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- the force will remain assigned, as is its Polaris predecessor, to NATO and dedicated to SACEUR targets. (We will have to be careful not to accent this theme so much in Western Europe that we undercut the TNF decision.)

- the improvement in NATO's striking power and enhancement of its credibility provided by the new force represents not only reaffirmation of the strategic dimension of the US-UK special relationship, but also reinforcement of the Atlantic Alliance and of the US commitment to NATO.

- the increase in striking power which the UK will gain by this modernization will just permit them to maintain the relative size of their ballistic missile forces with respect to the USSR in the face of massive Soviet force expansion. When the new UK force becomes operational it will represent approximately 7% of the size of Soviet forces, roughly the same percentage the Polaris force represented when it became fully operational in 1970.

III. Consultations with the French: The main adverse reaction we can expect from the French should not come from the Elysee or well connected strategic circles. Nonetheless a negative reaction can be expected from conservative Gaullists who will profess to perceive some perfidious Anglo-Saxon plot recalling the Skybolt/Polaris brouhaha of the early 60's. They will not be pleased to see the UK catch up to and overtake, with a minimum of sacrifice, their own SLBM forces which have been built at the cost of considerable French sacrifice. At the same time the Gaullists will be annoyed by British progress, they can be expected to depreciate the political and military significance of the modernized UK force by emphasizing its continued dependence on the US and its integration into NATO. While the heat from the French Right should not prove overly difficult for Giscard to weather, it may nevertheless for a time render even more difficult any Franco-US or French-NATO cooperative military efforts. It should also tend to short-circuit any British interest in nuclear cooperation with France (since they will be getting far more from us than they could expect from the French).

While it is possible that conservative Gaullist pressure could be sufficient to produce some unkind public allusions to this US-UK cooperation, we should be prepared to ignore such rhetoric. Our goal in consultations with the French should be to help Giscard weather whatever problems the announcement gives him and also to try to steer the French away from a possible reaction of squandering an even greater portion of their defense resources on their nuclear forces to the detriment of their conventional capabilities. We will want to emphasize:

- the effort the UK has been making in building up their conventional forces and their strong and continuing conventional and nuclear commitments to NATO.

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- our reluctance to see the UK emasculate its conventional forces in order to modernize its strategic forces which would have been the likelihood of independent modernization. (We should also ask Giscard if it would help him for us to make a public distinction between French and UK forces with respect to dependence on us and commitment to NATO.)

- necessity of improving western nuclear forces in the face of the expansion of Soviet forces.

- US willingness to continue and expand its cooperation with the French, but any such expansion will involve additional quids which we would be happy to discuss with the French on the basis of the principles entailed in our April offer of last year.

- reassurance that current activities will continue and we will maintain discretion according to French desires.

While these points may not help Giscard deal with public controversy, they may help him contain it insofar as we enable him to make the following arguments to key Gaullists (Debre, Chirac, Jobert) who are aware of current programs:

- the same rationale for UK modernization -- the expansion of Soviet nuclear forces -- can be used to justify expanded French efforts. (We will nevertheless hope to dissuade the French from any expansion that would sacrifice their conventional forces.)

- the UK will remain clearly tied to NATO, thereby accentuating the independence of the French force.

- the US is willing to expand cooperation with France, but a hostile French reaction could lead to disclosures about current French activities with the US, or at least block the path to their expansion.

While we do not know in advance how Giscard will wish to handle the conservative Gaullist leaders, we will need to be responsive to our consultations, solicit his views on what his problems will be and ascertain how we can best be of help in managing them.

IV. Consultations with the FRG and other Allies: European circles who opposed the TNF decision will ask why a GLCM force of over 500 weapons is necessary when the UK will be adding a like number to its SLBM force a few years later. Pro-NATO, anti-TNF Europeans looking for any alternative to TNF will no doubt embrace the SACEUR-dedicated UK force as most fortuitous. We can also expect the Soviet reaction will tend to reinforce the TNF-alternative arguments. Our consultations with Allies will therefore have to address these arguments by:

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- underlining the front rank role of the UK in pushing for TNF in addition to modernizing their SLBM force.
- arguing that posing the modernized UK force as an alternative to TNF would raise questions of "decoupling" and "nuclear regionalization."
- reminding the Europeans that the UK SLBM force can't be expected to lend to deterrence what US SLBM forces can't.
- working out an advance, joint public line for the US, UK and FRG which emphasizes the "strategic, central-system" character of the UK force as opposed to "theater."
- highlighting, both in consultations and the public line, the UK commitment to improve its conventional air, land and sea contributions to the Alliance via savings generated through this cooperation with the US (as opposed to independent modernization)

Other than the doctrinaire Left, military and political circles in the FRG should welcome the announcement as evidence of reinforced US commitment to NATO and enhancement of NATO's credibility in Moscow's eyes. Some will believe that the new UK force will strengthen the European finger on the US nuclear trigger and thus constitute powerful counter-argument to the Gaullist contention that NATO has little credibility in Soviet eyes. It is also evidence of UK determination to keep pace with French nuclear forces and thus maintain their counterpoise role to excessive French influence in European strategic concerns. In private consultations with Allied leaders we may wish to allude discretely to these considerations.

Allied concerns about this move constituting a fatal blow to SALT II will no doubt be reinforced by the predictable Soviet propaganda reactions. We should nevertheless stand our ground and point to this cooperation as evidence that the non-circumvention clause of SALT II will not prevent cooperation with our Allies, but that we still intend to push the Treaty forward to ratification at the proper time. We should also point out how small the UK force remains in comparison to Soviet (and US) forces.

V. Consultations with the Congress: Advance consultations with senior leaders of the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees of both houses will have to be carefully orchestrated. In addition to the common themes of consultation we will use with our Allies we will have to address funding problems and the instructions our negotiators will receive for coming to an agreement with the UK on purchase of the Trident system. Since we will want to avoid having to go through with what could be an unpredictable hearing process in an election year, our goal will be to facilitate smooth and uneventful passage of the required 50-day certification period.

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One potential element of congressional difficulty is the question of the UK share of R & D and other non-recurring costs. The PSA formula was highly favorable to the UK, but legislation passed since requires recovery of a fair share of such costs on a pro rata basis. We are informed by DoD that in the case of Trident the difference could be as much as \$400 million. Recovery can be waived in the case of items which enhance NATO R/S/I. As the UK force will be under SACEUR we could argue that such cost recovery be waived, but unless we could show that we had received a strategically advantageous set of quids from the UK sufficient to offset the \$400 million loss to the Treasury, we could expect some congressional opposition to a "give-away" to surface.

Our consultations with the Congress will also have to address the question of the force's relationship to any SALT III negotiations as well as to ratification of the SALT II Treaty. If this aspect of the consultations is handled properly, it is entirely possible that the new UK force could be a help to Senate ratification.

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