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EG&G ENERGY MEASUREMENTS

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Subject: MIGHTY DERRINGER OBSERVATIONS

My overall reaction to the exercise is quite positive and discussions with my colleagues at EG&G indicate that everyone involved came away with a net positive impression. Even though my primary involvement was at the CONUS site, I would like to express some overall thoughts as a result of observing the NV/EOC and some player discussions.

EOC

The first thing I discovered was that there was no controller assigned to the EOC-therefore I inherited the job. It seems important to me that in any exercise a controller be assigned to every location where there is major play anticipated. In this case the initial phases of the entire exercise would have been conducted by the players with no observation.

The play in the alert stages proceeded smoothly and previous experience with emergencies/exercises was evident. The confusion came about after the advance party was deployed. My observation was that the players did not comprehend the complexity of an OCONUS deployment-specifically how the State Department controls the matter. Maybe we should recommend some more detailed briefings on the logistics of an OCONUS deployment.

CONUS

Search - The players proceeded to set up and deploy in an expeditious manner. The FBI liaison in the TOC remained until about noon and then wasn't seen again. This did not effect the conduct of the search greatly since the reporting was directly into the FBI at the CP.

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There was some concern expressed about always searching high risk areas (ala Equus Red). We should keep this in mind in future exercises.

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The biggest lesson learned was that with the lack of communications we had personnel responsible for source surveillance should understand clearly any directions given them. We should also consider assigning a roving controller to the search area when we have the physical separation experienced in this exercise.

The direct reporting to the FBI worked so well it should be implemented in the future.

HRT TOC-The HRT TOC play proceeded quite well with the DOE players providing needed technical information. The HRT cooperated very well in helping with the I.D. problem.

We need to stress equipment reliability of the portable I.D. systems.

Consequence Phase - Zolin Burson's comments to Carl are quite well taken and provide a good summary of the play in the FRC. I think it became apparent that there was better FEMA play from the Washington people at Atterbury than was expected. The State and Local participants played their emergency roles with vigor, but learned that an emergency takes on a new dimension when one has to worry about nuclear aspects.

Future interaction with FEMA and State and Local emergency action personnel should continue to emphasize the free play nature of NEST exercises.


GENERAL COMMENTS

I believe a few more joint OCONUS/CONUS planning sessions may have been worthwhile. This is especially true when trying to keep the total scenario in mind when transitioning from one venue to another. This also can help the players better understand their involvement and how it came about.

The use of cellular phones was a great asset when we had coverage. I recommend we continue their use and have the commo group be prepared to issue cellulars like radios when necessary.

Another lesson learned on this exercise was that commo links will not be instantaneous and must come in stages. The search will have to commence with whatever assets can be first established and then use more as they become available.

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
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The FBI comments were very positive and although I was not present at Equus Red, it appears we have made a positive step in establishing a better working relationship with the bureau.

Sincerely,



Thomas S. Dahlstrom

TSD:em

cc: H.W. Clark, EG&G/EM
J.F. Doyle, EG&G/EM
L.G. Sasso, EG&G/EM
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MIGHTY DERRINGER SEARCH PLANNING

The CONUS search planning phase of Mighty Derringer consisted of five stages: (1) Scenario familiarization; (2) Integration of the search into the scenario; (3) FBI Liaison; (4) Survey of local area; (5) Local Liaison. This was all done with the overall exercise search objectives in mind—namely command and control and close liaison with the FBI. Since some key planners are quite familiar with the search problem the second category was essentially written into the scenario and any further refinement consisted of slight variations in the time line and structuring the search locations to fit the scenario.

Initial FBI liaison was made at the headquarters level followed by an introduction to the local FBI at site city.

Following the initial FBI contact in site city, a survey was made of the local area to determine likely locations for search and an actual source location that would meet the overall scenario. While planning the search phase and picking locations one must keep in mind the logic of the scenario and what areas would most likely fit this logic in the terrorists minds. The locations were picked based upon device knowledge (assuming the terrorists knew how to achieve maximum effect) and then tailored to the unfolding scenario. Close liaison was needed with the FBI CONUS' scenario writers to assure realism.

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Once the search locations were picked a meeting was set up with local officials, i.e., Public Safety, Fire and Law Enforcement, and the overall plan described.

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Following this meeting, the local FBI representative made initial contacts by phone with each hand-held search location and a follow-up meeting was planned where we met with these contacts in company with the FBI. At each site we described in general what we intended to do and what was required of the local contact. Without exception, cooperation was excellent. No building plans were acquired before hand; this was left as free play.

Local law enforcement was also asked for players to be navigators for mobile search. In addition, escorts were requested for hand-held searchers who might be used in verifying the hit in the source location. This was also a real world requirement.

In addition to identifying the search locations, we needed to locate a TOC separated from the CP by some distance since the CP was located approximately 40 miles from the search scene. We located a site about midway between the CP and site city and were able to obtain permission to use it from the local police. Two telephone lines were prestaged at this location.

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Once these arrangements were made, it was just a matter of checking with the local contacts the week previous to the exercise to ensure that everything was still on schedule and they were prepared to receive us.

Once the exercise started the players were given the contacts of the search locations as part of the search priority inject and free play ensued.

The TOC location was given as an advanced party selection based upon interaction with the FBI.

From this point on the search play proceeded rather smoothly and the players responded well.

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