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TRYING TO SELL US THE SAME HORSE FOR THE THIRD OR FOURTH TIME; THAT DRAWING OUT THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS HAS ALL THE EARMARKS OF FURTHER MOVING THE GOAL POST; THAT SUCH STALLING TACTICS ON PFP WILL NOT/NOT SLOW DOWN NATO'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECEMBER NAC DECISION; THAT BY REFUSING TO PLAY ON PFP AND THE NATO-RUSSIA DIALOGUE, RUSSIA RISKS ISOLATING ITSELF; THAT WE BELIEVED IT WAS AGREED THE EXCHANGE WOULD CONSIST OF TWO LETTERS ONLY, ONE IN EACH DIRECTION, AND THAT NO FURTHER U.S. LETTER WAS NECESSARY OR APPROPRIATE; THAT OUR GOVERNMENT HAS NO/NO INTENTION OF NEGOTIATING WITH RUSSIA OVER FUTURE NATO POLICY VIA PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

4. ALL THAT SAID (SEVERAL TIMES AND WITH GREAT EMPHASIS), I PRESSED KOZYREV HARD ON WHAT WOULD HE BELIEVED WOULD CONSTITUTE THE AMERICAN RESPONSE NECESSARY TO ENABLE RUSSIAN PFP SIGNING. HIS REPLY WAS AMBIGUOUS -- INDEED, SELF-CONTRADICTORY. HE ALTERNATED BETWEEN TWO ANSWERS. ANSWER NUMBER ONE: ALL THAT'S REQUIRED IN RESPONSE TO THE NEW YELTSIN LETTER IS A U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT TO TREAT THE FOUR RUSSIAN CONCERNS AS "LEGITIMATE" AND TO SEEK, THROUGH ENGAGEMENT OF THE OTHER ALLIES, A GOOD-FAITH NATO EFFORT TO REACH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS BY THE TIME NATO ACTUALLY TAKES IN NEW MEMBERS. ANSWER NUMBER TWO: WHAT'S REQUIRED IS A SPECIFIC, FAIRLY DETAILED U.S. PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE NOW TO EACH OF THE FOUR QUESTIONS -- ESSENTIALLY A WRITTEN VERSION, SIGNED BY POTUS, OF THE TALKING POINTS YOU USED ORALLY WITH KOZYREV IN GENEVA. I REITERATED WHY NUMBER TWO WAS NOT/NOT ACCEPTABLE (THE PRESIDENT CAN'T COMMIT THE ALLIANCE ON THESE ISSUES; WE DON'T WANT TO GET INTO AN OPEN-ENDED CORRESPONDENCE; THE FOUR QUESTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR THE AGENDA OF THE NEGOTIATION FOLLOWING RUSSIAN PFP SIGNATURE, BUT NOT/NOT FOR PRE-SIGNATURE BILATERAL HAGGLING).

5. I PLAYED BACK TO HIM WHAT HE'D SAID, POINTING OUT THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE TWO ANSWERS HE HAD GIVEN ME TO MY QUESTION AND OFFERING THE JUDGMENT THAT NUMBER TWO WAS A TOTAL NON-STARTER. HE ADMITTED THERE WAS SUCH A CONTRADICTION AND SAID WE NEED TO AGREE ON A "FORMULA" FOR YET ANOTHER ANSWER THAT WAS "SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN THE TWO EXTREMES" AND THAT MET HIS AND YELTSIN'S POLITICAL NEEDS WHILE NOT/NOT CROSSING THE RBD LINE I'D LAID DOWN. MUCH AS HE'D DONE WITH YOU IN GENEVA, HE CAST HIS PITCH ALMOST ENTIRELY IN TERMS OF RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE THREAT TO RUSSIAN REFORM POSED BY THE PROSPECT OF NATO EXPANDING EASTWARD. I SAID I'D PASS ALL THIS BACK TO YOU, AND THAT WE'D BE BACK IN TOUCH VIA TOM PICKERING ONCE WE GOT THE YELTSIN LETTER. I STRESSED THAT I COULD NOT/NOT COMMIT TO A NEW POTUS LETTER. END SUMMARY.

6. KOZYREV AND I MET FOR TWO HOURS, ONE-ON-ONE (NO NOTETAKERS), OVER LUNCH IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY GUEST HOUSE. AFTER SOME PRELIMINARIES, FEATURING HIS CURIOSITY ABOUT THE NEW CONGRESS, HE INVITED ME TO SUMMARIZE

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THE STIMULUS FOR PARTNERSHIP HAS TO A LARGE EXTENT BEEN KILLED BY ENLARGEMENT."

11. "THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PFP AND ENLARGEMENT IS THIS: PFP IS A FORMULA FOR 'WE TOGETHER, YOU AND US'; ENLARGEMENT IS A FORMULA FOR 'US VERSUS THEM' (HE USED A RUSSIAN PHRASE THAT TRANSLATES LITERALLY AS 'WHO/WHOM,' AS IN 'WHO WILL PREVAIL OVER WHOM IN A ZERO-SUM GAME'). ALL THIS TALK OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO IS CAUSING A FEELING OF ALIENATION IN RUSSIA. WE DON'T WANT ISOLATION. WE HAD ENOUGH OF THAT FOR 70 YEARS. LET'S OVERCOME THE US-VERSUS-THEM MENTALITY AND EMPHASIZE WHAT BRINGS US TOGETHER."

12. "ENLARGEMENT IS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM PFP. YOU HAVEN'T GIVEN US ANY ANSWERS TO THE LOGICAL QUESTIONS THAT ARISE HERE. IN

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EVERYTHING YOU SAY, YOU KEEP STRESSING HOW RUSSIA DOESN'T HAVE A VETO. WHEN YOU SAY YOU'LL TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS AND OUR INTERESTS, IT SOUNDS DISMISSIVE, NOT SERIOUS. IT CAUSES MORE ANXIETIES THAN IT ALLAYS."

13. "YOU SAY THAT WE CAN ENTER NATO OURSELVES SOMEDAY, BUT THAT'S NOT REALLY SERIOUS EITHER. IF YOU WERE TO SAY 'RUSSIA FIRST,' THAT WOULD BE ONE THING. BUT WE KNOW WE'RE LAST IN LINE. THAT'S THE POSITION WE KNOW BEST AND HATE MOST."

14. "OUR MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL PEOPLE ARE INFURIATED. THEY SEE THEMSELVES BEING FROZEN OUT." HE CITED PRESS-REPORTS ABOUT HOW THE U.S. IS ALREADY MOVING TO SELL MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE CEE COUNTRIES AS HAVING CAUSED A LOT OF WE-TOLD-YOU-SO OUTRAGE AMONG RUSSIAN ARMS MANUFACTURERS.

15. HE RECALLED YOUR TRIP TO TELL YELTSIN ABOUT PFP IN OCTOBER '93 AND SAID THAT YELTSIN REACTED SO FAVORABLY IN PART BECAUSE HE THOUGHT PFP WAS AN "ALTERNATIVE" TO NATO EXPANSION. HE THEN SPENT A FEW MINUTES ON HIS THEORIES ABOUT HOW PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD BEEN "TRAPPED" BY "THOSE WHO WANTED TO IMPOSE ON HIM A SIMPLISTIC AGENDA UNDER THE GUISE OF HAVING AN ARGUMENT TO USE AGAINST THE REPUBLICANS IN '96. YOU HAVE TO GIVE ME POSITIVE ANSWERS SO THAT I CAN MEET WITH OUR POLITICAL ELITES AND TALK TO THEM AND PERSUADE THEM NOT TO BE ALIENATED."

16. "WE COULD SAY YES TO PFP" -- I.E., SIGN THE DOCUMENTS -- "EVEN WITHOUT ANSWERS TO THE FOUR QUESTIONS, BUT NOT/NOT IF YOU'RE MOVING AHEAD WITH ENLARGEMENT. WITH ENLARGEMENT GOING FORWARD, EVERYTHING ABOUT PFP IS RUINED FOR US UNLESS YOU GIVE US SOMETHING SO THAT WE CAN DEAL WITH IT HERE."

17. IT WAS AT THAT POINT THAT KOZYREV TOLD ME THAT YELTSIN, VACATIONING IN SOCHI, WOULD BE SIGNING A LETTER TO OUR PRESIDENT "WITHIN THE HOUR" AND NEEDS A REASSURING POTUS REPLY. ONLY IN THAT CASE, HE SAID, IS THERE "A

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CHANCE, NOT A VERY BIG ONE BUT STILL A CHANCE, TO SIGN THE PFP DOCUMENTS."

18. HE CLAIMS THAT YOU AND HE DISCUSSED IN GENEVA THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL LETTER IN REPLY TO THE YELTSIN LETTER. THE AMERICAN LETTER, HE SAYS, SHOULD CONVEY THIS MESSAGE: "DEAR BORIS, I RECOGNIZE YOUR POINTS; THEY'RE LEGITIMATE; LET'S NEGOTIATE THIS WITH NATO." (NOTE: THAT WAS THE FIRST APPEARANCE OF ANSWER NUMBER ONE.)

19. HE WENT ON TO SAY, "I'M TRYING TO DESIGN A COMPROMISE SOLUTION, BUT I'M UNDER SEVERE ATTACK BOTH WITHIN THE BUREAUCRACY AND OUTSIDE OF IT. BUT I CAN'T DO THAT JUST BY PAYING LIPSERVICE TO PFP. WHAT BOTHERS ME MOST IS THE MAY 30 NAC MEETING. IF WE SIGN PFP BEFORE THEN, WHAT WILL THE NAC DO? WHAT IF THE NAC COMES FORWARD WITH CRITERIA FOR ENLARGEMENT? A LIST OF CRITERIA FOR NEW MEMBERS?" HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT YOU'D ADDRESSED THIS POINT IN GENEVA, BUT SAID "CHRIS'S REASSURANCES MIGHT WORK FOR DIPLOMACY FREAKS LIKE US, BUT NOT/NOT FOR LUKIN." HE PREDICTED-- BETTING ME A BOTTLE OF THE BEST ARMENIAN COGNAC -- THAT "WITHIN HOURS" AFTER THE MAY 30 NAC MEETING, LECH WALBNSA WILL ISSUE A STATEMENT SAYING THAT POLAND MEETS 90 PERCENT OF THE CRITERIA AND THAT THE OTHER 10 PERCENT WILL TAKE NO TIME AT ALL TO MEET; AND THEN VARIOUS POLITICAL FIGURES IN THE U.S., PLUS PERHAPS EVEN SOME ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS (HE EVEN USED A NAME: "HOLBRIGHT"!!!), WOULD ENDORSE WALES A "ON BACKGROUND." THEN LUKIN WOULD "SCREAM AND PROTEST." PRESIDENT YELTSIN "CAN'T AFFORD THAT KIND OF AMBUSH."

20. THAT'S WHY HE NEEDS, HE SAYS, "A LETTER THAT WILL GIVE ME AMMUNITION TO USE IN THE DUMA OR IN A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TO TAKE TO THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC AND THAT WILL ALLOW ME TO SAY, 'YES, THERE IS A STEP

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TOWARD ENLARGEMENT, BUT WE HAVE THIS LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON; IT SAYS, 1) THERE IS NO RUSH TO ENLARGEMENT, 2) PFP IS FOR REAL AND WILL BE AT THE CENTER OF THINGS FOR THE NEXT 2-3 YEARS -- PFP STANDS AT THE CENTER AND ENLARGEMENT, HOWEVER PRE-DECIDED AND INEVITABLE, WILL BE SECONDARY FOR SOME TIME; AND 3) HERE ARE CLEAR ANSWERS TO ALL OUR CONCERNS. WITH SUCH A LETTER, PRESIDENT YELTSIN CAN GO INTO THE ELECTIONS IN GOOD SHAPE AND I CAN GO TO MURMANSK AND WIN RE-ELECTION." (THAT SOUNDED LIKE ANSWER NUMBER TWO.)

21. CIRCLING BACK TO THE LETTER HE'S LOOKING FOR, HE SAID, "I NEED LANGUAGE THAT IS A SIGNAL PRESIDENT CLINTON SHARES THESE CONCERNS AND IS DETERMINED TO FIND SATISFACTORY ANSWERS WITH THE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES. THE LETTER WOULD SAY, 'I SEE YOUR POINT; YOU'VE IDENTIFIED THE RIGHT ISSUES, AND I'LL WORK WITH THE OTHER NATO PARTIES TO FIND THE RIGHT ANSWERS.'" (THAT SOUNDED MORE LIKE NUMBER ONE.)

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