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By ew NARA Date 9/15/95

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# Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Copy Nr. 1 of 10

TO : C - Mr. MacArthur  
S/P - Mr. Bowie  
EUR - Mr. Elbrick ✓

DATE: November 7, 1956

FROM : RA - Mr. Lunger ✓

*Stock pull  
General*

SUBJECT:

The attached memorandum is circulated in advance in preparation for discussion at a meeting this afternoon at 2:15 p.m.

Attachments:

1. Memorandum to The Acting Secretary from Mr. Elbrick by RA:Lunger 11/7/56;
2. Memorandum to The Secretary from Mr. Beam dated October 16, 1956 (photostat);
3. Letter to Secretary of Defense Wilson from Mr. Hoover by RA:Lunger 11/7/56;  
Enclosure: Memorandum for the President from the Acting Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense, by RA:Lunger, 11/5/56.

EUR:RA:Lunger:adm  
11/7/56

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*3-2/2 Renewal*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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MEMORANDUM

To: The Acting Secretary

Through: S/S

From: EUR - Mr. Elbrick

Subject: Program to Increase NATO Nuclear Capability and Secure Certain Base Rights.

Several weeks ago the Secretary approved a memorandum on this subject (see Tab A) which proposed our undertaking a number of steps leading to an announcement by the United States at the December NATO Ministerial meeting that we are prepared to offer NATO countries training in the employment of atomic weapons, subject to certain arrangements. In this connection we would be prepared to reply, if questioned, that we would make atomic weapons available to NATO forces trained in their use if and when this should become necessary in view of an emergency facing NATO. We also proposed that in accordance with Ambassador Dillon's suggestion he be authorized to make a specific offer of training to the French and at the same time seek French agreement to the introduction and storage by the United States of nuclear weapons in France.

If we are to adhere to the program recommended in the attached memorandum, it is now in order, in concert with the Department of Defense and after informing the Atomic Energy Commission of our intentions, to seek the President's approval. For that purpose a letter from you to the Secretary of Defense, with a proposed memorandum to the President from you and Mr. Wilson, has been prepared for your signature and is attached at Tab B. I believe, however, that you may wish to review the Secretary's earlier approval in the light of the subsequent developments in the Middle East. To facilitate this, I am listing below what it seems to me are the principal arguments in favor and against proceeding now with the recommended program.

In Favor:

1) As noted in the attached memorandum, increasing the nuclear capability of NATO is desired by United States military authorities as an enhancement of our security and the military have in the past few days confirmed their active support of this plan. We and they are both persuaded that it would give the defense programs of our NATO allies a psychological lift at a time when it is badly needed.

2) Planning for

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2) Planning for the use of atomic weapons has been accepted by NATO for some time, and we must be prepared to deal with the question of how NATO forces other than those of the United States and the United Kingdom would secure an atomic capability. In the NATO Council meeting of October 23 this question was specifically raised by a Belgian representative (see Tab C).

3) The independent action taken by the French with regard to Palestine suggests even more strongly the desirability of seeking to exert some control over French use of atomic weapons through the NATO multilateral approach to the weapons question, given the fact that the French will shortly be able to produce weapons for themselves in any event.

4) The NATO alliance is a fundamental article of United States security and foreign policy, and divisive forces which threaten NATO should be combated with initiatives on our part which will contribute toward the earliest possible re cementing of the ties among the allies.

Against:

1) Recent events in the Middle East may have strengthened the reservations held in certain United States quarters about proceeding with the training of NATO countries in the use of atomic weapons, or may have brought about at least a "wait and see" attitude. There may be a serious question as to whether the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Congressional Committee, among others, would be prepared now to see this program go forward, and it is not to be ruled out that their opposition would be so strong in the present atmosphere as to prevent our reviving this project even at a considerably later date.

2) The recommended program is something new for NATO, and we have not thus far revealed to any of the NATO countries our intentions in this matter. The fact that we suspended action within the United States Government would not become known, and therefore would not risk being interpreted by our allies as an indication that we are pulling back from full cooperation in the NATO alliance.

3) It is not now possible to predict the course of action in the Middle East, but it is quite possible that our recommended program might reach a critical point, such as offering the French training in the use of atomic weapons, just when Middle East developments would encourage the distortion and misuse of such action on our part in a manner seriously damaging to United States interests.

Conclusion:

The program approved by the Secretary on the basis of the memorandum at Tab A continues to be of fundamental importance to the continued development and solidarity of the NATO alliance and should move forward

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as rapidly as circumstances permit. The immediate question is whether it continues to be advisable to follow the schedule outlined in the memorandum under reference, which envisages an announcement at the December Ministerial meeting, or to postpone the initiation of action until shortly after the first of the year.

Recommendation:

That you determine whether:

1) the program recommended in Tab A should now proceed, in which case your signature on the letter to Secretary Wilson is requested; or

2) the program recommended in Tab A be postponed until after the first of the year.

Clearances:

S/AE -

C -

G -

S/P

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11/7/56

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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MEMORANDUM

October 16, 1956

To: The Secretary

Through: S/S

From: EUR - Mr. Bean *J.B.*

Subject: Program to Increase NATO Nuclear Capability and Secure Certain Base Rights.

Problem:

The Department of Defense has informed us that it is most desirable that the United States now assist certain allies to achieve capability in the use of atomic weapons. SACEUR has, moreover, stated that the United States security would be enhanced by such a program in NATO, and this would undoubtedly give the military program of the allies a psychological lift at this critical time. There is also a need for the continuing dispersal outside the United States of the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, both for security reasons and for accessibility in time of emergency to the forces employing them.

A specific application of these problems has arisen in France, where Defense had informed us of a requirement for the introduction and storage of atomic weapons (TAB B). Ambassador Dillon feels that such rights can be secured, but probably only if our request is accompanied by some offer of assistance; he suggests that we do this by responding favorably to an earlier, informal French request for training an air squadron in the use of atomic weapons.

Discussion:

I - General NATO Aspect

Planning for the use of atomic weapons in the event of all-out attack was authorized by the North Atlantic Council in December 1954, and the training of appropriate NATO military forces, in addition to those of the United States and the United Kingdom, to be in a position to implement this policy if necessary, would be a significant addition to NATO's deterrent power, as well as its ability to meet attack. Defense has expressed the opinion "from a military point of view, that it is most desirable that selected major allies now be assisted in the achievement of operational delivery capabilities with appropriate weapons

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systems compatible with United States stockpile atomic weapons" (TAB A). General Norstad has said that United States security would be enhanced by such training programs in NATO, adding that the placing of our allies in a position to be able to deliver atomic weapons would increase our flexibility.

In view of the foregoing it is considered that the NATO military authorities should now undertake the development of a program and schedule of priorities for the gradual achievement by the military forces of NATO of delivery capabilities with appropriate atomic weapons systems. The cooperation of the United States is obviously indispensable to the achievement of these capabilities and an offer of United States assistance in training in accordance with NATO military requirements would be a logical first step.

M.C. 48 gave to atomic weapons a major role in NATO planning, but most of the NATO nations as yet have no prospect of moving toward a capability in the atomic field. The maintenance of the deterrent through the continued whole-hearted participation of all NATO members and their forces can be expected only if they can look forward to being able to defend themselves and carry out their full role in such plans. Moreover, they are particularly preoccupied today with problems of air defense and anxious to augment present admittedly weak defenses with atomic weapons. This represents an additional reason in the political and psychological sphere why some forward step in this field is called for in the interest of maintaining NATO solidarity and unity of purpose. The coming December Ministerial Meeting would present a most appropriate occasion for the United States to make an offer of training.

A dispersal of the United States stockpile of atomic weapons outside United States territory and the storage of such weapons near where they would be needed are also militarily desirable. This can be accomplished, however, only to the extent that foreign countries acquiesce in the introduction and storage of such weapons. Our NATO allies, already tied together with us in a common strategy and defense plans, may be expected to accept such introduction and storage much more readily if the weapons involved include ones which would be available for the use of their forces in time of emergency as well as for United States forces.

A United States training offer will immediately bring to mind the United States "new weapons program", and Secretary Wilson's statement of December 1955 in this regard (TAB B). Our offer will be taken to have only a limited significance if we cannot at the same time give some assurances about the availability of the "new weapons", which include the instruments for delivery of atomic warheads and for the use of which much of the training would be designed.

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The training of NATO forces in the use of atomic weapons will also inevitably raise questions about the availability of such weapons in the event of hostilities, and we must be prepared with an adequate reply. The NATO countries know that United States law does not permit the present transfer of these weapons, but they can be expected to seek some commitment from us about providing weapons in case of emergency. It is permissible under the present law for the United States to store atomic weapons in NATO countries in United States custody, with such weapons remaining United States property. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is interpreted by the Department of Defense to permit the transfer of atomic weapons to Allied military forces in the event of emergency or attack, and it will be necessary for the United States to be prepared to give some assurances along these lines. (This would be with reference only to atomic and not thermonuclear weapons.)

Germany raises a special problem. An offer of training in the use of atomic weapons to the other NATO members must include all the members and yet French resistance to the inclusion of Germany may be anticipated, since training would undoubtedly be regarded as a first step toward possession. According to interpretations which the French have put forward, it was the intention of Protocols III and IV of the London and Paris Pacts not only that Germany should renounce the right to manufacture atomic weapons but that Germany should not have the right to possess atomic weapons. French modification of their WEU position would be required if we are to avoid a serious political problem with the Germans. Alternatively, we will have a serious problem with the French if we go ahead without having been able to secure their agreement. Furthermore, in view of Adenauer's recent statements indicating a desire not to be identified with nuclear preparations, this matter must also be sounded out with him in advance.

#### II - French Aspect

The Defense Department also refers in its letter (TAB A) to a specific, present requirement to introduce and store atomic weapons in France. Ambassador Dillon strongly recommends that with this specific requirement in mind, as well as the broader NATO policy mentioned above, we approach the French suggesting that, in line with the M.C. 48 concept, we have two specific things to propose to them:

1. That the United States be given authorization for the introduction and storage of nuclear weapons in France; and
2. That the United States train one French FB4F squadron in the use of tactical atomic weapons.

The Ambassador believes that the French will make any request for the introduction and storage of weapons the subject of bargaining for something they want from us. The offer with which he proposes to accompany

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his request is in itself a step which would be responsive to an informal French proposal of about a year ago and also has both political and military advantages.

SACEUR and the Department of Defense have endorsed Ambassador Dillon's proposal and have already studied the means of implementing it. Defense has determined that the training of the French squadron would require the conclusion of a United States-French bilateral agreement under Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and a proposed draft for such an agreement is attached to the letter at Tab A. Defense has carried on preliminary consultations with the A.E.C. and is prepared to inform the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy of our intentions. The State-Defense Military Information Control Committee has indicated the feasibility of working out with the French officials concerned the special security arrangements which a bilateral agreement would require.

Training French forces in the use of United States atomic weapons, coupled with eventual assurances about availability in time of need, might to some degree also improve the chances of the French Government's accepting some moratorium on weapons production in connection with EURATOM or some other scheme, or keeping to token proportions any French weapons production.

It is anticipated that when the offer to train NATO forces in the use of atomic weapons becomes public knowledge, it would probably give rise to some lively criticism, especially in Western Europe, as being contrary to the relaxation of tensions and as tending to commit NATO countries irrevocably to nuclear warfare. This last point is at the moment a particularly sensitive one in Germany and our actions would have to be timed to take this into account. On the other hand, it must be argued that NATO forces should be equipped with the most modern weapons to carry out their mission to hold as far to the East in Germany as possible in case of Soviet aggression; this is without prejudice to the need to be prepared for "brush fires" as well. Moreover, such training would build up greater confidence in the NATO countries in their ability to defend themselves, an unquestioned need which cannot be ignored until there is concrete and substantial progress toward disarmament, and would heighten the sense of unity and cooperation in NATO. These effects would, we believe, more than compensate for the unfavorable publicity.

Conclusion:

The time has come when we should indicate to NATO our readiness to help with the training of forces (including those of Germany) in the employment of atomic weapons and such an offer could be most effectively put forward at the December Ministerial meeting in Paris. In this connection the United States must be prepared with a response to questions, if raised, as to whether atomic weapons themselves would be available

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in time of emergency to those countries whose forces are trained in their use. By informing the French in advance of our proposed announcement at the December Ministerial meeting and at the same time making to them the approach recommended by Ambassador Dillon, we should facilitate the satisfaction of our requirement for the introduction and storage of atomic weapons in France.

Recommendations:

1) That agreement to the specific actions recommended below, in preparation for the December Ministerial Meeting, be reached with the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, and that the President's approval of this program be sought; following his approval there should be adequate consultation with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy;

2) That, following successful completion of Step (1), but not earlier than about mid-November, the United States approach the British, Canadian and French Governments to consult with them concerning United States plans on this subject for the December Ministerial meeting. We would tell them that at that meeting we intend to inform the Council we are prepared to make available to NATO countries training in the employment of atomic weapons, subject to priorities as established by the NATO military authorities and in connection with delivery systems which the United States, in accordance with NATO plans, is including in MDAP programs or making available for purchase; and subject to the completion of bilateral agreements required by the Atomic Energy Act. It should be understood that the offer will apply to Germany in the same manner as to the other NATO allies.

3) That in our approach to the French we also put to them the dual proposition suggested by Ambassador Dillon concerning introduction and storage of atomic weapons and training of one French squadron, making it clear that training would be contingent on conclusion of the necessary 144b bilateral agreement and subject to NATO military priorities as noted in (2) above. We would also ask the French to treat our training offer as confidential until our general proposal had been made in the NAC meeting.

4) That immediately following these talks we also review our plans for the December meeting with the Germans.

5) That, following successful completion of the first step, the Executive Branch prepare promptly the response which the United States should be in a position to give in reply to the anticipated inquiries concerning the availability of atomic weapons in time of emergency to NATO forces trained in their use.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Clearances:

KA-B.E.L. TLM

S/AE

S/P

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*ender*

Attachments.

EUR:RA: *W* *anger:adm*

10/16/56

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON



SECRET

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We have studied with considerable interest Mr. Gordon Gray's letter to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Mr. Robert Murphy, of October 10, 1956, and I have several proposals to make to you in this regard. We have noted in particular your reference to the desirability of making some announcement to our NATO allies concerning our policy with respect to the training of NATO nations in the use of atomic weapons, and I should like to invite you to join me in addressing a memorandum to the President on this subject. A draft text for such a memorandum is enclosed for your consideration. As you will recognize, the course of action proposed to the President would implement the Joint Chiefs of Staff objective of assisting selected major allies in the achievement of operational delivery capabilities with appropriate weapons systems compatible with United States stockpile atomic weapons, which was the subject of Mr. Gray's letter.

This course of action also has the objective of meeting the requirement for the introduction and storage of atomic weapons in Metropolitan France, a subject which you originally raised in your letter to Secretary Dulles of December 22, 1955, and to which Mr. Gray also refers in his letter under reference.

If you agree to our addressing a memorandum to the President on this subject, and after we have worked out a mutually acceptable text, I would suggest that we meet with Admiral Strauss to acquaint him with our intentions in this matter.

With the thought that it may be helpful in informing you more fully concerning our thinking on this subject, I am also enclosing a copy of a staff memorandum prepared in the Department of State which was approved by Secretary Dulles. It would be our intention, once Presidential approval has been secured, to implement the recommendations which are put forward at the end of this memorandum with a view to being prepared to make the appropriate statement at the December Ministerial meeting of NATO. If you concur, I would propose that our staffs proceed to work along these lines in close coordination with each other.

The Honorable  
Charles E. Wilson,  
Secretary of Defense.

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We are studying the technical annex and text of the proposed agreement with France, which was transmitted as an attachment to Mr. Gray's letter, and the appropriate officers in the Department will be shortly discussing this with their counterparts in Defense so that an agreed draft can be available for presentation to the French at the appropriate time. I understand that this technical annex has also been forwarded to the Atomic Energy Commission for its comment.

Sincerely yours,

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft text of Memorandum  
to the President

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Program to Increase NATO Nuclear  
Capability and Secure Certain  
Base Rights.

In accordance with the general policy stated in paragraph 17 of NSC 5602/1 and in keeping with the J.C.S. view that from a military point of view it is most desirable that selected major allies now be assisted in the achievement of operational delivery capabilities with appropriate weapons systems compatible with United States stockpile atomic weapons, it is proposed that the United States announce at the December Ministerial Meeting of NATO that the United States is prepared to make available to NATO countries training in the employment of atomic weapons for NATO's defense. It is anticipated that such an offer would: a) give renewed impetus to NATO's military program at a time when this is badly needed; b) increase the flexibility of NATO's defenses in that the capability of delivering atomic weapons, in case of need, which is at SACEUR's disposition would be greatly expanded; and c) assist in achieving a desirable dispersal of United States atomic weapons. This action can be taken under the present Atomic Energy Act.

In our announcement to the North Atlantic Council, we would make clear that training would be: a) subject to priorities as established by the NATO military authorities; b) related to delivery systems which the United States is including in MDAP programs or making available for purchase; and c) subject to the completion of bilateral agreements required by the Atomic Energy Act.

If you approve this action, we will undertake the following steps in preparation for the December meeting:

A. Consult with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy so that they are adequately informed concerning the proposed program;

B.

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B. Following step A, review with the British, Canadians and French our plans to make the training offer at the December Ministerial Meeting, making it clear that the offer to NATO of training will apply to Germany in the same manner as to our other NATO allies. We would also tell the French, in accordance with a proposal advanced by Ambassador Dillon and supported by SACEUR, that (1) we are prepared to train a French F84F squadron in the use of tactical atomic weapons as a first step in this program, contingent on the conclusion with France of the necessary bilateral agreement and subject to NATO military priorities, and (2) we are seeking French agreement to the introduction and storage (in United States custody) of atomic weapons in France.

C. Upon the successful completion of the talks with the British, Canadians, and French we would review our plans for the December Ministerial meeting with the Germans and, assuming no problems arise in this discussion, would then complete our plans to make the offer at the Ministerial Meeting.

It is anticipated that once the offer of training is made there will be inquiries concerning the availability of the atomic weapons themselves in case of need. If such a question should arise, we would propose to reply along these lines: "It can be stated that weapons would be made available to forces trained in their use if and when this becomes necessary in view of an emergency facing NATO. The conditions under which this would take place and the procedures to be followed are matters which still require further study by the United States." This reply would be based on the constitutional authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief.

This matter has been brought to the attention of the Atomic Energy Commission and Admiral Strauss concurs in the above actions.

Your approval of the foregoing is requested.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.  
Acting Secretary of State

Charles E. Wilson  
Secretary of Defense

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