" Program in India. This task is in addition to the general political-economic tasks outlined in d above. It is important because of the position of India and Communist China among the underdeveloped nations of the world. Both countries are attempting

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rapid advancement; the methods being employed by India, fundamentally based on Western philosophy, must not appear as "second best" throughout the world. It would be to the United States advantage if India assumed a position of leadership in Asia in the development of nuclear reactors for powering medical research, etc. India has moderate capabilities in the area of nuclear technology* which could be increased by US assistance.

f. Assist Japan in the peaceful application of nuclear knowledge. Japanese success in this area will provide additional proof of the technological advancement of non-communist Asian countries. Present and future technological advances should be publicized within peripheral Asia. Full advantage of Japan's contribution to the peaceful application of nuclear knowledge should be advertised to ensure that the Asian world is keenly aware of Japan's progress and local leadership in this field. In addition, it will be to the advantage of the United States if Japan remains technologically allied to the West.

g. Accelerate the over-all economic development of the non-communist, under-developed countries. This task is inherent in each of the tasks outlined above. The Free World must be able to show demonstrably that the Communist philosophy is not required for the economic development of a country. In addition, many scientific advances have been forthcoming as a result of the extension of the parameters of knowledge on the peaceful use of radioactive substances. Peoples of non-communist, under-developed countries should be educated as to how this technique could further the economic standards of those nations in such fields as medicine and agriculture.

* NIE 100-4-6Q, Table 1; on file in Joint Secretariat

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h. Cause the uncommitted people to recognize communism 1
as a basic threat to their security and enhance their will 2
to defend themselves against it. The United States should 3
 inculcate in the peoples of the developing countries an 4
 awareness of their stake in the efforts of the West to 5
 block the spread of communism in order to enhance their 6
 own will to defend themselves. 7

1. Strengthen the internal security of non-communist 8
Asian nations. These nations must not fall to communism 9
 through internal subversion and insurgency conducted in 10
 conjunction with pressures from Communist China. Combined 11
 political-psychological-economic-military programs are 12
 required. 13

j. Exploit Sino-Soviet Differences. Attempts should be 14
 made, as feasible, to widen rifts in the relations between 15
 the USSR and Communist China by both overt and covert means. 16
 Exploitation in the propaganda/psychological field 17
 should be made to open any rift between the USSR and Com- 18
 munist China to the end that the Soviets will realize the 19
 implicit danger in a Chinese nuclear capability. 20

k. Discourage the development of "Nth Country" nuclear 21
weapons capabilities in Asia. As a matter of policy, the 22
 United States should attempt to discourage the acquisition 23
 of an indigenous nuclear weapons capability by additional 24
 nations in Asia. Such a policy should be designed to 25
 elevate the importance of the nuclear capability of the 26
 United States in the area. Accordingly, the policy should 27
 show the disadvantages which will accrue when undeveloped 28
 countries use scarce resources for other than the peaceful 29
 goals of nuclear research. Further, the United States should 30
 attempt to have any US-Soviet agreement on cessation of 31
 nuclear testing extended to include other countries, 32
 particularly Communist China, in order to limit the develop- 33
 ment of nuclear weapons by other Soviet Bloc countries. 34

The United States should not adhere to such agreement, unless
Communist China accedes within a reasonable period of time.

1. Exploit the weakness of the Communist Regime. The
United States and selected Asian allies should undertake
effective and coordinated clandestine activities utilizing
trained indigenous forces to exploit the weakness of the
Chinese Communist regime and to lessen its control within
China. The ultimate objective of these activities would
be to reduce Chinese Communist power and prestige throughout
Asia thus tending to offset the prestige advantages accruing
from the attainment of a nuclear capability.

11. Mid-range period (Approximately 1962-1964 to 1968-1970)
The measures listed above must be continued during the stresses
and strains which will occur after the CHICOMS obtain a nuclear
capability. The following additional military objectives
should be attained early in the period; however, plans and pro-
grams must be initiated now:

a. Strengthen the US nuclear capability in Asia and the
Western Pacific. There is a requirement for a demonstrable
deterrence that will convince the peripheral nations that
the acquisition of a nuclear capability has not given the
CHICOMS a power advantage in Asia or the Western Pacific
area. During this period the United States will have a
missile advantage. This could be exploited through frequent
training exercises where US missile units support indigenous
troops. US weapons storage rights should be acquired in
selected Asian countries.

b. Strengthen the Air Defense capability in the area.
A complete air defense system of the NATO type cannot be
developed in Asia, primarily because of the technological
and economic status of the countries concerned. Pressures
to equip each country with the air defense missiles and
aircraft required for complete protection, but beyond the

country's ability to operate and maintain, must be avoided. 1
 Rather, a careful balance between indigenous and US capa- 2
 bility must be obtained in the significant areas. The 3
 CHICOM capability during the later part of the period will 4
 probably require increased efforts such as coordinated 5
 regional air defense organizations in such areas as Okinawa - 6
 South Korea - Japan. Nuclear air defense capabilities may 7
 be required, with selected Asian countries manning the 8
 missiles or aircraft, while the United States retains con- 9
 trol of nuclear components. 10

c. Strengthen the nonnuclear capabilities in the area. 11
 The CHICOM conventional military capabilities will almost 12
 certainly continue to grow and will increasingly threaten 13
 the noncommunist Asian periphery. This course of action, 14
 therefore, includes defense of the peripheral nations 15
 against nonnuclear attack from either the CHICOMS or com- 16
 munist satellites as well as an effective indigenous counter-17
 guerrilla capability. 18

d. Provide Certain Selected Asian Allies in the Area 19
with a Potential Nuclear Delivery Capability. The provision 20
 of a potential nuclear delivery capability including 21
 missiles to selected allies will materially offset the 22
 Chinese Communist gain and will enhance the Free World 23
 position of strength in the area. Such provision will 24
 be with the United States retaining control of nuclear 25
 components. 26

12. Long-range period (From 1968-1970 to well into the 27
 1970 decade). This period, characterized by a CHICOM missile- 28
 nuclear capability, will be the most difficult time for the 29
 peripheral countries of Asia. The actions initiated above, 30
 under both time periods, must be continued. The following 31
 additional objectives are required: 32

a. Complete a cohesive alliance, or alliances, which 1
will form the center of anti-CHICOM resistance in the area. 2
 As noted above, the peripheral countries of Asia, even those 3
 allied to the United States, do not have now the capability 4
 of forming a cohesive alliance which will form an "all- 5
 Asian" bulwark against Communist China. Major steps in 6
 this direction must be taken during this decade if these 7
 countries are to survive. Political, psychological, 8
 economic and military solidarity must be achieved. The 9
 United States should begin, now, to assist and guide the 10
 Asian nations in this direction. 11

b. Strengthen the US base complex in the area. United 12
 States bases located in the Western Pacific and Asia should 13
 not be evacuated because of a direct missile threat posed 14
 by Communist China. However, the vulnerability of the 15
 base complex must be realistically assessed vis-a-vis the 16
 CHICOM missile capability by the end of this decade. 17
 Technological advances in mobility can be exploited to 18
 reduce the vulnerability of US forces in the area. As an 19
 example, the security of US forces in the Far East could be 20
 increased by: 21

(1) Development of US possessions in the Western 22
 Pacific to provide depth and dispersal in military 23
 deployments. 24

(2) Development of additional bases within Asian 25
 countries bound to each other and to the United States 26
 by alliances. 27

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