

December 7, 1967

Academician Millionshchikov,

Having realized only today that Feld will be leaving tonight to meet with you, I have hurriedly assembled some things that might be useful in our discussions in Moscow.

First, several of us were struck by how well a recent article by Gilpatric reflected our own growing sense of urgency. Hence I have had some copies made. If you could distribute it to your colleagues they would have some sense of what makes us think these discussions are so important at this time.

Second, on the basis of discussion we have had here I have written down in my own words a summary statement of our concern and what we hope might be accomplished together with a list of items or questions that we hope we might discuss during our visit.

If you have time to look at these and send back with Feld any comments that you have we would be most grateful.

Most of us, including myself, intend to arrive in Moscow from London on British European Airways on the afternoon of December 27th. I am planning to leave via Copenhagen on January 3. If it is convenient, I would like to spend the 2nd in Leningrad, going and returning by the night train. You should have all of our plans shortly.

Please let Feld know if there is anything I could bring.

Looking forward with pleasure to our meeting, and meanwhile with best wishes to you and your wife.

I am sincerely yours,

(P. Doty)

We are concerned that political and technological developments are driving both the Soviet Union and the United States into a new round in the strategic arms race, and that unless very deliberate and carefully thought-out steps are taken we will find ourselves burdened with vast new and unnecessary expenditures on arms and, worse, moving into an era of increasing instability with great danger to the world. Though it appears to be almost too late to prevent this, we feel it imperative to try.

To this end we think it important that we attempt to (1) arrive at an understanding of how we each view the strategic arms race, (2) search for mutually acceptable points at which the race may be interdicted and some stability achieved, and (3) if there is some agreement on this, explore how greater stability can be brought about.

I. New Technological factors that Destabilize the Strategic Balance.

G. R. New missile systems

J. R. Ballistic missile defenses

J. R. Penetration aids

G. R. Consequent uncertainty of performance: relation to deterrence.

II. Factors Affecting Strategic Security

J. W. Asymmetry of the requirements for deterrence on the two sides

F. L. The Problem of Parity

J. R. + G. R. Overreaction by each side to technological uncertainties and misreading of intent

H. K. Response to new nuclear powers

F. L. The role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

III. What is Involved in Stopping and Reversing the Arms Race ?

J. W. To what extent can there be a common view of what mutual restraints are possible ?

P. D. What principles should govern agreements on mutual restraint, limitations on offensive and defensive missiles, and further steps toward disarmament ?

P. D. What technical step factors need be assessed in order to discuss realistic steps on limitations and disarmament ?

G. R. Can we restrict numbers and/or kinds of delivery systems ?

J. R. Can we find mutually acceptable limits on anti-ballistic missile defenses ?

J. R. How do these two kinds of limitations interact ?

G. R. How far can we proceed depending only on unilateral verification ?

F. L. + H. K. What concrete steps could be taken soon ?