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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

November 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Verification Panel Meeting, October 31, 1969

After opening the meeting, Dr. Kissinger asked Dr. Lynn to outline the report he prepared on behalf of the working group. During Lynn's presentation there was a brief discussion of criterion 3 (US-Soviet fatalities).

Packard said that the fatalities calculation was not consistent with the SIOF; Keeny said that many thought that the computer underestimated deaths. Packard said this was realized but he was not sure that all factors were taken into account in calculations. Richardson said that the political-psychological aspect was a problem; there was the imbalance between ability to inflict fatalities and reluctance to cause or accept large numbers of deaths.

Dr. Kissinger commented that one aspect of the problem was that both sides might not accept the same concepts; one side poses challenge which the other can only meet with assured destruction response, then the side with assured destruction strategy is at a disadvantage. For example, if Minuteman is destroyed, then would the US use the Polaris at the cost of great damage and fatalities to the US? The discussion continued with Packard promising further study of calculations.


At the conclusion of Lynn's briefing, Dr. Kissinger said that assuming these basic decisions are made, then someone must evaluate which Options meet the decisions.

Dr. Kissinger called on Richardson for comments.

Richardson said that more of the findings of the Verification Panel should be in the report, especially in describing which Options were sensitive to cheating and how much significance to cheating, both in strategic and diplomatic terms.

Sonnenfeldt said that assuming an Option is acceptable in strategic terms, if sensitive to cheating then it is unacceptable.

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Packard commented that one problem was the reliance on submarines which we could not be as sure of as the paper suggested.

Dr. Kissinger asked about vulnerability of command and control.

There was then a discussion to the effect that CC was indeed vulnerable and the effectiveness of Polaris communications would depend on the kind of attack and the time to resume contact with remaining National Authority.

Smith then made extensive comments on the report. His points were:

- suffering from rushing ahead; we need not table treaty; NSC should not select Option;
- report diffuse; President will need some recommendation from key advisors; must be a common sense clustering of ideas;
- we should identify changes from NSSM-28 and make a list.

Dr. Kissinger said that as the President goes through decisions he would in effect prejudice certain Options; for example, deciding against MIRVs would rule out certain Options.

Richardson said there were two different sets of Presidential decisions: what to table and what to negotiate in interactive process with the USSR. Options important in deciding what to table, but at least as important is to recognize the highly complex system of variables revealed in analysis we have done.

Dr. Kissinger said our purpose is to avoid renegotiating with ourselves; in previous arms control discussion unless the Soviets made an analogous proposal, we had to renegotiate within our own government. This way we can ask the President what relationship he will not consider.

Packard said that if initial discussion is to be on issues, we can decide which issues we are willing to discuss.

Smith said we need four pages on scope of talks.

Dr. Kissinger said NSC could give definition of scope.

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There was some discussion of criteria for strategic sufficiency, with Smith making the point that new criteria seemed to be invented; this was denied by others.

There was also objection by Smith to political discussion of Allied attitudes; he said Allies welcomed SALT. Weiss said that attitudes are ambiguous, especially beneath the surface. Dr. Kissinger concurred.

William Hyland

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