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By JG NARA Date 2/22/10

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Embassy should approach Italians on matter of GOI voice in use of atomic weapons in accordance with guidance contained Department's A-13 as supplemented by following.

(1) Avoid specific argumentation contained A-13 para. 4 beginning with QUOTE These procedures...UNQUOTE and running to end of paragraph.

(2) We continue to have serious concerns over possible implications of adding any language to stockpile agreement itself which injects bilateral US-GOI understanding on employment of weapons. Such modification is without precedent in other agreements and could lead to requests for similar most favored nation treatment if it became known to other NATO countries. Addition of bilateral understandings to this or other stockpile agreements could easily lead to requests for physical operational control procedures to make such understandings effective, which could have adverse effects on ability of NATO forces to respond in emergency. We believe important to limit procedures on

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Drafted by: EUR:RA:RJAlbright:jn  
7/27/61

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

RA Russell Fessenden

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cedures on weapons employment mentioned in stockpile agreements to NATO procedures. If in course of discussion it appears useful to reassure Italians on NATO procedures, Embassy may for purposes of clarification suggest modifying end para. 4 of agreement to read QUOTE..., they will be employed in accordance with procedures established by SACEUR which will be in accord with approved NATO plans and policies UNQUOTE. This would reflect our argument that GOI has real voice in use of weapons through NATO procedures, but would avoid undesirable effects of injecting bilateral understanding into a stockpile agreement for first time.

(3) Embassy should avoid proposing that text of paragraph 8 in IRBM memorandum or similar language be added to stockpile agreement. If Italians propose this, Embassy should attempt to dissuade them for reasons in para. 2 above. If Italians propose IRBM formula be contained in understanding separate from stockpile agreement Embassy should state that this is a matter on which the Embassy is not able to comment and would require Washington consideration.

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1954-1962, Part II**

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