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EXECUTIVE SESSION

MEETING NO. 87-2-40 - THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1962

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy  
Congress of the United States  
Washington, D. C.

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The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy met, pursuant to call, at

10:00 a.m., in the Committee Room, the Capitol, Honorable Chet Holifield (Chairman) presiding.

Present were: Representatives Chet Holifield (presiding), Melvin A. Price, Wayne N. Aspinall, Craig Hosmer and Jack Westland; Senators John O. Pastore, Henry M. Jackson, Bourke B. Hickenlooper and Wallace F. Bennett.

Committee staff present: John T. Conway, Executive Director, and George F. Murphy, Jr.

Committee Consultants present: Captain Edward J. Bauser, USN and Colonel Richard T. Lunger, USA.

Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman and Captain Arthur H. Berndtson, Military Aide to General Lemnitzer.

Representative of the Department of Defense:

Lt. Colonel Grover K. Coe (R&E, AE), Office of Assistant to the Secretary (Legislative Affairs).

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. General, it is a pleasure to have you with us again. I believe your last meeting with us was right after we moved

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JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY  
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into our new quarters and at the time when the Committee was trying so hard to put together the facts and requirements for the resumption of nuclear testing.

We wish to congratulate you on your recent appointment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and further to commend the President for his wise selection.

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We can well imagine the heavy demands upon your time right now, and we appreciate your affording us this opportunity of meeting with us prior to your departure for Paris. In my letter to you of August 27, I informed you of our intention to hold hearings August 29 on the Prescribed Action Link. Unfortunately, it was necessary to postpone the session and our meeting with you due to the scheduling of debate on the AEC Authorization Bill on the floor of the House that afternoon.

Let me assure you that the postponement of the hearing in no way indicates a lack of interest on the part of the Committee in the whole "permissive link" problem. We will hold these hearings with DOD, State Department and AEC this afternoon.

As you are well aware, the Joint Committee has been vitally interested in the entire NATO concept, and particularly so with regard to all phases of nuclear weapons support of the Alliance.

In 1958 the Joint Committee, after extensive hearings, recommended to the Congress certain changes to the Atomic Energy Act which resulted

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in greater cooperation between the United States and our allies in the matter of nuclear weapons support of NATO. Since then this Committee has reviewed and recommended a number of bilateral agreements with individual NATO nations incorporating the greater cooperating arrangements.

In February of 1961 we furnished you a copy of the Ad Hoc Committee Study of U.S. and NATO nuclear weapons arrangements which was prepared for and submitted to the President.

The report contained a number of constructive suggestions and recommendations in regard to both the particular and general problems which our extensive inspection uncovered. Since furnishing the report to the President, we have held periodic hearings to determine the progress made toward the solution of some of these problems.

I mention these matters only in order to give some indication of the intense interest this Committee has in NATO and the importance it attributes to the Alliance.

Let me once again express our pleasure in having you with us today. We very much appreciate this opportunity of sitting here with you this morning and informally exchanging some views and philosophies toward continuing the strengthening of the NATO shield.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. General Lemnitzer, I suggest we get right to the meat of the problem and discuss this permissive link proposal. Members and staff of the Joint Committee have been interested in

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the permissive link since 1960 when Committee consultants, Dr. Harold Agnew and Dr. John Foster, were asked to look into their possible utilization.

The Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy after an inspection of NATO installations in November and December in its report to the President recommended the use of electronic devices to improve the custodial arrangements as well as to improve command and control. While supporting the Presidential determination to develop and install permissive links, our Committee has become concerned lest there should be a premature decision to install devices in all weapons systems prior to obtaining operational experience.

A supplemental appropriation of \$23.3 million has been requested to develop and produce these devices.

In a letter to the President the Joint Committee expressed their concern on this point - [Doc # 7.221]

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I would like to reiterate that our concern at the time we made the trip through the NATO bases was on several counts. First we felt while there was technical custody, as called for by the Atomic Energy Act, on the part of the United States, there was actually very little real custody on our part. For all practical purposes custody had been turned over to friendly nations and it was just a token custody on our part.

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That was one concern we had. Part of that concern was caused by the fact we felt in a nation where the Government was inclined to be unstable or there was strong Communist infiltration in the Government that there was an unnecessary risk of espionage and sabotage. We felt there needed to be a bolstering of our control of the weapons. It was then that Dr. Agnew brought up the possibility of having an electronic device with a master control held by our own people against the possibility of seizure of the weapons or a "Colonel's Revolt"-- something like that.

On our return from this trip we talked this over with the Atomic Energy Commission. Incidentally we had an Atomic Energy Commissioner and staff member with us on the trip. They got busy immediately and the Laboratories started to develop this electronic device. They assured us it could be ready quite quickly. It was developed and orders were given, as you know, to install it.

However, they went a little bit further than we had anticipated and our concern was with the policy of putting these permissive links on all the weapons on our own ships and in our own custody since we felt it might involve an operational obstruction or delay which we believe is not necessary at all in the case of weapons on our own ships and completely in our own hands.

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The last letter we wrote was along this line. I don't know whether you have been briefed lately in this matter. We are going to have people in this afternoon to talk about it.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. That is what I understand. We in the Joint Chiefs of Staff have followed this <sup>suspect</sup> very closely. We understand the purpose behind the development of the permissive link and it <sup>can</sup> [does] serve a useful purpose in certain areas. We are concerned also lest we move too rapidly to install these <sup>permissive links</sup> in other areas, or move at all, I ~~might say~~, with respect to weapons strictly in U.S. custody where there is no opportunity whatsoever for any <sup>foreign national</sup> [other nationalities] to get their hands on the weapons.

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We believe this must be very carefully looked at first with the view of preventing the misuse of a weapon by other nationals but also with a view toward maintaining flexibility <sup>and represented</sup> so that if an <sup>urgent</sup> requirement develops for the employment of nuclear weapons, it will not be unduly restrictive. We can be disarmed, in effect, by having <sup>an essential</sup> a device that is hurried through <sup>to construction</sup> and does not permit the commanders to employ the weapons effectively. For this reason I can assure you the Joint Chiefs of Staff are <sup>closely</sup> following this <sup>now</sup> development and have submitted views on it and its employment.

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For example, if we find in analyzing the requirements for permissive links in an area like NATO, U.S. forces included, that <sup>the essential</sup> communications are absolutely vital -- and we all know in the case of

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a nuclear war, communications are going to be tenuous -- we certainly do not want to have nuclear weapons in the hands of American forces only to find them inoperative because of destruction of a headquarters by nuclear explosion, failure of communications, <sup>equipment, circuits, or things</sup> or things of that character.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I am glad to hear you say that.

The communications problem is one of the things we expressed concern about, as you know. In one base [redacted] we found they were depending upon commercial and local telephone lines to communicate with General Norstad in Paris. We made a strong recommendation that we have our own private short wave communication system set up. I would like to hear from you on that. Has there been any improvement in that situation?

GENERAL LEMNITZER. There has been a great effort put into <sup>communications in Europe</sup> communications, not only with respect to command and control of nuclear weapons, but for other purposes. The Defense Communications Agency has really been concentrating on this one and so has General Norstad's Headquarters. All of <sup>the new circuits</sup> them are not yet operative, but they will be <sup>the problem has been</sup> within the next few months -- before the end of this year, particularly [redacted]

I would like to say <sup>from</sup> a part of this particular discussion, <sup>and</sup> I appreciate very much ~~is~~ the interest the Committee and its staff have taken not only in nuclear <sup>weapons</sup> matters generally but <sup>also the specific nuclear weapons problems</sup> [particularly] the European area.

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I realize you have a statutory responsibility in this respect and I feel the recommendations made by the Committee as a result of their close look at nuclear matters in the NATO area have been very helpful <sup>to our concern</sup> in reaching a better perspective.

As you know, any responsible <sup>agency</sup> agency can get a lot of free advice from people who have no responsibility. I happen to be one who believes it is always good to have the suggestions and ideas of responsible people outside of the organization. This Committee does have an important statutory responsibility and knowledge in the field of nuclear weapons and I will continue to welcome visits and suggestions from this Committee.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We appreciate that. We are not interfering as a matter of idle curiosity on our part.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. I understand.

✓ CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. In those instances where there is a statutory obligation on the part of the Committee we felt that certain things should be called to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff and the President.

There has not been any news release or publicity on this matter by this Committee. This was handled on a completely secret basis with no desire on our part to break into print. I believe you will find this Committee does handle affairs of this nature in complete confidence.

We wanted this permissive link to be used specifically and in a discriminatory way, not from the standpoint of the fail safe type of thing,

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but protection against the sabateur or the espionage type of operation by having control in our own hands whether the body of the missile happens to be surrounded by friendly nations or not.

The question of uniformity has been raised in discussions with representatives of the White House, Defense and State. That is, the United States must maintain a principle of uniformity in its nuclear operational plan. For example, a recent decision not to assign two stage weapons to non-U.S. QRA forces in NATO resulted in two stage weapons being removed from U.S. owned and operated QRA units.

In a letter, dated May 14, 1962<sup>X</sup>, a number of the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy expressed their disagreement with this concept of uniformity. It has been the Committee's understanding that the original concept was that NATO countries were not supposed to be uniformly treated. Each nation was to contribute and to receive in accordance with its abilities and its capabilities. It was under this concept that I think NATO was set up.

Because you give an Honest John to one nation to say you have to give it to all nations or because you give a submarine to England that you have to give a submarine to Italy and to everybody else, in our opinion is completely wrong. It is wrong not only from the standpoint of the original concept of NATO, but it is wrong from the standpoint of the statute with respect to bilateral arrangements.

\* Doc # 7199. Reply from President is Doc # X.X.X IX-62

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The Act requires that certain agreements lay before Congress for a certain period of time. This clause was placed in the Act specifically for the purpose of seeing that each case was decided upon its own merits. There was certain criteria established also. The President had to determine the nation had the ability to keep secure the information that was to be entrusted to it; that it was of paramount interest to the Alliance and to us to make any such transfer of information or nuclear components and so forth.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Yes.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We do not believe because we furnish England something on a carefully selected basis that we are under any obligation to supply that same information or material to every other NATO nation. We know there are diplomatic difficulties in dealing with a group of nations. Everybody wants to get as much as anyone else and everybody else. We know you are going to be up against diplomatic pressures.

We would like your views on this point of uniformity if you would give them to us.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. I happen to have been involved in the drafting of the NATO treaty, <sup>and its</sup> for presentation to the Senate for ratification and I do not feel that uniformity is one of the prime criteria in NATO. I was involved also in the initiation and establishment of

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*was the* the military ~~aid~~ program which came *into being after the* ~~in behind~~ NATO and provided the weapons upon which the armed forces could be built to their present strength. If uniformity was a main criteria, we would <sup>have</sup> have 15 <sup>strategic</sup> strategic air forces and 15 of the various types of <sup>capability</sup> capability throughout ~~the Alliance~~.

This was not the basic concept of NATO.

As I recall the words, each member <sup>was</sup> was to provide that which it could best provide. This was the basis for our military aid program, as I recall. <sup>Big</sup> Big naval vessels, for example, were not <sup>the</sup> the responsibility of each nation. Weapons were given under the military aid program based upon the mission assigned to the forces, how they fit into total NATO force, what were the <sup>areas</sup> areas of operation and what were the military requirements for that particular nation.

As we look around the Alliance at the present time, the make-up of the forces are quite different. They are patterned on what they can best do, coupled with what we have provided to assist them in their local defense problems and not in any sense of the word that everyone should have the same capability across the board. I heartily agree with <sup>that</sup> that.

*concept which he governed the build-up of NATO force*  
 CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. It probably would not be right to say that the advisors around the President think that absolute uniformity should obtain. However, some of them in their conversations with us certainly stress this concern about treating one nation one way and another nation a different way and we think a little more strongly than they should when

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it comes into the field of transfer of nuclear weapons or participating jointly in nuclear weapon control and possession.

We want you to know our feeling in this respect before you go overseas so you will be under no illusions as to what the Committee's opinion is in this matter. We have studied this probably longer and more intensely than some of the advisors of the President who may be as well meaning as we are but who may not have as long a background of study.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. I recognize pressures will develop. They always do in any alliance. Human nature has a "me too" characteristic to it. I feel this is just one of the things that has to be weathered.

We have had it here in Washington in making up the military ~~equipment~~ equipment program across the board. I am talking now of the Chiefs of Staff. The Chiefs of Staff have not recommended equipment for nations that did not fit into the mission and military capability of the country ~~concerned~~. We never have and I don't think we ever should.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Don't the troops of many of these NATO nations have nuclear weapons already?

GENERAL LEMNITZER. They have the equipment that can deliver nuclear weapons. There are measures which are taken to retain <sup>the weapons</sup> them in U.S. custody but to get them into these units at the appropriate time. You, of course, are well aware of this.

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REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. You have German troops with nuclear vehicles, let's say.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. <sup>...with nuclear delivery vehicles;</sup> That is correct.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. You have French troops --

GENERAL LEMNITZER. That is correct.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. You have [redacted] You have [redacted] The Scandinavian countries don't want any part of this. The British, of course, are outside. What else is there? Isn't there actually a NATO nuclear force?

GENERAL LEMNITZER. In a sense I believe there is a NATO nuclear force. There isn't any question about it. They have the <sup>delivery</sup> capability. We have the weapons. The program for the employment of those weapons will be under the direction of SACEUR and SACLANT.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. I presume they want more tactical weapons in the nuclear field.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Yes, I am sure they need tactical weapons in Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have had a hand in recommending the weapons that should be provided. There isn't anything static in the field and I presume there will be additional requirements <sup>in</sup> on the future.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Is there anything to prevent a NATO nation, or let's say, any friendly nation from buying a delivery vehicle from Chrysler or some other company?

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GENERAL LEMNITZER. They are buying delivery vehicles in the form of aircraft right now.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. I am thinking of mobile units.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Do you mean missiles?


REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Yes.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. There are means of controlling this at the present time. If a nation wanted to purchase an Honest John or some of our new missiles like the Pershing and so forth, I would say that under the purchasing side of the military <sup>program</sup> whereby the Defense Department really acts as the agent for the country concerned if we wanted to interpose an objection to their having this particular type of vehicles, we could do so.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Suppose  to buy 50 Pershings?

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Right.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. That would have to be cleared, I suppose, through State Department, through --?

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Through State Department, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be called upon to give a recommendation as  should or should not be provided with <sup>the</sup> weapons.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. This is solid propellant. I can't recall whether this is a one unit piece of whether the warhead is a separate unit on the Pershing.

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GENERAL LEMNITZER. Yes, indeed, *it is a separate commitment.*

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Separate?

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Yes, the warhead is, *separate*

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Suppose that is approved. Would that mean we would have to put a certain attachment on it to handle each one of those warheads?

REPRESENTATIVE HOSMER. We have custodial responsibility in the general area where these weapons are liable to be used.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. On their bases?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. That is the way we are handling it now. If they are buying it not for national purposes but for NATO purposes, it would have to go through the General Council of NATO and be approved as part of the NATO over-all concept, would it not? I don't know whether I am calling the group by the right name but I am talking about the representatives of the different NATO nations. Do they not approve the component parts and plans of all member nations in the over-all strategy?

GENERAL LEMNITZER. In the development of over-all NATO plans and forces, yes they do. They have a voice in that. That is on the NATO side.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. On the national side separate from that, I think --

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GENERAL LEMNITZER. That is where we have our control. For example, take an extreme case which I don't believe has ever happened. Suppose some nation wants to put all its effort in nuclear capability. First, I think it would not get through the NATO planners under General Norstad. However, suppose it did get through. When it came to the U.S. side and we came to the conclusion this was not in the interest of NATO and certainly not in accord with our own views with respect to the way <sup>that they are</sup> ~~they are~~ building up <sup>their</sup> ~~their~~ forces, we could certainly interpose an objection at the Washington level which would preclude the provision of a Pershing to <sup>that</sup> ~~a~~ particular country.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. I was intrigued because a friend of mine told me he had been over in Europe recently peddling one of these weapons; that he was soliciting business. That is the principal reason I am asking these questions. It may not be pertinent to this particular discussion.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I think it is pertinent.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. I was interested in learning just what the procedure would be. In other words we do have a complete veto over whether or not the Italians, for example, might buy 50 Honest Johns, Pershings or Sergeants or any other thing. Is that right?

GENERAL LEMNITZER. <sup>It</sup> This is right. At the present time we have a complete veto, but this is a problem that is going to present itself

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with a proliferation of weapons. As the different countries get these weapons then there arises the problem of <sup>controlling a flow which is</sup> ~~control with a nation, in an~~ attempt to build up a capability of its own going to the British or French, after they get a nuclear <sup>capability</sup>. I don't see this as an acute problem. It is one over which we have control at the present time but I see <sup>the</sup> a situation developing in such a way that we may reach the point where we do not have quite the control we have had. This is going to present some real problems.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We realize you are facing some real problems along that line and this is a good time for us to have an understanding of what the Committee believes is the intent of the Act. I think I am expressing the general concensus of the Committee, but if there is anyone on the Committee who feels I am not expressing the general understanding of the Committee, I would appreciate it if he would speak up because I think it is very important General Lemnitzer have the views of the Committee.

Nowhere in the Act is the term "custody" used or defined. The Act uses the terms "transfer and possession". Custody as it is being practiced at this time, certainly in my opinion, is in contradiction to possession. The fiction of possession exists but the actual possession of the weapon has, in effect, been transferred in some instances -- not in all instances. In instances where we have possession of the

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warhead certainly the argument can be made that transfer of possession and custody has not occurred except for the missile vehicle itself. However, in the case of the QRA plane it is a little different.

In 1960 this Committee was most critical of action taken by the Defense Department, without prior notification of this Committee, in entering into a military arrangement with a foreign nation with respect to nuclear weapons. The Committee was particularly concerned over the delegation by the Defense Department of the responsibility for the security as well as the possession of weapons to a foreign nation such as those aboard the QRA planes sitting on the runway [REDACTED] for instance.

A recent inspection by representatives of DoD and AEC in which a staff member of the JCAE participated reflected great improvement in the security of nuclear weapons assigned to the NATO forces. Greater attention now appears to be given to the selection and training of American custodial and maintenance personnel including consideration of emotional stability and security background checks. This had been one of the criticisms of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The operational needs of our forces in Europe and NATO Alliance must be evaluated in line with the requirement of the Act that pertains to non-transfer and U.S. possession of nuclear weapons. Consideration should be given to changing or modifying the law rather than permitting

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the development of an illegal fiction in operational procedures.

We as a Committee of Congress, have been given the responsibility of a "watch dog" over these nuclear weapons. A situation now exists which seems to make it imperative that former concepts of possession be changed.

The bulk of Congress is under the misapprehension that the letter and intent of the law is being carried out while actually it is being avoided and evaded. If this Committee acquiesces, it puts us in a position of not keeping faith with our colleagues in the two bodies. Yet the concept of the law as it is now being used and the understanding of the Congress-- and I am speaking of the body of the Congress and not this Committee-- are different.

It seems to me this Committee must keep faith with our colleagues in the Congress and not shut our eyes to evasion or subterfuge leaving our colleagues under the misapprehension that things are as they were when actually they have changed.

I have brought this up because we hope that you, as the top representative of the U.S. Government out there, will keep this thought in mind. We are willing to cooperate. We want to do all of the things which the concensus of the Committee majority feel necessary for the security of the United States but we cannot be put in the false position of pretending an obsolete concept exists when conditions have changed.

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GENERAL LEMNITZER. I understand *the Committee's*

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We have our responsibility also. Is there anyone on the Committee who wishes to comment? Senator Bennett, you were on the Ad Hoc Committee.

SENATOR BENNETT. I would only back up the statement of the Chairman that there is great concern about the difference between fact and fiction with respect to the actual custody and responsibility. However, I do recognize how difficult it is to adjust the realities of a situation on a field to the legal necessities. I think it is important this Committee keep close watch on it because local pressures could gradually soften the thing to the point where there was nothing much left but a paper.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We have had some intimations there may be tremendous pressures on the part of the DeGaulle Government for concessions which we have not been willing to make. I think the members of this Committee ought to express themselves on this point.

I want to say that when I picked up the paper the other day and read that the sedan in which General DeGaulle was riding had 7 machine gun bullets put through it with one of them inches from his head, it brought very sharply to my mind the concern the Committee has had in regard to the transfer of nuclear information or nuclear weapons to the DeGaulle Government. The stability of the French Government has

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been one of our real concerns because of the permeation of a Communist element in the civil service and the local political structure of France. We have the feeling -- at least I have the feeling that DeGaulle is almost holding this thing together by the power of his personality and his own prestige.

I believe this is the second time they have attempted to assassinate him. Whether they are successful another time or whether due to advanced age he passes on naturally, we are going to be faced with a chaotic condition in France politically. We don't know who might come into power. It could be someone either secretly or openly in sympathy with the Algerian terrorists or the Communist Bloc in the Chamber of Deputies. In making any arrangements with France, I think this should be a consideration.

I know the pressure is great. I know France is in the middle of the NATO line. Nevertheless we have to think beyond the period of DeGaulle's control and his life, I think, in any agreements we may make. Germany, I think, is in a more stable position politically and militarily than is true of France, particularly France at this time. We are greatly concerned by the rumors we have heard of advancing information to France in certain realms where we feel we have a superiority over the Russians.

It has been the general feeling of the members of our Committee as a result of investigations we have made that the President could not, under the Act, justifiably represent the French nation as having a security

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system strong enough to really protect advanced nuclear information if we were to deliver it to them.



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There are areas -- and I am speaking specifically of the submarine field where we believe we are ahead of the Russians in our technology. If revealment and transfer of the specifications and plans of our advanced nuclear submarines to the French became a matter of consideration, this should be looked at very carefully. This Committee should be kept informed and no advance commitments should be made independent of the interest of Congress because this would be a matter undoubtedly where the law would have to be changed and the members of this Committee would have to go before their respective bodies and argue this case. If it were in the form of a treaty, it would involve only the Senate side of course, but if the law needed to be changed it would have to come before both bodies.

For these very important reasons we believe there should be a touching of bases before any commitments are made that would present this Committee and Congress with a fait accompli which they might not approve and might not implement. We hope you will keep this in mind. It is not that we just want to be interfering. This is strictly in line with our concept of the responsibilities of this Committee to our colleagues in Congress.

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GENERAL LEMNITZER. We have, of course, been dealing with these kinds of problems and this is one primarily for the Washington level.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I understand.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. I heartily agree with you that before we pass <sup>any</sup> information in this area or other areas of technology that is not known to be possessed by the Soviet Union, <sup>to any other nation, we</sup> ~~(this should require some~~ <sup>should require some very careful study and consideration</sup> very careful thinking before we pass it on to anyone outside of our <sup>own channels.</sup> ~~own channels.)~~

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I am talking, as you know, of interior design.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. I understand.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. There are some people who have said to us, "We could furnish a complete submarine to another nation and it would not involve necessarily revealing the interior design and specifications of component parts." On the other hand in the expert opinion of people who build these submarines to transfer these submarines to another nation it would be imperative almost that we transfer the interior design or they wouldn't be able to operate them or to correct any kind of mishap or any kind of accident -- excursion of power, something like, unless they were familiar with the component parts, the designs and specifications. We haven't gone into this in great detail but we have made some examination in this field. This is what we have been

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told by people who are very knowledgeable in this field.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Both Administrations have offered submarines to NATO.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I am not talking about the transfer of the sovereignty over a submarine, and not an offer for --

SENATOR BENNETT. The use of them.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Assigning them to NATO under American operation and supervision. I am talking about the transfer of any of these advanced weapons or advanced vehicles, such as a submarine, from one national sovereignty to another.

There is one other matter that we took up in our Report. That was conventional weapons capability of NATO.

The Joint Committee in its Ad Hoc Subcommittee Report strongly recommended the development of greater conventional capability within NATO. We are delighted an attempt has been made along this line and to a certain extent I think we are developing a better conventional capability in some of the nations of NATO.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. This is an area in which I have been an advocate since the day the NATO treaty was signed in this city and I continue to

*be in search for assignment of a greater conventional capability within NATO.*

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. It is about 12 years since the commitment was made and many of those commitments have never been fulfilled, as you know, by the NATO parties.

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*Yes -  
This is correct  
long ago - see transcript  
JCS Committee copy - attached  
to this transcript*

GENERAL LEMNITZER. As a matter of fact I feel the effectiveness of the military forces as a whole, if we have to use nuclear weapons, is enhanced by a conventional capability. I think the two fit together very closely and we must be capable of fighting with both types of weapons. I happen to be one who believes our nuclear capability if we are ever called upon to use it is enhanced by a strong conventional capability.

On the battlefield your targets are created by maneuvers and you maneuver with conventional forces. So I am heartily in accord with <sup>the Committee</sup> [this] <sup>in -</sup> <sup>Committee</sup>. As a matter of fact, particularly this last year when I was Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, <sup>in the JCS Staff sessions</sup> which <sup>is a regular</sup> comes around through rotation and is on its second phase now -- and at the Chief of Staff sessions, I pressed very strongly, <sup>last</sup> as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as Chairman of the Military Committee <sup>... Staff of Staff Director</sup> for the NATO powers to come up to their conventional force goals <sup>(124)</sup> (which have been) established through NATO planning. I shall continue to do so.

I want to add that I am pressing and will continue to press for the back-up -- adequate back-up in logistical capability, to support that conventional and nuclear capability, <sup>required logistic support</sup> which I think <sup>is one of the</sup> is one of the real requirements in NATO at the present time.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We realize conventional capability is not a substitute for nuclear weapons but our position has been that our NATO allies should meet their conventional commitments in armaments

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Note -  
General Lemnitzer  
can understand this  
I would agree -

and not use the U.S. nuclear weapons support as an excuse for cutting back on their conventional armaments. ~~I heartily agree with that.~~

*General Lemnitzer: I heartily agree with that, sir.*  
CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I am glad to have your assurance along

that line and to know you feel as we do.

We feel that some of these nations certainly can as a result of their advanced economic position do more than they are in the conventional field and I will support you in every way possible if you take this same position over there.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. What do you think is adequate - if you can ever use the word "adequate" -- in conventional forces?

You have now about 24 Divisions.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. I think in the central sector, the level of about 30 divisions, which is based upon the development of plans by sector commanders coming up all the way through General Norstad, *as SACENR*, is about a minimum conventional force. In other areas I happen to be in agreement with the general levels of conventional force goals which we presently have.

As a result of actions which have been taken *in agreement France* since the Berlin crisis a year ago, when Secretary McNamara and I went over to Europe *in July 1961* and in our contacts with the Ministers of Defense since -- and I talked to the Minister of Defense of Italy this morning on this subject -- the problem *originally, 1961* arises in filling up *to proper strength the units* the forces which they presently have *concerned*

LEMNITZER

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*from existing divisions*  
*the* *will*  
 [to proper strength] Sixty percent of the Divisions are not divisions ready for combat. We are pressing them to build up current forces to operational level and we are pressing very strongly those who have not developed their number of divisions to meet their force goals to do so.

In the central sector approximately 30 divisions is the minimum force at the present time in my opinion, in the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff, the opinion of General Norstad and as a matter of fact in the opinion of the Military Committee which comprises the Chiefs of Staff of all countries. This will vary according to the threat, but based on the threat that exists today, 1962, this seems to be about the minimum.

I would say also that the last estimate I *have* heard from General Norstad as the result of actions we have taken during the past year is that they are past the 26 division level. We are anxious that the new German Divisions --

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Are those operational divisions?

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Yes. Come along and fill this 30 division requirement.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Do they have logistic support of their own or are they depending pretty much on us?

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GENERAL LEMNITZER. They have some <sup>11</sup> but they do not have enough. Secretary McNamara, supported by the Joint Chiefs, is pressing all nations to develop a logistic capability to enable their forces to fight for longer than a week or ten days.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I think this is very important. Even though they bring up their strength to 80 percent or 90 percent but still do not have logistical support and depend upon us, in an hour of peril we might not be able to deliver the logistical support they need. Certainly they would have a reasonable amount of their own logistical support.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. I have sat in on many meetings, and I think Secretary McNamara is just about completing the round of discussions with NATO Defense Ministers, such as with the Minister of <sup>Defense</sup> Italy at the present time. He has stressed this, and so have I, in our discussions with all of them.

The Germans recognize <sup>the problem</sup> that. They are very smart military people and they recognize the requirement and are putting more effort into it. However, the other countries, the smaller nations have got to <sup>now</sup> look at this side of their total capability.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. We were told a couple of years ago that the NATO forces without adequate tactical nuclear weapons would be pushed out of Europe in a couple of weeks. They might make a stand in the Pyrenees or some place like that, regain some beachhead. If that

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premise is correct, it would seem that the acquisition of so-called "adequate" nuclear tactical weapons is of primary importance.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. There is no doubt whatsoever that tactical nuclear weapons are of prime importance to the defense of Western Europe in the NATO area. At the beginning of NATO, when the NATO treaty was signed, the Russian forces could have walked across Germany and France and have walked to the channel. They can't do it any more.

The object of the shield is to provide such forces that they can be delayed -- they can be stopped. I don't think any man can envisage the time at which it is appropriate to employ nuclear weapons. It will depend upon the circumstances and what the forces ~~are~~ <sup>it</sup> which <sup>forces</sup> are involved in a given operation. They can't walk across Europe today even though some of the NATO divisions are under strength.

The objective, of course, is to build <sup>the NATO divisions</sup> them up to where there has to be a real fight to advance at all in Western Europe. This is a problem which has been faced by my predecessors in Europe. There is no doubt it will be faced by me and those who succeed me. It depends upon the forces <sup>the Soviets, satellite forces,</sup> (Russia has and the satellites) where they are concentrated, <sup>and</sup> how they are backed up with ~~air~~, tactical air and with tactical nuclear weapons.

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The situation has changed in recent years. We are dealing with an enemy who<sup>is</sup> has tactical nuclear weapons. I would say it would be quite an <sup>extravagant</sup> statement to say we could fight<sup>with</sup> Russia's conventional/nuclear forces with conventional forces. This, of course, wouldn't work at all.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Have you seen any evidence of a lessening of tension?

GENERAL LEMNITZER. No, I wish I could say that I did.

I think if you look across the entire spectrum of the <sup>world situation</sup> world today -- what is happening in Cuba, in the Southeast Asia, in Iran, the pressures that are likely to be put upon Iran, the problems related to Berlin and the statements which are coming from Mr. Krushchev himself-- <sup>you will find</sup> it indicates to me there is no change in the objective of the International Communists or their determination to reach <sup>that</sup> that objective of world domination. They are resorting to other actions <sup>in the</sup> Southeast Asia. They are resorting to guerilla<sup>and</sup> subversive efforts which <sup>are</sup> hard to deal with. I see no lessening of tension <sup>in the world today.</sup> That is my opinion.

SENATOR PASTORE. I merely want to say, General, it is very comforting, at least to me, to know that you have been selected to go there to become Supreme Commander of NATO. I subscribe and applaud everything you have said.

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But why is it that we must always be prodding our allies in NATO to come up to their commitments? Basically what is the problem? Is it because they don't have the money or because they don't feel as strongly about this as we do?

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Senator Pastore, I would like to express my thanks for your congratulations and your confidence in me.

I would say that throughout the history of NATO the reasons have varied. In the early days when they were <sup>rebuilding</sup> rebuilding their economies, I think it is understandable <sup>that</sup> they wanted to put the greater part of their effort into their economic rehabilitation and development. I think also <sup>that</sup> since they [have] achieved or surpassed <sup>in</sup> this pre-war economic capability, it is just human nature to "let George <sup>do it."</sup>

They would like to rely upon our strength. They would like to devote more of their effort to building their economy beyond the levels which existed then. I think there is a bit of wishful thinking that they might be able to rest upon our nuclear capability as the panacea to all the military problems of the world. Of course our nuclear <sup>capability</sup> ~~ability~~ alone is not the answer to all military problems. For example, <sup>consider</sup> what is happening in Southeast Asia today. Nuclear weapons are not the answer to that particular problem. I think it is a combination of all things pertaining to human nature.

I would like to put it in these terms. It is not that we should do less in NATO, but that our Allies need to do more and measure up to

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*and we are not  
discussing the military  
aid program*

their capability. This is the position I have taken for the 12 years I have been defending the military aid program. I started the program I believe in it. I am very proud of the record. As you know, we are not giving grant aid to <sup>most of the</sup> these European nations today, nor do they think we should. But there is a need to provide them with an awareness that they are on the front line. They are closer to the front line than we are, but I also believe we can best defend the United States <sup>by the policy</sup> along the Iron Curtain today. I hope, however, there is no relaxation of pressure on <sup>the European allies</sup> (them) to pick up a greater part of the burden in defending the NATO area. <sup>then they have the burden to meet</sup>

SENATOR PASTORE. I know how frustrating this has been always. I have experienced more or less the same in talking with civilians of some of these countries, whether it be France, Italy or England. They don't seem to have the same sense of apprehension that we hold as against the Russians moving. I think their general attitude seems to be that this isn't going to happen. We have a lot of people in our country who feel that way too.

I would hope that once you get the feel of it over there you would think about what Congress might do to convince our friends in the NATO Alliance that they need to come up to full strength -- without being haughty about it, without being domineering. I am wondering if psychologically the Congress couldn't play some part in convincing them of the need to come up to the full commitments that

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you have already expressed.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. I am certain the Congress both in hearings and in visits by members of Congress could emphasize this point.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I think we are going to have to go further than that.

SENATOR PASTORE. I think we have to convince these people they have a part to play in this because they have something to lose just as we have something to lose. We meet our commitments because we believe we must and should because of world tensions, but from conversations I have had I doubt if that concern is universal on the other side of the water for some reason or other.

As you have said, in the beginning they were in a period of reconstruction. However, I don't believe it is economic any more and I am wondering what it is. If it is just that human reaction, "Let George do it", isn't there something "George" can do to convince them they must meet their commitments also?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I agree with Senator Pastore.

We are reaching a point here at home also where these people are going to have to face up to their commitments. We have this foreign aid bill coming up tomorrow and I would be very much surprised if they didn't knock out more than a million dollars of the foreign aid in the House. While this is a different subject, it is an illustration that

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that the Members of Congress, people who have supported NATO and supported foreign aid, as I have, are beginning to look at this with a very critical and jaundiced eye. It seems like to me the time has come when you have to say to those people over there, "Listen, you are in this boat with us. You are the first casualty in the line of fire. Unless you have the same feeling of urgency to engage in a counter effort, you are going to lose the cooperation of the United States."

And they are going to lose it because there is a growing feeling among the members of Congress. I can sense it in my talks with them every day. With the gold outflow we have and the high taxes and all of these things, the day of reckoning is coming. I certainly don't want to see this happen from the standpoint of the over-all security of the free world. However, these people are simply going to have to assume their share of the burden or we are going to lay it down.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. I think it would be most unfortunate if the *foreign* cuts being talked about in the press this morning ever materialized.

I happen to have presented this bill this year and so far as the military side is concerned, it is a minimum bill. Of the small amount in the 1963 military aid program going to the NATO area, *the greater portion* ~~(it)~~ is going (primarily) to two countries: Greece and Turkey. They are really

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unable to carry the military burden which they are carrying at the moment. The <sup>great part of our military resources</sup> ~~great majority~~ is going into the Far East where there is a real showdown with the Communists.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. That is why I said it is not a direct issue here, but it is related and it is related to the feeling of the American people. We are committed outside of the foreign aid appropriations. We are committed from the standpoint of maintenance of our troops on the line throughout the world and it is the cost of the maintenance as well as the cost of foreign aid which is now beginning to rest pretty heavily upon us.

I just have the feeling -- after having been on the Hill for 20 years -- that there is an awful lot of people who are looking very critically at this attitude on the part of our allies of the Free World.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. In further answer to the Senator's question as to why they feel this way, I think one factor is that of "I am a small nation. What can I do <sup>in the conflict</sup> between these two giants?"

This <sup>obviously</sup> overlooks completely the basis for our departure from our traditional <sup>US</sup> foreign policy in 1949 when we went into these various collective security arrangements that as a group e we do have strength. But the group is not strong itself if each one of the nations does not do its proper part. I think this idea has been pushed very

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aggressively in NATO, in SEATO and in OAS and other areas in which we have entered collective security arrangements.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Are there any questions?

REPRESENTATIVE HOSMER. I just want to add my word of appreciation to General Lemnitzer for being here and to say I am happy he has been assigned to NATO.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Thank you very much.

REPRESENTATIVE HOSMER. I think he has <sup>seen</sup> probably the irascible actions that sometimes characterize Adenauer and DeGaulle and that they have, in fact, perhaps helped their national interests to some extent. Perhaps the General might be as irascible on some of these items.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. I think some of my colleagues in NATO *usually* consider me as bad or worse than many of us regard them.

But I have had experience in the NATO field and in collective security arrangements. I can speak from personal experience as a result of my appearance before Congressional committees, not only in the military *aid* program but in hearings such as *the annual military position and defense* [this Defense] presentation. I hope *to* to use that experience effectively in carrying on.

Going back to the NATO area there has been tremendous progress made in NATO over the years. When I was first sent over by Secretary Forrestal to sit on the Military Committee of five powers, the U.K., France, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg, there was *had seen* a Corporal's Guard standing between the Red Communist Forces and the Channel coast.

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We have come a long way. This is no place to stop.

REPRESENTATIVE PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join Senator Pastore and Mr. Hosmer in expressing my pleasure at the assignment given to General Lemnitzer. I have had occasion through the years to be in close contact with him. I know how effectively and how efficiently he works. I think the assignment has been placed in the most capable hands.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Thank you, Mr. Price, very much.

REPRESENTATIVE ASPINALL. Mr. Chairman, first I wish to apologize for not being here for this entire discussion. It was necessary for me to attend another meeting and I could not come until late.

I too am pleased, however, that General Lemnitzer has been given this responsibility in NATO. I think the NATO organization needs not only his experience but his personality. I am very happy about this assignment.

I wish to join Senator Pastore, however, in his expression of criticism and the Chairman with respect to the reaction created among the American people by the publicity that has been given to our programs elsewhere. Of course, I represent an inland area where our activities in foreign areas are not well understood. However, when the people whom I represent see a statement that the strength of France and West Germany equals that of the United States, or something like that, they begin to ask: Why do we carry on then, if that is true? Why do we have to continue to assume this responsibility?

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I think there is a need to educate our people and I do not believe it can be done through Congressmen. I think a Congressman can help, but I do not believe it can be done primarily by Congressmen.

SENATOR JACKSON. Good morning, General. I am sorry to be late.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We are glad you are here to say good-bye to General Lemnitzer. The hearing is about to be concluded. You will have to rest on faith that your colleagues have presented the case of the Committee to him adequately.

If you have anything further to say, however, we will grant you five minutes.

SENATOR JACKSON. I know better than that.

(Laughter)

All I want to say, however, is that I know everything will be in good hands with General Lemnitzer in command over in NATO.

I am sure the General with his long experience with the "Hill" knows that what has been said here this morning will undoubtedly be followed through by some trips over there -

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Probably not this year though. We have a little campaigning to do if we ever get out of here.

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GENERAL LEMNITZER. Senator Jackson, may I repeat what I had said in the beginning that I happen to be one who welcomes visits by ~~various~~ <sup>various</sup> committees. As Commander-in-Chief, Far East, I did. I shall continue to take that attitude in the NATO area not only because it gives ~~them~~ <sup>the Committee members</sup> an appreciation of the type of problems I and my forces are concerned with but ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> also enables me and ~~the~~ <sup>my</sup> forces to realize there are people behind us here who do understand our problems and are carrying the ball for us here in Washington.

The nuclear field particularly is a complex business. We are always confronted with the dilemma of adequate control on one hand and sufficient responsiveness and flexibility on the other hand to make our capability effective if we ever have to use it. This is a dilemma that requires the best brains in this country and others ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> solve effectively.

I appreciate the statutory responsibility of the Committee. I welcome visits, suggestions and criticism, if criticism is in order, on the arrangements we have in NATO.

SENATOR JACKSON. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, I don't envy you your job. There has been a lot of talk and rumbling about disagreements within NATO that, to me, are merely manifestations of the fact that the child and their children are growing up. They have been dependent upon us for a long time. We had to carry them through during difficult

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times. Now they are building their own power which is the very thing we have tried to encourage.

I do think there is a tendency on the part of the press especially to equate this assertiveness on the part of some of our allies with dissidence and disunity. I do not so interpret it. I consider it to be a good sign that individual allies are asserting themselves. Unfortunately there has been confusion in the interpretation of the conduct of some members of NATO.

I think over-all we are definitely stronger. The thing that is important is to build a North Atlantic Community along more than just military lines. The Common Market is one means but which by going forward so fast is causing us some problems. However, it is the very thing we recommended. We said, "Europe, stop fighting among yourselves. Unite." They are doing precisely what we asked them to do and that is causing some problems.

I think we should clarify as often as we can to our own people the true meaning of statements being made by leaders in Western Europe from to time which seems to indicate there is great disunity. One would think France was about to leave the world and the same is true with some of our other allies. I don't agree with some of the positions being taken, obviously, but I think over-all Mr. Krushchev would be making a serious mistake if he should interpret these statements of our Allied

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leaders as being an indication of weakness.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. I quite agree with that, Senator Jackson.

I would like to assure this Committee, however, that although they are feeling their economic and political strength, the view I expressed, for example, to Foreign Minister of Defense Andriotti of Italy this morning and have to others is that NATO was conceived and established for security purposes. Defense is the keystone of NATO.

That is not to say they should not branch out into other activities, but I think it would be most unfortunate if because of economic issues or political issues they neglect defense or security. This is the basis of NATO. They are broadening out into other areas, but I hope that in all the give and take that is involved that they do not inject a divisive influence ~~into~~ that will affect the military strength of the Alliance because that is the purpose for it.

SENATOR JACKSON. I will conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying I think we are fortunate in having a man with General Lemnitzer's background receive this assignment. When I was on the House Appropriations Comm ttee he was intimately associated with the military aid programs in the very beginning of NATO and the time when the Marshall Plan was going forward full blast.

General Lemnitzer, I think the experience you have had will come in good stead in your new undertaking. I wish you well.

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GENERAL LEMNITZER. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. General Lemnitzer, thank you very much for your appearance here this morning.

The members have expressed their feelings and their confidence in you. If at any time through the regular channels you wish to apprise us in advance of problems you will have in this field and in which we can be cooperative, we would welcome the information and would be happy to receive it.

GENERAL LEMNITZER. Thank you very much. I will keep that in mind. I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We wish you well in your assignment, and at this time we will excuse you and your aides. I would like the members to remain for just a moment.

(Whereupon at 11:15 a.m. the meeting was adjourned.)

*P 1672 follow-up...  
... 3/8/62*

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September 18, 1962

Points of Interest to Discuss with General Lemnitzer

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✓ *Lemnitzer*  
1. PERMISSIVE LINKS

The Joint Committee Members and staff have been interested in permissive links since 1960 when Committee consultants, Dr. Harold Agnew and Dr. John Foster, were requested to look into their possible utilization. The Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the Joint Committee, after inspecting NATO installations in November-December 1960, in its report to the President, recommended the use of electronic devices to improve custodial arrangements, as well as improving command and control. While supporting the Presidential determination to develop and install permissive links in nuclear weapons assigned to NATO, the Committee has been concerned over a premature decision to install the devices on all weapons systems prior to obtaining operational experience. A supplemental appropriation of \$23.3 million has been requested to develop and produce the devices. In a letter dated May 29, 1961, Members of the Joint Committee wrote to the President of their concern.

2. QUESTIONABLE PRINCIPLE OF UNIFORMITY

In past discussions with representatives of the White House, Defense Department and State Department, an argument has been made that the United States must maintain a principle of uniformity in its nuclear weapon operational plans. For example, a recent decision not to assign two-stage weapons to non-U.S. QUR forces in NATO resulted in two-stage weapons being removed from U.S.-owned and operated QRA units.

In a letter to the President, dated May 14, 1962, a number of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy members pointed out their disagreement with the concept of uniformity. Based on the original NATO concept, it has been the Committee's understanding that NATO countries were not supposed to be uniformly treated but that each nation was to contribute and receive in accordance with its abilities.

### 3. CUSTODY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONCEPT

Nowhere in the Atomic Energy Act is the term "custody" used or defined. The Act uses terms such as "transfer" and "possession." In 1960 the Committee was most critical of acts taken by the Defense Department without prior notification to the Committee of entering into military arrangements for security of nuclear weapons in foreign nations. The Committee was particularly concerned over the delegation by the Defense Department to foreign nations of responsibility for security, as well as the "possession" of weapons aboard foreign QRA planes.

A recent inspection trip by representatives of the DOD and AEC, in which a staff member of the JCAE participated, reflected great improvement in the security arrangements of nuclear weapons assigned to NATO forces. Greater attention now appears to be given to the selection and training of American custodial and maintenance personnel, including attention to emotional stability and security background checks. The operational needs of our forces in Europe and the NATO Alliance must be evaluated in line with the requirements of U.S. law as it pertains to non-transfer and U.S. possession of nuclear weapons.

Lemnitzer

Consideration should be given to changing or modifying the law rather than the development of legal fictions if operational requirements make it necessary.

4. NATO CONVENTIONAL WEAPON CAPABILITY

The Joint Committee, in its Ad Hoc Subcommittee report, strongly recommended the development of greater conventional capability within NATO. This, however, is not as a substitute for NATO weapons, nor is it justification to withdraw nuclear weapons support from NATO. The JCAE position has been that <sup>our</sup> NATO Allies should meet their commitments in conventional armament and not use the U.S. nuclear weapon support as ~~a basis~~ an excuse for cutting back their conventional capabilities. Also an adequate conventional capability will result in a higher threshold prior to the necessity to commit nuclear weapons in the event of a Communist attack.

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**COPY**

October 15, 1962

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General L. L. Lemnitzer  
Room 2E857  
c/o Office of the Chairman  
Pentagon Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Lemnitzer:

I am forwarding to you enclosed three copies of the transcript of your informal meeting with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, September 18, 1962, at which you and the Committee exchanged views concerning nuclear weapon arrangements with NATO. The original of this transcript is on file with the Joint Committee.

It is suggested you may wish to review the transcript for accuracy. If you desire any changes or corrections it is suggested you return one copy with the corrections or changes noted therein. In view of the sensitive nature of the matters discussed, the transcript has been classified "Secret - Restricted Data".

Sincerely yours,

John T. Conway  
Executive Director

*When printed, this document is to be classified as "Secret - Restricted Data"*

Encs.

3 copies of transcript  
of 9/18/62 meeting

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

This document contains restricted information in the Atomic Energy Act

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Received 11/2/62  
dk

23 October 1962

Dear Mr. Conway:

Attached is the corrected copy of the transcript of General Lemnitzer's informal appearance before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on September 18, 1962. The corrections have been approved personally by General Lemnitzer.

It is understood by General Lemnitzer that because of the sensitive nature of the matters discussed, the transcript will remain as classified in its entirety. Accordingly, the transcript has not been submitted for Department of Defense security review for purposes of declassification.

Sincerely,

A. H. BERNDTSON  
Captain, U. S. Navy  
Military Assistant (L&L)  
to the Chairman, JCS

1 Incl  
Corrected Copy  
of Transcript  
(Cy #3)

Mr. John T. Conway  
Executive Director  
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy  
Congress of the United States

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**The U.S. Nuclear Presence in Western Europe,  
1954-1962, Part II**

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