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Dept. G-327, June 14, 1961.

The proposed revised text of Article 7 of the Atomic Stockpile Agreement was delivered to the Foreign Office on June 23. The Chief of the NATO Section, Paolo Pansa, thought the revision was a distinct improvement which appeared to eliminate the possible conflict between Article 6 and as described in the Embassy's G 811-12 of May 23-24, 1961. The broader problems involved in Article 7, raised by our rejection of Italy's proposal that a SACEUR decision to remove weapons from Italy be made in agreement with Italian authorities, was not further discussed pending completion of the review by Italian military authorities.

Pansa raised a new problem, however, by suggesting the addition to the agreement of provisions requiring a "two-key" control of atomic weapons, as in the IREM Agreement. He said that the only atomic weapons in Italy fully covered by written agreement spelling out the conditions and procedures for their use are the Jupiters, and that while the introduction of other weapons (Honest John and Nike) was made only with appropriate political and military concurrence, no such concurrence covers the presence here of other weapons for which the U.S. controls both the warheads and delivery systems. While he acknowledged that all Italian-held atomic capable delivery systems do have a physical "two-key" control system, in spite of the lack of written agreement, he said that the situation should be formalized for all weapons, so that Italy would have control over the use of any such weapon on Italian territory.

Asked if this was a formal proposal, Pansa said it was not at this time. He said the problem was receiving serious consideration, however and he would not be surprised if it became an Italian proposal. The Embassy officer thanked him for bringing it to our attention in a preliminary way and said he hoped he could have a U.S. reaction promptly.

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He did suggest, however, that there did not seem to be any need for such an arrangement. The real basis of the two-key system is to comply with U.S. law regarding warhead custody and use. The system is therefore practiced with respect to all nuclear-capable Italian-held delivery systems, without being spelled out in an agreement. Moreover, since all delivery systems here, including those held by the U.S., would be used only in accordance with SACRUR procedures, according to Article 4, Italy could be certain that proper Italian participation in the decision for use would be guaranteed. Finally, he said the lack of need for such a provision is strongly suggested by the fact that it is apparently not a part of any other stockpile agreements now in force, which are paralleled by the provisions of the proposed Italian agreement. He did agree, however, to report the matter and respond as soon as possible.

There is, of course, no specific provision in the IHM agreement which establishes the "two-key" system as such, since the principle derives from the effect of various provisions relating to ownership, control, custody and decision for use of the weapons. What the Italians appear to want, however, is some provision which would make it mandatory for an Italian to perform a certain physical operation before a U.S.-held Honest John or Corporal could be fired, or the payload of Aviano-based aircraft armed. Should such a requirement be acceptable to the U.S., perhaps it could be met in some fashion separate from the stockpile agreement, to which it appears to be extraneous.

Action Requested

That the Embassy be promptly instructed on how to respond to the "two-key" control suggestion. If we are opposed, the sooner we are able to forestall further Italian development of the idea the better. In this event, the Embassy should be furnished with some persuasive arguments.

REINHARDT

JVS

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