

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: WD 707419
 By: [Signature] NARA Date: 7/2/91

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

U.S.S.R.

STATE - AID - USIA COVER SHEET FOR

TOP SECRET

INFORMATION

S/P FILE COPY

G/PM-173e

TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER

DESCRIPTION

TELEGRAM, MEMO, LETTER, ETC.
 Memo from Mr. Farley to Mr. Owen transmitting cy report

SUBJECT
 US-Soviet Military Relationships

ORIGINATOR
 LSloss

DATE
 12/22/67

ADDRESSEE
 S/P - Mr. Owen

COPY INFORMATION

Action Copy Information Copy Copy No. of Copies

TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER'S SIGNATURE OFFICE SYMBOL DATE

EACH PERSON WHO RECEIVES THIS DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN NAME, ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL AND DATE IN THE SPACES PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE OF THIS FORM

THIS COVER SHEET SHALL NOT BE REMOVED UNTIL THE TOP SECRET DOCUMENT IT COVERS IS TRANSFERRED OUTSIDE OF STATE - AID - USIA, OR DOWNGRADED, DECLASSIFIED, DESTROYED, OR RETIRED. THE TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER TAKING THE ACTION SHALL SIGN HIS NAME, ORGANIZATION SYMBOL AND DATE AND NOTATE THE ACTION. HE SHALL FILE THIS TOP SECRET COVER SHEET IN HIS FILES AND RETAIN IT FOR FIVE YEARS. THIS FORM SHALL THEN BE FORWARDED TO THE APPROPRIATE OFFICE IN HIS DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY HAVING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF OFFICIAL RECORDS.

TRANSFERRED (Outside, State - Aid - USIA) ADDRESSEE DS-406 SERIAL NO.

DOWNGRADED OR DECLASSIFIED DATE NEW CLASSIFICATION

DESTROYED RETIRED DATE SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER'S SIGNATURE DATE

TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL OF TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

TOP SECRET
(With Attachment)

December 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: U - Mr. Katzenbach
M - Mr. Rostow
G - Mr. Bohlen
EUR - Mr. Leddy
EA - Mr. Bundy
NEA - Mr. Battle
INR - Mr. Hughes
S/P - Mr. Owen ✓
FROM: G/PM - Philip J. Farley
SUBJECT: US-Soviet Military Relationships

S/P FILE COPY

*DOD comments
5/24/68*

Attached is a copy of the final report on the Foreign Policy Implications of Changing US-Soviet Military Relationships along with three working papers which were prepared in the course of the study by members of the study group. I think you will find the report and the attachments of interest. I would welcome your comments.

Attachment
As stated.

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

G/PM/LSloss/v1

TOP SECRET
(With Attachment)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

A Study of US-Soviet Military Relationships
1957-1976

Foreign Policy Implications

Department of State
Staff Study
December 18, 1967

TOP SECRET
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

CHANGING US-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS


1. A General Observation - An assessment of relative military capabilities is exceedingly complex, uncertain, and controversial. It is complex because so many variables enter into the assessment of military capabilities and because military technology is advancing so rapidly and on so many fronts. Even for the present, many of these variables are subject to wide ranges of estimates (e.g., How hard are missile silos? How accurate are missiles? What is the actual operational reliability of weapons systems?). Intelligence estimates have not proven fully reliable in the past. In the future, the variations of these estimates may be even greater because it is inherently more difficult to obtain reliable information on qualitative changes of the type expected.

The present study confirms the fact that there are great and honest differences of opinion among knowledgeable experts, particularly as to the future relationship of strategic forces. "The truth" is elusive partly because our information cannot be complete, and partly because the relevant indicators of military capability depend on what you are trying to measure. Unquestionably the same uncertainties exist for the Soviet Union. Thus, categorical statements (including our own) about strategic relations, particularly projections more than five years into the future, should be treated with considerable skepticism.

2. Findings on the Strategic Balance - (Details at TAB A)

a. During the past three years, the Soviets have substantially increased their ability to damage the US in a nuclear exchange. Our ability to limit damage to the US has been correspondingly reduced. Their rapid buildup of hardened, dispersed ICBMs has given them a deterrent in which they should have high confidence. In a second strike, we estimate they could inflict two to four times more damage on the US today than they could in early 1965 (80-100 million fatalities as compared to 25-35 million). The Soviet leaders certainly are aware that their situation has improved, even though their detailed calculations may differ from ours.

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

CHANGING US-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS

1. A General Observation - An assessment of relative military capabilities is exceedingly complex, uncertain, and controversial. It is complex because so many variables enter into the assessment of military capabilities and because military technology is advancing so rapidly and on so many fronts. Even for the present, many of these variables are subject to wide ranges of estimates (e.g., How hard are missile silos? How accurate are missiles? What is the actual operational reliability of weapons systems?). Intelligence estimates have not proven fully reliable in the past. In the future, the variations of these estimates may be even greater because it is inherently more difficult to obtain reliable information on qualitative changes of the type expected.

The present study confirms the fact that there are great and honest differences of opinion among knowledgeable experts, particularly as to the future relationship of strategic forces. "The truth" is elusive partly because our information cannot be complete, and partly because the relevant indicators of military capability depend on what you are trying to measure. Unquestionably the same uncertainties exist for the Soviet Union. Thus, categorical statements (including our own) about strategic relations, particularly projections more than five years into the future, should be treated with considerable skepticism.

2. Findings on the Strategic Balance - (Details at TAB A)

a. During the past three years, the Soviets have substantially increased their ability to damage the US in a nuclear exchange. Our ability to limit damage to the US has been correspondingly reduced. Their rapid buildup of hardened, dispersed ICBMs has given them a deterrent in which they should have high confidence. In a second strike, we estimate they could inflict two to four times more damage on the US today than they could in early 1965 (80-100 million fatalities as compared to 25-35 million). The Soviet leaders certainly are aware that their situation has improved, even though their detailed calculations may differ from ours.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Author: WND 979519

By: E NARA Date: 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

2.

b. Perceptions of the strategic balance are probably more significant in international relations than the actual balance. Our own perceptions of the balance may not have changed as markedly as the above facts suggest. This is best assessed by our own leadership. However, it should be noted that, in the early 1960's, we already had credited the Soviets with the ability to do substantial damage to the US, and we foresaw the emergence of mutual deterrence by mid-decade. On the other hand, the Soviets undoubtedly had a feeling of strategic inferiority in the early 1960's which must have declined today.

c. Over the next decade, we expect the Soviets to continue expansion of their strategic forces and even to surpass us in some categories of strategic strength. They will equal the US in the number of ICBM launchers deployed during the coming year and will probably continue to expand their force beyond 1000 missiles. Several Soviet ICBMs with advanced performance characteristics now are in development. The USSR also will pass us in total intercontinental megatonnage in 1968 or 1969. They could equal or surpass us in numbers of POLARIS-type submarines in the mid-1970's. They already have an ABM system in the Moscow area, and it seems likely they will deploy ABMs more widely in the 1970's.

d. These trends do not now jeopardize the US deterrent, nor do they seem likely to do so in the next five years or so. We believe that the Secretary of Defense makes a persuasive case that our deterrent will remain more than adequate even against quite unlikely increases in the threat. However, we should point out that some qualified military experts question this conclusion. At present, our principal means of assuring deterrence into the 1970's is the MIRV* program. MIRVs will increase our total number of warheads from about 4000 today to 8000 in 1976, with the increase beginning in 1970. However, between now and 1970 the Soviets could come close to parity in total intercontinental warheads.

e. The Soviets also have been gradually increasing the reach of their conventional military forces. In recent years they have developed forces which, while probably originally intended for the general war mission, now provide them with capabilities for distant, limited operations. Specific

*Multiple, independently-targeted re-entry vehicles.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By WFE NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

3.

evidence of growing Soviet military reach includes: greater worldwide naval activity, particularly in the Mediterranean; the expansion and modernization of airlift and sealift capabilities; and a modest expansion of naval infantry (marines). The Yemen provides evidence of Soviet willingness already to exercise their growing reach. We foresee a doubling of port-to-port sealift capabilities over the next decade and a substantial increase in their airlift. However, the Soviets will remain far behind the US in their over-all capability to move large forces rapidly to distant points and will have less capacity for opposed operations beyond the range of their tactical aircraft.

f. The Soviets have maintained superiority in Central Europe and have modernized their forces, including the provision of a formidable tactical nuclear capability. However, since the early 1960's, our own assessments have recognized that the margin of their conventional superiority is much less than we previously assumed, particularly in a surprise attack. Furthermore, the consensus in NATO is that a Soviet attack on Western Europe is highly unlikely.

3. Political Implications - (Details at TABS B and C)

a. The current rapid growth in Soviet strategic nuclear forces is unlikely to increase their willingness to take actions which they believe would have a high risk of leading to nuclear war with the US either directly or by escalation. For in contemplating the possible consequences of any such course, their own casualties would still be likely to weigh more heavily upon Soviet calculations than their growing ability to hurt us. Such restraint, however, does not rule out Soviet initiatives that could adversely affect the US or its allies' interests. Where a direct conflict of interests develops, Soviet leaders may prove tougher in maintaining their positions in a situation of mutual deterrence.

b. We should be concerned that, as the Soviets view their higher strategic force levels as reinforcing deterrence, they may be more inclined to think they can intervene in third areas with reduced risk of American opposition. Potential

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979514

By WF NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

4.

Soviet options for such moves are created by the greater reach of their conventional forces. As a result, they may be more tempted to respond to requests for military support from governments or factions they support politically. Thus, we could be faced with situations in which the Soviets intervene before we do, leaving us with the choice of initiating confrontation or accepting a fait accompli.

c. While the basic condition of deterrence is not likely to be upset in the next five years, any close reckoning of the state of the strategic balance will be increasingly complex and difficult. In particular, net evaluations are becoming more and more sensitive to assumptions about weapons characteristics, such as accuracy, which are extremely difficult to verify. Traditional "box score" comparisons of US-Soviet strength relations are becoming increasingly subject to varied interpretations and possible manipulation for polemical purposes both by domestic critics of our defense programs and by the Soviets.

d. Domestic American controversy over defense policy is likely to increase, inevitably attracting foreign attention. So far, foreign reaction to changing Soviet capabilities has been limited, but American discussion will expose foreign opinion to criticism of American policy on two lines - one that US programs are pushing the Soviets into a new round in the arms race and the other that American vulnerability is increasing and that American ability to meet its Alliance commitments is declining. Either line of criticism could, if it makes an impact abroad, complicate our foreign relations.

e. Uncertainties will tend to generate mutually reinforcing pressures on both sides to use "worst case" assumptions. For the Soviets, this will mean having to adopt military budgets which entail a cost in over-all economic growth rates. Moscow may seek ways of regulating the pace of the arms race, perhaps using arms talks and even limited arms control agreements for this purpose. There appears, however, to be very little likelihood that the two sides will be able to attune their views on all the complex issues sufficiently to conclude a comprehensive agreement to end the race in strategic weaponry.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

5.

4. Conclusions

a. Mutual deterrence is here and likely to persist for at least the next decade. In these circumstances the US will have increasing difficulty in defining vital interests for which the use of nuclear weapons would be warranted. Moreover, even to maintain deterrence we will have to continue spending large sums because of the uncertainties inherent in the strategic equation and the steady development of new weapons systems.

b. Effect on the Soviet Union - The Soviets probably believe that their growing strategic capabilities will deter the US, enhance their prestige, and improve their ability to influence events in other countries. The Soviets may be more prone to take advantage of opportunities to intervene in local conflicts or may be more readily drawn into such conflicts and, once involved, may be less willing to withdraw. Thus, we may face situations where the Soviets are there first or where it will be desirable for the US to intervene rapidly to assure they are not. At present, this seems most likely to occur in the Middle East or Africa.

c. Effect on NATO Allies - Soviet military capabilities in Europe will remain at least as great as heretofore. From a military viewpoint, Soviet leaders will certainly feel as able as they have been in the past to engage in a policy of threats or renewal of pressures on Berlin. Their increased over-all power may cause our European allies to be more deferential to Soviet political pressures and lead to questioning of the reliability of American commitments. The confidence of the European members of NATO in US nuclear intervention in the event of an attack on Europe already has declined and probably will be further eroded. While the Europeans already understand in general terms that mutual deterrence exists, they have been slow to acknowledge the full meaning for them. Where they have recognized the implications, with the exception of France, they have chosen to play them down. To be sure, a significant deterrent to an attack on Europe will remain so long as the US retains a nuclear arsenal. However, continued concern about the US nuclear guarantee and demands for reassurance are likely to be prominent in our future relations with the NATO countries.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By W.F. NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

6.

If our allies feel these concerns are not being met, it could lead either to neutralism or to greater pressures for independent nuclear capabilities.

d. Non-Proliferation - Questions about the validity of the US deterrent in protecting other countries could feed pressures for additional independent nuclear capabilities - and not only in Europe. We are likely to encounter increasing pressures for more specific assurances as to our nuclear commitments at a time when the strategic situation and the mood of the American public make it less likely that we will be able to accede to these pressures.

Given our own obvious vulnerability to nuclear attack, it will be more difficult for the US to extend nuclear assurances, and it may also become increasingly difficult for us to satisfy other countries that their security requirements can be met through nuclear guarantees. (The light ABM defense should help, at least for some years, to reinforce our assurances to Asian countries that feel threatened by Communist China.) Under these conditions, there may be greater pressures for independent nuclear capabilities. Our efforts to resist such pressures are likely to increase strains in our relationships with friendly countries.

e. Limiting Strategic Forces - In current circumstances the reasonable approach would be for both sides to seek to limit their expenditures on strategic forces. However, the prospects for limiting strategic forces by agreement with the Soviets are not promising. The difficulties have been noted above, particularly the difficulty of controlling technology. However, the effort to achieve such an understanding should not be abandoned. If, as seems likely, a situation of mutual deterrence is destined to persist for some years, both sides may become convinced that they should try to maintain deterrence at lower levels of effort. Two possible approaches with respect to the Soviets have been advocated in recent years: (a) one stresses our ability to maintain superiority and the futility of their competing with us; (b) an alternative approach accepts approximate parity as inevitable and seeks specific means of implementing it through discussion, and,

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

7.

hopefully, agreement. Past US public statements of defense policy have stressed elements of both approaches. In our view, it is preferable to avoid the rhetoric of both "superiority" and of "parity." Rather, our statements should stress the adequacy or sufficiency of our deterrent and make the point that we are doing just as much as is necessary to assure our deterrent. We are not attempting to accelerate the arms race by doing more nor jeopardizing security by doing less.

f. Offense-Defense Balance - A major asymmetry exists between the US and Soviet strategies and strategic postures. This is the difference in relative emphasis which we and they place on strategic defense. In recent years, US policy statements have given increasing weight to "assured destruction" and lesser weight to "damage limitation." This trend has certain foreign policy implications.

First, the Soviets see us as "offense-oriented." Almost certainly they will perceive the sharp increases in US offensive warheads which will result from our MIRV program as a serious threat to them. This Soviet view contributes both to the maintenance of political tensions and constitutes an obstacle to disarmament agreements. It is possible that we could meet this situation, without necessarily increasing our total strategic effort, by a greater relative emphasis on defense in US strategic doctrine. Such emphasis might contribute to arms control in two ways: (a) Greater US defensive effort would complicate Soviet strategic planning and make their strategic effort more costly, thereby imposing further economic pressure for limiting arms; (b) If Soviet leaders want to reach agreement, a more balanced, mixed system might make agreement more feasible because of somewhat greater similarity in defense posture.

Second, the erosion of our ability to limit damage to the US is creating doubts about the firmness of US nuclear commitments. Even if defenses are far from perfect, doing something about defense could create a psychological climate which could be somewhat reassuring (without necessarily being falsely reassuring) both for our public and our allies.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority MWD 979519By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

8.

Finally, quite aside from its merits, we should also recognize that the prospect of defense against missiles continues to have domestic political appeal. If the Soviets continue to deploy an ABM and we deploy only for protection against China, this will remain a political issue in this country.

On the other hand, a greater emphasis on defense also presents us with many problems. As has often been pointed out, no combination of defense and counterforce can begin to provide complete protection against the Soviets. A larger ABM program could further stimulate arms competition, and would be even more likely to do so if undertaken in conjunction with further improvements to our offensive forces. Furthermore, deployment of ABMs and greater emphasis on civil defense will create opposition from many allies who are concerned that this will intensify the arms race.

Clearly, we should make a more intensive effort to analyze the pros and cons of the damage-limiting issue as it affects our foreign relations. In the meantime, we should not take positions which will make it more difficult for us to expand our defensive programs should we wish to do so in the future.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the Secretary of State, through the Under Secretary, request the SIG to arrange for appropriate political-military contingency planning in light of the above analysis. Such planning should focus in particular on the Middle East and Africa and should consider where and how the Soviets would be most likely to intervene in local conflicts if they should be requested to do so by a local government or revolutionary movement.

b. That the Secretary of State suggest to the Secretary of Defense the need for State and Defense jointly to develop a rationale for our strategic forces, to be used in the forthcoming DOD posture statement, which takes into account the impact of that statement on the Soviets and our allies.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

9.

Particular attention should be paid to the way in which our assured destruction and damage-limiting objectives and capabilities are described.

12/18/67

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

10.

PARTICIPANTS IN THE STUDY

The Honorable Foy D. Kohler

Mr. Robert R. Bowie

Mr. Philip J. Farley

Mr. Leon Sloss

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Mr. Richard Rosecrance

Mr. John C. Ausland

Mr. Robert Baraz

Mr. Jonathan Dean

Mr. Raymond Garthoff

Mr. Vladimir Toumanoff

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

US-Soviet Military Relationships

Attachments

TAB A - Comparisons and Trends

TAB B - Soviet Appreciation of the Emerging Military Balance
with the US

TAB C - US Strategic Views - by RR

NOTE: These are working papers, which were prepared to
provide a basis for discussion by the study group.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TAB A

TOP SECRET

12/20/67

US-Soviet Military Relationships

Comparisons and Trends

1. Objective and Approach. This paper describes the past, present and possible future military relationships between the US and the Soviet Union from 1957 to 1976. While the emphasis is on strategic forces, important trends in general purpose forces also are covered. The assessment is descriptive rather than statistical. A statistical annex contains tables and graphs, which are referenced in the text. For past periods, we attempt to describe how relationships were perceived at the time as well as how they are now perceived in retrospect.

2. The Question of Criteria. There are a number of ways to measure the relationship of strategic forces (e.g., launch vehicles, number of warheads, megatons, throw weight, fatalities, industrial damage). While there is considerable debate over what is the most representative measure, it seems clear that no single measure can represent this complex relationship; and different measures seem more appropriate to different time periods. For example, bombers were the important strategic weapon in 1957. In the early 1960's, the number of missile launchers was used as the most significant measure. More recently, it has been suggested that total megatonnage or total number of warheads are a better measure, because it is possible for a single launcher to deliver more than one warhead and because large weapons can do more damage than small ones.

However, neither megatons nor numbers of warheads are a fully adequate measure because the effectiveness of a warhead is highly dependent on reliability, yield and accuracy and on the type of target it is intended to destroy. This issue is discussed further in Annex A of this paper.

The most meaningful measure of strategic capability is the amount of destruction that a force can accomplish or prevent. However, so many assumptions and variables

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979514

By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

2.

enter into the calculations of damage limiting and damage inflicting capabilities that it is extremely difficult to get precise and meaningful estimates and even more difficult to reach agreement on what these estimates mean. For example, some would contend that it is the relative damage that can be done by both sides that is important in assessing deterrence. However, the prevailing view is that deterrence can be defined in terms of the minimum level of assured destruction that can be inflicted in a second-strike (with respect to the Soviet Union the definition of "minimum" has ranged from population fatalities of 40% in 1961-62 to 20% in 1967). Above all, uncertainties enter into any calculations, particularly estimates that are projected more than a year or two into the future. While improved intelligence capabilities have reduced our uncertainties as to numbers of bombers and missiles, uncertainties with respect to system characteristics (e.g., numbers of MIRVs and CEP), will increase and become more important in net evaluations.

Comparisons of conventional force capabilities also are difficult. For example US and Soviet divisions are not equal in manpower, types of armament, number of vehicles, etc. US and Soviet tactical aircraft are very different in armament, payload and performance characteristics. Thus, simple comparisons of numbers of divisions or numbers of aircraft are not a valid comparison of relative military capabilities. Nevertheless, such comparisons do have political significance because they are relatively simple to make and thus they are frequently made.

The approach in this paper is to examine the balance in terms of several criteria on the grounds that an over-all judgment can be made only on the basis of a reasonable sampling of the relevant indicators. A series of trend charts for several of the important indices is at Annex B 1. Selected assured destruction and damage-limiting calculations are summarized in Annex B 2. The following paragraphs discuss the strategic balance in more qualitative terms for several selected years. Key data on these years for strategic forces is an Annex B 3. Key data on general purpose forces is at Annex B 4.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

3.

1957. (Table B-3-1) In 1957 the key elements in the strategic balance were bombers and numbers of bombs. Warning was also an important variable because the forces on both sides were soft and relatively slow in reacting. As we now look back on the relative balance, it is clear that the US enjoyed marked strategic superiority. We had a sizeable advantage in number of long-range bombers and in our total nuclear stockpile. The bulk of the Soviet strategic bomber force consisted of medium bombers capable of only one-way missions, and their inflight refueling capability was very limited. We estimated that the Soviets could place 200 - 300 bombers over the US after absorbing a first strike. Our air defenses could be expected to intercept many of the bombers that could reach the US.

Most of our medium-bomber force was on overseas bases within range of Soviet targets on two-way missions. The US enjoyed an advantage over the Soviet Union in warning as well, and our bomber defenses were at least as good as theirs. In sum, the US possessed the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, even in a second-strike, while the Soviets did not have a comparable capability. However, the Soviets could have done considerable damage to the US in a first strike.

Our perceptions were not as optimistic as the above facts suggest. Our intelligence capability was not nearly as good as it is today, and thus there were considerable uncertainties about the existing balance. We knew the Soviets already possessed a considerable nuclear stockpile and the ability to deliver at least some nuclear weapons by bombers on the US. We believed that the Soviet strategy included a possible preemptive attack because their second-strike capability was so poor. However, we estimated that the Soviets would avoid risking a nuclear war or even a confrontation that might lead to nuclear war.

While we could not be confident of avoiding damage in a nuclear war, we could be reasonably confident of limiting

TOP SECRET

Authority NWD 979519
By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

4.

damage under any circumstances to much less than the Soviets would sustain.

A very significant factor in our calculations was the realization in August 1957 that the Soviets were well along in developing a ballistic-missile capability. In 1957 we estimated that they were likely to be ahead of the US in ballistic missiles in the early 1960's. This prospective threat began to dominate our estimates in 1957, and was an increasing concern until 1961.

Soviet ground forces were considered far superior to the US, particularly in Europe. Their strategic mobility was assessed as very limited but growing. Their tactical air and naval capability was assessed as inferior to the US although they did have a large submarine force which could be used to interdict US and allied shipping.

4. 1961. (Table B-3-2) 1961 has to be considered in two periods. In June, we were still gravely concerned about the "missile gap." The US then had 28 operational ICBMs and 80 Polaris missiles. The National Intelligence Estimate in June 1961 gave the Soviets 10 to 15 ICBMs, but there were vigorous dissents recorded. The State Department, for example, pointed out that the Soviets could possibly have as many as 200 ballistic missiles. The Air Force estimate was at least 120, and their comment in the NIE stated it was possible that Soviet ballistic missiles alone could bring all SAC air bases under attack.

By September 1961 the missile gap had officially disappeared, when revised estimates appeared based on better intelligence. This confirmed an estimate of 10 to 25 Soviet ICBMs. (We now estimate there were only four in mid-1961.) In retrospect, we can see that the US enjoyed strategic superiority in 1961 largely on the basis of a superior bomber force, and this strategic superiority increased from 1962 through 1964 as we began to deploy protected MINUTEMAN and POLARIS missiles in numbers. However, our perception in mid-1961 was again quite different, and it should be recalled that before the "missile gap" disappeared, there was President Kennedy's meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna and the building of the Berlin Wall.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority MWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

5.

5. 1962-1964. (Table B-3-3) By the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 we were more confident that we had a strategic force that would be a powerful deterrent to the Soviets. We recognized that we had a good second-strike deterrent and a considerable capability to limit damage against attacks from the Soviet Union. While it was clear that the Soviets could damage us seriously in a first strike, we could retaliate and do much greater damage to them, and their second-strike capability was still limited. Their ICBMs were soft and they were not dispersed, presenting only 20 aiming points.

An interagency study done in August 1962^{a/} found that the Soviets were seeking "to overcome the advantage which the US has enjoyed (in strategic capabilities). The Soviet weapons programs are obviously aimed at obtaining greater security for the Bloc and greater freedom for Soviet policy in the face of the immense threat posed by US strategic power." The study concluded that "growing strategic capabilities will strengthen the Soviet leaders' belief in their ability to influence the course of events in all areas of the world." However, the study also stated "We nevertheless regard it as likely that the Soviets will not abandon caution in Soviet-American confrontations, including Berlin. We believe they recognize there are severe limits to the challenges which can be posed with weapons which the challenger is as concerned as the opponent to avoid using." The study concluded that no basic changes in US foreign or defense policies were required.

Our relative position got even better at least through 1964 as the MINUTEMAN and POLARIS force expanded. By mid-1964 we had over 1000 land and seabased intercontinental missiles, while the Soviets had less than 200 ICBMs (2/3 of them soft) and 100 SLBMs.

There was no time during this period when the US Government believed we could maintain or should try to maintain a "full first-strike capability." (The Air Force has generally

a/ Report on the Implications for US Foreign and Defense Policy of Recent Intelligence Estimates, August 2, 1962.

TOP SECRET

Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

6.

dissented from this view.) However, we did still aim for a significant damage-limiting capability in the event deterrence failed. The one area where the Soviets had an edge was in IRBMs and MRBMs. They had over 500 in 1962 and over 700 in 1964. We had removed the THORS and JUPITERS from Europe in 1963, depending on our intercontinental missiles and bombers to counter the IRBM/MRBM threat to Europe. We believed that the Soviet strategy might be to utilize their superior medium-range missile capability for nuclear blackmail against Western Europe and to deter the US through its allies.

We continued to believe that Soviet non-nuclear capabilities in Western Europe were superior to NATO's, although the Soviets had undertaken a major reduction in general purpose forces in 1960. We believed our growing arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons would compensate for Soviet superiority in conventional forces in Europe. The mobility and reach of US forces was still considered to be superior to that of the Soviets and we believed they would not be likely to conduct military operations far from their borders, but would rely instead on proxies to fight their battles. The US saw an increasing prospect of limited wars and began a major effort to improve the mobility and strength of our general purpose forces in the early 1960's.

6. 1967. (Table B-3-4) By contrast with the late 1950's and early 1960's, our intelligence on current Soviet deployments is highly reliable. On the other hand, uncertainties about the future are as great or greater than ever with the prospect of such developments as multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and ABMs on both sides. As a result of these uncertainties, there are widely divergent views on the state of the strategic balance. Some claim that the US is losing its once superior position to the Soviets. Others believe we are about to widen our lead over the Soviets with the introduction of MIRVs. What is clear is that in the period 1965-1967, the Soviets have substantially increased their ability to damage the US in a second strike (Table B-2-5). It also is clear that they are spending considerable sums on strategic forces and on R&D (Table B-4-5).

TOP SECRET

Authority MWD 979519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

7.

It is widely accepted that mutual deterrence exists. We accept that the Soviets have a secure second-strike deterrent force, and there is a widespread belief that there is little we can do to change this in the future. What is more, we assume that they have reasonable confidence that they have a secure second-strike force. We are giving less emphasis to damage-limiting as a major strategic objective vis a vis the Soviets.

Nevertheless, the US retains today an edge in most indicies of the strategic balance. We still have more ICBMs than the Soviets, although they are closing this gap rapidly. We have considerably more and better SLBMs and can expect to maintain an edge in this category until the mid-1970's at least. We have more than three times as many long-range bombers, four times as many intercontinental weapons (warheads), and over 50% more total megatonnage if both bomber and missile weapons are counted. The Soviets still maintain their advantage in MRBMs. Despite the US advantage in the major indicies of strategic power, there is a growing recognition that strategic superiority has limited meaning - at least in a military sense - in a period of mutual deterrence. Arms control considerations play an increasing role in US strategy, as we seek means of stabilizing competition in strategic arms and limiting nuclear proliferation. China also has become a factor in the strategic equation, causing us to earmark a larger portion of our force against CPR targets.

In Europe we have changed our assessment of relative capabilities in two major respects. First, it is no longer assumed that tactical nuclear weapons can compensate for superior Soviet non-nuclear forces, because the Soviets also have a large inventory of tactical nuclear weapons. On the other hand, our assessment of Soviet conventional capabilities in Europe has been reduced. It is now questioned whether the Soviets can bring to bear superior non-nuclear forces if NATO forces receive and act on warning. Other new factors in the over-all military equation in 1967 are the growth of Soviet naval capabilities and the increased worldwide use of that force, particularly in the Mediterranean (Table B-4-3) and the engagement of the preponderance of US general purpose forces in Vietnam.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority MWD 979519

By W.F. NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

8.

7. 1972. (Table B-3-5) Any future projections must begin with the caveat that there are great uncertainties. There have always been uncertainties in future strategic projections, but by 1972 we reach a period where the US begins to deploy MIRVs in considerable numbers and the Soviets could begin to deploy an extensive ABM system. While we can be reasonably sure of our own capabilities for 1972, because most of the steps to create these capabilities have already been initiated, we are less sure of Soviet capabilities because all of the steps they have initiated are not obvious. There are even some uncertainties as to the capabilities of our own weapons such as how accurate MIRVs will be and how well we can harden our warheads against Soviet ABMs. In the case of the Soviets, we are uncertain as to how many missiles they will have, what new weapons systems they will introduce into their force, whether they will have progressed with MIRVs and ABMs, and if so, how far.

However, certain estimates can be made with some confidence. Almost certainly mutual deterrence will persist. The Soviets probably will surpass us in numbers of ICBM launchers and in intercontinental megatons before 1970. They cannot surpass us in numbers of SLBMs and long-range bombers in this time period. While they may have some MIRVs in 1972, we are almost certain to be ahead both in numbers and technology. On the other hand, their larger missiles give them the potential capability to deploy more MIRVs per missile should they choose to do so. If the Soviets do deploy an ABM beyond the Moscow area, it is not likely to be far along by 1972, and it will not have a significant effect on US assured destruction capability. It is not possible for the Soviets to have a reliable first-strike capability in 1972. However, they will have some counterforce capability even while holding enough force in reserve for assured destruction. Our counterforce capability with the smaller MIRV warheads is highly dependent on very good accuracies. Precisely how good future accuracies will be is not yet clear. Thus, there is considerable debate as to how good our damage-limiting capability will be. (See Annex A.)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

8.

7. 1972. (Table B-3-5) Any future projections must begin with the caveat that there are great uncertainties. There have always been uncertainties in future strategic projections, but by 1972 we reach a period where the US begins to deploy MIRVs in considerable numbers and the Soviets could begin to deploy an extensive ABM system. While we can be reasonably sure of our own capabilities for 1972, because most of the steps to create these capabilities have already been initiated, we are less sure of Soviet capabilities because all of the steps they have initiated are not obvious. There are even some uncertainties as to the capabilities of our own weapons such as how accurate MIRVs will be and how well we can harden our warheads against Soviet ABMs. In the case of the Soviets, we are uncertain as to how many missiles they will have, what new weapons systems they will introduce into their force, whether they will have progressed with MIRVs and ABMs, and if so, how far.

However, certain estimates can be made with some confidence. Almost certainly mutual deterrence will persist. The Soviets probably will surpass us in numbers of ICBM launchers and in intercontinental megatons before 1970. They cannot surpass us in numbers of SLBMs and long-range bombers in this time period. While they may have some MIRVs in 1972, we are almost certain to be ahead both in numbers and technology. On the other hand, their larger missiles give them the potential capability to deploy more MIRVs per missile should they choose to do so. If the Soviets do deploy an ABM beyond the Moscow area, it is not likely to be far along by 1972, and it will not have a significant effect on US assured destruction capability. It is not possible for the Soviets to have a reliable first-strike capability in 1972. However, they will have some counterforce capability even while holding enough force in reserve for assured destruction. Our counterforce capability with the smaller MIRV warheads is highly dependent on very good accuracies. Precisely how good future accuracies will be is not yet clear. Thus, there is considerable debate as to how good our damage-limiting capability will be. (See Annex A.)

TOP SECRET

Authority NWD 779519
By WF NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

9.

Predictions about general purpose forces for 1972 must be even more tenuous than prediction for strategic forces because many of the weapons systems involved have shorter lead times and thus, decisions on 1972 general purpose forces in many instances are not yet made. US capabilities will depend greatly on what happens in Vietnam and what we do after Vietnam. However, after the Vietnam war has ended, we are likely to have a smaller force than we have today but a force with greater flexibility to meet contingencies and a combat experienced officer corps. It is likely that there will be further US force reductions in NATO, and this in turn could lead to a further weakening of the Alliance.

Future Soviet general purpose force capabilities will depend to a great extent on how they decide to allocate their resources in the next several years. However, the most likely estimate is for a Soviet force that is at or slightly below present levels, more modern, and more mobile. While the Soviets probably will continue to extend the reach of their forces, they will not be able to match the capability of the US to project and support military power very far beyond their own borders. Limitations on the mobility of their tactical air will continue to be an important constraint unless they gain overseas bases. However, they probably will be able to move as much as several lightly armed divisions rapidly by air to areas within 1000 miles of the Soviet Union. It is quite likely that the Mediterranean Basin will become an area where US and Soviet capabilities are more closely matched than they have been in the past, although the Soviets will face logistic problems in supporting large-scale forces in the Mediterranean area.

8. 1976. (Table B-3-6) 1976 is much more difficult to predict than 1972. However, it is highly unlikely that either side will have a high-confidence first-strike capability. Thus, mutual deterrence will continue, but at higher levels barring a major technical breakthrough on the one hand or a major arms control agreement on the other. It seems likely that the Soviets will be ahead by some criteria such as megatonnage while the US will be ahead in others, e.g., numbers of warheads. The Soviets could have a heavy ABM defense by

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 7/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

10.

1976, and so could the US. But such predictions are highly speculative because they are based on assumptions as to decisions not yet made on both sides. If a major advance on one side appears to threaten the balance, the other side will, by 1976, have time to react. Both the US and the Soviet Union will have a large R&D base to draw on and ample economic resources, although the Soviet economy will be more constrained than ours. It seems likely that our uncertainties about the strategic balance will be even greater in 1976 than they are today unless intelligence capabilities improve markedly.

Soviet military "reach" is likely to increase further. We project a doubling of Soviet port-to-port sealift capacity between 1967 and 1976 (Table B-4-4). The level of forces in Europe could be affected by agreements on mutual reduction of forces which are now beginning to receive more serious consideration by our NATO allies. However, fundamental changes in the military confrontation in Europe probably are dependent on a political settlement of the political issues dividing Europe.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Annex A

Effects of Reliability of Yield and Accuracy on ICBM Effectiveness

This Annex discusses the effect of yield and accuracy on ICBM effectiveness. This has become an increasingly important issue because of the US trend toward small yield weapons, which are dependent on very good accuracies to destroy hardened targets, and because of the increase in hardened Soviet ICBMs.

TABLE 1

Effects of Nuclear Weapons as a Function of Yield and Accuracy

Damage Criteria^{a/}

	Radius of Effects			
	<u>50 kt.</u>	<u>500 kt.</u>	<u>1 mt.</u>	<u>10 mt.</u>
10 PSI (Population) ^{b/}	1.0 mi	2.25 mi	2.75 mi.	6 mi
25 PSI (Airfield)	.55 mi	1.25 mi	1.5 mi	3.25 mi
300 PSI (Missile Silo)	.15 mi	.325 mi	.4 mi	.875 mi

^{a/} Pounds per sq. in. max. overpressure assuming optimum height of burst.

^{b/} Severe damage to ordinary house. Light damage to reinforced concrete structure.

Table 1 shows the accuracy required to destroy three different types of targets as a function of weapons yield. Even "small yield" weapons (e.g., 50 kt.) will create very substantial damage to population and industry for a radius of a mile. Weapons of more than 1 mt. "over-kill" most urban

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

2.

targets in the Soviet Union, which are relatively compact in area. Moscow, the largest Soviet city in area, has a radius of about 5.5 miles. There are some 67 US cities larger in area than Moscow. These asymmetries and the fact that the accuracy of Soviet missiles probably is less than our own tend to make large yield weapons' appear a better option for the Soviets than for the US for use against urban targets.

The characteristics of the weapons in our missile force and in the Soviet force in the 1970's are shown in Table 2.

Although we are going to smaller yield warheads for our MIRVs, we are projecting CEPs^{a/} of a quarter of a nautical mile for each MINUTEMAN III warhead. Even assuming that our accuracies are considerably less than this (e.g., one nautical mile), even the smallest missile weapons that we plan to have should be adequate for the assured-destruction mission; and multiple warheads provide better possibilities for penetrating an ABM defense.

It is against hard targets that the question of yield and accuracies become critical. These factors affect our counterforce or damage-limiting capabilities rather than our assured-destruction capability. A single 50kt. weapon, even with a quarter-mile accuracy, cannot be considered adequate to destroy a hardened missile silo. However, three such weapons could destroy a 300 PSI silo, assuming accuracies of a quarter of a mile or better. But if we do not achieve better than one-half a nautical mile, then ten 50 kt. warheads, which we plan for the POSEIDON, or three 170 kt. weapons in MINUTEMAN III, would be inadequate against hardened missile silos. On the other hand, the larger yield Soviet SS-9 would be adequate to destroy a 300 PSI target even with accuracy of only a mile.

^{a/} Circular error probable. The radius of a circle in which statistically one half of the impacts will occur.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MWD 979519By WF NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

TABLE 2

Characteristics of US and Soviet Weapons

<u>US</u>	<u>Est. CEP</u> <u>1972</u>	<u>Yield</u> <u>Per w/h</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Yield</u>
MINUTEMAN II	.50	1.2 mt.	1.2 mt.
MINUTEMAN III	.25	.17 mt.	.340-.510 mt.
POLARIS A-3	.80	1.1 mt.	1.1 mt.
POSEIDON	.25	.05 mt.	.5 mt.
TITAN	.90	9 mt.	.9 mt.
<u>Soviet Union</u>			
SS-9	.50	18-25 mt.	
SS-11	1.0	1.0 mt.	
SS-Z-2 (Advanced ICBM)	1.0	1.5 mt.	
SS-Z-3 (Advanced ICBM)	.5	18-25 mt.	
SS-N-4 & 5 (SLBM)	1.0	2 mt.	
SS-N-Z-1 (Advanced SLBM)	1.0	1.5 mt.	

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979514
By MF NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

4.

Reliability also is an important factor. We are projecting over-all system reliability for the MINUTEMAN force at something over 70% in the early 1970's. It is less than 60% today. We estimate Soviet reliabilities to be less than our own at the present time but expect them to equal ours by the mid-1970's. This may be an optimistic assumption from the Soviet standpoint.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MWD 979519


By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

ANNEX B
STATISTICAL DATA

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

Introduction to the Statistical Annex

The charts and tables in this annex are intended to illustrate some of the military relationships between the US and the Soviet Union. A cautionary note about the significance of these statistics is in order.

Statistical comparisons can be illuminating if the statistics are properly understood. They can be misleading if they are not. The comparisons made in this paper are not intended as an evaluation of relative military capabilities. This would require a much more detailed analysis than has been undertaken here. They are intended to illustrate some of the comparisons that are likely to be made publicly of US and Soviet capabilities. While such comparisons may not be an adequate indicator of relative military capabilities, they may nevertheless have important political significance because they reflect what many people believe relative capabilities to be. In short, we are focusing here on the political, rather than the military, significance of comparative data on US and Soviet military forces.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97


TOP SECRET

SECTION 1
TREND CHARTS

TOP SECRET

BOMBERS 1957 - 1976 IN UNITS


Number of Aircraft



DECLASSIFIED
 Authority AWD 979519
 By WFE/NARA Date 9/5/17

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

ICBM LAUNCHERS 1961 - 1976




DECLASSIFIED
Authority: AWD 979519
By: WFE/NARA Del 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES 1961 - 1976

Number of Units




Top Secret

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: MD 979519
 By: WFE/NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

SUBMARINE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS 1961 - 1976




DECLASSIFIED
Authority: AWD 979519
By: WFE NARA Date: 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

MRBM/IRBM LAUNCHERS 1961 - 1976

Number of Launchers




DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: WMD 979519
 By: WFE/NARA Date: 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOTAL INTERCONTINENTAL FORCE 1961 - 1976

Number of Weapons




DECLASSIFIED
Authority: AWD 979519
By: WFE/NARA Date: 7/5/97

REPRODUCED FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

INTERCONTINENTAL MEGATONS

Total Force and Alert Force

1961 - 1976




DECLASSIFIED
Authority: AWD 979514
By: WEA MRA Delir 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

ALERT INTERCONTINENTAL FORCE 1961 - 1976

Number of Weapons and 1 MT Equivalents



DECLASSIFIED
Authority: AWD 7795-14
By: WFE/NARA Date: 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MWD 979519
By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

Section 2

Damage Limiting and
Assured Destruction Calculations

DECLASSIFIED

 Authority NWD 779519
 By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

Table B-2-1

TOP SECRET

Growth of the Soviet Target System

July 1966 to July 1967

	<u>July 1966</u>	<u>Jan. 1967</u>	<u>July 1967</u>
High Priority Nuclear Delivery Systems	1164	1432	1549
(Hard ICBMs included above)	(263)	(485)	(638)
Other Military Targets	368	362	391
Urban Industrial Targets	339	310	314

 Source: JCS

Comments: This table shows the effect on US targeting of the growth of the Soviet ICBM force. The growth of hardened ICBMs is particularly significant. A single 1 mt. weapon with a one mile CEP (about the characteristics of our present MINUTEMAN force) has a high kill probability against a soft target. It has a much lower kill probability against a hard target. Due to the increase in the number of Soviet ICBMs, we have had to reduce the number of our weapons targeted against each Soviet missile, thereby further reducing damage expectancies.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Table B-2-2

TOP SECRET

Assured Destruction

Trends in Soviet Fatalities
US Retaliation
(Estimated Fatalities in Millions)

<u>January</u>	<u>Max. Retaliation on Cities</u>	<u>Counterforce Retaliation (Collateral Damage)</u>
1964	77	40
1965	82	51
1966	80	46
1967	81	37
1968	80-73	37-32

Source: JCS

Comment: Our assured destruction capability has remained relatively constant and well above the minimum criteria of 20-30% established by DOD because forces have been targeted with this objective. However, to maintain an adequate level of assured destruction, it has been necessary to re-allocate weapons from the counterforce role.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

 Authority MWD 979519
 By ME NARA Date 9/5/97

Table B-2-5

TOP SECRET

Damage Limiting
Trends in Industrial Damage

<u>January</u>	<u>To US</u>		<u>To Soviet Union</u>
	<u>Preemption</u>	<u>Retaliation</u>	<u>Soviet Preemption</u>
1964	28%	52%	66%
1965	19	45	67
1966	41	55	64
1967	45	52	65
1968	48	54	68

Source: JCS

Comment: US ability to limit damage to industry has declined, as in the case with population. However, Soviet industry, being more highly concentrated, is still more vulnerable than US industry.

TOP SECRET

Authority AWD 979519
 By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

Table B-2-3

TOP SECRET

Assured Destruction
 Effect of Greater than Expect Threats
 (Percent Soviet Fatalities in US Retaliation)

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1976</u>
High NIE/Programmed US Force	46%	45%	44%
Programmed US Force with:			
Soviet MIRV	46%	44%	37%
Soviet ABM	46%	41%	18%
Soviet MIRV and ABM	46%	39%	9%
US Responses			
To ABM ^{a/}	46%	41%	29%
To ABM and MIRV ^{b/}	46%	39%	32%

a/ Increase POSEIDON from 10 to 14 MIRVs.

b/ Add pen aids to POSEIDON, light defense of MINUTEMAN, 450 new MINUTEMAN III super-hardened.

Source: Systems Analysis

Comment: The above table indicates that an extensive Soviet ABM, and even more, an extensive Soviet ABM plus MIRVs could reduce our assured destruction capability to an unacceptably low level by the mid-1970's. These programs would be very costly for the Soviets and are therefore considered unlikely. Furthermore, there are a number of possible responses open to the US which could restore our assured destruction capability. Two examples are shown on the last two lines.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

 Authority NWD 779519
 By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

Table B-2-4

TOP SECRET

Damage Limiting

 Trends in Free World Fatalities
 (Estimated Fatalities in Millions)

<u>January</u>	<u>United States</u>		<u>Europe and Asia</u>	
	<u>Preemption</u>	<u>Retaliation</u>	<u>Preemption</u>	<u>Retaliation</u>
1964	48	96	96	111
1965	28	84	82	112
1966	76	111	102	113
1967	82	102	108	112
1968	91	112	109	112

Source: JCS

Comments: The most significant development depicted above is the sharp decrease in our ability to limit damage to the US between January 1965 and the present. This results from the rapid Soviet buildup of hardened ICBMs, many of which would survive a US first strike. It also should be noted that the difference in US fatalities between the preemption and retaliation case has been narrowed substantially. The impact on the free world countries of Europe and Asia has been less as they have faced a formidable IRBM and MRBM threat throughout the period shown.


TOP SECRET

Damage Limiting Calculations^{a/}

<u>US Program</u>	<u>Sov. Response</u>	<u>CASE A</u>		<u>CASE B</u>		<u>CASE C</u>	
		<u>US Fat.</u>	<u>Sov. Fat.</u>	<u>US Fat.</u>	<u>Sov. Fat.</u>	<u>US Fat.</u>	<u>Sov. Fat.</u>
1971 Approved	None	120	120	100	80	80	80
1976 No ABM Approved	None	120	120	120	80	90	90
Light ABM ^{b/}	None	100	120	90	80	70	100
	Pen Aids ^{c/}	120	120	110	80	90	100
Posture A ^{d/}	None	40	120	10	80	10	100
	MIRV and Pen Aids ^{e/}	110	120	60	80	40	90
	Adds 100 Mobile ICBMs	110	120	90	80	60	90
Posture B ^{d/}	None	20	120	10	80	10	100
	MIRV and Pen Aids ^{e/}	70	120	40	80	30	90
	Adds 550 Mobile ICBMs ^{f/}	100	120	90	80	70	90

Source: DOD - Systems Analysis

- CASE A - Soviets Strike First Against Military and City Targets. US Retaliates Against Against Cities. Both Sides at High (Generated) Alert.
- CASE B - US Strikes First Against Military Targets. Soviets Retaliate Against Cities. US Retaliates Against Cities. Both Sides at High (Generated) Alert.
- CASE C - Soviets Strike First Against Military Targets. US Responds Against Military Targets. Soviets Retaliate Against Cities. US Retaliates Against Cities: Both Sides at High (Generated) Alert.



Authority NWD 779519
By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

SECRET

The forces used in these calculations are the US Programmed Forces and the high NIPP Soviet threat, modified as described. Fatality calculations include the effects of combined bomber and missile attacks against urban targets. Fatalities are rounded to the nearest ten million.

- b/ The light defense posture was designed to provide an urban defense against the evolving Chinese threat and some defense of US offensive forces. Against the assumed Chinese threat, expected US fatalities with this defense would be essentially zero; without the defense, they would be about five million. This posture includes a light defense of MINUTEMAN.
- c/ Enough chaff is added to the NIPP threat to produce 30 area aim points per SS-9 and SS-Z-3 booster and ten area aim points per SS-11, SS-Z-9 and SS-Z-2.
- d/ The response threats used in this table represent Soviet reactions to regain their deterrence. If we knew these reactions beforehand, we would design our defenses differently.
- e/ The yield of the MIRV is 200 kts. Each SS-9 and SS-Z-3 carries 18; each SS-11 and SS-Z-2 carries three; each SS-Z-9 carries 4. As penetration aids, each SS-9 carries 30 area aim points and each SS-11, SS-Z-9 and SS-Z-2 carries 10.
- f/ Each mobile ICBM carries nine 200 kt. re-entry vehicles (RVs) and has 20 area aim points. These numbers of mobile ICBMs are intended to restore non-AEM levels of Soviet Assured Destruction. (AD scenario is not shown.) This response is additive to the MIRV and pen aid response and is over and above the deployment of mobile ICBMs shown in the NIPP.

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority AWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

Section 3

Key Indicators of the Strategic Balance
for Selected Years
1957-1976

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 779519

By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Table B-3-1

TOP SECRET

Key Indicators of the Strategic Balance, 1957

	<u>US</u>	<u>SU</u>
Number of Bombers		
Heavy	335	90-150
Medium	1296	1350

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: MWD 979519

By: MF NARA Date: 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Table B-3-2

TOP SECRET

Key Data on the Strategic Balance
1961

	<u>US</u>	<u>SU</u>
Intercontinental Bombers	1723	130-145 ^{a/}
ICBMs	28	4 ^{b/}
SLBMs	80	60-80
Total Intercontinental Weapons	2706	322-359
Total Intercontinental Megatons	5560	2368-2715
MRBMs/IRBMs	112 ^{c/}	225

a/ In addition, 975-990 medium bombers were counted as possibly available for one-way missions.

b/ In June 1961, the official estimate was 10-25. Some estimates ran as high as 200 missiles.

c/ 64 THOR in UK, 32 JUPITER in Italy and 16 JUPITER in Turkey.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Table B-3-3

TOP SECRET

Key Data on the Strategic Balance
1962

	<u>US</u>	<u>SU</u>
Bombers	1788	175-200 ^{a/}
ICBMs	78	38
SLBMs	96	89
Alert Intercontinental Weapons	1600	
Alert Intercontinental Megatons	3400	
MRBM/IRBM	112	516-536

^{a/} Heavy bombers and tankers only: In addition, we estimated 955-965 medium bombers which could reach the US only on one-way missions.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Table B-3-4

TOP SECRET

Key Data on the Strategic Balance
1967

	<u>US</u>	<u>SU</u>
Intercontinental Bombers	740	200-210
ICBMs	1054	536-566 ^{a/}
SLEBs	656	104-107
Total Warheads	4179	880-903
Total Megatons	8489	5120-5006
Alert Force Warheads	2711	459-485
Alert Force Megatons	5329	2432-2458
MRBMs	0	700+

^{a/} June 30, 1967. December 31 figures are 666-716

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

Table B-3-5

TOP SECRET

Key Data on the Strategic Balance
1972

	<u>US</u>	<u>SU</u>
Intercontinental Bombers	554	105-130
ICBMs	1054	1059-1251
SLBMs	656	336-387
Total Weapons	6233	1535-1808
Total Alert Force Weapons	3971	1001-1155
Total Megatons	4055	9452-9933
Total Alert Force Megatons	2739	6244-6317
MRBMs	0	550-700

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Table B-3-6

TOP SECRET

Key Data on the Strategic Balance
1976

	<u>US</u>	<u>SU</u>
Intercontinental Bombers	554	55-80
ICBMs	1036	1090-1482
SLBMs	656	652-767
Total Warheads	8190	1802-2339
Total Warheads in Alert Force	5364	1122-1465
Total Megatons	3719	9429-11,526
Total Alert Force Megatons	2433	7070-8464
MRBMs	0	500-700

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 7/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Section 4

Selected Data on
General Purpose Forces

SECRET

Comparison of
Major Force Components
1962-1976

	<u>1962</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1976</u>
Army				
Active Divisions				
USA/ (Active)	14	21	19	19
Soviet (Category I & II) <u>a/</u>	99-102	100-104	91-103	85-100
Reserve Divisions				
US (Reserve)	3	9	9	9
SU (Category III)	31-46	33-46	20-30	20-30
Tactical Aircraft <u>b/</u>				
US Total Active INV.	7336	8083	7807	7691
US Total U/E	3828	4084	3971	3923
US Air Force & Marine U/E	2100	2264	2145	2145
SU Total in Tac. Av. Units	3100-3385	3200-3250	2750-3075	2225-2900
Naval Units				
Attack Carriers				
US	15	15	15	15
Soviet Union	0	0	0	0
Submarines (Excluding Ballistic- Missile Subs)				
US (nuclear/non-nuclear)	13/82	32/73	65/40	68/37
Soviet Union (nuclear/ non-nuclear)	10-12/321	41-46/285-290	62-76/244-253	74-96/191-195
Fleet Escorts				
US	305	296	279	252
Soviet Union	192	184-185	170-176	177-187

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: WD 979519
By: WFE NARA Date: 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

US divisions range in size from 12,500 to 15,000. Soviet divisions range in size from 4000 to 9000 men in the units. Thus, they are not strictly comparable.

b/ US and Soviet tactical aircraft have very different performance characteristics. Thus, numbers alone are not an adequate measure of relative military capabilities.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519
 By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Table B-4-2

TOP SECRET

Comparison of US and Soviet Military Capabilities
 Defense Manpower
 (In Thousands)

	<u>1957</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1972</u>
Manpower in Armed Forces				
US	2795	2805	3387	2723
Soviet Union ^{a/}	4275	2600-3300	2800-3600	2800-3800
Manpower - Army				
US	498	1066	1454	1015
Soviet Union	2650	1370-1640	1383-1719	1529-1887
Manpower - Navy				
US	677	666	753	687
Soviet Union	725	285-386	305-427	297-421
Manpower - Air Force				
US	920	883	899	811
Soviet Union	825 ^{b/}	508-694	583-777	508-818
Marine Corps				
US	200	190	281	210
Soviet Union				
Other SU (Command, general support & R&D)	75	420-546	497-663	497-685

^{a/} Does not include uniformed security troops not under MOD.
^{b/} Includes Naval aviation.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 779519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

Table B-4-3

SECRET

Soviet Naval Activity

Operating Days in the Mediterranean

1963	750
1964	1824
1965	4162
1966	4943
1967 (through October)	7305

Source: EUCOM

Comment: The figures reflect the sharp increase in Soviet Naval activity in the Mediterranean. The 1967 rate is almost double the 1966 rate through October.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

 Authority NWD 979519
 By WF NARA Date 7/5/97

Table B-4-4

SECRET

Comparison of US-Soviet Lift CapabilitySoviet Union
 ESTIMATED MAXIMUM SOVIET PORT-TO-PORT
 SEALIFT CAPABILITY^{1/}

(Number of Motorized Rifle Divisions at Full Strength)

<u>Fleet Area</u>	<u>Mid</u> <u>1967</u>	<u>Mid</u> <u>1972</u>	<u>Mid</u> <u>1976</u>
Northern	3.0	4.7	6.0
Baltic	5.3	9.0	12.0
Black	8.0	15.0	20.0
Pacific	6.0	10.0	12.5

^{1/} The above calculations are based on 70% availability of the total estimated Soviet dry cargo fleet (less refrigerator ships) for each period and fleet area without reference to heavy lift capability. However, it is estimated that the Soviet merchant fleet in mid-1967 will include about 250 ships with heavy lift capabilities ranging from 50 to 60 tons. While it is expected that the number of ships with heavy lift capabilities will increase to a considerable extent by mid-1976, it is not possible at this time to estimate the number of units in this category beyond 1967.

Amphibious Ships:	<u>1961</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1976</u>
	480-590	505-615	545-655	575-685

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519

By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

SECRET

United States

<u>30-day air and sealift</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1976</u>
To Europe (thousands of tons)	32.0	120.2	331.5	327.9
To Asia (thousands of tons)	14.7	65.1	170.4	167.7

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MWD 979519

By W.F. NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

Table B-4-5

Level of Expenditures for USSR and US Forces
(Billions)
July 1, 1967

	USSR		US	
	Rubles (1955)	% of GNP ^{1/}	Dollars (1967)	% of GNP ^{2/}
<u>Strategic Attack Forces</u> ^{3/}				
ICMBs	2.18		1.1	
SLBMs	.14		1.5	
Bombers	.48		1.6	
MRBMs/IRBMs	.23		Nil	
Total Strategic Attack ^{4/}	3.1	1.35%	5.96	.76%
(Total Military Manpower in thousands)	(300)		(191)	
<u>Strategic Defense Forces</u> ^{3/}				
Interceptors	.59		.25	
SAMs	1.20		.49	
ABMs	.11		.13	
Total Strategic Defense ^{4/}	2.58	1.12%	2.03	.26%
(Total Military Manpower in thousands)	(450)		(107)	
<u>General Purpose Forces</u> ^{3/}				
Total	4.9 - 6.3	2.19% - 2.74%	35.0	4.43%
(Total Military Manpower in thousands)	(2,000)		(1,862)	
<u>Command, General Support and Other</u>				
Total	2.6-3.1	1.13% - 1.35%	27.1	3.43%
<u>Space, and Military and Nuclear R, D, T and E</u> ^{5/}				
Total	5 - 6	2.17% - 2.69%	11.5	1.46%
<u>Military, Nuclear and Space Expenditures</u> ^{5/}				
Total	17 - 22	7.4% - 9.6%	81.6	10.3%

For Footnotes, see next page.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority MWD 979519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TAB B

TOP SECRET

SOVIET APPRECIATION OF THE EMERGING MILITARY BALANCE
WITH THE US

In our review of the military balance, two trends stand out clearly. First, Soviet military power has reached an unprecedented level and is still growing. In particular, Soviet capacity to damage the US in a nuclear war has been increasing dramatically. Second, as the capacity of each to do the other great damage becomes more nearly equal, the precise calculus of the state of the military balance becomes more complex and difficult. What implications will these trends have for the Soviets?

1. Soviet Attitudes Toward the Use of Military Force - The Soviet leaders are moved by their ideological convictions to assume a natural state of conflict in international politics and to pursue an active and assertive foreign policy. They are not, however, impelled or even inclined on the basis of ideological considerations to pursue their objectives by military means. Indeed, while there is no moralistic inhibition on use of military force, in the Communist view the moving force in history is social-economic progress and revolution, and not military advance, and there is, therefore, great caution in weighing any military involvement. An

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

2.

Ideologically sanctioned calculation of the balance of power and Realpolitik governs the Soviet approach to questions of use of military power, and in practice expedience is the guide.

At no time has the Soviet Union had military power relative to its potential opponents which would have tempted a Soviet initiation of a major war. The Soviet Union has, of course, indirectly used military means in other ways to serve its ends. Military advisors and aid to Spain in the Civil War, aid to the Chinese Nationalists in 1923-27 and again in 1937-41, limited assistance to the Chinese Communists in Manchuria in 1945, unleashing the North Korean proxy invasion of the South in 1950, preservation of Communist rule in Hungary in 1956, and military aid programs for Cuba and North Vietnam (as well as a host of non-Communist countries since 1955) round out the picture of Soviet use

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

3.

of various "military instruments" over the nearly half century since the close of their own Civil War.

The Soviet leaders have, of course, used their military power, and sometimes vague military threats, to brace their diplomatic position on various issues. This will no doubt continue, and it can in some cases lead to unanticipated confrontations. Similarly, military assistance to other states or to "national-liberation movements" can tend to involve the Soviet Union in crises - but Moscow can still decide to take local defeats rather than escalate to direct Soviet confrontation with the US.

As Brezhnev restated in his major programmatic speech on November 3, 1967, the Soviet Union does not believe in war between states as a way to advance Communism in the nuclear age. So long as we maintain a second-strike capability, even major fluctuations in the strategic balance would be unlikely to change this Soviet judgment. However, if the Soviet leaders should come to believe that we regard ourselves as counterdeterred from doing various things, they may rightly or wrongly judge that they can swing their weight around more than before. Their assessment of our view is thus more important than the precise balance of power, and has been so

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MWD 979519

By W.F. NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

.4.

in the past. The risk is not that the Soviet Union will believe the military balance permits them to attack us, or invade Western Europe, or even undertake less provocative direct military measures, but rather that they may be led by their assessment of our mood to extend their prestige so far in support of less direct aggression by proxies or others that they become involved in a direct confrontation with us.

II. Hardware and Teleology - Can Soviet purposes be deduced from the fact of deployment itself? Obviously, the Soviets do not spend large sums on weapons unless they think they need them. If the Soviets ever were content with some concept of minimal deterrence, it is clear from current numbers that some years ago they opted for something more. It is logical to suppose they first wanted to gain a higher level of assurance that their deterrent force would be capable of withstanding an American first strike, and second, that they also wish to limit damage to the USSR in the event of a nuclear exchange. Characteristics, as well as the size, of the Soviet strategic forces can be adduced as evidence of such a sequence of general objectives. Deployment of rather inaccurate ICBMs in dispersed single silos suggests a priority

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

5.

on survival of a force suited to attacking economic and population targets in retaliation for an American first strike. Testing of a fractional orbital bombardment system - its most likely purpose would appear to be to catch SAC bombers on the ground - suggests thinking about counterforce for purposes of damage limitation. But that is about the limit of what can be deduced from the hardware itself. To attempt to go further, one would have to assume that the Soviets work out the details of the strategic and political implications of weapons systems before they procure them - a proposition which, as a matter of history, is in at least some cases demonstrably untrue.

In general, Soviet strategic and political thinking has followed the hardware rather than preceded it. Once the hardware was developed there was a process of discovery of new purposes to which it might be put. The SA-2, for example, was developed and deployed to defend the USSR against American bombers; it would be hard to imagine that those who designed it were thinking of the ways in which the USSR could support "national liberation" struggles. But the SA-2 has become a major trade good in Soviet military aid programs to regimes in the third world, and the principal form of Soviet military

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MWD 979514
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

6.

assistance to the communist war effort in Vietnam. Similarly, the Soviets were roundly berating Secretary McNamara's ideas of counterforce strategy (they branded his 1962 Ann Arbor speech as an effort to legitimate nuclear warfare) when they began work on the ICBM system (SS-9) whose appearance now in such large numbers suggests that the purpose of deployment is in part for damage limitation by means of counterforce.

Since the hardware itself cannot provide answers to questions about political implications, we have to fall back to a broader examination of how the Soviets are likely to look at the military balance and an effort to estimate how such views may affect their actions.

III. From Numbers to Characteristics - Half a decade ago the number of ICBMs on each side sufficed at least as a rough index of relative capabilities. But this is no longer so. As both sides acquired forces for counterforce use, a net evaluation came to require a calculation of interaction of weapons systems against each other. And this evaluation in turn becomes more complex as new technology is introduced on both the offense and defense. Moreover, these evaluations become increasingly sensitive to the characteristics

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NWD 979519
 By WF NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

7.

of weapons. Accuracy of ICBMs mattered little when the primary targets were population centers, but it becomes a critical factor in reckoning the chances of destroying a hard silo. While each side has quite accurate information about numbers of the other's launchers, intelligence about characteristics is in general harder to come by. We know how many SS-9 silos the USSR has, but we have less confidence in our estimates of how hard they are.

Thus, it is in the nature of the weapons systems that in the next five years net assessments of the strategic balance are going to be more complicated, harder to understand and more likely to be subject to controversy.

In the US we have already seen public debate on the emerging ^{relation} strategic/ in which opinions range widely from one extreme which sees the Soviets as building for a first strike capability to the other which regards American programs -- most recently Sentinel -- as pressing the Soviets against their will into new rounds in the arms race.

We do not, of course, know precisely how the Soviets do their strategic bookkeeping. Kosygin implied that there might be profound differences when he said publicly in February

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MWD 979519
By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

8.

That it was unseemly for the US to use cost as the criterion for deciding whether to invest in offense or defense. Whatever the Soviets think of the macabre aspects of cost-effectiveness, it is logical to suppose that they, too, make an effort to calculate the net balance by working out the probable results of a nuclear exchange. But given the variety of mathematical models available in this country for such purposes and the sensitivity of the calculations to estimates or assumptions about characteristics, it would be an improbable accident for the Soviets to have arrived at the same net fatalities figures that we have in our computations.

IV. Soviet Expectations - Whatever the niceties of reckoning, the Soviet policymaker will doubtless know that his capacity for inflicting damage on the US has grown. His propensity actually to use his nuclear forces will not in all likelihood be greater, for he will still have to reckon with American capability to damage the USSR. One can hardly be precise about what constitutes an "acceptable level of damage" in the minds of the Soviet leaders. Historical data on how many casualties the USSR suffered in World War II or in the collectivization of agriculture mean little -- in neither

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

9.

ase did the Soviet leaders voluntarily decide to accept a given level of fatalities. Any judgment must be basically a priori, but it is difficult to believe that the Soviet leaders would find any figure in the tens of millions of fatalities attractive as a policy option. Indeed, so long as reasonable expectations of fatalities range in the tens of millions, one number is likely to be about as appalling as another. Moreover, the kinds of uncertainties to which net assessments are increasingly likely to be subject will tend to reinforce deterrence.

Elements of doubt will tend to make the military planner even more pessimistic about the outcome than the actual result might in fact be. Prudence will prompt the planner to make worst case assumptions. Such evidence as we have had over the years bears out the impression that the Soviet military do in fact lean to this kind of prudence in estimating risks involved in courses of action.

At the same time, such prudential calculations based on worst-case assumptions may produce pressures in the Soviet Union for further improvements in their strategic forces. As the Soviets look five years ahead they probably see

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

10.

American programs as cutting into the relative improvement in their posture vis-a-vis the US which is being produced by their current deployments. This is likely to be true despite the fact that certain dramatic crossover points will have been reached. Next year the Soviets will have more ICBM launchers than the US and a year or so later will be able to deliver more megatonnage to the US than the US can to the Soviet Union -- and for at least a vociferous minority of Americans the situation may seem increasingly unfavorable to the US. Among Moscow's concerns, American deployment of MIRVs will loom largest. Although the Sentinel decision occasioned vastly more comment in the American and European press, the MIRVs are likely to weigh more heavily in Soviet calculations of the world of 1972.

For years the Soviets have taken a rather matter of fact view of ABMs as a logical weapon system for both sides to develop and deploy, but they may see MIRVs as being of a somewhat more sinister nature. Riding the coattails of American strategic thinking, the Soviets some years ago decided to protect their force by switching from triple silos to dispersed single ones in deploying their present generation

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MWD 979519By WF NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

11.

ICBMs. Having spread their forces so as to create more aiming points for an attacker, the Soviets may see the American decision to put more warheads in each hole rather than to build additional launchers as creating a system better suited to a first than a second strike. Doubtless, the Soviets are sophisticated enough to understand that warhead count (we anticipate 6,000 American vs. 2,000 Soviet in 1972) is not an index to relative strategic capabilities any more than the box score of launchers. They will nevertheless be concerned by the multiplier effect of MIRVs. A key variable in the effectiveness of American MIRVs will be our ability to attain the accuracies necessary to make small warheads effective against hard targets. Whatever skepticism American critics of US defense policy may express on that account, the Soviets will most likely make their decisions on their own worst-case assumption.

V. New Directions in Soviet Weaponry - How will the Soviets react to American programs which threaten to erode the gains in relative posture which they have been making? They could simply do more of the same, continue deploying the ICBMs they have now and deploy the Moscow ABM system elsewhere.

TOP SECRET

Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

12.

More likely, the Soviets will seek to improve the characteristics rather than simply the numbers of their weapons. For two years, the Soviets have spoken of mobile, solid-fuel ICBMs, and they may be developing one for they recently tested the solid-fuel KY-6 to intercontinental range. We have had no evidence of Soviet testing of multiple warheads, but despite what the Soviets may have thought of American MIRVs, they probably will develop their own.

To the extent that the Soviets emphasize characteristics such as these, they may create new uncertainties in American intelligence. We may know when the Soviet FOBS becomes operational, but we may never know exactly how many have been deployed. We may know that the Soviets have deployed mobile missiles, but we may not know how many. If the Soviets choose to develop MIRVs which can be retrofitted to existing missiles, rather than more sophisticated ones for a follow-on ICBM, we may not know how many have been installed.

We do not, of course, know how much of what the Soviets will in fact choose to do. While our estimates of the Soviet strategic forces are quite good for present force levels and for about two years out (i.e., for the period when we deal

TOP SECRET

Authority NWD 779519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

13.

with things which are in being or under construction), our record for longer term estimates is only fair at best. Part of the Intelligence Community's judgment that the Soviets will turn from increasing numbers of current models to greater sophistication in characteristics of strategic weapons rests on the consideration that the Soviets, too, will find such an approach economical.

VI. Can They Afford It? As we look at the Soviet forces projected in the National Intelligence Estimates, we have to ask, "Can the Soviets afford it?" The answer is yes, but at a cost to their overall economic growth rate.

We do not have agreed Intelligence Community figures for a decade ahead, but projecting existing data we can illustrate the interaction of defense spending and growth rates.

In Years	GNP Grew by (% p.a.)		Defense by	
1957-77	66.7%	5.2%	36%	(%p.a.)
A high defense spending program for 1967-77 would mean	61%	4.8%	27%	3.1%
				2.4%
A low defense spending program for 1967-77	70%	5.4%	12% increase in 1970-73 dropping back to current level in 1976	

Thus, the defense burden - even projecting from the high side

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

14.

of the NIE force levels - appears quite bearable. Nevertheless, advantages to overall Soviet economic growth of lower levels of military spending are appreciable.

We are in general skeptical of analyses which postulate the division of the Soviet leadership into two basic groups - one tending to favor, and the other to oppose, defense spending, a harder line in foreign policy, etc. So far as we have been able to see over the years, the pressures of the one-party system have tended rather to make for more of a bell-curve distribution of Soviet political leaders on the spectrum of opinions in Moscow, one which peaks in the center. And the political arguments over budget issues seem to involve shifting coalitions which vary with the questions of the day. Be that as it may, cost will doubtless be an important factor in Soviet decisions on military programs. And in particular, the Soviets will find it important to manage the pace as well as the amount of their military spending.

For while Moscow can - and probably will - afford substantial outlays for continuing improvement of its military posture, the Soviets would find it particularly troublesome to have to compress the time frame for military programs. If too many programs peak at once, the Soviets would have to cut deeply into overall economic growth rates - perhaps to the point of imposing a negative growth rate upon themselves.

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

15.

VII. Factors Affecting Pace - Vietnam, Disarmament - This factor of pace in the arms race is important to the Soviet view of such issues as Vietnam and arms control.

In the US one hears the argument that the Soviets must welcome the war in Vietnam as tying down the US and inhibiting American spending on strategic weapons. Doubtless, the Soviets perceive this side effect of the war in Vietnam. But at the same time, Vietnam poses problems for the Soviets. While the Soviets seem to be operating on the judgment that the risks are manageable, they still do not apparently see the outcome clearly. And the potential risks of varying degrees of involvement would be likely to introduce a major factor of uncertainty into their calculations of future military requirements. Indeed, the Soviets face the possibility that Vietnam may impose upon ^{them} requirements to peak several military programs at once - and that would be the kind of multiple requirement which would force the Soviets into unpleasant economic straits.

With regard to disarmament, one can set out a strong case for the Soviets' being interested in ending or limiting the arms race. Increments to high force levels add only marginally to security but become increasingly costly as

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority MWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

16.

Systems grow more sophisticated. Nevertheless, there are obvious obstacles to any major agreement. Soviet strategic forces are in a state of dynamic growth at the moment, and Moscow would hardly wish to freeze them at a point when the USSR was gaining ground relative to the US. Any proposals or negotiations on vital security issues would doubtless be clouded with suspicions of the other side's purposes. With the advent of MIRV's and mobile missiles the problems of verification are compounded. And, finally, the intrinsic problems of developing reasonable tradeoffs among US and Soviet weapons systems may be insuperable. On balance, we believe that the Soviets probably look upon chances of a major arms limitation agreement with the US as quite poor.

We believe that the Soviets would not see attainable arms control as a meaningful alternative to the arms race, but rather as a means of regulating its pace. The example of the test ban agreement is relevant; it did not reduce Soviet forces (if anything it added to the cost of Soviet nuclear weapons tests). But it did inter alia create an atmosphere in which the US was less disposed to press its own strategic spending and afforded the Soviets some breathing space before they set out on their own rapid ICBM deployments.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

17.

VIII. Strength and Foreign Policy - Whatever the vagaries of our readings of the balance in 1972, the fact remains that the Soviet Union will be stronger than it has ever been before and that its military strength relative to that of the US is growing. What effect will this have on foreign policy?

There is, of course, a substantial body of opinion in the US which is disposed to the view that Soviet foreign policy is a function of Soviet military strength, and which assumes that the Soviets will necessarily grow more assertive as they grow stronger. As a historical proposition, we are skeptical of the view that assertive or aggressive Soviet behavior can be closely correlated with peaks in Soviet military strength. The Soviets have not been markedly more assertive with 700 ICBMs this year than they were with less than half that number a year ago. The heyday of Khrushchev's missile rattling in the late 1950's occurred well before the Soviet Union had any operational ICBMs deployed, though the fact was not widely realized at that time. If anything, a stronger historical case can be made for the proposition that Moscow's nastier periods were ones of relative weakness. The 1961 Berlin crisis occurred at a moment when the Soviets had no ICBMs to speak of, and, moreover,

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

18.

After Khrushchev had cut the general purpose forces in 1960. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis was the product of strategic weakness rather than a move from a position of strength. Whether the Cuban missiles were intended as a temporary expedient until more ICBMs could be deployed, or less likely as a permanent substitute for them, is problematical, But either way, the venture was not based upon Soviet strength.

In general, we doubt that their increased strategic strength will make Soviet leaders more prone to deliberately precipitate major crises or confrontations with the US. For at the end of the road to nuclear war, one's own casualties are more relevant than the damage one can inflict. However, if the Soviets see 1972 as we do, it will be a period in which dynamism in the development of strategic forces on both sides will result in stable mutual deterrence, and the very uncertainties which prompt weapons procurement may heighten the effect of deterrence. And in that case, the Soviets may see greater prospect of using conventional military force without risking crisis or confrontation with the US. Hence, some trends in the development of the Soviet Union's general purpose forces may be even more relevant to foreign policy

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519

By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

19.

in the 1970's than the big picture of strategic weaponry.

IX. Trend Toward Greater Reach - The Soviets have been gradually increasing the reach of their military forces. Moscow's increasing ability to project military power rapidly to distant areas was not the result of a decision to develop capabilities for distant limited operations. We see no evidence, for example, that the Soviets intend to build aircraft carriers (as distinct from helicopter carriers) - and the major limitation upon Soviet capabilities for opposed operations in remote areas remains lack of air cover. Rather the Soviets appear to have developed forces with greater reach as part of their capabilities for general war, and now seem to be in the process of discovering other potential applications.

The Middle East crisis has highlighted the trend toward greater reach in Soviet general purpose forces. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron gradually came into being as part of the general trend toward wider ranging activity by the Soviet Navy. The peak number of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean this summer was not radically different from what one might have anticipated by projecting the trend of the past two years. But the usual sharp autumn decline in

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

20.

The size of the Squadron has not taken place this year, and the Soviets have found new uses for their naval presence in the Mediterranean. They have not only used visits to Arab ports to make a show of military strength and support of the defeated Arabs, but also seemed to place ships in UAR ports to discourage the Israelis from military moves (a risky practice, for it seems to have been based on the assumption that the Israelis would in fact avoid the Soviet ships). While we doubt that the Soviets would wish to develop an infrastructure of permanent bases in Arab countries, the Mediterranean Squadron has become a permanent factor in the seascape. Moscow has most recently added a variant to its naval visit theme by sending medium bombers on a visit to the UAR.

The Soviets developed landing ships with an eye to possible operations in the European theater (they have 500 or 600 of all types now). However, the appearance of landing craft as a more or less permanent adjunct to the Mediterranean Squadron adds a new option to Soviet policy in the area. The Soviets have - whatever the unwisdom of doing it - the capacity to land quickly a token force.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

21.

Similarly, the Soviet AN-12 transports were developed for military operations in the European theater. But these, too, found new application in the Middle East crisis when Moscow dramatized its supply of new weapons to the defeated Arabs by mounting an unprecedented airlift operation. Since then, the Soviets have used much smaller airlifts to deliver military aid to Nigeria and the Yemen.

As to future trends, we foresee a doubling of port-to-port sealift capabilities over the next decade. When the large AN-22s begin to be operational in a year, they will add substantially to Soviet airlift capabilities (25 of them could transport as many as 10,000 lightly equipped troops in a single lift to a distance of as much as 5,000 miles or, one might say, Baku to Stanleyville). The Soviets are building two new helicopter carriers (one will be operational next year and the other the year after); these may be for ASW purposes, vertical assault missions, or perhaps space recovery or rescue.

The development of greater and speedier reach will pose questions for Soviet policymakers which they did not face before. In the past, the typical crisis in the third world -- to the degree that there was anything typical about such crises -- was

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

22.

that they were out of the reach of Soviet military power. This is no longer true, and as Soviet naval forces range more widely and as Soviet capacity for lift increases the Soviets will have more instances in which they have capabilities for intervening in distant areas. One can hardly attempt to foresee all of the trouble spots of the next five years, but we have no doubt that there will be a good number of them. And the chances that the Soviets have forces which are in the area or can get there will be greater. Each Soviet decision will, of course, be sui generis -- the nature and relative strengths of the local forces at work in any given crisis will always be different. Perhaps a local government may ask for Soviet help, in which case Moscow may feel that it has firmer ground for its action. The Soviets would be unlikely to attempt to put their military forces into a situation in which they would face American opposition -- Soviet capabilities for distant limited action will not match America's. The Soviets may, however, be more prone to believe that we will not oppose them (in part because of the strategic relation which is developing), particularly if they are already on the scene. If so, the question for the Soviets of intervention in the third world may tend to be one of who can get there first.

TOP SECRET

Authority WWD 979514
By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

23.

IX. Asian Threat and European Theater

A favorite theme of journalistic fancy these days is one of Soviet withdrawal from Europe in order to meet the Chinese threat. However, we have no evidence that the Soviets have materially reduced their forces arrayed against Western Europe for this reason. And the estimates expect the basic orientation of the Soviet military establishment toward the European theater as likely to continue.

We do anticipate that the present gradual but steady build-up of Soviet forces in Asia will continue. The appearance this year of Soviet combat troops in Mongolia was a milestone in that trend. While we would ^{not} expect the Soviets to thin out their present European oriented M/IRBM deployments, new systems may well appear in the Asian area. One early step in Soviet ABM development may be development of capabilities against third countries. Despite ^{Soviet} assertions to the contrary in clandestine-source reporting, the current Moscow system was not designed to cover approaches from China (or France either) and has only incidental capabilities in those directions.

While there appears to be no major change in Soviet deployments relevant to Europe, the application of new

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD 979519
By MF NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

Methods to the study of ground-force problems has led to some re-evaluation of Soviet capabilities for reinforcing and sustaining a major campaign in Europe. This year's National Intelligence Estimate revised the estimate of Soviet divisions ready for immediate commitment (Category I) downward from 61 to 46.

X. How Others See US

So far, the very rapid growth of Soviet strategic forces in the past two years has had remarkably little effect upon foreign opinion even in Western Europe, where sensitivity to such issues has usually been great. For the present, political leaders and journalists in Europe are more interested in Soviet intentions -- which are seen as detente minded -- than in Soviet capabilities. Nevertheless, the point at which the Soviet Union has more ICBMs than the US will not go unnoticed in Europe, and in another year or so the fact of the great increase in Soviet military strength vis-a-vis the US will begin to sink in. As we have already noted, the precise state of the military balance is becoming more difficult to appreciate, and doubtless some of the kinds of arguments now being generated in the US will have their reflections in Europe, too.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519

By W.F. NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

25.

It is possible that a new reputation for military strength may tempt the Soviets to renew pressures on Western Europeans by starting another Berlin crisis. On balance, we think that is unlikely. The Soviets seem to have more to gain from a continuation of their present tactics than by a line which would tend to force the West back together. And Moscow's Eastern European allies would have little enthusiasm for a new crisis in Europe.

Even in the absence of new Soviet pressure, the image of new Soviet power -- and perhaps exaggerated or distorted images of it -- will lead many in Europe to fresh questioning of whether the US would go to war on Europe's behalf, and of the meaning of alliances in the nuclear age. And that in turn may tend to make West Europeans increasingly loathe to put things to a test by offending Moscow. Indeed, the greatest threat to NATO seems to be that, without any great crises in the alliance, the allies may feel a need to assure themselves of Soviet goodwill, and a habit of deference to the Soviets may gradually take hold in Europe.

XI. Quality of Soviet Decision Making

Obviously, the Soviet leaders will have more than a few important decisions to make in the next five years both

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

26.

in terms of what kinds of military hardware to buy (and in what quantity), but also in terms of new options which their ability to reach new areas will present to them. Equally obviously we cannot predict how they may react to an event such as a coup somewhere in East Africa five years from now. And we could not do so, even if the military estimates were perfect. For many of the factors in Soviet decision-making will be unrelated to military considerations.

Looking back over the years, we are not impressed with the quality of Soviet decision making. Khrushchev was at times a brilliant tactician in international affairs, but his strategic blunders included the Cuban missile venture. His successors have studiously avoided his flamboyance and given an impression of much greater conservatism in their handling of foreign policy. But their contribution to bringing on the June war in the Middle East, and their eagerness to supply arms to areas of tension hardly inspires confidence. And in a period when the Soviet Union is becoming more powerful and in which the Soviets may have more options open to them for limited use of military force, we have reason to be concerned over the caliber of Soviet political leadership.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

Attachment C - Working Paper

December 20, 1967

S/P - R. Rosecrance

U.S. STRATEGIC VIEWS

U.S. strategic concepts for the past six years have stressed the twin objectives of Assured Destruction and Damage-Limiting. The first has always had priority in American calculations, because the development of a secure, second-strike capability is the most effective means of deterring an attack on the United States. At the same time, the strategy has attached a certain amount of importance to limiting the damage to the United States in event of nuclear war.

Role of Damage-Limiting

Damage limitation, of course, can be performed in a number of different ways. Traditionally, U.S. possession of a significant counterforce capability made it possible to think of limiting the impact of Soviet retaliation on the American homeland. Civil defense measures were an alternative means of restricting damage to the U.S. population. In more recent years, anti-ballistic missile systems have been seen as an additional method of damage-limitation. Various combinations of

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

2

these techniques could have possible relevance in a future strategic environment. Damage-limiting capabilities conferred by such systems could have importance aside from the intrinsic value of limiting American casualties and property damage in the event of war. They have also been important in American reassurances to European allies: if the impact of a war upon the United States could be reduced, the Soviets could believe that American willingness to respond to Soviet strategic and tactical challenges would be reinforced. Since it was believed for a considerable time that a war in Europe would quickly escalate to strategic exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union, U.S. possession of a damage-limiting capability helped to make the U.S. guarantee more credible and therefore to discourage a Soviet attack.

Possession of a "damage-limiting" capability, however, did not confer the ability to execute a first-strike with impunity. Traditionally and over a ten-year period such capacities have been rejected as neither feasible nor desirable. In 1962 Secretary McNamara explained this policy,

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NWD 979519By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

3

pointing out that: "it is almost certainly infeasible"; and " it would be extremely costly." According to available evidence American Presidents and Secretaries of State over the past decade have uniformly believed that a nuclear war would involve millions of American deaths. For a considerable time, therefore, the U.S. has credited the Soviet Union with the capacity to destroy a small but not insignificant fraction of the American population and industrial capability.

U.S. possession of a significant damage-limiting capability, then, did not detract from the basic relationship of strategic deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Given the ability to inflict substantial damage on the United States, the Soviets appear to have paid somewhat less attention to the de facto strategic balance than to its perception in American eyes. When the United States appeared to be uncertain of its capabilities, the Soviets felt able to exert pressure on Berlin even though they possessed an inferior strategic force. Their apparent calm in face of such balances was indicated by failure to press to the utmost their capacity to acquire strategic

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MWD 979519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

4

offensive weapons in several past periods. For example, the Soviets did not exploit their capacity to produce long-range bombers in much larger numbers; nor did they even approach economically feasible production rates for first generation ICBM's.

In the Cuban crisis, again, the Soviets posed a very substantial challenge to U.S. interests, even though they and the world were aware of U.S. strategic superiority. Clearly, the Soviets never accepted strategic inferiority as an immutable feature of the international environment. At the same time, they did not make the attainment of a secure, second-strike capability an overriding priority on their resources at each previous juncture. De Facto, they frequently acted from an unequal posture, but it does not seem that they were intimidated by our strategic preparedness from initiating risky foreign policy moves, as both Berlins and Cuba indicate. However, U.S. strategic superiority clearly was a significant factor in the Soviet reluctance to press any of these confrontations further than they did, and ultimately to back off.

TOP SECRET

Authority NWD 979514
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

5

Change in Soviet Posture

Several years ago, however, the Soviets apparently took steps to change the existing set of strategic relationships. These changes apparently involved a phasing and interlinking of two discrete steps: first, they improved their retaliatory force through acquisition of hardened missiles, and they increased the readiness of their bomber force. By 1962-63 Soviet strategic forces were able to inflict tens of millions of American fatalities on second strike. As a result, traditional U.S. disinclination to attempt to develop a first-strike option was strongly reinforced. Second, the Soviets decided not only to strengthen the existing fabric of strategic deterrence, but also to challenge U.S. strategic superiority. This clearly involved an attempt to reduce American capabilities to limit damage in the event of war.

The most substantial change in the actual balance of operational forces in the last decade has occurred since 1965. In January 1965, a U.S. strategic initiative would have held Soviet retaliation to infliction of 25 million American fatalities; today a Soviet retaliatory stroke would bring 90-100 million U.S. deaths.

TOP SECRET

Authority NWD 979519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

6

Implications of the New Relationship

The increase in Soviet capacity to hurt the U.S. involved in the Soviet buildup poses important strategic questions. While the American commitment to Europe is founded on tradition, precedent, and national interest, it has also been buttressed by reducing or holding to a minimum the vulnerability of the American population. Viewed from both Western Europe and the United States, if damage to the U.S. population could be limited, then a United States decision to respond strategically to an attack on American allies becomes proportionately easier.

As the Secretary of Defense has pointed out, our ability to hold down Chinese damage to the United States in a missile attack offers reassurances to Far Eastern allies. Traditionally, moreover, (though Europeans would not put it in these terms) it was the ability to limit damage in respect of the Soviet Union which provided substance to the American nuclear guarantee in Europe.

It is of course true that American readiness to respond strategically to an attack on Europe has not rested solely on estimates of damage to the United States. An

TOP SECRET

Authority NWD 979519By W.F. NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

7

American President might decide to respond to very damaging Soviet initiatives (such as, for example, the military absorption of Europe) even if scores of millions of Americans would be killed in the process.

Nevertheless, U.S. damage-limiting capabilities reinforced U.S. assured destruction capabilities, backed up U.S. commitments in Berlin, and probably played a role in dissuading radical Soviet initiatives there. As U.S. involvement proceeded in a crisis, buttressed by a superior strategic force, the Soviets could never be sure that the U.S. political stake would not become so large that it could not be faced down. U.S. involvement in Europe was in this sense different from the Soviet involvement in Cuba: in Cuba, the USSR hoped to avoid challenge by relying primarily on its political stake, since both its local and strategic capabilities were inferior; in Berlin the U.S. local deficiency was more than offset both by the superior American strategic forces and by a strong political commitment. In the Berlin episode of 1961 U.S. planners became increasingly aware as the crisis unfolded of the degree of Soviet inferiority. The Soviets were in no doubt on that

TOP SECRET

Authority NWD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

8

score and were not tempted to test U.S. determination beyond certain narrow limits.

Despite the strengthening of U.S. offensive capabilities, the substantial increase of Soviet capabilities to damage the United States clearly affects allied relationships. European partners understand that the current Soviet force is capable of doing grave harm to the U.S. population. They recognize that mitigation of this condition is an expensive and exacting task. As a result, there is a growing consciousness that the United States could live up to its strategic commitments to Europe only at the cost of catastrophic damage to the American population.

Such an awareness does not necessarily lead to fatalism or a conclusion that U.S. guarantees are no longer effective. Some Europeans are convinced that the Soviets will not precipitate another major crisis, so that U.S. responses are not in question. Others believe that the United States would respond regardless of the impact on the continental United States. The bona fides of U.S. policy are so clearly pledged in Berlin that

TOP SECRET

Authority MWD 979514
By W.F. NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

9

extrication may seem an impossible task. Acceptance of the present strategic relationship, however, seems to rest as much or more on Soviet hesitancy to provoke a renewal of tension as it does on U.S. strategic preparedness. If a new challenge occurred the adequacy of U.S. capabilities for damage-limiting could be called into question, and this in turn could affect American responses. For the first time in some years, then, peace and stability in Europe today is not the sole result of U.S. strategic preparedness; it is also a function of current Soviet tactics.

An increase in U.S. damage-limiting capabilities, however, would not represent a universal European prescription for strategic ills. Some would see a heavier ABM defense as provocative or as indicative of a possible trend toward "fortress America." Others would view it as a further reinforcement of U.S. and Soviet military advantage over other powers. It is unlikely to be believed that a reduction of the vulnerability of the American population would restore NATO to a position of high resolve and cohesion. Nor would Europeans wish to equate damage-limiting capabilities

TOP SECRET

Authority NWD 979519
By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

10

with defensive capacities. Improvements in the penetration and accuracy of offensive missiles might be seen as a desirable way of reducing damage to the U.S. In any foreseeable conjunction of circumstances, damage-limiting is unlikely to be the strategic panacea that some have claimed.

At the same time, increased U.S. vulnerability is likely to have consequences for a variety of other countries. In Europe, a further questioning of the U.S. guarantee is likely together with a further erosion of NATO solidarity. This could lead on the one hand to lower priorities assigned to defense matters and a gradual trend toward neutralism. On the other, it could lead both within and outside Europe to strengthening of national consciousness with national nuclear capacities as a possible result. We may face increasing pressures for more specific nuclear assurances at a time when the strategic situation and the mood of the American public make it less easy to accede to these requests. Given our own obvious vulnerability to nuclear attack, it will be more difficult for the U.S. to offer nuclear

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519By WF NARA on 7/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

11

assurances, and it may be harder for us to satisfy other countries that their security requirements can be met through nuclear guarantees. These outcomes would feed pressures for independent nuclear capabilities. U.S. efforts to resist these pressures would be likely to increase strains in our relationships with friendly countries.

On the Continent, a European defense organization is a third possibility, but its success would partly depend on technical military assistance and political support from the United States. As European countries increasingly take an independent posture and dilute their ties to NATO, such help seems less likely to be forthcoming. It is a paradox that when NATO ties are close and cohesive, the U.S. is most willing to offer support and assistance to interallied sharing arrangements; on the other hand, when ties are close, intra-European arrangements are less needed. When NATO solidarity has declined, there is greater need to construct a purely European defense force, but the U.S. incentive to contribute to the success of that force is reduced. The ultimate impact of the great increase

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519

By MF NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

12

in American vulnerability may vary but its possible impetus in fostering proliferation, neutralism, or a purely-European approach to strategic forces does not appear to advance American interests as now construed. The lessened U.S. ability to limit damage to the United States reinforces and speeds the erosion of the trans-Atlantic relationship which is already in train.

Further, the most recent increases in Soviet capabilities afford a marked challenge to the structure of U.S.-Soviet strategic relationships since the Second World War. Until 1965 bilateral deterrence existed, but only the United States possessed a damage-limiting capability. In another year, in contrast, the Soviet Union will equal the United States in ICBM launchers; it will surpass the United States in total intercontinental megatonnage in 1968-69; it has the capacity to match our Polaris force in the mid-seventies. Furthermore, the Soviets will probably deploy ABM's in other areas besides Moscow in the next decade. The Russians will not only be able to reduce our damage-limiting capacities to minimal proportions, they may acquire a damage-limiting potential of their own.

TOP SECRET

Authority NWD 979519By MF NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

13

Possible Implications of Increase in U.S.
Damage-Limiting Capability

It is, of course, uncertain how the Soviets would react if we sought to restore a portion of the damage-limiting power we previously possessed. It is possible that they would insist that a very high level of U.S. fatalities was essential to their requirements and would act to augment their offensive force accordingly. There are some historical precedents which suggest that they would feel impelled to respond, within feasible economic and technical constraints.

On the other hand, there is nothing intrinsically more stable or rational about present force balances than those of the past. Indeed, the present force relationship is a departure from past precedents. The Soviets, of course, may not think in terms of Assured Destruction capabilities against the U.S. population. They have apparently aimed over time at better capacities to damage the U.S., but they have not always assigned an overriding priority to the attainment of these capabilities as a sine qua non of Soviet strategy. There have been considerable periods in which the

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: WWD 979519

By: WFE NARA Date: 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

14

United States possessed a substantial damage-limiting capability. Assured Destruction requirements for both the United States and the Soviet Union have never represented an immutable standard. U.S. Assured Destruction tasks have varied between 40-20 percent of the Soviet population.

In short, there is no necessary inevitability to an increase in Soviet Assured-Destruction requirements any more than there is an inexorable tendency to reduce or increase our own.

Implications of Changed Relationship for Soviet Policy

In still another way, Soviet force deployments of recent months pose questions for U.S. defense policy. If damage-limiting capabilities are reduced, the United States will be less inclined to respond to threats which do not imperil the American homeland. In turn, greater strategic equality focuses attention on local-conventional balances of force. The increase in Soviet general purpose capabilities and their enhanced capability to project force over distance

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority WVD 979519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

15

suggests that third areas may become more subject to Soviet challenge.

The Russians will have a capability for intervening locally and for doing so quickly in relatively distant areas, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. With an approximation to strategic parity in the next few years, they may believe they can intervene in third areas with reduced risk of American opposition. Such conclusions would have to discount the greater U.S. general purpose capability and presume that the United States would be disinclined to challenge Soviet conventional forces at a time when U.S. forces are heavily engaged in Viet Nam. Positing a lessened U.S. readiness to respond, the Soviets might be tempted to fulfill requests for military assistance and support from governments or factions they support politically. The United States, in turn, could be faced with threats of local faits accomplis. Prior Soviet intervention would face us with the choice of local or strategic confrontation or non-involvement.

Dangers of U.S. Public Debate

Finally, increased Soviet abilities to damage the United States may have repercussions aside from their

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority WVD 979519
By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

16

precise implications for the strategic balance. During the Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961 there were public expressions of doubt concerning the adequacy of the U.S. strategic force. In 1958, these were not reflected at governmental levels because the dangers then foreseen had to do with time periods two to three years distant. U.S. decision-makers in 1958 did not question our ability to strike back after absorbing a Soviet attack. In 1961, the first months of the Berlin crisis were endured even though there remained some uncertainties about existing capabilities. Our margin of superiority was not fully revealed until the crisis was underway.

On both occasions, however, public uncertainties and controversy over the state of the U.S. strategic force may have played a role in Soviet initiation of crisis. Deterrence of provocative actions by an adversary, of course, depends upon our ability to influence his perceptions. If his perceptions are inaccurate, he may misread governmental attitude and miscalculate accordingly. There is some evidence that the Soviets have responded as much to their assessment of our view (both public and governmental) as to the actual balance of power at a given moment.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWD 979519

By W.F. NARA Date 9/5/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES I

TOP SECRET

17

If there should be a major public controversy in the United States over the state of our strategic preparedness, and if the responses of U.S. decision-makers did not succeed in laying the issues to rest, the Soviets could find incentives for foreign policy initiatives that they would otherwise abjure.

Conclusions

1. Prior to the most recent increases in Soviet forces, the Soviets possessed a significant ability to damage the United States in a strategic war.
2. Until 1965, the United States possessed a significant capacity to limit damage to the U.S. population. Since that time the Soviets have significantly increased their ability to damage the American homeland.
3. This ability reinforced U.S. guarantees to European and other allies. While the United States might be willing to accept a high level of U.S. fatalities in order to respond to an attack on allies, the lower the level of damage to the United States, the more likely would be U.S. willingness to fulfill its guarantees.

TOP SECRET

Authority WVD 979519By WF NARA Date 9/5/97

TOP SECRET

18

4. For a considerable period, indeed, for most of the past decade, the Soviets possessed a capability which was much inferior to the one they now possess and to one which they might feasibly have possessed at the time. An unequal capability did not prevent them from initiating political crises, and it did not foreclose a strategic crisis at the time of Cuba. In accepting such a position, the Soviets on more than one occasion did not seize opportunities to press toward strategic parity or advantage.

5. Present Soviet force increases give the Soviets a capability which they have never had before, and they represent a signal increment to the Soviet force increases of 1962-63, which first made possible a secure Soviet retaliatory force.

6. These increases could affect U.S. guarantees to its allies and impinge upon other states' willingness to accept or rely on U.S. guarantees. They could give grounds for further trends toward neutralism and/or nuclear proliferation.

7. The associated increases in Soviet general purpose forces and the Soviet ability to project force through distance raise the possibility of additional Soviet military involvement in third areas.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NVD 979519By WF NARA Date 7/5/97

TOP SECRET

19

In the absence of effective U.S. counter moves, the enhancement of Soviet strategic power may lead the Russians to believe that they can engage in third-area commitments with diminishing risk of American counteraction. This in turn could give rise to local faits accomplis.

8. Soviet force increases will probably occasion public controversy in the United States. In the past such controversies may have led Soviet leaders to miscalculate the American mood, possibly to believe that American leaders thought themselves counterdeterred from making certain responses and therefore to believe that they could exercise a greater foreign policy initiative than before. Under certain circumstances, there is risk that they may be led by their assessment of our attitude to extend their prestige so far in support of less direct aggression by proxies or others that they become involved in a direct confrontation with us.

TOP SECRET