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TO: EUR - Mr. Selby
FROM: RA - Alan G. James *aj*
SUBJECT: Atomic Stockpile Negotiations with Italy

November 6, 1961

*Index
EUR/RFM
Djunior
8/15/62*

Mr. Fessenden has requested that the attached telegram be brought to Mr. Tyler's attention. It gives a picture of where we stand in negotiating a NATO atomic stockpile agreement with Italy.

In recent messages Ambassador Reinhardt has reported strong interest of the GOI in accompanying the stockpile agreement with an Italian-U.S. understanding that atomic weapons stored in Italy would be used only with the prior consent of the GOI. The Ambassador has strongly urged that we meet the GOI desires, and the Secretary so recommended in a letter to Secretary McNamara. Secretary McNamara responded that Defense would prefer to avoid such a bilateral understanding with the GOI, and recommended that we seek to defer this matter with the GOI pending further discussions in the North Atlantic Council of procedures for deciding to use nuclear weapons.

This message combines Defense and State views into a presentation by Ambassador Reinhardt to the Italian Foreign Minister. If the Foreign Minister continues to desire a "consent" agreement the Ambassador is authorized to offer specific language for such an understanding.

Attachment:

Department telegram to
Rome, 1315, dtd November 3, 1961

cc: RA - Mr. Fessenden

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Vertical line with handwritten marks and date 6/11/65

Microfilm by EM/8

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Recent Embassy messages and discussions here with Andreotti indicate Italian and US authorities have reached common agreement on desirability concluding rapidly atomic stockpile agreement with Italy. In interest of speeding agreement and maintaining GOI trust and cooperation on NATO programs of major importance to US we are prepared to meet Italians on QUOTE consent to use UNQUOTE formula if they continue to so desire after the Ambassador has explored personally with Foreign Minister certain ramifications of taking such action at this time. At earliest opportunity Ambassador should discuss stockpile negotiations with Foreign Minister along following lines.

Ambassador might open with general expression US desire to do all in its power to take measures necessary to develop force posture required within NATO to meet tense international situation, of which Berlin is the most

611.657/10-2761

Drafted by WELang / RA 11/3/61
EUR:RA:RJAlbright:jn

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

RA - Russell Fessenden

Clearances: WE - Mr. Brown (draft) S/AE - Mr. Thomas (draft)
OSD/ISA - Mr. Nitze (draft)

L/SFP Mr. Pender (draft)

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most acute manifestation of aggressive Bloc policies. In this connection US has undertaken major steps to increase readiness of its forces. We commend the GOI on its progress to date in meeting increased defense needs of the Alliance. Rapid conclusion of stockpile agreement currently under negotiation between our two governments would be constructive step of mutual benefit to forces of both countries and to NATO as a whole.

Key remaining question relating to stockpile negotiations so far as GOI is concerned appears to be GOI proposal for consent agreement. Our review of GOI proposals has required careful consideration of number of factors affecting conclusion such a US-GOI agreement at this time.

After Italian Gen Off proposed consent formula, NATO Military Committee sent MOD's proposed report to North Atlantic Council (MC 95) analyzing military considerations re use nuclear weapons. MC 95 states military view of need under present NATO strategy for commanders be able respond with nuclear weapons to certain types of attack within two to fifteen minutes if Europe to be defended effectively. This report, which shortly will be submitted to NAC, also raises questions political consultation. We do not know what proposals might evolve from NAC discussion these questions. We are concerned generally that various requirements for consultation re employment nuclear weapons and forces do not rpt not pyramid to point of delaying necessary and desired military response. Therefore, until NAC has had chance to give full consideration to political and military factors involved, US would prefer delay working out specific consent arrangements with GOI.

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3 of telegram to Amembassy ROME


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If Ambassador believes it would be helpful, he should also point out that under existing arrangements governing US forces stationed in Italy, under which nuclear weapons were deployed to Italy some years ago with knowledge and consent of Italian Government, these forces can be used only in furtherance of NATO plans and objectives. He should point out further that US fully aware importance of consulting with its allies before nuclear weapons are used and US has made clear over years in NAC that it would do so, circumstances permitting, before nuclear weapons are used anywhere in world.

If, after above presentation, Foreign Minister still wishes separate understanding on use nuclear weapons in Italy, Ambassador may state US prepared to meet GOI wishes in this regard. Specifically, US would confirm in ~~formal~~ ^{classified} exchange of notes with GOI our intent to consult with GOI concerning use of any nuclear weapons stored in Italy pursuant to this stockpile agreement. Ambassador may in his discretion read following official US text of proposed operative language for such notes and/or leave text with Foreign Minister:

QTE In connection with the agreement concluded between our two governments today covering the stockpiling of United States atomic weapons in Italy for possible use by NATO atomic capable forces under the direction of SACEUR, it is ~~the decision to employ~~ ^{taken} understood that these weapons will be ~~employed~~ by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, only in consultation (agreement) with the Governments of Italy and the United States of America. The consultation by the two governments will take place (agreement of the two governments would be given) in the light of circumstances at the time

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the time and having regard to the undertaking they have assumed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Since NATO procedures for the command and control of nuclear weapons which might be established at some future date could affect the procedures agreed in this note, it is understood that on request of either of our two governments the procedures herein will be reviewed to take account of any such future NATO procedures. UNQTE

FYI We leave to Ambassador's discretion whether formula should provide for QTE consultation UNQTE or QTE agreement UNQTE. Overall effect of note is same as if para 4 of agreement stated that when weapons are released by appropriate authority, decision to employ weapons, in accordance with procedures established by SACEUR, will be taken by SACEUR only in ... etc. END FYI

Ambassador should ^{point out} ~~note~~ that this language parallels language in para 8 of memorandum contained in IRBM agreement, with exception of review proviso in last sentence. New provision appears desirable, since it appears NAC will be giving increased attention to this problem.

Ambassador should make clear that our proposed language would be contained in classified notes which would be separate from and not referred to in stockpile agreement. We believe it important for political and military operational reasons that text of stockpile agreement with Italy be essentially same as similar agreements already concluded with other NATO countries.

Regardless of outcome discussion on consent question Ambassador should state that US assumes recent technical briefings for GOI officials on cost questions and discussions with Andreotti in Washington have resolved remaining outstanding issues

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5 of telegram to Amembassy, ROME

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issues on costs and on passing information re numbers of weapons to GOI authorities.

We gather that it now possible for GOI to accept in stockpile agreement itself language already proposed by US on these questions. Embassy is prepared to meet with GOI officials as soon as possible to reach final agreement on text of stockpile agreement.

The Ambassador might request confirmation that arrangements to deal with numbers of weapons problem would be worked out at the military level, including text of technical agreements to cover arrangements. If Foreign Minister requests that there be document at diplomatic level which would recognize that numbers problem is being handled through military channels, Ambassador should propose general language separate from stockpile agreement along following lines.

QTE The procedures whereby authorities of the Government of Italy will be kept informed as to numbers of weapons scheduled for location in Italy in furtherance of NATO plans will be arranged with the Italian military authorities UNQTE.

We are sending by airgram article-by-article analysis of where our records show we stand with GOI on actual text of agreement. However, Ambassador's presentation to Foreign Minister should not rpt not be delayed pending receipt this analysis.

Bowles
 Acting
 (R.F.)

BOWLES



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1954-1962, Part II**

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