

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 957308
 By AC Date 6/30/05

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Copy No. MI-3

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Total pages--15
 (Incl. TAB A)

No. 1204 - 12 July 1945

WAR DEPARTMENT
 Office of A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth. A. C. of S., G-2
 Date 12 July 1945
 Initials C. W. C.

"MAGIC"—DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY

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
The enemy knows that we attempt to exploit these sources. He does not know, and must not be permitted to learn, either the degree of our success or the particular sources with which we have been successful.

MILITARY

1. Japanese peace move: On 11 July Foreign (196154
 Minister Togo sent the following "extremely urgent" 196155
 message to Ambassador Sato: WLMR)

"We are now secretly giving consideration to the termination of the war because of the pressing situation which confronts Japan both

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at home and abroad. Therefore, when you have your interview with Molotov [In accordance with previous instructions] you should not confine yourself to the objective of a rapprochement between Russia and Japan but should also sound him out on the extent to which it is possible to make use of Russia in ending the war.


"As for our proposal that we pledge mutual support in the maintenance of peace over a long period,* that should be put forward in conjunction with sounding out Russia's attitude toward Japan; in connection with the abrogation of Japan's fishing rights, we are prepared to seek Russia's favor through amendment of the Portsmouth Treaty. Note also the fact that we will consent to discuss other matters and will meet Russia's wishes on a broad scale. While we naturally hope to obtain a treaty through the negotiations between Hirota

*On 29 June ex-Premier Hirota had transmitted to Soviet Ambassador Malik in Japan a proposal for a treaty of non-aggression and of mutual assistance in the maintenance of peace in the Far East, and a statement of Japan's willingness to (1) conclude an agreement for the "neutralization" of Manchukuo, obligating Japan to withdraw her troops after the end of the war and both countries not to interfere with Manchukuo's internal political situation, (2) renounce her fishing rights--in return for oil--and (3) discuss any matter Russia might want to bring up (DS 9, 10 Jul 45).

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and Malik, those talks are also intended to find out the extent to which it is possible to make use of Russia in ending the war.

"We would like to know the views of the Russian Government on this subject with all haste. Furthermore, the Imperial Court is tremendously interested in this matter, so please have an interview with Molotov, notwithstanding the fact that T. V. Soong may still be in Moscow and, bearing the above facts in mind, attempt to sound out the Russians' views and reply at once.

"While there is no question as to your skill, please be careful in your conference to avoid giving the impression that our plan is to make use of the Russians in ending the war."


A little later on the same day, Togo sent Sato another "extremely urgent" message, reading as follows:

"Despite the last statement in my previous message, it would appear suitable to make clear to the Russians our general attitude with regard to the termination of the war. Therefore, please tell them that:

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'We consider the maintenance of peace in East Asia to be one aspect of the maintenance of world peace. Accordingly, Japan--as a proposal for ending the war and because of her concern for the establishment and maintenance of lasting peace--has absolutely no idea of annexing or holding the territories which she occupied during the war.'


"We should like you to have the interview with Molotov in a day or two. Please reply at once as to his answer."

Note: There have been occasional hints in the past--notably in connection with last summer's proposal for sending a "special envoy" to Moscow--that Japan hoped to obtain Russia's good offices in arranging a peace. However, so far as appears from Togo's accounts of ex-Premier Hirota's recent conversations with Soviet Ambassador Malik (DS 3, 10 Jul 45), Hirota made no suggestion to that effect. The only exchange in which the subject was approached was at the close of their 14 June interview when Hirota said: "Japan too, like Russia, wishes to revert to peace quickly," and Malik replied: "Since Russia is not a belligerent in the

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East, His Excellency Mr. Hirota must be well aware that peace there does not depend on Russia."

2. Reports from Sato: On 10 July--the day before Foreign Minister Togo dispatched the "extremely urgent" messages noted above--Sato advised Tokyo that he had been granted an interview with Vice Commissar Lozovsky for that evening and that he would also try to see Molotov, but doubted whether he could do so before the Berlin Conference. The Ambassador noted that, although T. V. Soong was still in Moscow, Premier Choibalsan of Outer Mongolia had left for home after a four-day visit, contrary to Sato's earlier expectations, and that accordingly "his visit may have been primarily connected with victory festivities and he may have participated only indirectly in the Sino-Russian talks."*

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Late that night Sato transmitted to Tokyo an account of his interview with Lozovsky. That message is annexed in full as TAB A; it discloses the following:

*Sato had previously reported--on 6 July--that judging "from the formal reception given to the Premier of Outer Mongolia by Russian representatives from Molotov on down and the treatment accorded him as a leader of an independent country, I would surmise that there is some sort of an agreement between China and Russia as to the status of Outer Mongolia and that a treaty may be signed by the three countries shortly" (DS 10 Jul 45).

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
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a. Sato repeatedly urged an "immediate reply" to the proposal which former Premier Hirota had made to Ambassador Malik in Japan (DS 9, 10 Jul 45) and was informed by Lozovsky that "it is naturally difficult to predict what my Government's reply will be, but we shall do our best to comply with your wishes."

b. In response to Sato's inquiry, Lozovsky stated that T. V. Soong's talks in Moscow were concerned only with Sino-Russian relations and that Sato should pay "no particular attention" to rumors that other subjects such as Manchukuo and the Pacific war were under discussion.

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POLITICAL

1. Soviet request for German property in Far East; Japanese answer: (196025 CRN)
 As previously noted (a) the Japanese have been uneasy over the prospect that Russia would lay claim to German property in the Far East, and (b) their fears were partially borne out on 30 June when the Soviet Consul at Harbin asked the Manchukuoan Government to turn over to him--as the only representative of the United Nations in Manchukuo--the German Government's "movable and immovable property" in Harbin, Hsinking and Mukden (DS 5 Jul 45).


A 10 July circular sent out to his representatives in the Far East by Foreign Minister Togo indicates that the Russians have now asked for German property in Japan and other Japanese-controlled areas, and that the Japanese have, at least for the time being, turned the Russians down.

Togo's message--only the second half of which is available--describes an interview between Counselor Anurov of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo and the Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office. From the message it appears that Anurov conveyed

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a "Soviet proposal . . . for the transfer of property," pointing out that the only representatives of the four victors over Germany "in Japan and the territory occupied by the Japanese Army" were Soviet officials, who "are vested with the function of taking over the property." The message proceeds:

"The [Japanese] Bureau Chief stated that, since Japan is at war with England and America, she cannot recognize a four-power agreement between Russia and such countries as England, America and France [i.e., the Berlin Four-Power Declaration of 5 June]. Consequently, it would be absurd to think that any such agreement should apply to Japan itself, and Japan could not even consider recognizing the Soviet proposal . . . Such being the case, the problem could not be settled as the Soviets demanded."

2. Catroux-Menemencioğlu conversation: On (NCW)
4 July Turkish Ambassador Menemencioğlu reported that in the course of an interview late in June with General Catroux, French Ambassador to Russia currently in Paris, the latter had made substantially the following statements:

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a. Stalin himself is the most moderate element in Russia; however, very ambitious men are grouped around him, and the future frontier which those men want to draw around Russia is so wide that it could not be effaced.


b. Only the existing military equilibrium is protecting Europe today from the worst consequences. That equilibrium results from (1) the air superiority of the Americans and British and (2) the 5,500,000 experienced German troops who are in their hands. The Russians well know that these prisoners, together with the great material potential of the Americans, constitute a reserve of strength. However, if the Far Eastern war lasts very long--as it unfortunately will--one must assume that the Americans and the British, especially the Americans, will send a greater force to the Far East and that will cause the Russians to cast off their present comparative moderation.

c. Stalin proposed the Soviet-French alliance and got General de Gaulle and M. Bidault

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to accept the text prepared by the Russians, word for word, without discussion of a single point. The Alliance may be considered a success of Soviet policy and no credit is due the French Government.

According to Menemencioglu the conversation also touched on Soviet-Turkish relations, as follows:

"General Catroux mentioned the Soviet demands made of us. He informed me of the difficult position of Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper and told me that these demands could, in principle, produce question after question.


At the present time he did not think it probable that the Soviets would venture on a military operation, but the point was not to let them strike us from within. If they left the matter in the air they could expect to produce a panic amongst us.

"He asked whether the Turkish public was likely to split on this question. I mentioned that the Turkish nation was very sensitive when faced with foreign questions and said: 'Whatever decision should be taken, the whole nation would stand united around the Chief.' General Catroux said: 'That is half the battle.'"

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3. Bidault's position on Levant problem: (195776

In a 7 July report Ahmed Daouk, Lebanese Minister in Paris, describes a conversation on the Levant problem with Foreign Minister Bidault. His report includes in substance the following:

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"Mr. Bidault . . . declared that the French authorities had acted unwisely during his absence in San Francisco. He expected to settle the Syrian-Lebanese question very liberally in accordance with the declaration which he had made to me before his departure.* However, he is sticking by his Government.


"After the [Recent] contacts between [General] Beynet, [his deputy] Ostrorog, and the Lebanese Government, Bidault is optimistic about the possibility of settling the present conflict. France will transfer the Troupes Speciales with certain reservations and will evacuate her troops at the

*In early May, Wadi Naim, the head of the Lebanese Delegation in San Francisco, reported that Bidault had assured him that France was ready to give up the Troupes Speciales at once and to withdraw French forces at the same time as all other foreign forces (DS 16 May 45).

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same time as the British. Cultural and economic questions will be considered on a French-Syrian-Lebanese [Level]. The question of strategic bases will be left to discussion by the United Nations Organization."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:



CARTER W. CLARKE
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MIS

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