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ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 ADS-00 /000W  
-----E92D77 011108Z /38

O 011107Z SEP 93  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8611  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY KIEV IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UK, RS, UP  
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SUBJECT: TALBOTT-FCO DISCUSSION OF  
U.S.-RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN TRILATERAL MEETING

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. TALBOTT TOLD FCO OFFICIALS THAT TRILATERAL MEETINGS IN LONDON ON AUGUST 27 HAD REVEALED CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN BILATERAL RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN DISCUSSIONS AIMED AT DEACTIVATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE. THE RUSSIANS APPEAR PREPARED TO SIGN A BILATERAL AGREEMENT AT A YELTSIN-KRAVCHUK MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 3 THOUGH SOME KEY UKRAINIANS STILL OPPOSE. U.S. TRILATERAL DRAFT REMAINS IN PLAY. THE FCO OFFICIALS WERE CRITICAL OF CHERNOMYRDIN, ASSERTING THAT HE WAS A MAJOR PLAYER BEHIND THE CURRENCY DEBACLE "CONSPIRACY." END SUMMARY.

UKRAINE AND RUSSIA: MORE PROGRESS THAN HAD MET THE EYE

3. ON AUGUST 27, AMBASSADOR TALBOTT, ALONG WITH BRIGADIER GENERAL GORDAN AND S/NIS SPECIAL ASSISTANT NULAND BRIEFED FCO POLITICAL DIRECTOR APPELYARD AND EASTERN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR MANNING ON TRILATERAL TALKS WITH RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV AND UKRAINIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TARASYUK THE PREVIOUS DAY. AMBASSADOR SEITZ AND POLCOUNS HABIB (NOTETAKER) PARTICIPATED IN THE BRIEFING. TALBOTT SAID HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE TALKS, WHICH HAD AIMED AT ACHIEVING PROGRESS ON THE DEACTIVATION OF UKRAINIAN SS-19S AND BUILDING A TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: Geoffrey W. Chapman, Senior Reviewer, A/GIS/IPS  
3/25/2019

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4. THE U.S. SIDE HAD INTENDED TO FOCUS THE TALKS ON A U.S. TRILATERAL PROPOSAL TO DEACTIVATE UKRAINIAN SS-19S. HOWEVER, THE TALKS HAD REVEALED THAT THE RUSSIANS AND UKRAINIANS HAD THEMSELVES BEEN HOLDING INTENSIVE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON DEACTIVATION, THAT CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, AND THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT YELTSIN AND KRAVCHUK WOULD SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON SEPTEMBER 3. THE PROSPECTIVE BILATERAL AGREEMENT WOULD PROVIDE FOR THE STORAGE OF THE SS-19 MISSILES IN RUSSIA AND COMPENSATION TO THE UKRAINIANS IN THE FORM OF RUSSIAN DELIVERIES OF LOW GRADE REACTOR URANIUM, BEGINNING IN ABOUT 18 MONTHS. (THE U.S. TRILATERAL PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE THE WARHEADS TO BE REMOVED FROM THE MISSILES AND TEMPORARILY STORED IN UKRAINE. WE WOULD ALSO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE MONETARY COMPENSATION TO THE UKRAINIANS FOR THE FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN THE WARHEADS).

5. TALBOTT SAID A NUMBER OF UKRAINIAN LEADERS HAD ALREADY INITIALED THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT BUT SOME IMPORTANT FIGURES HAD NOT DONE SO. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TARASYUK INDICATED HE WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE THE BILATERAL TEXT, URGING KIEV TO HOLD OUT FOR THE U.S. TRILATERAL DRAFT. TARASYUK SEEMED CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE RUSSIAN BILATERAL TEXT WOULD PREVAIL WITHIN HIS OWN GOVERNMENT. OUR APPROACH, TALBOTT EXPLAINED, WAS NOT TO JEOPARDIZE PROSPECTS FOR THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT WHILE KEEPING OUR OWN PROPOSAL IN PLAY. TARASYUK HAD EAGERLY SOUGHT A COPY OF THE U.S. TRILATERAL DRAFT TO USE IT TO TORPEDO THE BILATERAL TEXT. WE HAD DECLINED, GIVING HIM ONLY OUR CONCEPT FOR AN AGREEMENT, POINTING OUT THAT OUR INTENTION HAD ALWAYS BEEN TO WORK THE TEXT WITH THE RUSSIANS BEFORE PROVIDING IT TO THE UKRAINIANS.

6. LOOKING TOWARD SEPTEMBER 3, TALBOTT SAID THE RUSSIANS WERE OBVIOUSLY PREPARED TO SIGN THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT BUT THE JURY WAS STILL OUT ON THE UKRAINIANS. WE WERE HOPEFUL BUT WERE PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH OUR TRILATERAL TEXT, IF NECESSARY.

7. APPELYARD EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE U.S. EFFORT ON DEACTIVATION, UNDERSCORING THAT THE BRITISH WERE PREPARED TO DO WHATEVER SEEMED USEFUL TO SUPPORT OUR LEAD.

A MIXED BAG: THE SS-24S, START 1 AND THE NPT

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8. TALBOTT SAID WE HAD ALSO PRESSED THE UKRAINIANS ON EARLY DEACTIVATION OF THEIR SS-24S. THE UKRAINIANS SAY THEY INTEND TO DEACTIVATE BUT THAT THE RADA WOULD OPPOSE AN EARLY MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION AND THAT THIS COULD THEN ALSO JEOPARDIZE PROSPECTS REGARDING THE SS-19S. WE STRESSED THAT KIEV MUST TAKE SOME POSITIVE ACTION TO DEMONSTRATE MOVEMENT ON THE SS-24S AND GIVE A CLEAR SIGN THAT THEY WERE NOT CONSIDERED EXEMPT FROM LISBON PROTOCOL. WE SAID KRAVCHUK WOULD NOT BE WELCOME IN WASHINGTON IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A STEP. TARASYUK INDICATED THAT THE UKRAINIANS MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME

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MQVE BUT ONLY IF IT WERE NOT PERCEIVED AS A RESPONSE TO U.S. CONDITIONALITY REGARDING A KRAVCHUK VISIT.

9. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, TALBOTT OPINED THAT THE UKRAINIANS WERE PREPARED TO RATIFY START I BUT STILL HAD A WAYS TO GO REGARDING NPT ADHERENCE. TARASYUK THOUGHT THE RADA WOULD RATIFY START I THIS YEAR.

10. APPELYARD REMARKED THAT TALBOTT'S PRESENTATION HAD CONVINCED HIM THE UKRAINIANS WERE BEING MORE RESPONSIVE ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE THAN LONDON HAD THOUGHT. HE OBSERVED THAT THE UKRAINIANS HARBOR A DEEP, NOT UNJUSTIFIED, SENSE OF INSECURITY VIS-A-VIS THE RUSSIANS. THEY PERCEIVE, PROBABLY CORRECTLY, THAT MOSCOW HAS STILL NOT ACCEPTED THAT UKRAINE IS NO LONGER A PART OF RUSSIA. THEY ARE WORRIED AND UNWILLING TO BET THE FARM ON YELTSIN.

YELTSIN AND THE HARDLINERS  
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11. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION FROM APPELYARD, TALBOTT SAID YELTSIN APPEARED TO HAVE SHARPENED HIS DOMESTIC STRATEGY SINCE RETURNING FROM VACATION. HIS "HEALTH" APPEARED TO HAVE IMPROVED AS WELL. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN. TALBOTT SAID MAMEDOV HAD CALLED THE PRIME MINISTER THE CRUCIAL FIGURE IN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL EQUATION; YELTSIN WAS FINISHED IF CHERNOMYRDIN SIDED WITH PARLIAMENT. MANNING THOUGHT THE PM'S INSTINCTS WERE ESSENTIALLY CONSERVATIVE; HE HAD MADE SEVERAL APPOINTMENTS WHICH FAVORED THEM OVER THE REFORMERS. MANNING ADDED THAT CHERNOMYRDIN WAS IN PART RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CURRENCY DEBACLE WHICH HE AND APPELYARD (IN STARK CONTRAST, THEY NOTED, TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW) BELIEVED WAS A "CONSPIRACY" INTENDED TO DAMAGE YELTSIN. APPELYARD SAID YELTSIN HAD INVITED MAJOR TO VISIT THIS FALL BUT THE PM WAS MORE LIKELY TO DEFER UNTIL EARLY NEXT YEAR.

12. TURNING TO THE BALTICS, TALBOTT SAID MAMEDOV HAD BEEN SANGUINE ABOUT A RESOLUTION OF THE LITHUANIAN PROBLEM. THE YELTSIN-BRAZAUSKAS MEETING WOULD LIKELY BE RESCHEDULED AND A FACE SAVING AGREEMENT WORKED OUT, E.G., THE LITHUANIANS MIGHT DROP THEIR DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION WITH THE RUSSIANS AGREEING TO COMPLETE THEIR TROOP WITHDRAWAL BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER. APPELYARD NOTED THAT THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN LONDON WAS SIGNALLING THAT THERE WOULD ONLY BE A BRIEF DELAY IN COMPLETING THE WITHDRAWAL.

13. ON NATO EXPANSION TO THE EAST, MAMEDOV HAD BEEN VERY RELAXED; OBSERVING THAT DOUBTS AMONG ALLIANCE MEMBERS WOULD BLOCK NEW ASPIRANTS. APPELYARD SAID OFF THE RECORD THAT MAJOR HAD SAID HE THINKS POLAND AND EVENTUALLY SOME OTHERS SHOULD BECOME NATO MEMBERS BUT IT WAS BY NO MEANS CLEAR THAT THIS WAS BRITISH POLICY.

14. APPELYARD SAID HE HAD RAISED THE BW ISSUE ON AUGUST 26 IN A MEETING WITH MAMEDOV. THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER HAD MADE SOME SEMI-REASSURING NOISES BUT HAD NOT GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION HAD BEEN TOTALLY OVERCOME.

15. IN CLOSING DISCUSSION, TALBOTT ASKED THAT THE

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BRITISH CONTINUE TO STRESS TO THEIR RUSSIAN  
INTERLOCUTORS THE IMPORTANCE OF YELTSIN KEEPING HIS  
COMMITMENT TO VISIT TOKYO IN MID-OCTOBER.  
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