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REMARKS

The SCYLLA III-73 simulation Quick Look Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense for his information is attached.

Attachment
a/s

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Date: APR 25 2011

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: SCYLLA III-73 Quick Look (U)

1. ~~(TS)~~ SCYLLA III-73, an interagency politico-military simulation, was conducted in the Pentagon facilities of the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency from 26 November through 14 December 1973. SCYLLA was designed to create and evaluate nuclear options for use in military conflicts short of strategic engagement. Following is a Quick Look summary of the simulation. Distribution is limited pending further evaluation, at which time a more analytical summary will be forwarded to appropriate agencies.

2. ~~(TS)~~ Initial Scenario: World scene 1973-1976 depicted detente, further disintegration of NATO, contracting US commitment overseas, US domestic problems and continuing Soviet expansion worldwide with emphasis on strengthened influence in Middle East. Dawn of 1976 portrayed gathering storm in the Middle East. Friction between Iraq and Iran grows. King Faisal assassinated and Saudi junta declares hostility to the United States and Iran. Soviets abet deteriorating scene by increasing aid to Iraq; United States increases aid to Iran. In June 1976, Iraqis attempt to seize disputed territory from Kuwait by force. Iran pledges support to Kuwait and invades Iraq. As fall of Baghdad becomes imminent, USSR intervenes. Soviet military elements join Iraqis as two Soviet divisions cross USSR-Iranian border south of Caucasus. US intervention considered vital to save Teheran, but insufficient conventional strength immediately available. US President directs options be prepared for use of tactical nuclear weapons in Iran.

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3. ~~(S)~~ Move I:

a. Blue Team (United States) assessed world leadership in balance. If USSR exploited opportunity, Soviet primacy -- and control of Middle East -- would be assured. To counter Moscow's move, Blue selected strong military response/lesser diplomatic actions to accomplish political objectives as opposed to stronger diplomatic/weaker military actions which might not guarantee end of conflict. Blue objectives were to terminate conflict at lowest level and preserve stability (status quo) in Middle East, unilaterally if necessary, but preferably with NATO Allies' support. Military option selected was strike against Soviet ground forces and LOCs in Iran with 85 nucs authorized, 47 air delivered, 30 artillery and 8 ADMs. Of these, 54 weapons were expended. Concomitant US alerts and DEFCON 1 ordered. NATO allies/Japan advised in advance of Blue plan; USSR advised, on launch, and informed strike was manifestation of US resolve/intent to preserve Iran. Blue assumed strikes would cause serious international/domestic concern; USSR reaction would be surprise at US "first use" and indecision on US readiness to escalate further. OSD 3.3(b)(4)

b. Red Team (USSR) response to US nuclear attack and resultant casualties was reasoned and deliberate. Moscow understood US signals/intentions. Recognizing struggle was political -- contest for world supremacy -- Red reacted for maximum political gain using conventional military force. Two-phase course of action was:

(1) Pause in Iran, continue worldwide mobilization, and conduct intensive anti-US propaganda campaign.

(2) After 48 hours press attack against Iran including coordinated airborne/ground seizure of Teheran. Red rationale was to deceive United States with non-provocative buildup then spring politically decisive conventional move. Hope was United States would sense victory during Red Phase I and not press attack; Phase II would present fait accompli making US use of nuclear weapons difficult. If United States did use nuclear weapons again, USSR contingency was forceful nuclear response -- avoiding strategic exchange.

4. ~~(S)~~ Move II:

a. USSR pause and conventional response to US nuclear strike, assessed by Blue Team as successful "reading" of

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Soviet "game plan." Blue Team concluded Red Team decision not to respond with nuclear weapons was consistent with historical Russian backdown in face of unequivocal firmness. Blue Team evaluated renewed Soviet conventional advance as confirmation of Moscow's determination to control Middle East oil and achieve superpower primacy as well as modest probe to test continued US resolve without risk of strategic -- and possibly further tactical -- nuclear exchange. Accordingly, Blue determined to maintain pressure on Red and pre-serve Iran by continued reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. Course of action selected directed use of 118 weapons against Soviet troops/LOCs in Iran; 72 air delivered, 30 artillery, 12 PERSHINGs and 4 ADMs. Of these, all but one ADM were expended.

[REDACTED] deployed TACAIR to control and suppress Soviet airborne landing near Teheran; and, replenished expended US/Iranian resources. Simultaneous political actions informed Moscow of American determination/intentions and elicited NATO/world support for United States. Contin-gency planning considered USSR tactical nuclear response and provided for [REDACTED]

OSD 3.3(b)(4),(5),(6)

b. Red Team was dismayed by apparent failure of conventional attack to seize Teheran and extent of the US nuclear response. The Team believed situation left USSR no face saving out or satisfactory option in battle area. Consequently, Red Team resolve to achieve original objectives hardened. Nuclear retaliation planned to indicate to the United States that Washington's brinkmanship had brought USSR to limit of its options/restraint. Soviet strikes would be large but non-strategic and would place onus on the United States to initiate major escalation of war/signify willingness to engage in possible strategic exchange. Accordingly, USSR struck five US aircraft carrier task groups, (two in Med; two in Pacific; one in Gulf of Oman) and naval and air facilities on Guam with nuclear weapons launched from LRA and SSBNs. In Iran, Soviet forces took up nuclear defensive positions to re-group and replace losses. Iranian field forces were struck with nuclear weapons sufficient to inflict 40% casualties; all Iranian jet capable airfields were incapacitated by nuclear strikes. Turkey was issued ultimatum indicating future use of Turkish territory by US aggressor forces would generate attack on Turkish soil by USSR strategic

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rocket forces. In addition, PRC was warned that US/Chinese interference would be dealt with harshly; NATO allies were warned to deny facilities to US forces. At the same time, as an adjunct to worldwide politico-diplomatic overtures, Moscow offered to join the United States in cessation of hostilities and opening of negotiations on disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces in Iran. Pending US reply, Soviet forces ordered to refrain from further attacks and remain in a maximum state of readiness.

5. ~~(TS)~~ Move III:

a. Blue Team reaction to Soviet strikes was dichotomous. On the one hand, Blue believed that it had met Soviet challenge and recognized necessity to cease hostilities; consequently, Washington indicated to USSR that it was prepared to negotiate. On the other hand, Blue concluded they could best maintain a bargaining chip during negotiations, demonstrate resolve, and reestablish US/USSR naval balance by initiating mining/blockade of selected international straits, Soviet ports, channels, and passages and ordering conventional offensive attacks against USSR/Warsaw Pact merchant/military shipping in international waters. Blue Team was reasonably certain that USSR would perceive military actions as deescalatory since attacks were conventional (although military commanders were authorized to use nuclear weapons for self-defense against nuclear counterattack), not on Soviet soil, and limited to shipping. In addition, Kremlin would realize that negotiations would only affect their short-term goals in Middle East without jeopardizing long-term aims. On balance, Blue believed that combined political-military action was required to end the war at once and stimulate negotiations in which both sides would accept positions of relative parity. In related attempt to bolster US position, Blue Team took firm stand against NATO allies reluctant to support the United States in conflict. Allies advised that unless NATO mobilized for own defense in deterring subsequent USSR aggression, US forces earmarked for Europe might be redeployed to areas more advantageous for US defense.

b. The Red Team, in responding to Blue's strikes concluded that the USSR had, in effect, at this point achieved its objectives, i.e., had not "lost face" as a superpower; in addition USSR possessing a portion of Iran, had access

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to the Persian Gulf through Iraq. (The latter would ultimately lead to Soviet control of the Middle East.) Consequently, Moscow offered to cease fire and negotiate -- with Iran, not the United States. As incentive it began withdrawing troops from Northeastern Iran. Meanwhile, Soviet forces in Northwestern Iran secured/consolidated occupied areas which Moscow intended to retain under its tutelage. Consonant with their desire to cease hostilities, no offensive action was taken against the United States. Instead Soviet shipping was ordered to the nearest ports; military ships assumed defensive postures; missile boats were deployed to areas likely to be mined/blockaded; and, Soviet submarines made their presence known near US and allied merchant ships. Simultaneously, the United States and its Allies were advised of Moscow's actions and warned that any further offensive attacks would cause renewed Soviet retaliation.

6. ~~(TS)~~ Preliminary observations.

a. Both teams:

(1) Exercised judicious behavior to avoid general/strategic war.

(2) Determined not to relinquish superpower influence/prestige.

(3) Recognized that the use of nuclear weapons required them to reassess the relationship between their political/military objectives.

(4) Agreed to cease-fire/negotiate when they thought they had "won," or at least not "lost."

(5) Accepted shifts in geographic location and change in types of targets as well as an increase in numbers of weapons as valid courses of action.

(6) Considered strikes against sea forces and Guam as distinct from strikes against the "homeland."

(7) Regarded "tit-for-tat" exchanges as not necessary to convey signals/intentions.

(8) Anticipated little willingness on the part of NATO to become involved.

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(9) Accepted use of nuclear weapons when recourse to conventional alternatives was either infeasible or had not succeeded previously.

(10) Were subject to some misassessment of the exact intentions and the meaning of overtures of the other side.

(11) Were unable to precisely predict the options and response of their adversary within the relatively limited range of candidate courses of action.

(12) Developed and executed ad hoc nuclear options as required to achieve objectives.

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POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION

SCYLLA III-73

FINAL REPORT

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STUDIES, ANALYSIS, AND GAMING AGENCY
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POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION

SCYLLA III-73

26 NOVEMBER - 14 DECEMBER 1973

FINAL REPORT

Prepared By

POLITICO-MILITARY DIVISION
STUDIES, ANALYSIS, AND GAMING AGENCY
ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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EXORDIUM

The Politico-Military Division of the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency; OJCS, prepares, develops, and conducts manual simulations which seek to identify future climaterics in national security policy. Accordingly, each exercise is created from an individualized set of circumstances designed to address specific issues normally projected at a point in the foreseeable future.

SCYLLA III-73, the third of a series of exercises relating to nuclear weapon strategy and employment, was conducted in the Pentagon from 26 November to 14 December 1973.

Preparations for SCYLLA III-73 were directed by Brigadier General Harold A. Strack, USAF, Chief, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency, OJCS; and supervised by Colonel Donald M. Marks, USAF, Chief, Politico-Military Division (SAGA).

This volume, Final Report, is the second of two volumes documenting SCYLLA III-73 and contains an Analysis and a Summary of the material contained in the first volume. It is compiled for the purpose of enabling readers to grasp quickly and easily the overall impact of the simulation. Volume One, Simulation Documentation, contains the Initial Scenario, Team Messages, Scenario Projections prepared by the Control Group, and an edited transcript of the final Critique meeting.

A strict policy of non-attribution applies to all participants' remarks and comments, thus guaranteeing an environment conducive to greater candor in discussing and solving crucial problems.

The material in this document does not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency, or any other Government agency.

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INTRODUCTION

SCYLLA III-73 was designed to explore major politico-military factors and risks likely to influence United States decisions for execution of nuclear attack options appropriate to a Middle Eastern environment.

The participants were organized into a US (Blue Team), USSR (Red Team), and a Control Group. The Blue Team represented the National Command Authorities of the United States; the Red Team represented the National Command Authorities of the USSR; and the Control Group represented all other nations, international organizations, and other influencing factors.

Each team, meeting in sequence, considered an initial scenario and two scenario projections. Once the Blue Team had met and made its decision on a course of action, the Control Group considered additional influencing factors and prepared a brief scenario projection for the Red Team depicting the Blue Team's actions and their consequences. After this, the Red Team met to evaluate the crisis in light of Blue Team's actions and to decide their own courses of action. Following both team meetings, Control Group prepared a new scenario projection for the Blue Team to begin the next move of the simulation. This cycle repeated itself for each succeeding move. At the end of three moves, a Critique was held during which the decisions and rationale of each team were discussed and general conclusions were summarized.

As a starting point, the scenario portrayed a situation which required the use of nuclear weapons. This was done to stimulate thinking on option development for a nuclear confrontation. Once the simulation began, no effort was made to "engineer" nuclear warfare -- simulation play was allowed to progress in accord with team desires.

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SUMMARY

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SCYLLA III-73 SUMMARY

THE INITIAL SCENARIO

In the Spring of 1976, although detente prevailed throughout the world, certain disturbing signs were evident.

The NATO Alliance was suffering from transitional pains and the adverse influence of a growing European antagonism toward the United States. US troop strength in Europe had been cut by 20,000, with more cuts imminent and the American armed forces reduced to 2.1 million. US leaders had become increasingly preoccupied with domestic issues.

At the same time, a weakening Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe led Moscow to take a harder line with its Pact neighbors. The USSR continued to strengthen its military forces and political influence worldwide, particularly in the Middle East.

An interim settlement between Egypt and Israel, in 1974, and subsequent Arab-Israeli negotiations offered hope for genuine peace, but Arab radicalism and anti-Zionism remained as realistic threats. The next sign of a move toward a final settlement was expected with the scheduled reopening of the Suez Canal in the Winter of 1976.

King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was assassinated in March 1976 and a military government with Arab nationalist leanings was established. Fearing instability in the Middle East and disruption of vital energy resources, the US military presence in Turkey was increased. A carrier task force was deployed on a "good will" cruise of the Persian Gulf. Simultaneously, Soviet forces in the Caucasus north of Iran were augmented and additional advisory personnel were ordered to Iraq.

In June 1976, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In response, the Shah of Iran launched an attack into Iraq. Four days later, six Soviet divisions thrust across the northwestern border of Iran. The Shah's armies, pressed on two fronts, fell back.

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Appalled by the probable consequences of an Iranian defeat, the President considered US intervention vital. However, since the United States did not have sufficient conventional strength immediately available, the President directed his advisors to provide him with options for the use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East crisis.

MOVE I

Blue Team Actions. The Blue Team saw the Soviet invasion of Iran as a two-pronged threat to US interests: First, as a move by the Soviet Union to exercise its traditional goal of dominance over the Middle East and its oil supplies. Second, as a threat to the US worldwide position. The team made a key political judgment that Soviet forces had to be evicted from Iran prior to any negotiations. The team reasoned that if the US had simply called for an in place cease-fire, subsequent negotiations would not be successful in evicting Soviet forces. The United States would have been shown impotent in not being able to prevent a fait accompli.

As US forces were placed in a DEFCON 1 posture, NATO members were urged to initiate parallel actions. Japan and the PRC were informed of US intentions. Warsaw Pact members were asked to intercede with the Soviet Union. Moscow itself received a stern warning that the US was prepared to repel the invasion of Iran.

The US military response was designed to force the Soviets to pause long enough to seriously consider whether they were ready to pay a higher price for their ambitions. Blue decided to strike Soviet ground forces and LOCs in Iran with 85 tactical nuclear weapons in the [redacted] range (47 air delivered, 30 artillery and 8 ADMs). Of these, 54 weapons were expended. Collateral damage constraints, aircraft losses and in the case of artillery and ADMs, target acquisition and troop movements precluded expenditure of the remaining assets.

OSD 3.3(b)(4)

The team attempted to demonstrate US restraint by limiting the use of nuclear weapons to Iranian territory, but

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it was prepared to consider expansion to other areas of the world, including the USSR itself, if that became necessary to protect US interests.

The nuclear options listed below were rejected as being either purely psychological, not contributing to the immediate objective of repelling the Soviet invasion of Iran, or as too escalatory:

1. Demonstration (no target) over the Caspian or Black Seas or within Iran.
2. Strike on Iraqi forces.
3. Strike on Soviet naval units in the Persian Gulf.
4. Strike on Soviet LOCs within the USSR (south of the Caucasus).
5. Strike on Soviet military targets within the USSR (south of the Caucasus).
6. Strike on POL refineries in the USSR (at Baku).

Red Team Actions. The Red Team was surprised by the magnitude of the initial United States response to the Soviet invasion of Iran. The team felt, thinking as Soviets, that the United States had used nuclear weapons in a rather heavy handed manner and had left the Soviet Union few options for response. It decided on a conventional attack, endeavoring to play to Soviet strength and against an American weakness --the lack of US conventional forces in the area. A two-phase operation was ordered.

The intention was to conduct a massive anti-US propaganda campaign while reconstituting Soviet forces, deceiving the United States with a non-provocative buildup and the absence of political responses to its messages, and then launch a quick, decisive conventional attack against Iran. Hope was that during the force buildup world opinion would denounce the US use of nuclear weapons and, thereby, restrain any future US nuclear response. If the United States did employ nuclear weapons again, the USSR contingency was to be a forceful nuclear reply--yet one short of an all-out nuclear war.

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The options listed below were rejected as not militarily necessary. Moreover, the team reasoned that the Soviet rejection of a nuclear response would be viewed favorably in the world and would place the onus on the United States for any further nuclear strikes:

1. Nuclear strikes on Iranian airfields.
2. Nuclear strikes on US carrier task groups.
3. Conventional attacks on US carrier task groups.
4. Spread of hostilities to other countries.

FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION

The US nuclear strikes resulted in losses of 35 to 45 percent of the Soviet's two lead divisions in northwestern Iran, slight casualties in the two accompanying divisions, and light damage to the LOCs.

Despite differences in the degree of concern and the lack of any positive commitments, Free World reaction tended to coalesce behind US leadership. On the domestic scene, most of the citizenry, including congressional and government leaders, gave measured approval to the apparently successful nuclear ploy.

As time continued to pass without a Soviet nuclear response, the world began to breathe a bit easier. However, the Soviet's explicit failure to respond to US demands resulted in a sense of foreboding among Iranian leaders and high officials in Washington.

In addition to indications that Soviet divisions in Iran were being reconstituted, and that the Soviets had positioned additional long-range aircraft south of the Caucasus, US intelligence reports revealed the marshaling of a Soviet Airborne Division along with extensive force build ups in the Caucasus Military Districts. Other reports revealed the loading of military equipment at

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Soviet Black Sea ports, and the mobilization of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

These preparations were but the prelude to the massive Soviet non-nuclear attack which was launched against Iran in the early morning hours of 28 June. Four of the six Soviet divisions in northwestern Iran proceeded with their attack, penetrating south from Zanjan and from Rasht along the Caspian sea coast, on the main routes to Teheran to link up with the airborne division which had launched an assault on the Teheran International Airport. In addition, two divisions invaded Iran along the northeastern border.

MOVE II

Blue Team Actions. The Blue Team was surprised that the initial Soviet response was conventional. They assessed it as a partial "back down" in the face of US resolve. The team concluded, however, that Moscow still was determined to gain control of Middle East oil and to achieve super-power primacy without risking all-out nuclear war. Accordingly, Blue decided to increase its previous political overtures, and maintain its nuclear pressure on Red.

In addition to urging NATO to declare a Reinforced Alert, the Blue Team sought Turkish cooperation in closing the Bosphorus and staging the 82nd Airborne Division. However, under the pressure of Soviet counter-ultimatums, Turkey agreed only to covert emplacement of ADMs along the Turko-Soviet border. A high-level US politico-military delegation opened special talks with Chinese leaders in Peking. The United States hoped that this ploy would make the USSR nervous about the Chinese threat and prevent any redeployment of Soviet forces from the Sino-Soviet border.

On the military side, the Blue Team redoubled its nuclear fires. One hundred and eighteen weapons (72 air delivered, 30 artillery, 12 Pershings, 4 ADMs) were launched against Soviet troops and lines of communication in Iran; all but one of these were expended on target. As a reminder to

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the Soviets of the importance of the oil resources issue, an SR-71 reconnaissance mission was successfully flown over the Baku oil complex.

The options listed below were rejected as not militarily necessary, too escalatory and, in the case of those involving NATO and the PRC, politically difficult to accomplish:

1. US nuclear strikes conducted from Turkish bases.
2. Nuclear response by the Turks under NATO auspices.
3. Closing the Bosphorus by military action.
4. Requesting the Peoples Republic of China to take military actions against the USSR.
5. Nuclear strikes on Soviet airfields and oil fields in the Caucasus.

Red Team Actions. The second use of nuclear weapons by the United States caused the Red Team to reassess the situation. It concluded that continued conventional action appeared futile. US actions had left the Soviets no face-saving option in Iran and had forced them to the limits of their restraint. The Red Team elected to use nuclear weapons in worldwide, integrated, but non-strategic strikes. This response would place the onus on the United States to escalate or to accept a cease-fire.

Accordingly, using approximately 200 nuclear weapons, the USSR struck Iranian air and ground units, five US aircraft carrier task groups (two in the Mediterranean, two in the Pacific, one in the Gulf of Oman) and US facilities on Guam. The Red Team recognized that there was risk involved in striking Guam but believed the American people would not view such a strike as an attack on the US homeland.

In addition to the psychological impact on the US leaders, the Red Team saw the strike on Guam as important to the Soviets vis-a-vis the PRC. The Red Team was concerned about possible Chinese moves against the Soviet maritime provinces inspired by the US politico-military mission to Peking. Thus, the strike on Guam was also seen

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as a straightforward prudent military move to minimize the US capability to support any Chinese action with Guam-based US nuclear assets.

In concert with their strikes, the Soviets issued a second warning to the PRC not to interfere, a similar warning to NATO, and a second ultimatum to Turkey to deny the United States the use of Turkish bases or suffer the consequences.

Following the nuclear strikes, the USSR offered to cease hostilities and open negotiations on the withdrawal of opposing forces in Iran. Pending a US reply, Soviet forces refrained from further action but remained in a state of maximum readiness.

The options listed below were rejected as they no longer offered a viable military solution, were too risky or, in the case of Rota, Holy Loch and Turkey, were not consistent with the Soviet desire to weaken support for the United States:

1. Continued non-nuclear operations.
2. A conventional attack on Rota, Spain and Holy Loch, Scotland.
3. A nuclear strike on the US nuclear capabilities in Turkey.
4. An attack on Israel by Egypt/Syria.
5. Reinforcement of the Soviet Airborne Division in Teheran with an additional airborne division.
6. A preemptive nuclear strike on China.

SECOND SCENARIO PROJECTION

The United States met the renewed Soviet conventional attack of 28 June with intensified nuclear strikes on

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Soviet combat forces. The first nuclear wave, delivered by air, artillery, missiles and ADMs, was directed at the penetrating ground forces in the northeastern and northwestern sectors. The strikes produced an estimated 18,000 Soviet casualties as well as an estimated 30,000 casualties among Iranian civilians.

The Soviet counter-blow, which fell by mid-day 28 June, destroyed the bulk of the Iranian Air Force and the country's jet capable airfields and left the Iranian ground forces in a state of disarray. Casualties among Iranian civilians climbed to an estimated 500,000.

Of the five US carrier task groups struck in the Pacific, eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea, three were seriously damaged and two lightly damaged. Two nuclear detonations of one megaton each destroyed Anderson AFB and Apra Harbor Naval facilities at Guam. A substantial reduction in the naval SIOP assets of the US resulted and thousands of American lives were lost.

MOVE III

Blue Team Actions. The Blue Team had anticipated a Soviet nuclear retaliation but had not foreseen the character of that response. It was concerned about the altered naval balance resulting from the Soviet strikes on the carriers, and was appalled by the strike on Guam.

The team recognized the necessity for negotiations to deescalate and regain control of the situation. It concluded that the United States could best maintain a bargaining chip during negotiations and reestablish US naval prominence by mining and blockading selected international straits, Soviet ports and channels, and by ordering conventional offensive attacks against USSR/Warsaw Pact merchant/military shipping in international waters. The Blue Team was reasonably certain that the USSR would perceive these actions as deescalatory since the naval attacks were to be conventional, and would not impinge upon Soviet soil.

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In a related attempt to bolster the US position, the team took a firm stand with NATO Allies who had been reluctant to support the United States. They were advised that unless NATO mobilized for its own defense in deterring subsequent USSR aggression, US forces earmarked for Europe might be redeployed to areas more advantageous for US defense.

The options listed below were rejected because they would leave the United States in a very weak position for follow-on negotiations, US capabilities to accomplish them were severely limited, or, they were too escalatory:

1. Acceding to the Soviet offer for the immediate cessation of all hostile acts and the opening of negotiations.

2. Conventional attacks against Soviet bases in the Middle East and Soviet naval forces in Middle East ports.

3. Nuclear strikes against Soviet naval/air bases

[REDACTED]
OSD 3.3(b)(5)

4. Nuclear strikes against Soviet airfields and other military targets [REDACTED]

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

5. Nuclear strikes against high-value industrial targets in USSR, [REDACTED]

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

6. Nuclear strikes on Soviet bases in the Warsaw Pact nations.

7. Comprehensive nuclear strikes against Soviet strategic targets, wherever located.

Red Team Actions. The Red Team interpreted the American conventional naval response to the Soviet nuclear strikes as the first real evidence of US willingness to negotiate in a conciliatory fashion. The team felt that the United States had presented the Soviets with an excellent opportunity, while the United States itself was left in a somewhat vulnerable position. Soviet superpower status was undiminished, and access to the Persian Gulf had now been assured through Iraq via the captured Iranian territory.

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Consequently, the USSR offered to cease fire and to negotiate with Iran, but not with the United States. By spurning negotiations with the United States, the USSR expected to reduce the level of US participation and influence in the area, and perhaps establish a puppet government in the occupied Iranian territory.

The Soviets thus proceeded to consolidate their positions in northwestern Iran. At the same time, as a sign of their willingness to negotiate, they began withdrawing forces from northeastern Iran. Soviet shipping was ordered to the nearest ports and naval combatants assumed a defensive posture. Missile boats were deployed to areas likely to be mined or blockaded and submarines made their presence known near US and Allied merchant ships. In concert with these military actions, Moscow warned the United States and its Allies that further offensive military actions would only lead to renewed Soviet retaliation.

The options listed below were rejected because they would result in a renewed escalation, or prolongation of the conflict:

1. Renewed offensive in Iran.
2. Immediate prosecution of a war at sea.
3. Use of nuclear weapons on US merchant ships.
4. Immediate conventional attacks on US merchant ships.

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ANALYSIS

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ANALYSIS

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Motivations

During the course of the simulation, both teams operated on the basis that a nuclear exchange between the homelands of the United States and the Soviet Union was to be avoided. Neither team, however, was unanimous just where such a threshold resides. Some members of the Blue Team believed that nuclear attacks on Soviet forces on foreign soil, such as in Iran, would be close to the threshold; however, others expressed the opinion that attacks on selected targets in the Soviet homeland would not necessarily trigger an all-out nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Some members of the Red Team supported this latter view during team discussions -- but it was never put to test during the simulation.

Throughout SCYLLA III, the Red Team regarded the Soviet homeland as inviolate; that is, a US attack on the USSR itself would, in all likelihood, trigger a massive nuclear strike against the United States. Several exceptions to the policy were expressed as contingency actions, but it is questionable whether the team would have adopted them had the "moment of truth" arrived.

Considerations

The Red Team did consider a nuclear attack on such forward US bases as Guam as lying below the all-out war threshold. The team correctly reasoned that the United States would accept such an attack since it did not strike the US homeland; thus, the United States would desist from further nuclear escalation. Although the Red Team was not in full agreement on the consequences of such an attack, this action does underscore the susceptibility of the US forward-basing system to nuclear blackmail.

These differing opinions, among both Blue and Red Team members, emphasize that those conditions for crossing the threshold of a homeland nuclear exchange are likely to change repeatedly as a crisis develops -- and will be

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highly dependent upon continuing assessments made by both sides as to their interests, objectives and fortune. Although both teams perceived only a remote possibility of a homeland nuclear exchange resulting from actions in Iran, they did recognize the risk. Accordingly, both studiously attempted to signal the limited nature and intent of their actions.

The Blue Team recognized that, in Iran, it was operating from a weaker position than that held by the USSR. Consequently, it was vital that the United States obtain support for its action from NATO and the PRC. A mobilized NATO would have created a threat to the Soviets from Western Europe, thus giving them cause to pause and reconsider their actions in Iran. The same situation held true in the Far East. The United States needed Chinese support to give the Soviets concern over possible PRC military actions along the Sino-Soviet border.

US efforts to mobilize NATO fell on deaf ears -- a point not overlooked by the Kremlin. The Soviets accentuated the US-NATO rift by avoiding any acts which would have furthered NATO involvement or coalescence. As a result, the Red Team had little fear of coordinated NATO intervention.

The US courtship of the Chinese had a far more telling effect than its efforts with NATO. The Soviets were genuinely concerned with PRC intervention and, accordingly, planned the nuclear strikes on the carrier task forces in the Pacific and on Guam, in part, as a warning to the Chinese not to become involved. Implications of such an action are of obvious concern to US policymakers.

The Red Team believed that the Soviet Union's offer to guarantee a continued flow of oil to its "friends" in West Europe would further erode any support for the United States. In actuality, the offer had been made as a simple propaganda ploy. The Blue Team interpreted this "guarantee" as a prelude to Soviet seizure of Middle Eastern oil. The team reasoned that the Soviet Union couldn't live up to this promise without such a seizure. In fact, the Blue Team used this threat in its propaganda and political messages to garner support for the US position. Thus, the Red propaganda ploy backfired.

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From the outset, the Blue Team recognized the need to retain use of US bases in Turkey without antagonizing the Soviets. Therefore, the team elected not to launch strikes against Soviet forces from these bases but rather to use them for staging flights through forward bases inside Iran.

Generally, the Red Team would have preferred to keep Turkey out of the conflict believing it more advantageous to Soviet long-term goals in the Middle East. But the team was not willing to allow the United States a sanctuary. Thus, after the second US nuclear strike on Soviet forces in Iran, the Red Team chose to warn Turkey that any future use of Turkish territory or facilities by US military forces would result in an immediate Soviet nuclear response.

Originating attacks solely from Iranian soil also played a role in Blue Team's use of carrier-based aircraft. The team felt that the staging of such aircraft through Iranian air bases might minimize the probability of Soviet retaliation against the carrier. The team recognized, however, that the simple physical presence of the carrier made it a prime target regardless of aircraft use. The team also recognized that carrier aircraft were the most immediately available nuclear asset; their use eliminated the need and potentially difficult political problem of redeploying ground-based assets from West Europe.

From the onset of the simulation, it was evident that both teams considered the crisis as primarily a political duel rather than a specific military engagement in Iran. Operating with this view, both teams were able to add other widely dispersed geographic locations to the military arena and vary the quantities and types of weaponry used without initiating a homeland nuclear exchange.

Observations

As the simulation ended, the Red Team believed that Soviet objectives of superpower primacy and control of the Middle East had been partially obtained while US prestige as a world superpower had been damaged and her influence in the Middle East diminished.

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
CONCLUSIONS

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CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions are based on the participants' actions during SCYLLA III. With due allowance for the artificialities inherent in any politico-military simulation, they may be considered as valid summary statements of the simulation's insights into limited nuclear options.



5. It will be mandatory that political messages accompany the use of nuclear weapons. Such messages will need to emphasize both determination and restraint; sufficient determination to deter further escalation; and sufficient restraint to convey a willingness to terminate hostilities. OSD 3.3(b)(5)

6. Selectivity in the application of forces (i.e., geographic or political area limitations, size, intensity and the relationship of destruction to military objectives) appears to be the best method of providing the necessary signals.

7. Assessments of an opponent's interests, objectives and intentions and his likely interpretation of those of the United States, will be of major importance in designing appropriate US nuclear options.

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8. "Forward-bases" (to include sea forces in international waters and territories such as Guam) may not be construed as the US or USSR "homeland," and strikes on them may not trigger a strategic nuclear exchange. They, however, may represent the upper limit or "threshold" at which an opponent must choose to a) initiate strategic war, b) put his opponent in a similar position, c) deescalate or d) capitulate.

9. Within the range of force applications which might be available, an opponent's responses to nuclear attack cannot be predicated with confidence.

10. Predetermined nuclear options for use in a given conflict/area of conflict may prove inappropriate.

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

11. The need for restraint, imposed by the mutual assured destruction capability possessed by the USSR and the US, requires that the bargaining process aspects of conflict resolution receive greater attention in peacetime defense planning.

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
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
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
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POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION

SCYLLA III-73

SIMULATION DOCUMENTATION



STUDIES, ANALYSIS, AND GAMING AGENCY
ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION

SCYLLA III-73

26 NOVEMBER - 14 DECEMBER 1973

SIMULATION DOCUMENTATION

Prepared By

POLITICO-MILITARY DIVISION
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FOREWORD

Simulation Documentation is the first of two volumes documenting SCYLLA III-73, a management-level politico-military simulation. It examined major military factors and risks likely to influence US decisions for execution of nuclear attack options appropriate to a Middle Eastern environment in the Mid-1970s. SCYLLA III-73 was conducted at the Pentagon from 26 November - 14 December 1973. This volume contains the initial scenario, team move messages, scenario projections of the Control Group, and edited transcript of the Critique proceedings.

Participants were organized into a US (Blue Team), USSR (Red Team), and a Control Group. The Blue Team represented the National Command Authorities of the United States. They were assisted by a Military Staff representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Red Team represented the National Command Authorities of the USSR. The Control Group represented all other nations of the world, international organizations and other influencing factors.

Each team, meeting in sequence, considered an initial scenario and two scenario projections. Once the Blue Team had met and made its decision on a course of action, the Control Group considered additional influencing factors and prepared a brief scenario projection for the Red Team depicting the Blue Team's actions and their consequences. After this, the Red Team met to evaluate the crisis in light of Blue Team's actions and to decide their own courses of action. Following both team meetings, Control Group prepared a new scenario projection for the Blue Team to begin the next move of the simulation. This cycle repeated itself for each succeeding move. At the end of three moves, a Critique was held during which the decisions and rationale of each team were discussed and general conclusions were summarized.

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO BLUE

MOVE NO. I

RED

DTG 220800Z MAY 76

INITIAL SCENARIO - PART I

The situation described in this scenario is hypothetical and is intended to provoke thought and to stimulate discussion. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency; or any other government agency.

All scenario times are Greenwich Mean Time.

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PART I

THE WORLD OF 1976

Despite a general atmosphere of detente, the roles played on the world stage by the protagonists suggested cautious optimism rather than euphoria.

The worldwide energy crisis which had been exacerbated by the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was somewhat eased by the interim settlement between Egypt and Israel in 1974 and the subsequent Arab-Israeli negotiations. Oil production, however, continued to lag behind the world demand resulting in an energy environment characterized by supply restraint and national self-interests.

Southeast Asia continued to simmer as the developing nations struggled to fend off insurgencies and to keep pace with the political and economic needs of their people.

The multipolar world which emerged in the early seventies -- the United States, the Soviet Union, the European Community, China, and Japan -- apparently had committed itself to military detente and was engaged in fiercely competitive political and economic rivalries to achieve its goals. By 1976, this competition produced a vastly complicated, intertwining skein of bilateral, multinational, and regional enterprises which transcended governments and ideologies.

THE INTERVENING YEARS, 1973-1976

The United States

President Nixon's second term had achieved a notable record in foreign affairs but evinced continued domestic criticism. Persistent inflation, heightened by fuel shortages, scattered unemployment, and the approaching Presidential elections only aggravated the situation. Congress, moreover, had revitalized its legislative prerogatives, acting on its own bills, which were carefully tailored to suit an electorate it would soon face. Opposing any tax increase and responding to the rising popular clamor for

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military reductions, lawmakers held the 1974 Defense Budget at its 1973 level of \$76 billion and cut foreign aid by 4 percent. This total was maintained in 1975, but was threatened in the fiscal year 1976 budget hearings.

In contrast to the disappointing domestic scene, the Administration moved to maintain its momentum in foreign affairs. But even fast-moving international play did not allay some unspoken world anxieties that the United States was becoming increasingly isolationist.

Sensing a growing challenge to the credibility of its commitments, Washington sought to assuage Allied fears by reaffirming US determination to adhere to its security obligations while expanding the role of its European partners in NATO's decisionmaking processes [REDACTED]

As a further concession, the United States reaffirmed that as the structure of Europe changed, so would that of NATO. Despite these declarations, Europeans remained doubtful.

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These common skepticisms about the United States commitment to European defense were wrenched again by the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In the majority of NATO councils, American policy toward Israel found little welcome, and less support. For the first time Washington and the Western European capitals publicly criticized each other's alleged self-interest to the detriment of the Atlantic Alliance.

Another shock to NATO unity was administered in February 1974. Congressional and domestic pressures forced the Administration to reduce the armed forces to 2,150,000 men. In addition, 20,000 troops were withdrawn from Europe in response to mutual force reduction talks with the USSR. Government spokesmen privately admitted to their European counterparts that additional cuts might not be far distant.

The Soviet Empire

The Soviet Union was not immune to the forces of change. Under General Secretary Brezhnev, Moscow altered its modus operandi, and by 1974, was in the forefront of the drive toward detente, economic competition, and apparent cooperation. The United States and the USSR contracted various

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bilateral economic commitments and pursued mutual force reductions and SALT II negotiations.

Notwithstanding external appearances, all was not well within the Soviet Union. In 1974, the two-edged sword of detente had caused serious wounds within the Pact. "Consumerism," agricultural deficiencies, and other trading gaps motivated bilateral economic arrangements with the West and with the Third World. National identities began to resurface, and Pact nations were partially persuaded that the Soviet Union would tolerate further nationalistic expression. In the fall of 1974, discontent had surfaced in Poland. The GDR, hurt seriously by a poor economic situation, was kept busy quieting the increasing demands of its inflation plagued workers and the ever louder harangues of underground reunification organizations. Other Eastern European nations underwent similar disturbances. By the end of 1974, the Soviet leadership had introduced a discreetly harder tenor to the questions of detente and cooperation.

In November 1974, Premier Kosygin announced his retirement. He was replaced by Kirill Mazurov -- a long-time critic of Brezhnev policies. Shortly thereafter, loyal Communist Parties were informed that the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (CPSU) would be held in October 1975. Within a week after the meeting of the Congress, Andrey Kirilenko replaced Brezhnev as General Secretary.

The new leadership continued to emphasize military developments and improvements. Soviet naval units including amphibious forces cruised widely in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea expanding their port visits and ship days on station.

Airlift capability for both troops and material also grew steadily. Its resupply capabilities had been well tested in missions to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The Soviet AN-12s, the huge AN-22s, and the new jet-powered IL-76 cargo aircraft enabled two airborne divisions to be lifted to distant trouble spots within one week.

The Soviets pursued the acquisition of basing agreements with stepped up vigor, and increased the use of anchorages in the Mediterranean. Arrangements similar to the Soviet

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use of Egyptian port facilities existed at Latakia and Tartus, Syria; Berbera, Somalia; Aden and Hodeida in the two Yemens; and Umm Qasr in Iraq.

By 1975, there was no doubt that the Soviets were capitalizing on the influence gained from their opportunistic support for Arab radicalism. It served as a convenient means of increasing their presence in the Middle East and of reminding Western Europe and Japan of the tenuous nature of their oil supply arrangements. In addition, the Soviets had solidified relations with their friends in the neighboring Indian Ocean and South Asian regions, especially with India, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

Soviet defense spending remained at an annual rate of nine percent of the GNP. Although spending for strategic and general purpose forces stayed relatively constant at the 1973 levels, research and development funds increased significantly each year. Rumors persisted that the Soviets had surreptitiously developed radically new weapons systems of frightening potential -- to include "clean" tactical nuclear weapons and sophisticated laser weapons systems.

The European Community

The evolving configuration of an economically oriented Europe presented particular problems to the United States and to the USSR. The United States found itself in danger of being cut off from competitive trading with Europe. European economic jingoism was inflamed by the vulnerability of the Europeans to a cutback in the oil flow from Arab oil fields in contrast to US energy policies of self-sufficiency. Despite frequent meetings among the Allies to coordinate their oil policies and to avoid competition for oil supplies, differences in each nation's relative energy situation and the resulting domestic pressures prevented meaningful compromises. Europe and Japan remained as dependent as ever upon Arab oil supplies.

Among the Allies, France continued her "special relations" with the Soviet Union. Acting as the "main link" between the USSR and Europe, Pompidou sought to realize De Gaulle's vision for France. Relations with the United States were cool but calculated not to wholly alienate the United States from France -- or Europe -- in spite of increasing politico-economic differences.

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The FRG position in the new Europe was unique. Its special relationship with the United States, through NATO, had been eroded by US diplomatic and economic ventures. Politically, the FRG accommodated with the East, but German strategy attempted to effect a neutral buffer in Central Europe. Bonn recognized Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1974 and put particular emphasis on cooperation with East Germany, which responded with popular enthusiasm. Nevertheless, the Honecker regime remained wary of the growing closeness of the two nations.

Britain, although formally committed to Europe, found it difficult to abandon its traditional ties with the United States. For the most part, Britain's venture in Europe was an economic affair. Militarily, the UK did keep its hand in both Europe and NATO by maintaining its defense budget at four percent of the GNP.

Predictably, the actions of the minor powers of western and neutral Europe were governed by those of France and Germany. In general, the Southern Flank aligned itself with France in community matters and foreign affairs, while the Northern Tier, and smaller central states, cast their lots with the FRG.

The Far East

Japan and The People's Republic of China dominated the Far East during 1973-1976. Japan possessed economic power and military potential, while the PRC garnered military power and economic potential. In 1975, Japan became the number two economic power in the world with an adjusted defense budget which had grown two and one half times in the past three years. The PRC, on the other hand, preferred to concentrate on domestic and economic development and, for the most part, qualitative defense spending. Sino-Soviet relations continued to be troubled by conflict over political, ideological, and territorial issues. Peking hastened the deployment of its nuclear weapons and vied with the USSR for increased trade and economic assistance from both the United States and Japan.

Japan cultivated markets throughout the world with particular attention directed to the Arab Middle East, United States,

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and the USSR. She intensified economic relations in the Persian Gulf, and by 1976, had invested nearly one billion dollars in oil concessions. Japan remained a member-in-good-standing of the US security commitments; contacts with the USSR were insurance against Peking.

The Middle East

The Israeli Army, during 1974, staged a symbolic withdrawal from its deployments west of the canal to tactically more advantageous terrain at the Mitla Pass in the Sinai. Both sides of the canal were patrolled by a UN peacekeeping force. In return, Egypt had conceded Israel passage rights through Bab el Mandeb. Work to reopen the Suez Canal began in late 1974 but was not expected to be completed before the winter of 1976.

The Egyptian-Israeli settlement did not erase the Syrian military confrontation with Israel. Border crossings, sporadic fire fights along the Golan Heights, and terrorist incidents by both Tel-Aviv and Damascus marked the cease-fire. Radical Baathist factions, accusing their Syrian leaders of gross ineptness, found willing sponsors in an expanding Soviet presence.

Despite the obvious fissures and cracks in the Arab world, a new degree of functional cooperation had been achieved. Compared to Israel's isolation from her former friends in Western Europe and Africa, and her dismal potential capability for sustained combat in the future, the Islamic world appeared to be enjoying a virtual Renaissance.

Although a final solution to the Arab-Israeli problem remained as intransigent as ever, the interim settlement and de facto cease-fires had reduced the danger of a deliberate military attack by either side.

Seeking new opportunities to assuage their frustrations, the militant radical Arabs renewed their traditional opposition to Iran and the conservative sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf.

Soviet initiatives, diplomacy, and subversion had entrenched Moscow's interests even more firmly in Iraq

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than they were in Syria. In fact, the Soviet influence in these two countries greatly exceeded the base of activity which they had briefly enjoyed in Egypt in the 1971 period.

Along the Persian Gulf, radical Arabs, led by the Popular Front For the Liberation of the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), had established themselves in nearly every government center. They were the predominant influence among the discontented elements of Bahrain. They had plagued Abu Dhabi with radical incidents, which had gained many adherents among Egyptian and Palestinian immigrants, and they represented a potential threat to the ruling family of Kuwait. Farther south in Oman, the radicals had established an impressive base in Dhofar, where the opportunities for insurgency continued to spread.

In contrast to the radical Arabs led by Iraq, Saudi Arabia continued to exercise a conservative hand in its relations with its immediate neighbors and the great powers. The Saudis had learned how to apply their weapons of oil and had begun to exercise a titular Islamic leadership in the contest with radical Arab elements surrounding the Arabian Peninsula. King Faisal provided both financial and technical help to the enclaves of like-minded sheiks in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and to Jordan.

The United States maintained its position as the leading supplier of military technology to the Saudis; however, the American Middle East force, withdrawn from Bahrain at the request of Manama during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war had not been restored. Consequently, no US military capability existed in the area. The American presence in Saudi Arabia consisted of approximately 500 diplomatic, commercial, and technological advisors. Another 2000 advisors and dependents were in Iran.

The Shah's government voiced Iranian support for the Arab cause, largely as a gesture of solidarity with fellow Muslims. However, Iran had not supported the oil boycotts in 1973 and 1974, nor had she provided material or funds to Arab combatants. Instead, Teheran assured its principal oil export consumers that oil supplies would continue to expand as scheduled to provide the needed revenue for Iranian development. The Shah's balanced

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approach to Middle East affairs throughout 1974 served to extend Iranian influence in Europe, where Britain, France, and Italy assiduously warmed their relations with Teheran. In addition, both Iraq and Afghanistan sought to reestablish formal diplomatic relations.

Growing concern for the increasing Soviet presence in the Middle East had led to a series of joint United States-Iranian exercises during 1974 and 1975. Despite the fear of the Soviets and an occasional domestic challenge to the Shah from Arab extremist elements or disaffected Iranians who were unhappy with the pace of development, Iran appeared to be riding the crest of the wave in the Middle East.

A Dolorous Pattern

In November 1975, Sheik Ahmad, ruler of the Trucial sheikdom of Umm al Qaywayn, was overthrown by Bahraini-based PFLOAG militants. Rumors of Soviet assistance to this latest venture of the Popular Front were not doubted. The entire Trucial peninsula was thrown into disarray as the new government preached the glories of nationalist revolution. As though on signal, an outbreak of radical nationalism erupted in Dhahran. Saudi-based Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) leaders incited their followers to a revolt which destroyed large parts of the city and killed dozens of US citizens before it was crushed with the aid of Saudi military forces. The ferocity of this attempted coup -- and its near success -- caused further alarm among the ruling sheiks who considered it a direct threat to their own sheikdoms. Sheik Zayid, as leader of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), called for assurances of protection from King Faisal. The Shah of Iran, deeply concerned over the spreading terrorism and its implications, informed Faisal that Iran stood ready to assist in quelling any future insurgency should Faisal desire help. The Shah further demonstrated his resolve by assuring Sheik Isa in Bahrain that Iran would dispatch troops immediately upon request if the militant revolution spread to that island.

These crucial developments were a prelude to the lightning bolt events of early 1976. Shortly after midday on 8 March, the fanatical ANM struck a dramatic blow in the tragedy of

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incipient anarchy in the Gulf states. As King Faisal entered his limousine, after a personal visit to Saudi Army headquarters, a terrorist hurled a single grenade at the vehicle. Faisal, his Minister of Defense, and his personal chauffeur, were killed. Within the hour, Major General Hashim, Commander of the Saudi Air Force, proclaimed himself head of a revolutionary military junta as well as "Interim Chief Executive" of Saudi Arabia. Hashim's first official act, after tersely deploring the assassination of the monarch, was to declare a moratorium on all Saudi military and economic commitments to foreign governments pending a "detailed reevaluation" of the situation.

World reaction was electric. The news from Jidda presaged certain catastrophe. Almost immediately, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain called for assistance from Iran. The Shah warily agreed. At the same time, Iran raised its state of military preparedness to just short of national alert.

In the United States, the President, in a televised press conference, informed the American people of his concern over the latest events in the escalating crisis in the Persian Gulf, deploring the assassination of the Saudi ruler and the senseless murder of US citizens in Dhahran. However, he carefully avoided any intimation of US military involvement.

Within the closed councils of government, however, the press reported happenings of deep concern.

On 14 March, the US deployed a USAF F-4 wing, along with KC-135 tankers to Incirlik Air Base in eastern Turkey, near Adana. On the same day, two F-4 squadrons each deployed to Batman and Diyarbakir air bases just 200 miles from the Soviet-Iranian border. A Navy Carrier Task Force, assembled from the Pacific fleet, was ordered to proceed on a "good-will cruise" to the waters of the Arabian Sea.

Within the Kremlin, Faisal's abrupt death occasioned consternation. General Hashim's threat to "reevaluate economic commitments" showed a far greater Arab independence than Soviet planners anticipated. The danger of exposure or expulsion by the unpredictable Saudis was a critical possibility. On the other hand, assistance to the radical

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adherents seemed imperative. Though Kremlin decisionmakers made no public announcements, diplomatic and press reports indicated that Iraqi and Syrian harbors and wharves were choked with war materials. Downtown areas of Baghdad and Damascus were resonating with guttural Russian. Kayhan International press releases decried the menacing buildup of Soviet infantry and armor along the Russo-Iranian border.

Through April and May, the Middle East seethed. President Bakr, in spite of clear Soviet disclaimers, abetted the turmoil. General Hashim expropriated, without compensation, all "alien enterprises within the Nationalist Republic of Arabia." American companies, citizens and embassy staffs gathered their families and belongings for evacuation. Not clear as to the extent of disruption the expropriation represented, Western and international oil business representatives consulted among themselves and petitioned the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) for restraint. Nevertheless, the OPEC following a strong Saudi bid, raised crude oil prices 50 percent, and approved greatly restricted export quotas to countries who proved unfriendly. More ominously, the volatile General Hashim shattered former King Faisal's tenuous (but tangible) friendship with both the United States and Iran by siding with the "true scions of Mohammed" and openly advocating "Pan Arab confederalism."

On 21 May 1976, a James Reston New York Times article recapitulated world fears darkening the Middle East horizon. Lamenting the consequences of US worldwide military draw-downs, he reviewed the increasing animosity between Middle Eastern nations and the impending crisis:

"Increasing US public and congressional demands to curtail military expenditures and to avoid military involvement overseas have prompted radical Arabs, with the backing of the USSR, to attempt to overthrow moderate Arab governments in the Persian Gulf area and the Government of Iran. Now Saudi Arabia, formerly a steadfast friend of the West, has joined the militants and expropriated American investments.

"Iraq, with Soviet support, has increased the supply of arms to the dissident Baluchi

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tribesmen in Iran and infiltrated guerrillas and saboteurs across the mountain frontiers into Iran.

"The Soviet Union has reemphasized its support of Iraq and other radical Arab groups. They have covertly supplied Iranian Marxist organizations and have augmented their forces along the Soviet-Iranian border. Moreover, a Soviet naval task force in the Persian Gulf has recently conducted a combined amphibious landing exercise with the Iraqis at Umm Qasr, Iraq, which the Iranians view as a rehearsal for a landing in Kuwait or Iran.

"Increased terrorist activities by the Marxist organization in Iran have included an aborted assassination attempt upon the Shah. Tensions between Iran and Iraq and, now Saudi Arabia, have reached a point of imminent explosiveness. Unless there is determined effort by the superpowers to defuse the situation, another war appears inevitable."

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 102

TO BLUE

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 101

DTG 232310Z JUN 76

INITIAL SCENARIO - PART II

THE CRISIS

A Glorious Vindication.

On Tuesday, 15 June 1976, the eruption occurred. President Bakr ordered Iraqi forces into Kuwait. Emboldened by the mentors, aroused by the vociferous support of radical Arab cohorts, and faced with apparent confusion among the smaller Gulf States, Bakr decided the time opportune to act in the name of Allah and settle longstanding territorial disputes.

The advance of the Iraqi forces was rapid and unimpeded. By 1700 hours the same day, armored units were reported passing the oil field at Ar Rawdah about 20 miles inside the Kuwaiti border on the main north-south road. World reaction was vehement. In New York, the Kuwaiti representative to the United Nations, in an impassioned appeal for help from the rostrum of the General Assembly, referred to the "recent ostentatious display of Soviet-Iraqi military hardware" as "more than an unhappy coincidence, and clearly indicative of Moscow's collusion in the sack of Kuwait." The Iranian delegate denounced Iraq's brutal and unwarranted breach of the peace:

"The Shah of Iran desires to make clear to Iraq -- and to the world -- that this unbridled aggression will not go unchecked. Unless Iraqi forces cease their advance and begin withdrawing to their established borders; within 12 hours, Iran will consider this depredation an attack on its own inviolate borders."

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Diplomatic channels hummed as the world attempted to sort out the growing crisis. Hotline communications between President Nixon and First Secretary Kirilenko were frank. The USSR denied any detailed knowledge of Iraqi intentions. The President forcefully reiterated the gravity of the situation and urged maximum efforts by both nations to restore order. Both nations agreed not to enter into the fighting and to restrain any nation not already involved from expanding the conflict.

Persepolis Resurgent.

At 0430 hours on 16 June 1976 -- almost 12 hours to the minute, Iranian F-4s began flying sorties against the still advancing Iraqi forces and against installations in Iraq. The US Embassy in Teheran reported that the Shah had informed both US and Soviet ambassadors that he did not intend to force a major war. Accordingly, he had taken a symbolic step to buy time. His Air Force had bombed several strategically located Iraqi airfields with considerable success and had attacked the spearhead of the Iraqi's armored concentrations in Kuwait. The effect of this bombing had been to slow, but not stop, the Iraqi advance. The Shah emphasized that although he had not yet committed ground forces to the battle against Bakr, he was prepared to do so if necessary to restore the status quo.

Any doubt of the Shah's determination was dispelled by early afternoon. A flotilla of hydrofoils disembarked an Iranian infantry brigade at Bahrah, Kuwait, and five supporting landing craft shuttled equipment to the beach. The force grouped and moved northward to meet the spearhead of the Iraqi assault. Concurrently, the Iranian Air Force launched a new round of strikes against Iraqi airfields and armored elements of the Iraqi force in Kuwait.

At first light, on 17 June, the initial elements of an Iranian infantry division, under heavy tactical air cover, crossed the Iranian-Iraqi border astride route 46, the principal east-west artery between the frontier and the port city of Basra. At dusk the same day, the force had interdicted the main supply route from al Amarah into Basra.

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Not until the evening of the 17th did the Shah break his official silence on the developments of the past two days. On national radio, he informed his countrymen that Iran was not at war, but had acted solely to preserve the community of Gulf nations from the territorial aggrandizement of Iraq and its "alien communist supporters" which threatened to defeat them. The Iranian leader claimed that his Army had entered Iraq only to force an immediate cease-fire on Iraqi predators in Kuwait and to insure their withdrawal from the territory of their innocent southern neighbor.

At 1500 hours on 18 June, the UN Security Council convened an emergency session. Previously unable to obtain a meeting of the minds on the urgent necessity for a general cease-fire, the council members now exchanged charges and countercharges of aggression. The Soviet representative condemned the "Iranian invasion" of Iraq and cited his country's treaty relationships to aid Iraq's efforts to defend itself. He sternly warned that the presence of Iranian forces on Iraqi soil would be met with the fiercest rebuff. Calling for an immediate cease-fire throughout the Persian Gulf, the Soviet diplomat moved that a UN factfinding team be dispatched to the area. The session ended, despite Iran's violent objections, with a resolution calling for a general cease-fire -- the initial point of departure.

Yet another menacing development occurred on 18 June and was a topic of grave closed-door discussions in both Washington and Moscow. General Hashim, the would-be Saudi strongman, gambling on assuring his future position in the Arab constellation, took advantage of the opportunity and militarily reoccupied the Buraimi Oasis -- with additional promises of aid to Iraq once Saudi forces were "proved capable and loyal." Hashim had miscalculated, however, the point to which the momentum of events had borne the government in Teheran. Sheik Zayid, already agitated beyond rhetorical consolation, implored the Shah to preserve the United Arab Emirates from the imminent hand of fate. The Sheiks of Bahrain and Qatar endorsed the plea. Late on the evening of the 18th, the Shah air-lifted a battalion of light infantry to Abu Dhabi. The palace in Teheran paraphrased the earlier explanation of the intervention in Iraq: preservation of the innocent... deterrence of revolution...early withdrawal.

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Iraqi forces, now caught between the twin fires of the Shah's wrath, began withdrawing from their forward positions in Kuwait. During the next two days, there was growing evidence of a complete Iraqi rout. Iranian forces charged forward with panzer-like speed, while Iraqi diplomats futilely cajoled erstwhile allies for assistance. The fall of Baghdad seemed inevitable if Arab or Soviet intervention was not soon forthcoming. In spite of these favorable auguries, Iranian forces began meeting stiffer opposition in their advance. Air battles became ferocious. The F-4 attrition rate grew alarmingly when large numbers of MIG-21 Fishbed fighters began to appear and mobile SAM batteries took their toll. The Supreme Commander's Staff reported to the Shah that tank casualties had forced a temporary halt to the advance. Teheran called for US naval air support from the US carrier task force which had just arrived in the Gulf of Oman, but a reply was tactfully withheld pending consideration.

The Sword of Ishmael.

On 20 June, with a measured Iranian advance again underway, the Iranian delegate to the UN startled Assembly representatives by accusing the Kremlin of providing direct assistance to the Iraqis. "Only yesterday," he flared, "42 Soviet military personnel were taken prisoner. Interrogation of these unfortunates revealed that large-scale Soviet involvement was certain. The new model MIGs harassing Iranian flyers were flown by Soviet pilots; SAM crews and many antitank platoons were made up of Soviet soldiers. In addition, some pliant prisoners had admitted hearing reports that Soviet Diversionary Forces teams were preparing for insertion into critical approaches on the Iranian side of the Russo-Iranian border in the northwest of Iran."

Although Moscow unequivocally denied direct participation in the conflict, increasing evidence belied Kremlin propaganda. Consequently, US military planners ordered increased reconnaissance in both the battle zone and the Iranian border areas with the USSR. These intelligence sources reported that selected elements of the Soviet airborne divisions were placed on alert and that some routine military air transport activities had been cancelled, while

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other transport aircraft appeared to be deployed towards the Soviet-Iranian border. To augment Iranian air defense in the northwest region, two squadrons of USAF F-4s were transferred from Diyarbakir to Shahrokhi airfield. Rules of engagement authorized involvement with enemy units only in self-defense.

By daylight on 21 June, Soviet intentions appeared clear and Teheran's accusations justified. While Radio Moscow explained the Soviet Union's actions as "defense of Iraq's sovereign right to unhampered self-development," Red armor crossed the border at Julfa and Astara. The Soviet Ambassador in Teheran, in accordance with previous instructions, personally delivered identical notes to the Shah and to the US Ambassador. Predictably, their contents regretted the circumstances which had forced Soviet intervention; denied territorial ambition; and pledged cessation as soon as Iran agreed to withdraw its forces to its own borders. Outraged, Shah Pahlavi tore the Soviet note to pieces in the presence of the Ambassador and swore Iranian perseverance however bitter or long the war might be.

The next two days brought misfortune upon misfortune to hard-pressed Iranian armies. Outnumbered in the north and unable to reinforce because of combat commitments on the western front, they could not stem the advance of Soviet forces. By the evening of 23 June, Soviet units driving down the coastline had reached Rasht -- 190 miles from Teheran; a second group had surrounded Tabriz and its advance elements were proceeding along the Maragheh highway toward Zanjan. To all appearances, the disastrous tide which had ebbed from Baghdad was about to inundate Teheran.

Appalled by the consequences of this probability, the United States decided that Iran must be preserved. Its loss would catapult the Soviet Union to the jugular vein of US and Allied energy resources. Once the decision was reached, it became startlingly obvious that the necessary military capabilities were far short of intentions.

At 2300 hours on 23 June, President Nixon summarily convened the National Security Council and explained the purpose of the meeting:

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"Gentlemen, the defense of Iran is vital to US interests. I have informed the Shah that the United States will assist him to repel the Soviet invasion. I am advised, however, that sufficient conventional assistance cannot be provided before Teheran would be in Soviet hands. In view of this, I see no alternative but to use nuclear weapons. What I desire from you and your staff are options for the best possible and most effective use of these weapons."

The time is now 232310Z June 1976.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 102

DTG 232310Z JUN 76

1. IMPACT OF CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS.

a. US interests.

(1) US position of world influence directly challenged.

(a) Failure to meet challenge could hand to the USSR the role of world leader -- US position likely never to be regained.

(b) Even by meeting challenge, the United States has a great deal to lose and probably only status quo to gain.

(2) Loss of US influence in Middle East region.

(a) Growing dominance of USSR.

(b) Restrictions on Middle East oil (both to the United States and her allies).

(c) US movement throughout Persian Gulf/ Indian Ocean area could be severely restricted.

(d) Regional instability likely to increase.

(3) Increasing stress as to NATO and other US alliances, e.g., bilateral, CENTO, etc.

(a) Serious degradation of US system for international security.

(b) Growing USSR influence in Western Europe.

(c) Economic impact of restricted access to Middle East energy resources.

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(d) Requirement for allied bases and air routes to support US actions in Iran.

(4) Increased risk of "all-out nuclear war," i.e., massive strategic exchange. This points out necessity to:

(a) Control escalation.

(b) Terminate conflict.

b. USSR interests.

(1) Opportunity for direct Soviet access to Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean.

(2) Opportunity for enhanced influence in the Middle East and the control of energy resources.

(3) Enhanced position of world influence at the expense of US influence and alliances.

(4) Minimized risk of "all-out nuclear war" with the United States.

c. Iranian interests.

(1) Survival as a nation.

(a) Retention of territory.

(b) Continuation of a viable, stable government.

(2) Retention of a position of regional influence.

d. Iraqi interest.

(1) Avoidance of further losses -- men and territory.

(2) Survival as a viable nation.

e. Interests of others.

(1) Western European and Japanese interests.

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(a) Continued access to Middle Eastern oil.

1. Economic survival.

2. Political and social stability.

(b) Reliance on US security guarantees.

1. Strategic nuclear umbrella.

2. Alliance system.

(2) Peoples Republic of China (PRC).

(a) No direct threat -- vital interests are not involved.

(b) Opportunity to enhance influence in the Middle East.

(c) Probably would consider a setback to the Soviets to be in their interests.

2. OBJECTIVES.

a. US objectives.

(1) Immediate.

(a) Repel the Soviet invasion of Iran.

(b) Protect US citizens and interests in Iran and the Middle East.

(c) Avoid massive nuclear exchange between the United States and the USSR.

(d) Alter, to the United States' advantage, the USSR perception of risks involved.

(2) Near Term.

(a) Restore peace/order in the Middle East.

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(b) Insure continued flow of Middle Eastern energy resources to the United States and its allies and deny Soviet control of Middle Eastern oil.

(c) Limit Soviet influence in the Middle East.

(3) Long Term.

(a) Preserve/protect the NATO Alliance.

(b) Preserve/protect the CENTO Alliance.

(c) Maintain viability of US commitments.

b. United States perception of USSR's immediate objectives.

(1) The USSR will come to the aid of Iraq.

(2) The USSR will exploit the situation in Iran while controlling the level of risk.

(3) The USSR will avoid massive nuclear exchange.

(4) The USSR will attempt to weaken US influence in the Middle East and erode US power worldwide.

c. The USSR will likely perceive the following as US immediate responses:

(1) Attempt to retain the area status quo.

(2) The United States would desire to employ conventional forces if available.

(3) The United States would seek [REDACTED] in the Iranian operation.

3. POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES.

a. Military attack option to be executed.

(1) [REDACTED]

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

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(a) Nuclear strikes should be scheduled in approximately 36 hours. If the loss of Teheran is imminent the theater CINC may request earlier implementation of a portion of the strike plan.

(b) Strikes should be conducted within a four to six-hour period.

(c) Targets should consist of railway and highway routes in northern Iran which comprise the primary USSR LOC. Particular emphasis should be placed on cutting the LOCs and isolating USSR forces from their sources of supply.

(d) USSR forces would be struck simultaneously by ground delivery means, e.g., 8" nuclear artillery, and US tactical air. Strikes should be of sufficient scope to render USSR forces militarily ineffective (approximately 50% destruction).

(e) ADMs will be employed to delay the advance of USSR forces as part of a coordinated strike plan.

(f) The strikes outlined above would require approximately eighty-five (85) nuclear weapons consisting of forty-seven (47) air delivered, thirty (30) artillery and eight (8) ADMs.

Weapon requirements will be as follows:

1. Air launched.

OSD 3.3(b)(4)

a. Tactical air.

15 strikes against Soviet elements.

17 strikes against Soviet LOCs in Iran

b. Naval air.

15 strikes against Soviet elements.

2. Artillery fired.

OSD 3.3(b)(4)

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30 rounds against Soviet elements [REDACTED]

3. ADMs.

8 SADMs.

OSD 3.3(b)(4)

Yields [REDACTED]

4. Total: 47 air delivered

30 artillery

8 ADMs

85 weapons

(2) Strikes will be launched from bases in Iran or from Iranian territorial waters and constrained to targets within Iran.

(3) Weapons will be selected with regard to yield, height of burst, and targets to be attacked to minimize collateral damage.

(4) Action must be taken to move US nuclear weapons from storage sites [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

may also be moved to launch bases if required.

(5) Action must be taken to augment the USAF F-4 force by two additional squadrons from USAFE. Similarly, an RF-4 force of six aircraft should be moved to Iran from USAFE resources.

OSD 3.3(b)(5)(6)

(6) US TACAIR forces should be based in Iran as far as possible from the area of combat operations in order to enhance the air defense at their bases. A HAWK battalion, and other air defense capabilities as required, from USAREUR resources, should be deployed to Iranian launch positions as soon as possible; however, scheduled nuclear strikes will not be delayed for their emplacements.

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(7) In concert with the above action, the following collateral military measures will be taken:

(a) Place all US military forces in DEFCON 1 posture.

(b) Direct CINCEUR to request that NATO forces be placed in a condition of Reinforced Alert.

(c) Position US 7th Fleet assets on station off Soviet Pacific Maritime Provinces.

(d) Intensify effort to locate and trail Soviet naval elements.

(8) The Soviets will be advised that the strikes have been launched, their purpose, and of the very careful constraints applied. It will be forcefully pointed out that nuclear weapons are not being used on Soviet territory. The Soviets will be advised that the use of nuclear weapons is a manifestation of US intention to aid Iran and that such aid will continue until the Soviets withdraw.

b. Associated political responses.

(1) Associated political responses are reflected in the messages located in Attachments 1-9. In addition, the desired political signals are reflected in the military actions selected.

(2) It is also recommended that immediately on launch, the President address both Houses of Congress and the public, with national and international coverage to gain worldwide acceptance of US support of Iran. (See Attachment 10).

c. Likely perceptions/responses of protagonists.

(1) Soviet leaders may question US intentions, i.e., do US actions represent only a localized attack or are they indicative of a more serious readiness to escalate the conflict?

(2) Soviet military leaders will call for use of nuclear weapons on US and Iranian forces.

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(3) USSR response may range from an agreement to stop further military action, to a response in kind, to a nuclear reply which escalates the degree of conflict.

d. Other international reactions and domestic responses.

(1) International.

(a) Public demonstrations will take place in NATO capitals decrying US use of nuclear weapons, raising specter of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the effects on innocent human beings from resultant nuclear fallout, e.g., radiation sickness, birth defects, etc.

(b) Official reactions of our allies are expected to be less extreme and more sympathetic.

(c) Iraq and her Arab supporters will call for "an eye for an eye" response.

(d) Saudis and other oil producers are likely to cut off oil supplies to United States and Western Europe, or may threaten to cut off US allies if they do not dissociate themselves from US actions.

(e) Radical groups in Middle East may take advantage of turmoil in Iran to seize control from moderate governments.

(2) Domestic.

(a) Demonstrations protesting US use of nuclear weapons will take place in Washington, D.C.; size could approach 250,000 people.

(b) US public opinion will express consternation at US use of nuclear weapons, question need for United States to engage in war in Middle East, and the real US requirements for Middle East oil.

e. Other options considered but rejected.

(1) Nuclear demonstration (no target).

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(a) This would require detonation of a nuclear weapon(s) over the Caspian or Black Seas or within Iran so as to be easily observable to the Soviets.

(b) The option was rejected since its effects are psychological only and may actually be perceived as a lack of resolve.

(2) Nuclear strike on Iraqi forces.

(a) Strikes would be made with [REDACTED]

(b) This option was rejected since it does not accomplish immediate objective of repelling USSR force. It involves a strike against a third party whose forces are presently on the defensive. It may serve only to further increase Arab enmity against the United States.

OSD 3.3(b)(4)(5)

(3) Strike Soviet naval units.

(a) Units to be attacked are those located in the Persian Gulf. Strike vehicles to be used are US naval air resources.

(b) This option was rejected since it does not contribute to the immediate objective of repelling Soviet aggression. The action would expand the geographic area of the conflict and could serve to invite retaliation against US CVAs. This could result in greater losses to the United States than to the USSR.

[REDACTED]

(b) This option was rejected for the same reasons as 3e(3) above.

[REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(5)

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south of the Caucasus Mountains (which were in support of the attacking forces), would be attacked.

(b) This option was rejected for the same general reasons as 3e(3) above.

[REDACTED]

(b) This action was rejected since it does not contribute to the immediate objective of repelling the Soviet invasion. The targets are not clearly military in nature nor are they confined to Iranian soil. This option is too escalatory in nature at this time.

JS 3.3(b)(5)

4. CONTINGENCIES.

Actions by USSR.

Actions by the US.

1. If USSR strikes with nuclear weapons preemptively.

a. In Iran:

a. US will strike with nuclear weapons USSR forces in Iran and con-

[REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(5)

b. In Europe:

b. US will participate in defense of Europe.

c. In US selective critical target (e.g., Alaskan pipeline).

c. US will consider striking like targets in in USSR (e.g., Baku).

2. After initial US attack in Iran.

a. Attacks with nuclear weapons CVA task force in Gulf.

a. US will continue nuclear strikes on USSR forces in Iran and

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Actions by USSR.

Actions by the US.

consider nuclear strikes
on targets in southern
USSR.

b. Same as above.

JS 3.3(b)(5)

3. Actions by NATO.

If NATO does not
support use of nuclear
weapons in Iran

US will continue to
plan and execute nuclear
attack.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 102

DTG 232310Z JUN 76

FROM SEC STATE

TO US AMBASSADOR NATO
US AMBASSADOR JAPAN

INFO US AMBASSADOR ALL NATO COUNTRIES

FOR US AMBASSADOR NATO

In view of the threat to the US and allied security interests posed by the USSR invasion of Iran, the United States has determined that immediate action is necessary to consider possible allied actions. It is apparent that the use of nuclear weapons may be required. Request you take action to convene the North Atlantic Council at ambassadorial level to prepare options for the best possible and most effective use of these weapons. The convening of NAC is intended to accomplish the following:

- a. Impress on our allies, the US determination to prevent the attainment of USSR goals in Iran and the Middle East.
- b. Demonstrate US intent to consult with and encourage the participation of our allies in this joint action.
- c. Determine the views and positions of allied governments as to the use of nuclear weapons in this instance.
- d. Devise specific nuclear options for consideration of appropriate NCAs. Advise soonest of date and time of NAC meeting. Specific instructions and US representatives from here will depart immediately to participate in the NAC. Prompt reporting of allied views is urgently required.

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FOR US AMBASSADOR JAPAN

Request you inform GOJ of proposed NAC meeting and intent and obtain their comments and views soonest.
KISSINGER

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Atch 1

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO BLUE

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE BLUE MSG 101

DTG 232310Z JUN 76

FROM USNATO

TO SEC STATE

SUBJECT: Request for NAC Meeting

1. Message requesting convening of NAC at Ambassadorial level received.
2. Have informed NATO Ambassadors of desire to convene NAC.
3. Expect request to be met in next few hours.
4. Unofficial soundings indicate a reluctance to act without seeing what alternatives US proposes.

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO BLUE

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE BLUE MSG 101

DTG 232310Z JUN 76

FROM USEMB TOKYO

TO SEC STATE

SUBJECT: Response to Political and Military Measures
Request

1. GOJ appreciates US informing them of intentions.
2. Unofficial soundings indicate a reluctance to act without seeing what alternatives US proposes.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 102

DTG 232310Z JUN 76

FROM SEC STATE

TO AMEMB MOSCOW

The following to be delivered to Soviet First Secretary upon receipt. The United States views invasion of Iranian territory by Soviet Forces with gravest concern. Their immediate and total withdrawal is demanded as a first step toward reestablishment of peace in the area. The United States is fully prepared to take whatever steps may be necessary to support the Government of Iran and its armed forces in repelling this invasion including all necessary measures of force. At the same time, we will continue to exercise careful restraint to ensure that the area of conflict is not further expanded.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 102

DTG 232310Z JUN 76

FROM SEC STATE

TO AMEMB MOSCOW

The following to be delivered to Soviet First Secretary at TBA* Z. The President has authorized US military personnel to utilize a limited number of low yield nuclear weapons on Soviet forces invading Iran. All strikes have been launched from Iranian territory or territorial waters. Our use of nuclear force has, so far, been limited and selective.

The US objective is to restore the peace, territory, and integrity of Iran. This objective is vital to US national interests. To achieve this end:

a. The USG demands the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of Iran.

b. The USG demands Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

c. If the above actions are taken, the United States guarantees Iranian withdrawal from Iraq.

The United States considers the freedom of all states in the Middle East, and continued access to the area's energy resources essential to the security interests of the United States and Western Europe. Continued USSR aggressive military action in the area may result in further responses in this and other areas. You should know that the United States and its allies have available for employment a range of possible further actions to protect Iran and prevent the loss of the energy resources of the area.

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The United States considers the freedom of all states in the Middle East, and continued access to the area's energy resources essential to the security interests of the United States and Western Europe. Continued USSR aggressive military action in the area may result in further responses in this and other areas. You should know that the United States and its allies have available for employment a range of possible further actions to protect Iran and prevent the loss of the energy resources of the area.

*Time of delivery to be concurrent with strikes on Soviet Forces in Iran.

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MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 102

DTG 232310Z JUN 76

FROM NSC

TO SEC STATE

You are directed to request consultations with Ambassadors from Warsaw Pact nations (excluding the Soviet Union), and inform them that:

a. United States views with gravest concern the events in Iran and Middle East.

b. USSR aggression in Iran has placed their countries in serious jeopardy.

c. Series of events could cause severe damage to their homelands.

d. They use their good offices to intercede with USSR to withdraw forces from Iran and reduce/eliminate tensions in Iran and Middle East.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 102

DTG 232310Z JUN 76

FROM NSC

TO SEC STATE

You are directed to call in the PRC Ambassador and advise him that:

a. The United States views with gravest concern the events in Iran and Middle East.

b. The United States will take all necessary actions to insure defense of Iran and repel the Soviet aggression.

c. The United States feels that the PRC should be apprised of our views because of continuing better relations between PRC and US.

d. We will keep PRC informed of further actions.

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MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

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DTG 232310Z JUN 76

FROM SEC STATE

TO IRAN

1. As previously advised, the United States is prepared to provide whatever support is necessary to repel the Soviet invasion. In order to accomplish this objective, before the further decimation of Iranian forces and certain fall of Teheran, use of tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet forces and LOCs in Iranian territory is the only feasible military option. Exercising careful restraint, absolute minimum of such weapons necessary to terminate Soviet incursion and ensure survival of Iran will be used. In addition, utmost care will be exercised to minimize collateral damage and casualties to Iranian civilians and armed forces. Prior Iranian approval and support for such a grave move is essential. Urgent evacuation of Iranian civilians from the vicinity of Soviet forces should be executed to the maximum extent feasible.

2. It is essential that your forces provide maximum resistance until our plans can be prepared. We will advise you three (3) hours in advance of our strike so that your forces can disengage the enemy.

3. Approximately one hundred (100) weapons will be used.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 102

DTG 232310Z JUN 76


FROM SEC STATE

TO NATO

(To be delivered 12 hours prior to nuclear strike execution in Iran.)

1. The United States has determined that the national integrity of Iran is of vital importance to the United States and the "free world." The Soviet invasion now threatens the survival of Iran and efforts to repel the invaders have been to no avail.

2. Since the Soviets are continuing their aggression, the only resort available to the United States in responding to the Shah's request for immediate assistance is the employment of nuclear weapons. This decision was taken only after close consultation with the Shah who concurs in this action as an appropriate measure to save his nation. Of crucial importance in arriving at this decision was the awareness that Soviet domination of Iran would result in the unacceptable control of critically needed energy resources by forces allied against the United States and Europe.


4. The immediate objective is to maximize the military effects against the invading forces and their LOCs and to terminate the conflict promptly with Soviet Forces withdrawn from Iran. This will be accomplished by using

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approximately 100 weapons against appropriate military targets. All weapons will be targeted against forces in Iran. Targets outside Iran will not be attacked with nuclear weapons. The nuclear strike forces will be based in Iran.

5. This action is clearly defensive in purpose and will be carefully limited in the initial phase. This careful limitation should not be construed as a sign of weakness nor an unwillingness to use additional nuclear weapons wherever they may be required to insure the survival of Iran.

6. In response to this action, we are expecting the Soviets to cease their aggression immediately and begin withdrawing. Because it is possible that the Soviets will retaliate, we are placing US Forces, worldwide, on DEFCON 1 as of TBA Z. We urge that NATO take parallel measures as well as supporting our actions politically.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 102

DTG 232310Z JUN 76

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS AND
THE PEOPLE

(Broadcast concurrent with Iranian Strikes)

"Several days ago, Soviet forces mounted an unprovoked attack against the people of Iran. This incursion threatens to extend Soviet hegemony over the entire Middle East -- an event that would drastically shift the balance of power and seriously affect US interests in that area of the world. The Shah of Iran has requested US aid in assisting him to repel the Soviet invasion; consequently, I have directed US military actions on Iran's behalf. These operations will provide the Shah with required US support to include, if necessary, the limited, selective use of tactical nuclear weapons."

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 103

TO RED

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 101

DTG 251800Z JUN 76

INITIAL SCENARIO - PART II

THE CRISIS

A Glorious Vindication.

On Tuesday, 15 June 1976, the eruption occurred. President Bakr ordered Iraqi forces into Kuwait. Emboldened by the sudden isolation of Kuwait from its former conservative mentors, aroused by the vociferous support of radical Arab cohorts, and faced with apparent confusion among the smaller Gulf States, Bakr decided the time opportune to act in the name of Allah (and settle long-standing territorial disputes).

The advance of the Iraqi forces was rapid and unimpeded. By 1700 hours the same day, armored units were reported passing the oil field at Ar Rawdah about 20 miles inside the Kuwaiti border on the main north-south road. World reaction was vehement. In New York, the Kuwaiti representative to the United Nations, in an hysterically unbalanced cry of disrespect for the members of the General Assembly, referred to the "recent ostentatious display of Soviet-Iraqi military hardware," and Moscow's "collusion in the sack of Kuwait." The Iranian delegate in turn denounced Iraq's "brutal and unwarranted" breach of the peace:

"The Shah of Iran desires to make clear to Iraq -- and to the world -- that this unbridled aggression will not go unchecked. Unless Iraqi forces cease their advance and begin withdrawing to established borders, within 12 hours, Iran will consider this depredation an attack on its own territory."

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Diplomatic channels hummed as the world attempted to sort out the growing crisis. Hotline communications from the United States were frank, but not threatening. First Secretary Kirilenko denied any detailed knowledge of Iraqi intentions. President Nixon forcefully reiterated the gravity of the situation and urged maximum efforts by both nations to restore order. It was generally agreed not to enter the fighting and to restrain any nation not already involved from expanding the conflict.

Persepolis Resurgent.

At 0430 hours on 16 June 1976 -- almost 12 hours to the minute, Iranian F-4s began flying sorties against the still advancing Iraqi forces and against installations in Iraq. The Soviet Embassy in Teheran reported that the Shah had informed both US and Soviet Ambassadors that he did not intend to force a major war. Accordingly, he had taken a symbolic step to buy time. His air force had bombed several strategically located Iraqi airfields with considerable success and had attacked the spearhead of the Iraqi's armored concentrations in Kuwait. The effect of this bombing had been to slow, but not stop, the Iraqi advance. The Shah emphasized that although he had not yet committed ground forces to the battle against Bakr, he was prepared to do so if necessary to restore the status quo.

Any doubt of the Shah's determination was dispelled by early afternoon. A flotilla of hydrofoils disembarked an Iranian infantry brigade at Bahrah, Kuwait, and five supporting landing craft shuttled equipment to the beach. The force grouped, and moved northward to meet the spearhead of the Iraqi assault. Concurrently, the Iranian Air Force launched a new round of strikes against Iraqi airfields and armored elements of the Iraqi force in Kuwait.

At first light, on 17 June, the initial elements of an Iranian infantry division, under heavy tactical air cover, crossed the Iranian-Iraqi border astride route 46, the principal east-west artery between the frontier and the port city of Basra. At dusk the same day, the force had interdicted the main supply route from al Amarah into Basra.

Not until the evening of the 17th did the Shah break his official silence on the developments of the past two days.

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On national radio, he informed his countrymen that Iran was not at war, but had acted solely to preserve the community of Gulf nations from the territorial aggrandizement of Iraq and its "alien communist supporters" which threatened to defeat them. The Iranian leader claimed that his army had entered Iraq only to force an immediate cease-fire on Iraqi predators in Kuwait and to insure their withdrawal from the territory of their innocent southern neighbor.

At 1500 hours on 18 June, the UN Security Council convened an emergency session. Previously unable to obtain a meeting of the minds on the urgent necessity for a general cease-fire, the council members now exchanged charges and countercharges of aggression. The Soviet representative condemned the Iranian invasion of Iraq and cited his country's treaty relationships to aid Iraq's efforts to defend itself. He sternly warned that the presence of Iranian forces on Iraqi soil would be met with the fiercest rebuff. Calling for an immediate cease-fire throughout the Persian Gulf, the Soviet diplomat moved that a UN fact finding team be dispatched to the area. The session ended, despite Iran's violent objections, with a resolution calling for a general cease-fire -- the initial point of departure.

Yet another menacing development occurred on 18 June and was a topic of grave closed door discussions in Moscow. General Hashim, the "would be" Saudi strongman, gambling on assuring his future position in the Arab constellation, took advantage of opportunity and militarily reoccupied the Buraimi Oasis -- with additional promises of aid to Iraq once Saudi forces were "proved capable and loyal." Hashim had miscalculated, however, the point to which the momentum of events had borne the government in Teheran. Sheik Zayid, already agitated beyond rhetorical consolation, implored the Shah to preserve the United Arab Emirates from the imminent hand of fate. The Sheiks of Bahrain and Qatar endorsed the plea. Late on the evening of the 18th the Shah airlifted a battalion of light infantry to Abu Dhabi. The palace in Teheran paraphrased the earlier explanation of the intervention in Iraq: preservation of the innocent ... deterrence of revolution ... early withdrawal.

Iraqi forces, now caught between the twin fires of the Shah's wrath, began withdrawing from their forward positions

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in Kuwait. During the next two days, there was growing evidence of a complete Iraqi rout. Iranian forces charged forward with panzer-like speed, while Iraqi diplomats pleaded with Arab allies for assistance. The fall of Baghdad seemed inevitable if Arab or Soviet intervention was not forthcoming. In spite of these initial successes, Iranian forces began meeting stiffer opposition in their advance. Air battles became ferocious. The F-4 attrition rate grew alarmingly when large numbers of MIG-21 Fishbed fighters began to appear, and mobile SAM batteries took their expected toll. The Supreme Commander's Staff reported to the Shah that tank casualties had forced a temporary halt to the advance. Teheran called for US naval air support from the US carrier task force which had just arrived in the Gulf of Oman, but a reply was tactfully withheld pending consideration.

The Sword of Ishmael.

On 20 June, with a measured Iranian advance again underway, the Iranian delegate to the UN startled Assembly representatives by accusing the Kremlin of providing direct assistance to the Iraqis. "Only yesterday," he flared, "42 Soviet military personnel were taken prisoner. Interrogation of these unfortunates revealed that large-scale Soviet involvement was certain." The new model MIGs harassing Iranian flyers were flown by Soviet pilots; SAM crews and many antitank platoons were made up of Soviet soldiers. In addition, some pliant prisoners had admitted hearing reports that Soviet Special Forces teams were preparing for insertion into critical approaches on the Iranian side of the Russo-Iranian border in the northwest of Iran. As a contingency some parachute regiments were placed on advanced alert. Additional military aircraft were put under operational control of North Caucasus and Transcaucasus Military District Commanders.

In the United Nations, Moscow unequivocally denied direct participation in the conflict, but alarmist press reports in Western cities broadcast the sensational charges. The CIA and US military intelligence activities stepped up their collection efforts in both the battle zone and the border areas with Iran. Besides covert activities, the Americans also moved two squadrons of USAF F-4s from Turkey into Iran. They were reported to be at Shahrokhi Airfield.

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By daylight on 21 June, Soviet statements clarified the situation and denied Teheran's accusations. Radio Moscow explained the Soviet Union's actions as "defense of Iraq's sovereign right to unhampered self-development." The Soviet Ambassador in Teheran, in accordance with previous instructions, personally delivered identical notes to the Shah and to the US Ambassador, regretting the circumstances which had forced Soviet intervention on Iraq's behalf; denied territorial ambition; and pledged cessation as soon as Iran agreed to withdraw its forces to its own borders. Outraged, Shah Pahlavi tore the Soviet offer of peace into pieces and swore Iranian perseverance however bitter or long the war might be.

The next two days revealed the weaknesses of the hard-pressed Iranian armies. Outnumbered in the north and unable to reinforce because of the combat commitments on the western front, they could not stem the advance of Soviet forces which had crossed the Iranian border early on 21 June in the vicinity of Julfa and Astara. By the evening of 23 June, Soviet units driving down the coast-line had reached Rasht -- 190 miles from Teheran; a second group had surrounded Tabriz, and its advance elements were proceeding along the Maragheh highway toward Zanjan.

Apparently ignoring the probable consequences of Iranian aggression, the United States elected to intervene.

The Hammer of Thor.

The first indications of the US decision to do so were contained in a note delivered by the US Ambassador to the Soviet First Secretary on the 24th.

"The United States views invasion of Iranian territory by Soviet forces with gravest concern. Their immediate and total withdrawal is demanded as a first step toward reestablishment of peace in the area. The United States is fully prepared to take whatever steps may be necessary to support the Government of Iran and its armed forces in repelling this invasion -- including all necessary measures of force. At the same

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time, we will continue to exercise careful restraint to ensure that the area of conflict is not further expanded."

In the meantime, Soviet intelligence sources pieced together ominous bits of information. A covert source determined that an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council had been convened and that the agenda included a discussion of the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in the crisis. KGB analysts disregarded the latter revelation although US forces were known to possess tactical, low yield weapons in storage sites in Turkey and Western Europe. Other reports indicated that air movements, associated with US fighter squadron deployment and supporting air lift from Europe, began on 24 June and were suspected of including possible nuclear weapons for deliveries to Iranian bases. It was also learned that US forces had been put on highest alert. Seventh Fleet units were observed moving toward the Pacific Maritime Provinces.

Among the intense diplomatic exchanges, Soviet diplomatic sources reported communiques from Washington to Warsaw Pact capitals and Peking. These messages echoed the salient points in the United States' note. Obviously appeals for political support, they indicated that the intentions of the United States were to use its diplomatic channels to gain time, coerce its allies into line, and to attempt to pressure world opinion against the communist group. India undertook efforts in the United Nations General Assembly to arrange for a cease-fire in place.

In view of these indicators, and the tone of the US Ambassador's note, Soviet leaders replied with a strongly worded protest. The United States Ambassador in Moscow and the US Secretary of State in Washington were informed by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs that the USSR was fully aware of the two US F-4 squadrons and other force deployments into Iran, and that these might grievously exacerbate the crisis provoked by the vicious Iranian invasion of Iraq. Secretary Gromyko further warned the United States -- in veiled threats -- of the possible military consequences which forces directly involved in the crisis might suffer. He concluded that expansion of the conflict would be a tragedy and would be the direct

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fault of the United States as world opinion and history would universally attest. In addition, the Minister advised both officials that the Soviet Union had also delivered messages to NATO and CENTO members, to Spain, and to Israel. These "unmistakably frank" warnings stated that any use of allied territory or bases by US military forces for aggression against Soviet or Iraqi forces would be viewed by the USSR as direct involvement in the conflict.

Colossus Under Strain.

As a military response to US alert measures, Soviet strategic forces were alerted. On 24 June, a maximum dispersion of missile armed submarines was ordered. Five Soviet divisions, at reserve bases in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus Military Districts, began filling to Category I standards.

Developments along the FEBA were closely monitored. In the west, advancing Soviet units of the Seventh Guards Army had secured the environs of Tabriz on 24 June. By the evening of the 25th, the entire 168th Division had reached Meyaneh, approximately 120 kms east of Maragheh. Advanced elements had spearheaded through the junction toward Teheran.

Along the Caspian Sea coastal routes, the Sixth Motorized Rifle Division entered Rasht where it encountered considerable refugee congestion and local resistance. To avoid unnecessary casualties, the division had paused to secure its rear areas and its communications with the reinforcing 75th Division, 60 kilometers to the north. Because of this delay, lead battalions did not move through to open the routes into the mountains south of Rasht towards Teheran until 25 June. Iranian defenders of Rasht fell back to mountain defiles in a rear guard action.

Goetterdaemmerung.

As flagging Iranian forces reeled, Red armor again gathered momentum. By late afternoon of the 25th, US advisors on both salients reported impending disaster. The valiant armies of the Shah had buckled before the renewed Soviet drive.

As evening approached, effusive reports of Soviet commanders became less sanguine. Iranian forces had made no

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attempt to establish defensive positions in spite of favorable terrain; enemy air sorties increased in intensity and number -- then suddenly ceased. The contrast to the fighting of a few hours ago perplexed division headquarters; the Kremlin urged advance in spite of field commanders' misgivings.

Shortly after 1500Z the same day, the puzzle was startlingly clarified. Units advancing on the highways near Meyaneh and south of Rasht reported -- incredulously -- a series of nuclear detonations on their lead battalions. Initial reports indicated ground burst nuclear demolitions on the main routes and low yield air bursts over the columns. Communication nets between Moscow and the front hummed with almost unbelievable reports and demands for verification. Field commanders reported the leading divisions sustained strikes from approximately 40 weapons. In addition, about 10 weapons were detonated along LOCs farther to the rear. Since most of these were airbursts, they failed to disrupt key bridges or transport facilities. A few low capacity wooden bridges were destroyed and several land slides were reported north of Tabriz. Initial estimates indicated that sufficient repairs to restore critical LOCs would be completed within one to two days. Although an overall assessment by Soviet intelligence analysts was not possible, it appeared that the routes of advance of the 6th and 168th Divisions were blocked for at least six to eight hours. In addition, it was probable that the lead units, which came under heavy nuclear attack, had sustained 30-40 percent casualties.

While Soviet military planners were evaluating initial battlefield reports, Kremlin leaders pored over other diplomatic communiques:

AMEMB Moscow (Hand Delivered at 251500Z):

"The President has authorized US military personnel to utilize a limited number of low yield nuclear weapons against Soviet forces invading Iran. All strikes have been launched from Iranian territory or territorial waters. Our use of nuclear force has, thus far, been limited and selective.

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"The US objective is to restore the peace, territory and integrity of Iran. This objective is vital to US national interests. To achieve this end:

"a. The USG demands the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of Iran.

"b. The USG demands Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

"c. If the above actions are taken, the USG guarantees Iranian withdrawal from Iraq.

"The US considers the freedom of all states in the Middle East and continued access to the area's energy resources essential to the security interests of the US and Western Europe. Continued USSR aggressive military action in the area may result in further responses in this and other areas. You should know that the US and its allies have available for employment a range of possible further actions to protect Iran and prevent the loss of the energy resources of the area."

SOVIET EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, 251530Z JUN 76.

"The President of the United States has just spoken to a joint session of Congress. His message is receiving full media news coverage here and on international wire services.

'Several days ago, Soviet forces mounted an unprovoked attack against the people of Iran. This incursion threatens to extend Soviet hegemony over the entire Middle East -- an event that would drastically shift the balance of power and seriously affect US interests in that area of the world.

'The Shah of Iran has requested US aid in assisting him to repel the Soviet invasion; consequently, I have directed US military actions

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on Iran's behalf. These operations will provide the Shah with required US support to include, as necessary, the limited, selective use of tactical nuclear weapons.'

"General reaction here is one of alarm over the conflict in the Middle East. However, I believe a quick surge of Soviet information worldwide, and appropriate initiatives with like-minded nations, especially in the Middle East, could deflect any sympathy the United States might induce for its rashness. In Washington, the enormity of the shock associated with the US use of nuclear weapons in Iran has created a stunned realization of the extent of US involvement. Horrendous reactions probably can be expected in a few hours. Request instructions."

Reports from the Soviet force commander provided some new facts:

COMMANDER, CAUCASUS FRONT, 251800Z JUN 76.

"The 6th Division Commander at Rasht and 168th Division Commander east of Maragheh report their forces attacked by nuclear weapons at about 251500Z JUN 76. Approximately 1,000 dead in the 6th Division and over 3,000 in 168th. No accurate count of Iranian civilian and/or military casualties. 168th Division is non-combat effective. 6th Division Commander reports his situation is uncertain due to loss of communications. Units north of Rasht also suffered casualties but extent of damage is unknown.

"Information is incomplete but General Voronsky reports that the attack on his forces east of Maragheh included 18 separate airbursts. Ten airbursts were observed vicinity of Rasht.

"General Voronsky also reports that prior to attack on 168th Division, our surveillance aircraft detected contacts approaching from bases

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in southern Iran. No identification or intercepts were made. ELINT/COMINT indicates US F-4 aircraft and possibly US naval strike aircraft.

"My overall estimate is that because of the high number of casualties, combat elements are unable to continue offensive operations at this time. It is my intention to remain in present positions and regroup."

Time is now 251800Z JUNE 1976.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 103

DTG 251800Z JUN 76

1. IMPACT OF CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS.

a. USSR interests. The crisis presents an opportunity to:

(1) Extend Soviet influence and improve world power position.

(2) Facilitate decline and eventual demise of our imperialistic competitors, not only the United States but Japan and Western Europe as well. However, at the same time it increases the possibility of a strategic nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States. Such an exchange would not be in the interest of the Soviet Union. The crisis could also adversely affect our position vis-a-vis the PRC should the crisis result in diminished power/influence for the USSR.

b. US interests. The United States shares with us a primary interest of avoiding strategic nuclear exchange between our two nations. However, the United States' use of nuclear weapons creates uncertainties as to US intentions. It is likely the United States recognizes that a major interest in Middle East oil is at stake. The United States may also see in the crisis its potential decline as a viable political and military superpower. It will need to maintain as many allies as possible to forestall an eventual US demise. Thus, it may be ready to take drastic measures to prevent collapse of US imperialism.

c. Iranian interests. Iran faces a situation in which the Shah's influence may have been denigrated with the weakening of both the Iranian government and armed forces. The crisis presents an increased opportunity for dissidence. Iran will act to preserve its present form of government and leadership in the region. Its primary interest is seen

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as national survival and freedom from coercion and outside influence.

d. Iraqi interests. Iraq also has a primary interest in national survival and freedom from outside influence. In addition, its actions indicate a desire for territorial acquisition and a leading role in mobilizing radical movements in the region. The United States' use of nuclear weapons may affect Iraq's resolve as an ally of the USSR. With pressure on Iran eased as a result of US support, the Iraqis may feel more dependent on the USSR.

e. Interests of others.

(1) Western Europe. While recognizing that its basic security is tied to the United States, the crisis will raise doubts about the wisdom of US action and the subsequent impact on West European security. West European nations can be expected to examine their alliances as they seek to avoid direct involvement in the conflict and preclude economic losses should their access to Middle Eastern oil be curtailed or interrupted.

(2) Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The PRC will see an opportunity to exploit the situation in order to maintain its relative power position vis-a-vis the USSR and prevent either of the superpowers from gaining hegemony in the Middle East.

(3) Japan. Japan's basic security remains tied to the United States. The potential effect of the crisis on Japan's oil supply will raise concerns of political blackmail and economic disaster.

(4) Third World Nations. The Third World Nations will view their interests as being best served if they can avoid injury from the Middle East conflict.

(5) Turkey. Turkey will seek to protect its territory and interests and avoid involvement in the conflict. The US action will turn Turkey's primary concern to its own security.

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2. OBJECTIVES.

a. USSR immediate objectives.

(1) Improve/maintain the credibility of the USSR as a world power.

(2) Maintain/improve the Soviet influence in the Middle East by:

(a) Protecting and strengthening Iraq, and

(b) Weakening Iran.

(3) Provide an effective response to the United States' use of nuclear weapons.

(4) Separate the United States from as many of her allies as feasible.

(5) Avoid strategic nuclear exchange.

(6) Exploit opportunity to marshal world opinion against the United States.

(7) Avoid nuclear strikes on Soviet territory.

b. USSR perception of US immediate objectives.

(1) To resolve the conflict quickly.

(2) To localize the conflict.

(3) To force the withdrawal of USSR forces and thereby humiliate the Soviet Union.

(4) To maintain Iranian independence under the present Shah's government.

(5) To preserve and protect US imperialistic oil interests in the Middle East.

c. The United States is likely to perceive the immediate objectives of the USSR as:

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- (1) Conquer Iran.
- (2) Control Middle East oil.
- (3) Avoid strategic nuclear exchange.
- (4) Regain the initiative, an objective which might be achieved by starting another crisis elsewhere.

3. POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES.

a. Military attack options and associated political signals.

(1) Phase I.

(a) Institute worldwide political and propaganda moves as follows:

1. Warn US allies not to support the United States.

2. Fan anti-US sentiments of leftist/liberal elements worldwide.

3. Denounce, within the UN forum and through the world press, United States' use of nuclear weapons (see Atch 1).

4. Specifically warn Turkey to prohibit US force deployments from Turkey.

5. Provide support to Baluchi tribesmen to incite dissidence in Iran.

6. Alert all Soviet forces and initiate a full-scale mobilization.

(b) Institute military readiness moves to include:

1. Deploying fleet units to best advantage.

2. Alert and deployment of Warsaw Pact forces to assembly areas.

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3. Order Soviet forces in Iran to halt in place and regroup (See Atch 2).

4. Redeploy conventional forces within the area to minimize nuclear vulnerability.

5. Provide individual replacements for decimated units in Iran.

6. Deploy nuclear capable units to best advantage, including staging at Warsaw Pact airfields.

7. Small-scale, low level infiltration of Soviet forces into Iraq by land routes through Iran and by direct aerial emplacement. Load out ships in Black Sea with heavy equipment to be shipped to Syria for further transfer to Iraq.

(2) Phase II. Military phase to include a massive non-nuclear attack on Iranian airfields coincidental with an airborne assault (at first light) on Teheran International Airport in order to hold city hostage. Order existing forces in northern Iran to continue to Teheran for link-up with airborne troops. Order one motorized rifle division and one tank division on the eastern side of the Caspian to proceed to Teheran. Step up augmentation of Soviet forces in Iraq. This phase to be executed 48 hours after US nuclear attack.

b. Rationale, constraints, risks and consequences for the military and political options selected.

(1) Rationale: Principal rationale for non-nuclear approach is the opportunity to:

(a) Cool the situation.

(b) USSR will appear as a peacemaker in the world and cast the United States in the odious role of instigating WW III.

(c) Takes advantage of Soviet conventional superiority, and increases the difficulty for the United States in resorting to a nuclear option in the future.

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(2) Constraints.

(a) Need to hold Teheran long enough for it to serve as a bargaining chip.

(b) Meticulous planning required to reduce the vulnerability to nuclear attack of link-up and transiting forces in Iraq.

(c) Speed is essential to the success of airborne operation.

(d) Extreme care is necessary to avoid provoking additional US tactical nuclear strikes.

(3) Risks and consequences.

(a) Low key response runs risk of misinterpretation of Soviet resolve to use total military power.

(b) In spite of precautions, the link-up force remains vulnerable in some degree to nuclear attack.

(c) Failure to link-up places the entire operation in jeopardy, and casts doubt on the validity of Soviet conventional superiority.

(d) Compromise of the secrecy required in the deployment of forces through Iraq creates the risk of nuclear attack on these forces.

c. Likely perceptions/responses of protagonists.

(1) Iran.

(a) Seizure of Teheran and other actions will create a military situation in which the US nuclear capability will be of no immediate help.

(b) Iranian Government could fight on but with little expectation of success.

(2) Iraq.

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(a) Will be strengthened, in fact and in spirit, by the Soviet reinforcements.

(b) Iraq will fight on.

(3) United States.

(a) Will be relieved that there was no immediate Soviet nuclear escalation. Probably will not use nuclear weapons on Soviet troops seizing Teheran.

(b) Will be dismayed by minimum vulnerability of Soviet forces and will be reluctant to attack Soviet forces entering Iraq during Phase I since:

1. They pose no immediate danger to Iran.
2. They do not offer a good target.
3. Action would expand conflict to another country.

(c) Will not strike Soviet forces inside Russia before our strike on Teheran.

(4) Turkey.

(a) Will not initiate ground war against Soviet Union but will not expel US forces.

(b) Will nervously maintain, essentially, the status quo and will blink at Soviet ships passing through the Bosphorus.

(c) Will protest and may constrain US nuclear operations from Turkish bases.

d. Other international reactions and domestic response.

(1) Generally, the world should readily contrast Soviet moderation and sense of responsibility with US adventurism and recklessness.

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(2) Soviet response should pry Atlantic Alliance farther away from its irresponsible partner, the United States.

(3) Nonaligned nations should clearly identify US actions with their worst characterizations of super-power behavior with the USSR emerging as a champion of peace.

(4) The Middle East nations will note the willingness of the United States to turn their region into a nuclear battlefield to secure its imperialistic objectives.

(5) The PRC may interpret the USSR's moderate response as a lack of resolve to use its total military power.

(6) Neutral nations, Sweden and Switzerland, in particular, should complain loudly and long in international forums over the naked use of US nuclear power.

(7) Within the United States, schisms will undoubtedly occur within the Congress which will jeopardize future nuclear employment, particularly when confronted with patently incommensurate risks. Sharp dissent among opinion leaders and pressure groups should also result.

(8) Within the United Nations, USSR leadership should be strengthened and prospects for key Soviet projects such as a World Disarmament Conference should be enhanced.

(9) The option offers an excellent opportunity for spontaneous consensus and defuses the issues of Soviet and Warsaw Pact internal dissent and domestic demands over consumerism.

e. Other options considered but rejected.

(1) Nuclear attack on Iranian airfields.

(a) Not militarily necessary in overall scheme of action. Restraining such an attack puts onus for further, indeed if any, nuclear strikes on the United States.

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(b) In a political sense, the rejection of this option does more to protect Soviet forces against further nuclear attack since the USSR would be unwilling to strike all the bases that could bring US nuclear power to bear on Soviet forces.

(2) Attacks on US Fleet.

(a) Conventional attack would tend to mobilize US support for a continuing campaign.

(b) Nuclear attack rejected for same reasons cited in paragraph 3e(1) above.

(3) Immediate, rather than delayed attacks on airfields and Teheran or other overtly hostile acts.

(a) Time is needed to organize airborne operation.

(b) There is insufficient time to permit a propaganda campaign to work.

(c) The United States has no apparent reason to act further unless the Soviets are overtly hostile since the United States has indicated a desire to terminate the conflict.

(4) Spread of hostilities to other countries.

(a) Is inconsistent with intent of Phase I to give the impression of a Soviet desire to minimize the expansion of hostilities.

(b) Expansion of the conflict would risk galvanizing the Western allies into a cohesive response.

(c) It is inconsistent with the objective of presenting the United States with maximum ambiguity.

(d) It is inconsistent with a desire to count on the use of long-term political forces to accomplish major goals.

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4. CONTINGENCIES.

Actions by US.

a. If the United States again strikes Soviet forces on Iranian soil with nuclear weapons.

b. In highly unlikely event the United States uses nuclear weapons against Soviet targets in South Caucasus.

c. Comment: We will leak, via several established intelligence channels, all of above information to the US Government with the exception of the 24-hour evacuation notice. This will be announced publicly if and when it becomes necessary to attack a US city.

Actions by the USSR.

a. We will:

(1) Use nuclear weapons on:

(a) Turkish targets.

(b) US naval targets in Persian Gulf and Mediterranean.

(2) Initiate reinforcement of GSFG with second echelon units from Western Military Districts.

(3) Publicly propose summit meeting at Geneva.

b. We will:

(1) Carry out all of above.

(2) Select medium-sized US city, provide 24-hour evacuation notice, and then attack the city with one ICBM.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 103

DTG 251800Z JUN 76

UNITED NATIONS ADDRESS AND WORLD PRESS RELEASE

The United States has brought the world to the brink of destruction. On the pretext of an alleged threat to their interests, the imperialists have gone halfway round the globe to unleash the horror of nuclear war. Playing with the fate of mankind in this manner is impermissible.

Such conduct cannot go unpunished. The Soviet Union calls on the states and peoples of the world to condemn this reckless, wanton action. It is imperative that the United Nations should resolutely rebuff this bestial attack, imposing the severest sanctions upon the US Government.

The USSR and the progressive peoples of the Middle East call upon the people of Iran to rise up against the corrupt government which has engrossed their country to the threat of total destruction.

Soldiers of the USSR, moving to the assistance of their Iraqi friends who are a subject of Iranian aggression, were among the victims of this reckless attack. The Soviet Government is mindful of its responsibilities for the fate of mankind in dealing with this attack. At the same time, the Soviet Government is determined that this crime shall not go unpunished. Nor should the US Government delude itself into thinking that Soviet territory can be violated with impunity.

The Soviets are ever mindful of the threat of cold and misery which the brash actions of the imperialist warmongers have imposed on many of the peace-loving peoples of the world. The USSR will work to lessen this threat by maintaining a continuous supply of vital oil to the Government

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of Japan and our friends in western Europe. Great will be the sorrow of those nations who aid the United States in her aggressive acts against the peoples of the USSR and Iraq. They will go hungry because of their inability to harvest the crops in the fields and their peoples will shiver with cold in their homes, factories and schools.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 103

DTG 251800Z JUN 76

FROM MOD/USSR

TO CDR CAUCASUS FRONT

1. Halt in place forces presently deployed in Northern Iran.
2. Reorganize and reconstitute forces.
3. Establish defensive positions.
4. Report critical losses of personnel, equipment and supplies.
5. Initial medical reinforcements and medical evacuation aircraft being dispatched.
6. On order, be prepared to continue attack along Zanzan-Teheran axis to seize Teheran city and effect link-up with airborne forces occupying Teheran International Airport. Speed in effecting link-up essential.
7. Once link-up has been effected, assume command of all forces in area.
8. Initial airborne assault of International Airport to be conducted by 104th Abn Div with 19th Mtz Rifle Div being air landed to reinforce airhead.
9. Secondary ground attack to be made along Sharud-Teheran axis by 15th Tank Div and 54th Mtz Rifle Div of Turkestan MD to facilitate link-up and reinforcement of airhead.

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MOVE II

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO BLUE

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE BLUE MSG 101

DTG 272000Z JUN 76

FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION

PART I

SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS

Following quickly on the heels of the 23 June National Security Council meeting, a series of US military and diplomatic actions worldwide confirmed President Nixon's resolve to assist Iran in repelling the Soviet invasion. The tenor of the actions was set forth in a note to the Soviet First Secretary:

"The US views invasion of Iranian territory by Soviet Forces with gravest concern. Their immediate and total withdrawal is demanded as a first step toward reestablishment of peace in the area. The US is fully prepared to take whatever steps may be necessary to support the Government of Iran and its Armed Forces in repelling this invasion including all necessary measures of force. At the same time, we will continue to exercise careful restraint to ensure that the area of conflict is not further expanded."

In Washington, Secretary of State Kissinger informed the Ambassadors from the Warsaw Pact nations of the salient points in the US note to the Soviet Union, and urged them to use their good offices to intercede with the Kremlin to withdraw Soviet forces from Iran. He dispassionately outlined the danger to their homelands if the Kremlin continued its irrational action. In a separate meeting, the PRC Ambassador was apprised of US views and told that his government would be informed of further actions. At an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the US

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Ambassador to NATO stressed US determination to prevent the attainment of the USSR's goals in Iran and the Middle East and urged participation in joint actions to restore peace. He outlined the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons as well as the air movements currently under way. Although receptive to the US views, NATO members equivocated. The Government of Japan was advised of the NAC meeting and Japanese views solicited.

In a somber message, the Shah of Iran was reassured of full American assistance. He was told, however, that the grim situation made the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet forces in Iran the only feasible option if the Soviet invasion continued. The Shah reluctantly agreed.

On 25 June, the continuing Soviet advance immediately signaled to the President the Kremlin's desire for overt military actions. As a consequence, the President ordered the employment of nuclear weapons.

Soviet leaders were shocked and surprised by the US nuclear attack. Lead divisions were not only deprived of a relatively bloodless conquest of Iran, but they had given up critical maneuvering space and had lost the initiative to Iranian defenders.

USAF/USN aircraft, in conjunction with artillery, delivered nuclear weapons against Soviet elements on two fronts. Several deeper penetrations also struck Soviet rear LOCs in Northern Iran. Primary impact of the attack centered around the detonation sites of four ADMs where more than 30 coordinated nuclear artillery and air strikes lashed leading Soviet units, blocked by the ADMs, and neutralized the Soviet thrust. Scattered Iranian battlefield reports, post strike reconnaissance, and initial debriefings by American pilots indicated losses of 35 to 45 percent in the two Soviet divisions at Meyaneh and at Rasht. Four F-4s were lost.

To the rear, nuclear air bursts over bridges at Archivan and Chelvand, north of Rasht, and against choke points north of Tabriz, imposed light damage on LOCs and inflicted slight casualties on two other Soviet divisions nearby.

The extent of the attack not only startled Soviet military planners, but also emboldened the hard-pressed Shah

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and stiffened Iranian fighting resolve. Regrouping their forces into new defensive positions north and west of Qazvin, the Iranians prepared to fight a delaying action against any renewed Soviet attack. East of Teheran, near Gorgan, at the Amol bridge and Shahi tunnel, new ADMs were emplaced for possible use. In the meantime, elements of two Iranian divisions, previously located at Kermanshaw, near the Iraqi border, closed with the defenders and provided welcomed reserves.

Nuclear Allergies

Despite these battlefield setbacks, the Soviets gave no diplomatic indications that they were willing to talk. Vigorous appeals for conflict limiting negotiations had accompanied the nuclear flashes but failed to revitalize the Medusa-like stares of the world. In the main, the Soviet Union propagandized "irrational American actions," charging that the United States, in characteristic manner, had gravely damaged world peace for the present and future generations.

The impact of the Soviet diatribe was not completely lost upon the American public. Remembering the agonies of Vietnam, many wondered had the US indeed acted in an irrational manner and again involved itself in a part of the world where it did not belong? But despite sporadic demonstrations among some of the extreme camps on the American domestic scene, most of the citizenry, including Congressional and government leaders, gave measured approval to the apparently successful nuclear ploy. As the period of time without a nuclear response from the USSR grew longer, the public became more optimistic that a standoff had been achieved and a negotiated settlement would somehow be possible.

On 26 June, Soviet actions around the world aimed at widening the differences between the US and its allies on the nuclear issue. In Europe, public outcry of the socialists flared in protest against United States actions. However, absence of a Soviet nuclear retaliation caught the pundits of doom sans explanation. Although the newspapers did their exaggerated best to fan the average reader's fears, free world reaction tended to coalesce behind US leadership.

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Indeed, there were differences in the degree of concern among the allies and no government official expressed any positive commitment; nevertheless, the UK gave its assurances of understanding for the nuclear response, while West Germany, fearing potential escalation of the conflict, argued strongly for concerted NATO preparations. France sought to exercise its three-cornered relations with each protagonist by maintaining a neutralist position and offering to mediate the conflict.

The Soviet Union, along with its propaganda about the horrors of atomic bombs, issued a second warning to US allies not to support the United States. Turkey became a special target for abusive propaganda aimed at deterring United States force deployments from Turkish bases. But the capstone of Soviet efforts was delivered to an apprehensive audience in the General Assembly of the United Nations:

"The United States has brought the world to the brink of destruction. On the pretext of an alleged threat to their interests, the imperialists have gone halfway round the globe to unleash the horror of nuclear war. Playing with the fate of mankind in this manner is impermissible.

"Such conduct cannot go unpunished. The Soviet Union calls on the states and peoples of the world to condemn this reckless, wanton action. It is imperative that the United Nations should resolutely rebuff this bestial attack, imposing the severest sanctions upon the US Government.

"The USSR and the progressive peoples of the Middle East call upon the people of Iran to rise up against the corrupt government which has exposed their country to the threat of total destruction.

"Soldiers of the USSR, moving to the assistance of their Iraqi friends who are a subject of Iranian aggression, were among the victims of this reckless attack. The Soviet Government is mindful of its responsibilities for the fate of mankind in dealing with this attack. At the

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same time, the Soviet Government is determined that this crime shall not go unpunished. Nor should the US Government delude itself into thinking that Soviet territory can be violated with impunity.

"The Soviets are ever mindful of the threat of cold and misery which the brash actions of the imperialist warmongers have imposed on many of the peace-loving peoples of the world. The USSR will work to lessen this threat by maintaining a continuous supply of vital oil to the Government of Japan and our friends in Western Europe. Great will be the sorrow of those nations who aid the United States in her aggressive acts against the peoples of the USSR and Iraq. They will go hungry because of their inability to harvest the crops in the fields and their peoples will shiver with cold in their homes, factories and schools."

Actions Speak Louder

None of these words matched the stark persuasion of Soviet military preparations which backstopped their propaganda efforts. In London, knowledgeable Kremlinologists pondered the significance of signs that a worldwide Soviet alert was underway. Did it portend more horrors yet to happen, or was it merely a response to the US alert? Embassy officials in Moscow confirmed that the Soviets were beginning full-scale mobilization. Reserve fill-ins, unit stagings and cessation of normal training, were observed throughout the Warsaw Pact, while Pacific and North Atlantic fleet movements attracted anxious attention.

Despite the seeming popularity of Soviet propaganda, there were some credits along with the debits in world reactions to the United States' resolution to defend an ally. The NAC had listened carefully to US rationale for its actions. European leaders publicly conceded the issue to the popular clamor to avoid war at any cost. Nevertheless, Soviet deployments throughout Warsaw Pact nations had not gone unnoticed. The NAC, at the insistence of the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey, reluctantly agreed to initiate Simple Alert.

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American efforts to gain support in Asia received veiled "thank yous." Japan was particularly distressed by public consternation over the repeated use of nuclear weapons by its ally -- and appeared swayed by Soviet promises of assured oil supplies. Government leaders privately conveyed their hope that the United States would be able to successfully resolve the conflict in the Middle East. The Peoples Republic of China informally acknowledged the United States effort to keep its leaders informed and went on maximum alert.

Iran conducted its own diplomatic overtures. From Turkey, it received discreet sympathy and increased liaison. Pakistan, on the other hand, moved quickly to quash the upsurge of Baluchi dissidents along the common southeastern border. There was no doubt in either Iranian or Pakistani minds that the Soviets were behind this diversionary unrest.

The Arab Middle East and the Third World naturally vocalized against the nuclear crisis. Even so, this cacophony of outcries neither moved the Soviets to the negotiating table nor displaced any tactical forces committed to the battle.

Redeeming the Time

In the lee of the nuclear storm, Iranian and American forces worked to exploit the pause gained by their initiative. US airlift resupplied the nuclear weapons expended on 25 June to include [redacted] aerial bombs, and, as a bolster to the Iranian defenses, two batteries of Pershing missiles. These latter six weapons were emplaced in a site just south of Teheran, and although manned by a US Army crew, training of Iranian launch crews began immediately. The newly created Iran Support Command element was collocated with the Imperial Iranian Chief Supreme Command in Teheran. Tactical air support units arrived at Shiraz Air Base to maintain USAF aircraft. A new deployment route was opened via Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean.

In response to NATO alert measures, four CRESTED CAP fighter squadrons deployed into West Germany to replace assets consigned to Iran. REFORGER units were readied for deployment, awaiting a Presidential decision to enter the battle either in Europe or in Iran.

OSD 3.3(b)(4)(5)

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The Agony of Silence

The first 24 hours after the US nuclear attack were marked by the absence of the anticipated Soviet nuclear counterblow. As time continued to pass without such a response, the world began to breathe a bit easier. Reinforcing this diaphanous feeling was the lack of renewed fighting and general lull over the battle area. However, the Soviet's explicit failure to respond to the President's proposal, resulted in a sense of foreboding among Iranian leaders and high officials in Washington.

Although there were no overt indicators of expanded Soviet activities in either Damascus or Baghdad, Turkish diplomatic sources reported that the Soviets intended to resupply and reequip their training establishments in Iraq. Iranian intelligence insisted that a renewed outbreak of fighting along the Iraqi fronts was imminent. They doubted that their hard-pressed units protecting the routes from the border to Ahvaz would be able to contain a revitalized, Soviet-cadred Iraqi invasion. In fact, Soviet units already were reported moving in small groups along the Iranian/Turkish border.

Despite the nuclear strikes on the battlefield, Soviet first line combat divisions remained in Iran. By 27 June, aerial reconnaissance, SIGINT and interrogations of captured troops jointly reflected that the nuclear struck forces had been reconstituted and reequipped. Soviet combat units appeared capable of renewing their assault. Except for some Iranian peasants who claimed to see small groups of foreign troops moving in both directions along the roads near the Tabriz and Julfa routes, no new Soviet units had been observed entering Iran. Some Iranian field commanders believed that Soviet units had reacted to the nuclear attacks by dispersing their surviving units into population centers and moving their replacements in small, scattered groups. Further proof of the Soviet's regenerated capability was evinced at dusk on the 27th by Soviet shelling of Iranian rear echelon units in the vicinity of Manjil. In addition, electronic intercepts confirmed the presence of FROG and SCUD missile units in support of the Soviet divisions in Iran. This new evidence was magnified by increased reports of heavy equipment and vehicular activity in the Soviet

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rear areas during the night. The increased artillery shelling and movements convinced Iranian leaders that a Soviet breakout was imminent. The Soviet mobilization of reserves and the massing of divisions at assembly points were pointed out as further evidence of the Kremlin's designs toward Iran.

Meanwhile, in Washington, intelligence briefers reported to the President the gist of the latest developments detailed by all source information.

1. Soviet units throughout Eastern Europe and the USSR had largely completed their mobilization. Extensive reserve buildups continued in the Caucasus Military Districts. Of grave concern to Iranian military planners were the movements of the 15th Tank Division and 54th Motorized Division to assembly areas near Ashkhabad and Kizyl-Arvat on the northeast border, and massing of the 104th Airborne Division at its airhead at Kirovabad.

2. Black Sea ports reflected considerable activity and large amounts of heavy equipment were being loaded.

3. The complement of TU95 Bear aircraft, normally at Mozdok Airfield in the Caucasus, had been increased.

Troubled by the apparent failure of his diplomatic initiatives, in face of the looming Soviet threat, the President warned his planners not to overlook the possibility of renewed fighting. He directed that they consider all plausible US options, military or political in nature, that might be employed to bring the conflict to a rapid and just conclusion.

The time is now 272000Z JUNE 1976.

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 202

TO BLUE

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE BLUE MSG 101 & CONTROL 201

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION

PART II

AMEMB, TEHERAN 280100Z JUN 76

Commander Iranian 92nd Armored Division, deployed eastern edge of Basrah, reports heavy fighting with Iraqi armored columns. Several command posts along his perimeter suffering heavy casualties and in danger of being overrun. Iranian air cover in doubt. Unusually aggressive MIGs and highly accurate SAM firings may have eliminated most available air support. Soviet leadership, or direct involvement by "advisors," with Iraqi troops suspected. Forward line of contact approximately 10 kilometers wide along Iranian border. At this time, deployed Iranian forces incapable of adequate defense. Abadan refinery certain loss. US air strikes essential to slow Iraqi invasion.

Action reported above coincides with renewed hostilities other regions of Iran. Air battle over capital intensified. In addition, radar intercepts Soviet air penetration proliferating.

Reports now being received reveal several Iranian air bases under attack by Soviet bombers. No, repeat, no nuclear detonations reported thus far.

Just informed Soviet air transports dropping airborne troops outskirts of capital. Apparently Soviets attempting to establish perimeter vicinity Mehrabad airfield, where they can reinforce with air landed heavy equipment and additional forces. The Iranian Imperial Guard is making a very determined effort and appears to be containing the airhead.

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A more menacing situation is presented by the inexorable advance of Soviet divisions along the Tabriz-Maragheh and Rasht-Teheran axes. Of equal concern are the movements out of Turkestan of the Soviet 15th Tank Division and 54th Motorized Rifle Division, which are driving along the Sharud-Teheran axis in an apparent effort to linkup with the airhead. Iranian forces are engaged in delaying operations, but it appears that a conventional defense on their part will be ineffective. Accordingly, the fall of Teheran seems to be a matter of time.

Despite these cataclysmic developments, Shah gives appearance of courageous determination to resist enemy. I urgently recommend we follow his example.

The time is now 280100Z JUN 76.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO.- 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

1. IMPACT OF CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS.

a. US interests.

(1) While our basic US interests remain fundamentally unchanged, it is clear that:

(a) The challenge to US leadership has, at least initially, been met. Our position of world influence has not been eroded, at least for the time being.

(b) The United States is now in a potentially better position than previously assessed. The former limitation of regaining only the status quo in the Middle East appears no longer valid. In fact, our position of influence in the Middle East has not been diminished, and the United States may well be in a position to exploit the current situation and realize gains for US interests in the Middle East.

(2) The apparent thrust from the USSR toward Middle East oil resources has been temporarily blunted. However, the reconstitution of the Soviet forces in Iran could engender a renewal of the situation that called for the US nuclear strikes.

(3) The extensive USSR buildup threatens US personnel and interests, both civilian and military, throughout the Middle East and Europe. Consequently, US commitments are likely to be exercised in areas other than Iran.

b. USSR interests. Despite temporary setbacks, the USSR interests remain fundamentally unchanged. In fact, the USSR moves to resupply and reinforce as well as new massive buildups indicate further Soviet resolve to establish their direct access to the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean and to ultimately control the Middle East oil resources.

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c. Iranian interests. Unchanged, and intensified.

d. Iraqi interests. Unchanged, but now more expansionist in nature, stimulated by direct Soviet support.

e. Interests of others.

(1) Western European and Japanese interests. Unchanged, and intensified, especially European interests in that their security is more seriously threatened.

(2) Peoples Republic of China.

(a) Basic interests unchanged.

(b) Opportunity increased to exploit the situation for gains with respect to their long standing differences with USSR.

2. OBJECTIVES.

a. US objectives.

(1) Immediate.

(a) Continue to repel the Soviet invasion of Iran.

(b) Protect US citizens and interests in Iran and the Middle East.

(c) Avoid massive nuclear exchange between the United States and the USSR.

(d) Alter, to the United States advantage, the USSR perception of risks involved.

(e) Marshal non-Soviet/Warsaw Pact governments to support United States.

(f) Highlight to the Middle Eastern nations the threat to them posed by the Soviet aggression, and potential control over their oil.

(2) Near Term.

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- (a) Restore peace/order in the Middle East.
- (b) Insure continued flow of Middle Eastern energy resources to the United States and its allies and deny Soviet control of Middle Eastern oil.
- (c) Limit Soviet influence in the Middle East.

(3) Long Term.

- (a) Preserve/protect the NATO Alliance.
- (b) Preserve/protect the CENTO Alliance.
- (c) Maintain viability of US commitments.

b. United States perception of USSR's immediate objectives.

(1) The USSR will continue to drive for control of Middle Eastern oil.

(2) The USSR will attempt to confine scope of conflict to Iran.

(3) The USSR will continue to employ conventional attacks.

(4) The USSR will reserve tactical nuclear option for most decisive time and place.

c. The USSR will likely perceive that the US may again employ nuclear weapons in the Iranian operation.

3. POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES.

a. Military attack option to be executed.

(1) Engage Soviet divisions in Iran with nuclear weapons to halt their advance and render them militarily ineffective. ADMs will be employed at choke points in advance of the invading forces. TACAIR delivered weapons will be used against troop concentrations and LOCs. Pershing missiles will be employed against fixed LOC targets. Nuclear artillery will be employed against leading elements,

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preferably in those areas where ADMs have been detonated. A total of 118 nuclear weapons is scheduled for delivery. Strikes against Soviet divisions are also intended to render ineffective FROG and SCUD units located in Iran.

(a) Eastern (Turkestan) Front

Artillery	██████████	15
Pershing		6 (Fixed targets)
ADM		2
Air Delivered (Naval Air)		<u>29</u>
Total Weapons		52 (Max yield: ██████████)

██████████ OSD 3.3(b)(4)(5)

(b) Western Front (Maragheh - Zanzan and Rasht - Teheran axes)

1. Soviet Divisions

Artillery (lead elements)	15
TACAIR	29

2. LOCs in NW Iran

Pershing (Fixed targets)	6
TACAIR	14

3. ADM choke points

ADMs	<u>2</u>
Total Weapons	66

(2) Ground bursts may be employed against the westernmost salient (Meyaneh - Zanzan) only.

(3) All nuclear strikes will be launched from

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bases in Iran or from CVA at sea and constrained to targets within Iran (no closer than 50 km from Soviet border).

(4) [REDACTED]

(5) All nuclear strikes will be conducted within a 24-hour period. JS 3.3(b)(5)

(6) Temporarily redeploy two F-4 Squadrons from Turkey to Iranian bases to augment TACAIR (release in-country assets for air defense role -- resultant 24-hour degradation in NATO GSP).

(7) Other military measures.

(a) Attempt to establish and maintain tactical air superiority in vicinity of Teheran. At minimum, deny Soviet freedom of action in that area.

(b) Render Soviet airborne elements in vicinity of Teheran militarily ineffective, including destruction of reinforcements en route (conventional weapons only).

(c) Using CVA and Iranian AF assets, establish and maintain tactical air superiority in Basrah area. At minimum, deny freedom of action to Soviet and Iraqi TACAIR in that area.

(d) Move 82nd Airborne Division into Turkey. Be prepared for possible further deployment.

(e) Emplace ADMs in Turkey and release control [REDACTED]

(f) Strike and render militarily ineffective the small Soviet naval force in the Persian Gulf using Iranian AF assets and conventional weapons. OSD 3.3(b)(5)

(g) Relocate one Iranian Division from NW Front to assist in neutralizing Soviet airborne elements in vicinity of Teheran (see paragraph (7) (b) above).

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(h) Expedite necessary action to replenish expended US/Iranian weapons, aircraft losses, air defenses, etc. (including CVA resources).

(i) Authorize CVA to use nuclear weapons (SAMs) over high seas, if necessary for self-defense.

b. Associated political responses.

(1) Associated political responses are reflected in the messages at Attachments 1 - 11. In addition, the desired political signals are reflected in the military actions selected.

(2) It is also recommended that just prior to new strikes, the President address the nation with his remarks beamed via satellite to foreign countries: Informs the United States and world of new US strike, emphasizing the fact that Soviet was initial aggressor; that US response is limited and defensive; that it is in support of our commitments; and in particular, that Soviet goal is now clearly exposed as dominating oil supplies not only to the United States, but also to Europe and Japan as well. He stresses that vital interests of our allies in serious jeopardy if the USSR were to gain control of the region's oil resources.

(3) One hour prior to the President's address, the Shah of Iran addresses his nation; speech beamed to the United States via satellite. Thanks the United States for previous support and implores it for continued support.

c. Likely perceptions/responses of protagonists.

(1) United States is more determined than expected and means business; risks are greater than anticipated.

(2) Soviets may, therefore, withdraw to try again another day.

(3) Soviets may preempt.

(4) Iran is prepared to continue its resistance.

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d. Other international reactions and domestic responses.

(1) International.

(a) Favorable though cautious reaction by NATO and Japan.

(b) Arab countries less critical and wavering in view of Soviet oil designs. They are unwilling to have Soviets control their economic and political destinies.

(2) Domestic.

(a) Near complete support in view of evident Soviet action and designs.

e. Other options considered but rejected.

(1) Conduct strikes from Turkish bases.

(a) Would not materially increase available forces in Iran.

(b) Objectives can be accomplished without employing this option.

(c) Turks may not desire to accept the risks.

(d) Slightly degrades CINCEUR GSP by employing earmarked forces.

(e) At this time, do not desire to involve Turkey because we require Turkish bases as sanctuaries and for logistic support.

(2) Nuclear response option by Turks under NATO auspices.

(a) Difficult to obtain NATO consensus and would likely cause NATO internal conflict.

(b) The step is not required at this time.

(c) May expose Turkey to attack unnecessarily.

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- (3) Close the Bosphorus with military action.
 - (a) Soviets may respond by attacking Turkey.
 - (b) Does not directly assist the accomplishment of objective.
 - (c) Turks may not accept the risk.
 - (d) Alternative to military closure presented which accomplishes closure (see Attachments 6, 7, 8).
- (4) Request PRC take military actions against USSR.
 - (a) Presumptuous.
 - (b) May escalate world tensions and cause USSR overreaction.
 - (c) Japanese would reject the proposal.
 - (d) Not necessary step at this time. Concluded that sending proposed political military action team would accomplish objective without incurring risks.
- (5) Attack Soviet airfields in Caucasus.
 - (a) Considered too escalatory at this time.
 - (b) Desire to limit conflict to Iran.
 - (c) Strike on Soviet homeland may incur strikes on United States.
- (6) Initiate attack on Soviet oil fields in Caucasus districts.
 - (a) Considered too escalatory at this time.
 - (b) Desire to limit conflict to Iran.
 - (c) Option has merit as oil target for oil target (tit for tat) and should be retained for future examination.

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4. CONTINGENCIES.

Actions by USSR.

1. If USSR preempts planned second US nuclear strikes with nuclear strikes in:

a. Iran

b. Turkey

c. Europe

d. United States

2. If USSR invades Turkey.

3. If USSR "stops" and requests cease-fire negotiations.

Actions by the US.

1. US would:

a. Strike, as planned, Soviet forces in Iran and consider selective strikes in southern USSR.

b. Press for Turkish closure of Bosphorus and conduct nuclear strikes on targets in southern

[REDACTED]
press for concerted NATO action by virtue of attack on NATO member.

c. Participate in defense of Europe using nuclear weapons as appropriate. JS 3.3(b)(5)

d. Retaliate.

2. US would:

a. Release additional nuclear weapons [REDACTED] for use by Turkish forces.

b. Consult with NATO allies for implementation of follow-on joint action. OSD 3.3(b)(4)(5)

3. United States would reiterate its preconditions for negotiations to include withdrawal of Soviet troop from Iran.

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Actions by USSR.

4. If USSR retaliates with nuclear strikes in Iran and then asks for cease-fire and negotiate.

Actions by the US.

4. Consider acceptance of the cease-fire but insist on Soviet withdrawal as a precondition to negotiations. Alternatively, if USSR fails to initiate withdrawal, United States would pursue international discussions (UN) while fighting continues.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FROM WHITE HOUSE

TO KREMLIN (USSR)

Soviet forces have continued to press their aggression in Iran despite my limited employment of nuclear weapons. The US is compelled to continue the use of these weapons, which for the present time, will be confined to the area of conflict. You must immediately cease all attacks and withdraw all Soviet forces from the area. The vital importance of the Middle East oil assets to the entire world has accelerated my efforts to solicit the support of all nations regardless of political alignment in undertaking actions countering your aggression. Continued Soviet advances against the world's primary energy source which is of vital importance to all free world nations would inevitably force us to consider military action against vulnerable Soviet resources of a like nature.

I again wish to reiterate the present level of constraint being employed but want to make it perfectly clear that extensive options are available. Your further aggression will force expanded actions.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FROM NSC

TO SECSTATE
SECDEF
CJCS

Addressees will prepare a team of US representatives to visit the PRC in Peking in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. Departure time will be 2000Z 28 June.
2. Team leaders will be Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, each with appropriate staff members.
3. Principal purpose of trip is to maximize political impact.
4. Establish a visible permanent joint US/PRC political-military action team in place in Peking.
5. Convey to the leaders of the PRC that crisis termination is primary US objective.
6. Explore likely political targets of opportunities directly relatable to Sino/Soviet border problems in Siberia. To insure this action is understood, a well advertised aerial reconnaissance of the PRC side of the contested Siberian border area by one or more principals of the US Team is encouraged.
7. Public statements from Peking will include indications of US military assistance to the PRC without com-

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mitment to specific measures.

8. Team will meet with Government of Japan during trip to and from Peking to insure full and obvious consultation with regard to Iranian crisis.

9. Team, less those remaining as members of US/PRC political-military action team, will limit stay in Peking to 48 hours.

10. SECSTATE to coordinate in advance with Peking all details of this mission to include purpose, timing and the establishment of US/PRC political military action team.

11. SECSTATE will advise PRC of actions taken to date by the US in this crisis, in particular, planned deployment to Japan and movements of Seventh Fleet, stressing they pose no threat to PRC.

(Deployments to Japan designed to allay any Japanese fears of PRC as well as exercise US reentry rights into Japan. Deployments will be without publicity and consist of aircraft with nuclear weapons - see Atch 3).

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FROM SECSTATE

TO NATO Allies and Japan
NATO (NAC)

Continued Soviet aggression against Iran, including a new threat mounted by Iraqi forces with Soviet support, makes clear that a major Soviet goal is to dominate the oil resources of the Middle East. Their recent offer to furnish oil to Europe and Japan can only be met if they control Middle East oil. The USSR has moved militarily to secure Middle East oil. If successful, the USSR will place the European nations and Japan in the position of being economic and political pawns of the communist world. Thus, they have made their goal clear. None of us can afford to have our future access to oil controlled by the Soviets. Our vital interests -- those of all of us -- are seriously threatened. It is essential that we stand together in this crisis. The United States is prepared to join with its allies in an equitable sharing of energy resources if you are prepared to stand with us in meeting the current military threat.

FOR US NATO AND NATO CAPITALS

1. Advise allies of military actions taken by the United States and our most recent message to Moscow. (Atch 1).
2. Request NAC to authorize SACEUR to place NATO forces on REINFORCED ALERT.
3. Request major allies to reinforce our representations to Moscow with demarches of their own.

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4. Request NAC to instruct SACEUR to alert ACE Mobile Force to be prepared for immediate deployment.

FOR TOKYO

1. Advise GOJ fully of actions taken by USG to date.
2. Request permission of GOJ for reentry of tactical air into Japanese bases.
3. Request PM privately for permission to deploy nuclear weapons into Japan.

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Atch 3

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FROM WHITE HOUSE

TO SECSTATE

You are directed to send the following message to all appropriate governments in Middle East and North Africa:

The current military crisis in Iran has grave implications for all freedom loving people. The Soviet Union has brazenly moved to gain control of Middle East energy assets. Initially, this action is aimed at Iran. If the Soviets are permitted to conclude this adventure successfully, all Middle East nations will be subjected to increasing Soviet domination and a reduction in ability to manage and market vital national oil assets.

Your direct military support during this crisis is not essential now. You are advised that the United States will continue to combat Soviet aggression using nuclear weapons as required.

Your reaction to the US decision to use nuclear weapons should include consideration of the deliberate aggressive nature of the Soviet forces which are in Iran as invaders and are attempting to impose their will on the Government of Iran. US nuclear actions are limited to those Soviet forces in Iran. These actions will terminate promptly when the Soviet Union withdraws the invading force.

Your friendship, cooperation and understanding are needed during the crucial days ahead.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FROM SECSTATE

TO US AMBASSADOR UN

A statement along the following lines should be made before the Security Council soonest:

Soviets have increased their unprovoked aggression against Iran in the face of a clear warning and restrained response to their initial advance. They have made clear their ultimate objective of obtaining control of all Middle East oil and thereby making Japan and Europe and other Free World countries pawns of the whims of Soviet political and military desires.

The United States is taking all necessary steps to see that this monstrous design does not succeed. It has no other objective than the political independence and economic welfare of non-Soviet countries, a limitation on the present confrontation, and the avoidance of general war.

We call on Soviets to withdraw completely from Iran.

We call on SECGEN to form at once a peacekeeping force to enforce a cease-fire and arrange for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kuwait. Announce the Iranian willingness to withdraw from Iraq as soon as UN units enter Kuwait.

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KISSINGER

Atch 5

H-17

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FROM SECSTATE

TO AMEMB TEHERAN

INFO CINCEUR
AMEMB ANKARA

You are requested to approach GOI with following proposal to be held on closest basis. US wishes to put special forces crew aboard Iranian tanker now in the Mediterranean. Purpose would be deliberate collision this tanker with another merchant ship in Bosphorus to impede Soviet shipping. Urgently request Iranian cooperation.

KISSINGER

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Atch 6

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FROM JCS

TO USCINCEUR
AMEMB ANKARA

Subject: Delegation of Authorization to selectively
detonate ADMs

1. For USCINCEUR: In light of current crisis, integrity
of Turkey is of crucial concern. Therefore [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as the military situation may dictate subject
to concurrence GOT.

OSD 3.3(b)(4)(5)(6)

2. For USEMB Ankara: Advise GOT of above action and US
intention to continue all possible support to Turkey.
Advise Turks US temporarily deploying two F-4 squadrons to
Iran from Turkey as additional air resources urgently
needed for defense of Iran. Also request GOT concurrence
in deployment 82nd AB Div to Turkey for use as developments
in situation may dictate.

3. Advise GOT of plans to block Bosphorus (Atch 6) and
enlist their cooperation. Attached as Atch 8 is suggested
wording of message from GOT to USSR announcing the "accident."

4. State concurs.

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Atch 7

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FROM GOVT OF TURKEY

TO GOVT OF USSR

REPORT OF ACCIDENT WITH POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

The Government of Turkey regrets to report a major collision has temporarily closed the Bosphorus. A large tanker of Iranian registry collided with a large ore carrier of US registry at the base of the bridge across the Bosphorus at Istanbul. The hulks have temporarily blocked all traffic through the Straits. The conditions of the collision are suspicious and under investigation. Every effort to clear the waterway is being undertaken. Your Embassy will be kept informed of the progress.

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Atch 8

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FROM NSC

TO AMEMB TEHERAN

Subject: Support of Iran

Reference your 280100Z JUN 76.

1. In reply reference, request you inform the Shah that unless he advises otherwise the President will take the following immediate action to assist in the preservation of the Iranian territorial integrity in the face of these new Soviet assaults:

a. Initiate nuclear attacks against leading elements of two northwestern and one northeastern thrust.

b. Reinforce US forces engaged in the air battle over Teheran. Only conventional weapons will be used in Teheran area.

c. Lend air support to Iranian units defending in the vicinity of Basrah -- conventional weapons only.

2. In accomplishing the above additional tactical air units will be moved from Turkish bases. Naval TACAIP elements also will be used to effect the above.

3. Every effort being made to minimize damage to civilian population. Strenuous diplomatic effort being made to force Soviets to cease their aggression and withdraw from Iran.

4. Additional proposed action will follow.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FROM NSC

TO JCS

INFO US EMBASSY ANKARA

1. 82nd AB Div will deploy immediately to Turkey and will be prepared for further deployment to Iran to defend Teheran or to defend Abadan refinery. Deception measures will be taken prior to and during deployment to make it appear to the USSR that the 82nd AB Div is being deployed directly into the combat areas of the Middle East.

2. For Ankara: Please make appropriate arrangements with Government of Turkey (see Atch 7).

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 & 202

DTG 280100Z JUN 76

FROM NSC

TO JCS

You are to arrange at once for SR-71 mission to obtain up-to-date photography of Baku and other major Soviet oil installations. Mission is to be flown so that Soviets are clearly aware of it, but risks of exposure to hostile action are to be minimized.

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Atch 11

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 203

TO RED

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE RED MSG 101

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION

The Precarious Balance.

The United States use of nuclear weapons against Soviet forces in Iran was initially viewed with dismay in the Kremlin. Believing that the United States shared their interest in avoiding a strategic nuclear exchange, Soviet leaders were clearly surprised by the magnitude of the attack. To some, it appeared the irrational act of a nation struggling to retain its position as a superpower. Preliminary evaluation was that it left the USSR with precious few options for response. Surveying the damage, Soviet military analysts drew a less bleak picture than feared at the outset. Although the 6th and 168th Divisions were decimated, four other divisions in Iran had escaped the nuclear attack with only slight losses of personnel and equipment. Accordingly, the Caucasus Front Commander was ordered to halt in place, establish a defensive position, and reorganize and reconstitute his remaining forces. Medical reinforcements and evacuation aircraft were dispatched to assist the effort, while surviving divisions dispersed into villages and other areas near Iranian refugee concentrations. The 164th Division was ordered to replace the 168th at Meyaneh by incrementally moving forward under cover of darkness. Likewise, the 75th Division moved to replace the battered 6th Division at Rasht. These movements were stealthily executed so as to avoid providing lucrative targets for any additional US tactical nuclear strikes. By dawn of the 27th, the actions were completed.

After hours of debate with traditional strategists demanding nuclear retaliation, Politburo members elected a conventional response. They ordered the Red advance be expanded by an airborne attack on Teheran with the goal of toppling the government and making the fall of Iran a

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fait accompli. The airborne attack would be supported by the six divisions advancing on the capital from the northwest while two additional divisions from the Turkestan Military District would attack across the Iranian border east of the Caspian Sea. Such action would exploit Soviet conventional superiority; gain worldwide support for Soviet restraint in the face of the irresponsible and unbridled US nuclear attack; and, place the United States in a seemingly untenable position. A necessary delay to position forces (without alarming the enemy) also provided opportunities for an energetic propaganda campaign aimed at portraying the United States as a reckless despoiler of world peace who, once again, had unleashed the horrors of nuclear war.

Words or Warheads?

In an impassioned address before the United Nations, the Soviet Ambassador warned that the United States would not go unpunished for its wanton action. Japan, and other sympathetic governments, were assured that the Soviet Union would work to maintain supplies of vital oil from the Middle East. Radical Arab governments were encouraged to vociferate their charges against the United States. From India and Japan came "earnest appeals" for an early ceasefire. France, seeking to play its self-assumed role as the main link between the USSR and Europe, received a barely polite audience for its tremulous offer of mediation. Most Western European officials replied to Soviet diplomatic ventures that the United States was not the "aggressor" in Iran.

The Soviet Ambassador in Ankara delivered a blunt warning to the Turks to prohibit US force deployments from their bases; at the same time, they were informed that the Soviet Union would continue to transit the Bosphorus to resupply and reequip its military assistance programs in Iraq and "elsewhere." Turkey indicated concern while attempting to conceal its pro-western leanings with statements about free access to international waters.

Socialist students and workers around the world expressed profound gratitude for Soviet restraint and denounced the "imperialist US killers of innocent Iranian peasants." Several large demonstrations occurred in Europe, the Middle East, Latin American, and on several university campuses in the United States -- mostly by SDS activists.

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Nonetheless, Soviet information sources noted that most outbreaks of sympathy for the Soviet cause lacked popular support from the US population, while politicians generally were rallying behind the jingoistic leadership of the Nixon coterie. Cautious feelers in Peking sensed tacit Chinese approval for United States nuclear strikes against Soviet troops -- despite a public posture of polite concern for a halt in the conflict.

The Fires of Prometheus.

Accompanying these polyphonic propaganda tunes, and inducing deep reverberations, was a series of military activities which nearly stunned the western allies. The Soviet Union carried out full-scale mobilization, deployed its fleet units, and staged nuclear capable units at Warsaw Pact airfields. Counterpointing its themes, the Soviets in stentorian tones warned western allies not to support the United States. However, the North Atlantic Council, apparently influenced by Bonn and Ankara, reluctantly agreed to adopt Simple Alert measures in an attempt to match the Soviet posture.

An implied signal to Iran was manifested indirectly in the form of a Soviet supported upsurge of Baluchi dissidents in the southeastern region where insurgent equipment, propaganda, and cadre training had posed a chronic challenge to Iranian security. However, this support was offset by prompt assistance from Pakistan. Along the western border, small groups of insurgents, led by Soviet diversionary forces, continued their successful infiltrations.

The diplomatic and political smoke screen adequately concealed Soviet military intentions. Combat units in Iran were ordered to resume their attack at first light on 28 June along the Zanzan-Teheran axis to seize the capital city and to effect a linkup with the airborne assault to be concurrently conducted by the 104th Airborne Division. A secondary ground attack was also launched along the Sharud-Teheran axis by two divisions from the northeast. Preliminary artillery strikes along the northwest front during the evening of the 27th, covered movement of the lead combat elements into assault positions.

In the early hours of 28 June, a coordinated air attack against Iranian airfields was carried out by 38 TU-95 Bears

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and 25 TU-22 Blinders. In the initial air conflict, an estimated eight US F-4s were shot down. Severe damage to installations, runways, and hangers at Shahrokhi and Bushehr Air Bases was achieved at a cost of three TU-22s. However, stiff aerial combat by interventionist USAF aircraft at Shiraz limited damage there to taxiways and temporary shelters, while causing the loss of 11 TU-95s.

The battle for control of the sky over Teheran was reminiscent of the Battle of Britain in its intensity with 30-40 of the hard-pressed Iranian fighters being destroyed over the capital itself. The Soviet air transports were able to deliver most of their troops despite the loss of several AN-12s in the lead element. Vigorous Soviet combat air missions struggled to gain freedom of action in the area, but intense dogfighting prevented the airlanding of reinforcements which was necessary to secure the Teheran airhead.

The initial advance of Soviet troops, during the early part of 28 June, also stimulated Iraqi armored units, which drove the Iranian 92nd Division from Basrah in headlong retreat. Suffering great losses to both aircraft and armor, the Iranians abandoned their forward defenses and exposed the border from Abadan to Khorramshahr.

The twin breakouts of the 164th and 75th Divisions northwest of Teheran, the 15th and 54th Divisions (which had crossed Iran's northeastern border), and the sudden collapse of Iranian units in the south, presented three fronts converging across the Iranian frontiers like barbs of a lance toward Teheran. The fall of the government seemed but a matter of time.

For several hours, Soviet combat elements advanced towards their objective in Teheran. While a significant portion of the airborne division had landed successfully, it had not broken through the defensive blocking units nor secured the crucial runways. The Shah's Imperial Guard Division counterattacked repeatedly causing heavy casualties and containing the airhead.

Stiff resistance was also met by the Red Army in the northwest. Dispersed for protection against nuclear attack, the 164th slowly approached the northern edge of Zanjan.

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From the Caspian seacoast, only light resistance impeded the advance of the 75th. Its troops reached open terrain west of Qazvin, expecting to join their comrades on the road to Teheran.

Northeast of the capital objective, two columns of the 54th and 15th advanced against a light enemy screen nearly to Sari, and to a point about 30 kilometers east of Sharud, respectively. Soviet military commanders were jubilant.

The Growing Implications.

Perhaps understandably, they excused President Nixon's remarks warning that continued aggression compelled the United States again to combat "Soviet aggression" using nuclear weapons as required. It appeared to the Soviets to be an appropriate political gesture to satisfy the panic-stricken Shah who had just cried for continued support. The President's warning reached most foreign countries. It was supplemented in the United Nations by a US proposal for a peacekeeping force to police a cease-fire and arrange for a withdrawal of foreign combat troops. More sobering words were cabled to the Kremlin from the White House:

"Soviet forces have continued to press their aggression in Iran despite my limited employment of nuclear weapons. The US is compelled to continue the use of these weapons, which for the present time, will be confined to the area of conflict. You must immediately cease all attacks and withdraw all Soviet forces from the area. The vital importance of the Middle East oil assets to the entire world has accelerated my efforts to solicit the support of all nations regardless of political alignment in undertaking actions countering your aggression. Continued Soviet advances against the world's primary energy source which is of vital importance to all free world nations would inevitably force us to consider military action against vulnerable Soviet resources of a like nature."

While the Soviet leaders determined the perceptions portended by this latest diplomatic jibe, informed sources in Europe filed reports of another American call for NATO

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unity to oppose the current military threat. Europeans and Japanese were reminded of their likely dependence upon the USSR for critical supplies of oil if Iran were to fall and the Soviets were to gain dominance in the Middle East. Allied response was increasingly concerned but stopped short of any new measures of support.

Meanwhile, KGB channels reported evidence suggesting an imminent move of the US 82nd Airborne Division from North Carolina to an overseas base. This information coincided with urgent efforts by the Pentagon to find new F-5s, air defense equipment and weapons to replace the heavy losses suffered by the Shah's troops.

From Turkey came the news that another two US F-4 squadrons had just deployed to Iranian bases. However, there was no indication that either Turkish aircraft, or US aircraft on Turkish bases, were arming for possible nuclear strikes. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in the northeast border region, but confirmation had not been received.

OSD 3.3(b)(5)(6)

Coincident with the US warning to NATO, a SITREP from the Soviet SA5 control site near Baku reported an attempted engagement of a hostile aircraft on a southeast heading at an altitude in excess of 90,000 feet and a speed of approximately Mach 3. The track was identified by the Baku Air Defense District as an isolated SR-71 reconnaissance flight.

Some limited air engagements excited the battle scene over the Persian Gulf. Tactical reports from Soviet advisors in Basrah and from the Commander of the Soviet Naval Task Force in the Persian Gulf indicated sporadic conventional air strikes without significant damage. Some sightings of the hostiles included reference to US naval markings. The Soviet High Command estimated that attack aircraft probably came from the US Carrier Task Force in the waters of the Gulf of Oman.

These defensive responses of opposing forces provided no real clues as to a possible United States countering move. The conventionally armed defenders made little difference to the Soviet advances, except in the air, where daylight hours allowed visual target acquisition and attacks over Teheran and other combat zones. The time was still early,

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and the political toughness of Nixon's latest words was casehardened in a variety of diplomatic waters. Of such, the most turbulent to Soviet strategists was the announcement, jointly in Peking and Washington, that a high level mission, including the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] JS 3.3(b)(5)
Soviet intelligence sources were directed to confirm US intentions in regard to Iran by obtaining, if possible, any new Iranian authorizations of nuclear strikes. While they were about their business, the confirmation arrived by other means:

COMMANDER CAUCASUS MILITARY FRONT 280800Z JUN 76.

"Combat units report US NUDETS delivered along northwestern and northeastern fronts at estimated 280700Z JUN 76. Land routes temporarily blocked by ADM and coordinated nuclear attacks possibly from aircraft and Iranian artillery. Lead elements north of Zanzan currently pinned down. Reinforcing units west of Qazvin also unable to advance. Lead units of four divisions may be destroyed if attack continues. Detonations larger than previously used have caused widespread destruction in rear areas. Communications with two brigade headquarters on eastern sector are disrupted. Believe Division Command of 15th Armored also destroyed in initial attacks. Decimation of troops east of Sharud is continuing. Forces appear no longer capable of reaching Teheran as scheduled. Initial losses may exceed 5,000 troops in each sector. In addition, ground burst detonations along road and rail routes supporting the 164th may cause 2,000 more military casualties. Complete disruption caused by inhumane saturation bombing tactics against our division units will prevent early reinforcements of Teheran area. Devastation and civilian

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carnage exceed belief. May be 30,000 civil casualties but no reliable data. Airborne units in Teheran fighting heavy battle for survival but no, repeat, no nuclear weapons used by Iranians so far. Nuclear attacks are continuing at this time on northwestern and northeastern fronts. Current estimates of nuclear detonations sustained vary from 80 to 100. Surviving forces attempting to establish defensive positions."

Right-thinking military spokesmen assailed their strategy opponents in the Politburo for this catastrophic debacle, as they grimly confronted the new estimate of the situation and waited First Secretary Kirilenko's decisions.

The time is now 280800Z Jun 76.

NOTE: Attachments 1-4 of this message represent responses to Red Team queries which arose during the play of Move II.

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 203

TO RED

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE RED MSG 101

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

KGB ESTIMATE OF ENEMIES' ACTIONS IN IRAN

Report of deployment of two F-4 squadrons from Turkey to Esfahan (Isfahan Air Base) now confirmed. Base has 11,500 foot runway and POL facilities are available. Current status is commercial.

US nuclear transport units believed to be active between CONUS and Iran. Local sources reporting unusually heavy security around temporary storage sites at Shiraz airfield. Other sites suspected but not located.

There is no firm estimate of the number of nuclear weapons in the possession of US forces. However, based on previous attack size, we can expect that up to 100 nuclear weapons may be immediately available for use by deployed forces.

Iranian armed forces' capabilities are seriously damaged. Barring US resupply efforts, approximately half of the Iranian aircraft have been destroyed, and one-third of the Iranian Army has suffered casualties.

US nuclear weapons previously thought to be located in Turkey are now believed to have been moved into Iran. There is no firm indication that the nuclear stockpile in Turkey has been replenished. However, this contingency is a likely possibility. There is no significant change in the alert status of US forces from their highest readiness posture.

Soviet air assets are available to support actions in the Middle East to the extent required. Current order of

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battle available to Soviet commanders is unchanged from previous information with the exception of the most recent losses to LRA resources resulting from strikes of 28 Jun 76.

Intelligence lists 12 additional operational military airfields in Iran which are jet capable. This includes 2 fields in Teheran which are under heavy combat. List follows:

KGB LIST OF REMAINING OPERATIONAL MILITARY AIRFIELDS IN IRAN
(AS OF 280800Z JUN 76)

Teheran/Mehrabad Intl	35-41N/051-18E
Teheran/Doshan	35-42N/051-28E
Vahdati AB	32-26N/048-23E
Teheran/Ghale Morghi	35-38N/051-22E
Rezaiyeh	37-33N/045-55E
Kermanshah (old)	34-19N/047-06E
Abwaz	31-20N/048-45E
Abadan Intl	30-21N/048-13E
Mashhad	36-14N/059-38E
Zahedan	29-27N/060-54E
Bandar Abbas	27-20N/056-20E
Kerman	30-15N/056-57E

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 203

TO RED

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE RED MSG 101

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

FROM CG 104TH AIRBORNE DIVISION

Unrelenting combat with fanatical Iranian palace guards forcing my pullback around perimeter. Red soldiers struggling to survive. Radio contact with elements of second regiment being intercepted/jammed -- their status uncertain. Heavy losses to my forces prevent the capture of Mehrabad airhead. Urgent resupply and reinforcement essential to prevent overrun by Iranian troops.

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 203

TO RED

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE RED MSG 101

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

FROM COMMANDER CAUCASUS MILITARY FRONT

Our forces find themselves between SCYLLIA and CHARYBDIS. If we disperse to avoid nuclear attack, vulnerability to piecemeal defeat by Iranian forces increases. If we group to attack Iranian units, vulnerability to nuclear attack increases. Degree of dispersion also limited by channelling nature of terrain. These factors combined with the US saturation bombing attack and our efforts to regroup in preparation for the continuing attack led to high numbers of casualties.

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 203

TO RED

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE RED MSG 101

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

FROM COMMANDER CAUCASUS MILITARY FRONT

Reports from surviving combat elements indicate nuclear attacks are continuing at slower pace. Approximately 10 more bursts reported against LOCs and troops in northwest. Additional medical assistance required. Remnants of valiant Soviet army without any further means to attack the enemy. Casualties among survivors expected to increase from radiation and other delayed effects. Command and control is no longer possible with frontline combat elements. Attempting to pull back and regroup.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 203

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

1. IMPACT OF CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS.

a. USSR interests. The crisis offers opportunities while presenting certain dangers.

(1) Opportunities:

(a) Extend Soviet influence and improve world power position.

(b) Facilitate decline and eventual demise of our imperialistic competitors, not only the United States but also Japan and Western Europe as well. However, at the same time, it increases the possibility of a strategic nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States. Such an exchange would not be in the interest of the Soviet Union. The crisis could also adversely affect our position vis-a-vis the PRC should the crisis result in diminished power/influence for the USSR.

(2) Dangers:

(a) A military defeat in the Middle East would be detrimental to Soviet influence worldwide.

(b) The United States could exploit the current crisis by strengthening its relations with China.

b. US interests. The United States shares with us the primary interest of avoiding strategic nuclear warfare between our two nations. The United States recent actions clearly indicate that it intends to use tactical nuclear weapons in whatever numbers it feels necessary in order to halt Soviet military operations in Iran. The United States clearly recognizes that Middle East oil is at stake and it also could see in the crisis its potential decline as a viable political and military superpower. It will thus

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need to maintain as many allies as possible to forestall such a demise. Overall, the United States clearly sees its stakes as high enough to take drastic measures to prevent collapse of US imperialism.

c. Iranian interests. Iran faces a situation in which the Shah's influence may have been denigrated with the weakening of both the Iranian government and armed forces. The crisis presents an increased opportunity for dissidence, although Iran will act to preserve its present form of government and leadership in the region. Its primary interest is seen as national survival and freedom from coercion and outside influence.

d. Iraqi interests. Iraq also has a primary interest in national survival and freedom from outside influence. In addition, its actions indicate a desire for territorial acquisition and a leading role in mobilizing radical movements in the region. The United States continued use of nuclear weapons may affect Iraq's resolve as an ally of the USSR. However, with pressure on Iran eased as a result of US support, the Iraqis may feel more dependent on the USSR.

e. Interests of others.

(1) Western Europe. While recognizing that their basic security is tied to the United States, West European nations may have increasing doubts about the wisdom of the US action and its subsequent impact upon Western European security. These nations will reexamine their alliances as they seek to avoid direct involvement in the conflict. Disruption of oil shipments from the Middle East could cause short range economic losses. Should the disruption continue, it might be necessary to turn to Moscow for oil. All Western European nations are becoming increasingly concerned about US nuclear weapons stored on their territory and fear nuclear strikes by the USSR against such sites -- as well as against other US and NATO bases in their countries.

(2) Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The PRC will see an opportunity to exploit the situation in order to maintain its relative power position vis-a-vis the USSR and prevent either of the superpowers from gaining hegemony in the Middle East.

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(3) Japan. Japan's basic security remains tied to the United States. The potential effect of the crisis on Japan's oil supply will raise concerns of political blackmail and economic disaster.

(4) Third World Nations. Third World Nations will view their interests as being best served if they can avoid injury from the Middle East conflict.

(5) Turkey. Turkey will continue to protect its territory and interests and avoid involvement in the conflict. Turkey is becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility of a USSR strike against US forces based in, and being staged through, Turkey.

2. OBJECTIVES.

a. USSR immediate objectives.

(1) Improve/maintain the credibility of the USSR as a world power.

(2) Improve/maintain Soviet influence in the Middle East by:

(a) Protecting and strengthening Iraq.

(b) Weakening Iran.

(3) Provide an effective response to continued US use of nuclear weapons, by:

(a) Neutralizing US nuclear strike capabilities in Iran and the Gulf of Oman.

(b) Neutralizing the Iranian armed forces opposing Soviet forces.

(c) Holding the northwestern corridor of Iran.

(d) Supporting Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

(e) Destroying significant portions of US forces to signal Soviet resolve.

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(4) Continue exploitation of opportunities to separate the United States from its allies.

(5) Avoid strategic nuclear warfare with the United States.

(6) Exploit/increase momentum of world opinion against the United States.

(7) Avoid nuclear strikes on Soviet territory.

b. USSR perception of US immediate objectives.

(1) Resolve the conflict quickly.

(2) Localize the conflict.

(3) Prevent reinforcement and subsequently force withdrawal of USSR forces, thereby humiliating the USSR.

(4) Maintain Iranian independence under the present Shah's government.

(5) Preserve/protect US imperialistic oil interests in the Middle East.

c. The United States is likely to perceive the immediate objectives of the USSR to be:

(1) Avoiding strategic nuclear warfare.

(2) Regaining the initiative.

(3) Placing onus for nuclear escalation on the United States.

3. POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES.

a. Military attack options and associated political signals.

(1) Deliver strong ultimatum to Turkish Government to deny US military forces use of Turkish territory and facilities, or suffer grave consequences (Atch 1).

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(2) Institute following military measures in areas of responsibility.

(a) Deploy additional ground forces to positions north of Iranian border.

(b) Provide, within existing capability, individual personnel and logistical replacements to Caucasus Front units (Atch 2).

(c) Provide massive medical support and evacuation to Caucasus Front units (Atch 2).

(d) Halt Caucasus Front units in northeastern Iran and deploy them in defensive positions to minimize their vulnerability to nuclear attack (Atch 2).

(e) Attack Iranian ground forces with ground and air delivered nuclear weapons to render them noncombat effective (Atch 2).

(f) Deploy sufficient Air Force resources to Caucasus Front (Atch 3), to accomplish the following:

1. Insure destruction of enemy jet capable airfields in Iran.

2. Conduct nuclear attacks on enemy ground forces.

3. Provide sufficient close air support, nuclear and conventional, to cover withdrawal of 104th Airborne Division (Atch 4).

(3) Continue to fan anti-US sentiments of leftist/liberal elements worldwide.

(4) Continue to provide support to Baluchi tribesmen to incite dissidence in Iran.

(5) Continue fleet deployments to best advantage.

(6) Continue deployment of Warsaw Pact forces to assembly areas.

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(7) Continue deployment of nuclear capable units to best advantage, including staging at Warsaw Pact airfields.

(8) Neutralize US Carrier Task Force in Gulf of Oman by attacking with submarine and air launched nuclear weapons (Atch 3).

(9) Neutralize US 7th Fleet Carrier Task Forces located off coast of Japan and Soviet Eastern Maritime Provinces by attacking with air launched nuclear weapons (Atch 5).

(10) Neutralize US carriers in Mediterranean by attacking with submarine and air launched nuclear weapons (Atch 5).

(11) Conduct nuclear strikes against Guam to destroy selected military targets; minimize collateral damage. Utilize previously deployed submarine launched nuclear weapons (Atch 5).

(12) Continue attempts to alienate the United States from its West European allies (Atch 6).

(13) Inform the world, through the UN, of:

(a) The Soviet rationale for utilizing nuclear weapons to counter the imperialist actions of the United States (Atch 7).

(b) Soviet desire for a cease-fire (Atch 7).

(14) Warn the PRC that the USSR views with grave concern PRC reception of US war planners and that continued involvement with the United States could engulf the PRC in the nuclear conflict (Atch 8).

(15) Ignore US proposal for UN/Middle East peace-keeping force and:

(a) Inform the United States of Soviet nuclear strikes against US forces (Atch 9).

(b) Warn the United States against further escalation of conflict (Atch 9).

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(c) Offer to join with the United States in ending hostilities (Atch 9).

NOTE: It is desired that the nuclear attacks on US/Iranian forces in Iran and on the CVAs in the Gulf of Oman, the Mediterranean, and off the coasts of the Soviet Eastern Maritime Provinces and Japan be initiated ASAP, preferably at the same time. However, if delay is necessary to coordinate all attacks, those against the US/Iranian forces in Iran should be given priority to relieve pressure on engaged Soviet forces. In addition, it is desired that the attack on Guam be conducted within 15 minutes of the completion of the other attacks. The messages to the President of the United States, the UN, the PRC and the Tass news statement are to be released as soon as all strikes have been completed. In the event that not all strikes can be completed as planned, messages and news statement are to be released on order.

b. Rationale, constraints, risks and consequences for the military and political options selected.

(1) Rationale: Principal rationale for nuclear approach.

(a) Given futility of further conventional action, there is the need to demonstrate firm Soviet resolve.

(b) Achieves revenge and avoids Soviet humiliation by inflicting casualties on US forces.

(c) Escalates level of nuclear conflict and underlines the imminence of a strategic exchange; places responsibility for this escalation on the United States.

(d) Signals to GOT the imminent dangers which would result if Turkey continues to provide support to US forces.

(e) Minimizes actual US capabilities to continue nuclear attacks on Soviet forces in Iran.

(f) Signals the PRC the dangers of supporting the US position.

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(2) Constraints.

(a) Need to minimize collateral damages on Guam.

(b) Need to insure that the United States does not consider nuclear attack to be strategic or directed at her homeland.

(3) Risks and consequences:

(a) Airborne forces vicinity of Teheran could be destroyed.

(b) Forces in Iran remain vulnerable to nuclear/conventional attack.

(c) The United States may escalate and attack targets within Soviet Union.

c. Likely perceptions/responses of protagonists.

(1) Iran will have little actual capability to fight. Some government officials will flee. Iranian forces engaged in local defense of Teheran may panic as a result of conventional and nuclear aerial fire support for 104th Airborne Division.

(2) Iraq.

(a) Will be strengthened, in fact and spirit, by Soviet reinforcements and success on southeastern front.

(b) Iraq will fight on.

(3) United States.

(a) Will be stunned by massive Soviet counter-move.

(b) Will still take all measures to avoid strategic exchange.

(c) May continue to attempt use of nuclear weapons to attrite Soviet ground forces in Iran. The United States may be reluctant to strike Soviet ground forces that

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are not advancing or those that are concentrating in major cities.

(d) May well attack Soviet warships in Mediterranean.

(e) May attack Soviet oil assets inside Soviet Union. This probably would be limited to the refineries in the Caspian Sea area, vicinity of Baku.

(f) May attack Soviet airfields in Caucasus area to reduce air support of Soviet forces in Iran.

(g) May deploy US airborne division to aid Iranian forces in Abadan/Kuwait area even though airfields have been struck. This move would serve little or no purpose.

(4) Turkey.

(a) Will not initiate ground war against Soviet Union but will not expel US forces.

(b) Will nervously maintain, essentially, the status quo and will blink at Soviet ships passing through the Bosphorus.

(c) Will protest and may constrain US nuclear operations from Turkish bases.

d. Other international reactions and domestic responses.

(1) Generally, world will be shocked by massiveness of Soviet response. Most world leaders will be intent upon stopping the conflict.

(2) Soviet response will definitely turn some allies away from the United States.

(3) PRC will perceive, from attacks on US Pacific Fleet/Guam, that the USSR has the will to persevere and will not tolerate PRC/US interference.

e. Other options considered but rejected.

(1) Continued non-nuclear operations are not militarily viable, would show weakness and would not

bring pressure on the United States to negotiate.

(2) Conventional attacks on Rota, Spain and Holy Loch, Scotland, would have little significant military advantage. Withholding these attacks provides maximum opportunity for Spain/UK to remain out of conflict -- restricts conflict to US/USSR.

(3) Nuclear attack on [REDACTED] USSR desires to have Turkey neutral in post-conflict era. Aerial recon and ultimatum should produce the desired results of forcing the United States to withdraw its forces from Turkey.

OSD 3.3(b)(5)(6)

(4) Attack on Israel by Egypt/Syria would not immediately relieve pressure of Soviet forces in Iran. In addition, it is to long term Soviet advantage to have Israel as irritant to Arabs, as this gives Arabs reason to court Soviet arms; aids in maintaining Soviet influence in the region.

(5) Reinforce 104th Airborne with additional airborne division. High risk of parachutists landing on deployed, engaged opposition; also need to take Teheran has been greatly lessened as a result of the major nuclear escalation.

(6) Preemptive nuclear strike on China. Considerable risk of PRC retaliation. The Chinese "problem" is best handled by attacks on US forces in Middle East and the Pacific.

4. CONTINGENCIES.

Actions by US

a. If the United States conducts air strikes against USSR from Turkey.

b. If the United States conducts single attack on Soviet soil and attack is determined to be tit-for-tat for Guam; there are reasonably

Actions by the USSR

a. USSR will attack and destroy all air bases/SAS sites in Turkey with IRBMs.

b. USSR will take no retaliatory action and will accept cease-fire.

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Actions by US

low civilian casualties; and, the United States calls for cease-fire.

c. If the United States conducts multiple attacks on Soviet soil and attacks do not appear tit-for-tat for Guam and the United States calls for cease-fire.

d. If US forces use Western European bases for attacks against Soviet fleet or forces.

e. If China attacks USSR with either conventional or nuclear weapons.

Actions by USSR

c. USSR will accept cease-fire but will make a tit-for-tat strike to inflict US casualties based upon Soviet evaluation of the weight of the US attack in terms of damage and/or casualties, and of possible Soviet gains in the Middle East.

d. USSR will be prepared to conduct attrition strikes against all tankers in all areas of the world and will conduct nuclear strikes against oil ports in Middle East.

e. USSR will use all available resources, including nuclear weapons, to defeat and punish reactionary Chinese.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 203

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

FROM USSR

TO SOVEMB ANKARA

DELIVER TO GOT UPON RECEIPT

(FOR PUBLIC RELEASE AFTER DELIVERY TO GOT)

1. The Soviet Government addresses the Government of Turkey in a moment of grave peril for the peoples of Turkey, the USSR, and the world.

2. The American imperialists, having unleashed nuclear war in a region of which Turkey is a part, continue their criminal acts and now threaten attacks against the USSR itself. The reckless policy of the GOT in providing support to the imperialists puts Turkey in an extremely precarious position.

3. Considering its national security to be directly threatened, the Soviet Government warns the Government of Turkey that any future use of Turkish territory or facilities by US military forces will result in an immediate and devastating Soviet response against Turkey. Appropriate instructions have been issued to the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces.

4. The Government of Turkey should realize that this warning is of the utmost seriousness.

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Atch 1

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 203

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

FROM MOD USSR

TO CDR CAUCASUS FRONT

1. Halt forces presently deployed in northern Iran.
2. Reorganize and reconstitute forces within capability. In so doing, avoid giving impression that additional Soviet forces are being deployed into Iran.
3. Take appropriate defensive measures to limit losses to enemy nuclear attacks.
4. Disengage and establish defensive positions.
5. Report critical losses of personnel, equipment, and supplies.
6. Continue medical reinforcements and medical evaluation of casualties.
7. Attack opposing enemy units with nuclear weapons to render them combat ineffective while insuring the safety of your own troops. Expend up to 50 percent of available weapons utilizing yields appropriate for attack options.
8. Air arm will provide backup nuclear strikes on enemy units. Coordinate.
9. 104th ABN Div, under cover of close air support, disengage and withdraw to defensive position vicinity coordinate WV 0757 Garm Darren.

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Atch 2

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10. Air Army will attack 81st Armd Div, 77th Inf Div, and 16th Armd Div. (See msg to Commander, AF.)

11. Imperative that all nuclear strikes be completed ASAP.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

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DTG 280800Z JUN 76

FROM MOD USSR

TO CINC, AIR FORCES

Take the following immediate actions:

a. Deploy sufficient air assets to the Caucasus Front and accomplish the following specific objectives:

(1) Attack with tactical nuclear weapons and render ineffective (40% destroyed) the following Iranian ground forces:

- (a) 77th Inf Div.
- (b) 16th Armd Div.
- (c) 81st Armd Div.

(2) Provide backup strikes for SCUD and FROG launched tactical nuclear attacks on other Iranian forces.

(3) Provide follow-up nuclear attacks (initial strikes to be made by IRBM/MRBM) on enemy jet capable airfields in Iran.

(4) Provide conventional close air support for the 104th Airborne Division; detonate several nuclear air bursts to facilitate withdrawal of force to west.

(5) Provide air defense cover for Soviet forces deployed in Iran.

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Atch 3

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b. Attack US CVA Task Force in the Gulf of Oman with LRA using nuclear ASM. Attack with sufficient force to insure that Task Force is disabled.

c. Provide continuous reconnaissance over all Iranian jet capable airfields.

d. Provide continuous reconnaissance over all Turkish jet capable airfields.

e. Imperative that all nuclear strikes be completed ASAP.

f. Coordinate above actions with Commander, Caucasus Front.

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FROM COMMANDER CAUCASUS FRONT

TO CG 104TH ABN, DCG (AIR) CAUCASUS FRONT

1. On order, be prepared to withdraw by foot march to defensive positions 3-4 kms NE Garm Darren (WV 0757).

2. Coordination.

a. Air Force to provide, on call, tactical air support for disengagement present positions.

b. Air Force to support with low yield nuclear air bursts to clear route from present positions to withdrawal positions.

c. Withdrawal to commence ASAP following termination nuclear attack.

d. TACAIR to continue support until closure withdrawal positions. Support to terminate on order CG, 104th ABN.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 203

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

FROM MPD ISSR

TO CINC, NAVAL FORCES

Take the following actions:

a. Direct an SSG/SSGN attack against US military bases on Guam (Anderson AFB and Naval Station). These naval units are now deployed to maximize accuracy and minimize collateral damage. Size attack to inflict heavy damage against sub tenders, aircraft, and above ground facilities.

b. Direct submarine attacks employing nuclear weapons against two US CVAs deployed in the Mediterranean. Employ surface/air (as appropriate to insure success) forces to backup submarine attack.

c. Direct submarine/air (as appropriate to insure success) attack employing nuclear weapons against CVA Task Forces located off coast of Japan and Soviet Eastern Maritime Provinces with submarines now positioned in trail. Avoid nuclear fallout or other damage to Japanese territory.

d. Direct attack submarines to proceed to the Persian Gulf/Gulf of Oman region. Force to be used to monitor and/or attack petroleum tankers and oil ports.

e. Continue maximum state of readiness and be prepared to repulse enemy attacks.

f. Imperative that nuclear strikes against CVAs be completed ASAP.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 203

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

TASS STATEMENT

(TASS IS AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE THE FOLLOWING ON COMPLETION OF ALL NUCLEAR STRIKES.)

The countries of the NATO Alliance face a grave peril. Acting on a pretext which poses no threat to the interests of Europe, one member of that Alliance has chosen to unleash nuclear war. Should this war continue and expand, no country can be safe. The peoples of Europe are particularly vulnerable to the devastating effect of nuclear weapons. It is clear to all that Europe could not survive such a confrontation.

But once nuclear war has begun, no one can say how far it will spread. The criminal American attacks on Soviet forces cannot go unpunished, and the USSR already has undertaken appropriate countermeasures. Should the Americans now persist in expanding nuclear war, the USSR would have no choice but to attack US forces wherever they are located.

The Soviet Union appeals to the peoples and governments of Europe to restrain the American nuclear aggressors whose reckless actions have placed Europe and the world in gravest jeopardy. As the US Government already has been informed, the Soviet Government urgently proposes an immediate end to all hostile acts, to be followed by negotiations concerning the initial causes of the conflict in Iran. The European peoples and governments must insist that the United States turns from its insane course and accepts these proposals in the name of the future of mankind.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 203

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

FROM USSR

TO SOVAMB UN

(FOR DELIVERY TO UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF ALL NUCLEAR STRIKES.)

1. The USSR acted initially to preserve the territorial integrity of its ally -- Iraq, which had been attacked by imperialist Iran.

2. The United States entered the war and employed nuclear weapons in great numbers against Soviet forces assisting the Iraqis, thereby, inflicting thousands of casualties upon heroic Soviet troops. US nuclear strikes came via aircraft from US naval carriers deployed in the area, as well as via US tactical aircraft deploying from Iran, Turkey, and other bases.

3. The USSR has taken measures to protect its forces from further nuclear attacks by US forces.

4. The Soviet Union cannot continue to suffer such casualties, and acting in self-defense, has taken measures to protect its forces and the forces of Iraq from further nuclear attacks by the United States. The Soviet Union has confined its response to strikes against US forces directly threatening Soviet and Iraqi forces and has avoided any attack on the territories of other sovereign nations.

5. It is the Soviet desire to avoid the spread of this conflict and bring about its rapid termination.

6. The United States is urged to join the USSR in an early cease-fire.

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MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 203

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

FROM USSR

TO PRC

(TO BE RELEASED FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF ALL NUCLEAR STRIKES.)

1. The Soviet Government notes with astonishment that, at a moment when nuclear war threatens to engulf mankind, a delegation of American war planners has been received in Peking. One cannot fail to condemn this act which associates the Peoples Republic of China with the reckless purposes of the imperialists.

2. The Peoples Republic of China should realize that, once nuclear warfare is unleashed, no country can be safe. The populous country of China is, in fact, particularly vulnerable to the devastating effects of these weapons.

3. The Soviet Government regards the current deployment of US naval forces in the western Pacific region as a direct threat to its security. It has already taken appropriate measures against these forces. It will not hesitate to take similar measures against other threats to its security in this area of the world.

4. The Soviet Government urgently appeals to the Peoples Republic of China to reconsider the dangerous course it is taking. The Soviet Union has no hostile designs upon China, but it will not hesitate to deal with aggressive acts against its territory; and it will not confine its response.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 203

DTG 280800Z JUN 76

FROM SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY

TO PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

(TO BE RELEASED FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF ALL NUCLEAR STRIKES.)

Dear Mr. President:

Your latest actions and threats have created a situation of the gravest peril. You should understand that the USSR considers its vital interests to be directly threatened in the present crisis.

You will shortly learn from your commanders the military counteractions which we have been forced to take. I must, at this time, tell you that we consider the USSR and the United States to be on the very brink of total nuclear war, for which history -- if it does not come to an end -- will place total responsibility upon the American Government.

Your last message speaks of vulnerable Soviet resources. Are we to regard this as a US threat to launch attacks against the territory of the Soviet Union? Can anyone imagine that the Soviet people would tolerate such an attack? Please consider well, Mr. President, the uncontrollable consequences of such an action. We, for our part, have never threatened the resources of other countries, nor do we do so now.

We warn you directly that this war cannot expand further and still remain under human control. Should you refuse to join with us in bringing hostilities to an immediate end, we will not allow the USSR to receive the first blow.

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In the name of humanity, we urgently appeal to you for an immediate cessation of all hostile acts and the immediate opening of negotiations concerning the disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces in Iran. These negotiations should be directed at the restoration of peace and be based upon respect for the sovereignty of the nations involved.

Pending your reply to this proposal, we have ordered our forces to refrain from further attacks and to remain in a maximum state of readiness.

A. KIRILENKO

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Reviewed Chief, DoD OSR
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MOVE III

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 301

TO BLUE

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE BLUE MESSAGE 201

DTG 281500Z JUN 76

SECOND SCENARIO PROJECTION

An Ignoble Impact.

Iranian commanders were encompassed on all fronts by heavy fighting early in the morning of 28 June, when Soviet combat elements of four divisions launched a headlong advance toward Teheran. Dispersed for protection against nuclear attacks, the 164th Division approached the northern edge of Zanzan. Advancing from the Caspian seacoast, the 75th Division met only light resistance as its troops drove into open terrain west of Qazvin to link up with their comrades on the road to Teheran. In the northeast, two columns of the 54th and 15th Divisions advanced against a light enemy screen to the vicinity of Sari and to about 30 kilometers east of Sharud, respectively.

In the air, coordinated attacks by 60 Soviet bombers against 3 Iranian airfields (Shahrokhi, Bushehr and Shiraz) caused some damage and the loss of 8 defending F-4s. However, stiff opposition from scrambled USAF F-4s at Shiraz Air Base limited damage at that base to taxiways and temporary shelters while shooting down 11 TU-95 Bears. A ferocious battle for control of the air chewed up nearly half of the Imperial Iranian Air Force fighters. Over Teheran, the aerial fight was reminiscent of the Battle of Britain in its intensity as more than 30 of the hard-pressed Iranian aircraft were destroyed over the capital itself. Although a Soviet airborne division had been airdropped on the western edge of Teheran during a momentary lull on the morning of the 28th, Soviet air still did not gain freedom of action in the area. Consequently, indomitable Iranian pilots were able to prevent Soviet air-landings of reinforcements necessary to secure their airhead. On the ground

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below, the Shah's Imperial Guard Division, reinforced by uncommitted units from the northwestern front, counterattacked repeatedly causing heavy casualties.

The Spirit of Haile Selassie.

Shah Pahlavi repeated his desperate appeals to the United States and the Western World for help. He thanked the United States for its previous efforts and implored its continued support. In answer, the Iran Support Command and American Embassy hurriedly informed the Shah of their plans to repeat an enlarged nuclear attack. The strikes were planned against leading elements of two Soviet northwestern and two Soviet northeastern divisions, while conventionally armed aircraft were to reinforce air defenses over Teheran and the southern Iraqi border. Meanwhile, a frenetic diplomatic dialogue emanated from Washington. President Nixon proposed to the UN Security Council a peace-keeping force to police a cease-fire and to arrange for a withdrawal of foreign combat troops.

Addressing a somber message to the nation and the world, President Nixon warned that continued aggression compelled the United States to again combat Soviet aggression with nuclear weapons. He reminded Europe and Japan of their likely dependence upon the USSR for critical supplies of oil if Iran were to fall and should the Soviets gain dominance in the Middle East. Similarly, Middle Eastern and North African nations were cautioned of a reduction in their ability to manage and market vital national oil assets if the Soviet plan succeeded. Private ambassadorial contacts with the Japanese also requested permission for reentry of USAF tactical aircraft to Japanese bases as well as permission to deploy nuclear weapons to Japan. Not deterred by the disquieting lack of response in Tokyo, the White House cabled sobering words to the Kremlin:

"... the United States is compelled to continue the use of nuclear weapons Continued Soviet advances against the world's primary energy source, which is of vital importance to all free nations, would inevitably force us to consider military action against vulnerable Soviet resources of a like nature ..."

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In order to make clear the portents of his diplomatic warnings, the President authorized SR-71 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet oil complexes at Baku. The mission was tracked, but not intercepted.

Along with the multiple overtures of harried State Department officials, the Pentagon honed its own plans. The 82nd Airborne Division, which had begun to marshal for deployment, was delayed pending Turkish approval of its basing there. Meanwhile, two F-4 squadrons moved from Turkey to Isfahan Air Base, Iran. The United States urgently began allocating additional aircraft, air defense equipment and weapons to replace the losses suffered by US and Iranian forces. In Iran, US naval aircraft began combat air support missions with conventional ordnance in support of the beleaguered 92nd Division facing Iraq. A few Iranian aircraft, also using iron bombs, carried the fight into the Gulf, striking the Soviet naval task force which lingered offshore. However, these missions caused no significant damage to enemy ships. The US naval task force prepared its nuclear defenses for possible retaliatory Soviet aerial attacks.

Effusive Eruptions.

The seeds of strenuous diplomatic efforts to force the Soviets out of Iran appeared to be planted in rocky soil. Resolutely, the United States launched a restrike of Soviet combat forces. From 0700-0800 on the 28th, the first wave of tactical nuclear weapons burst over and around the Soviet forces. First to hit assigned targets in the northeast were 12 A-6s from the US naval carrier task force. Twenty-four troop targets and choke points were demolished. In the northwest, 22 F-4s repeated the carnage.

On the ground, three ADM sites were detonated, one in the northeast and two in the northwest, temporarily halting the Soviet advance and forcing a momentary massing by the enemy.

Miraculously, only one A-6

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and three F-4s fell to enemy fire. Determined in this effort to annihilate any Soviet troops striving to take Iran, the United States continued to strike identifiable enemy targets the remainder of the morning. Another seven artillery detonations burst upon Soviet troops in the northeast, and five naval air sorties interdicted LOCs in the same area. The last seven USAF strikes were carried out against northwestern LOCS. One ADM, in the northeast, was not detonated as Soviet forces were halted before they reached the site. By 1130, the last of the 118 scheduled weapons had cratered the Iranian landscape on each side of the central capital.

Sterile statistical computations had predicted that as many as 3,900 troops in each of the four leading divisions might become casualties. In addition, [REDACTED] detonations along the road and rail routes supporting the 164th Division were expected to eliminate 2,000 more Soviet troops. In the early hours of the attack, these anticipated results could not be accurately evaluated; however, it was obvious that Soviet troops were decimated and that many Soviet lead elements were pinned down or scattered. Dazed prisoners and other tactical intelligence sources gave evidence that headquarter units were disrupted and surviving forces were attempting to establish isolated defensive positions. SIGINT intercepted frantic cries for medical assistance, evacuation and resupply.

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Catastrophic Consequences.

The debacle of a second nuclear attack against Soviet troops in Iran reverberated in communist camps. For the moment, it appeared that another conventional advance (even using the massive division reserves north of Iranian borders) could not change the immediate situation. On top of this setback was a pressing need to support the 104th Airborne Division fighting for survival on the outskirts of Teheran. Tactical air support sought to help its withdrawal, but by midmorning the 104th's remnants barely avoided being overrun by abandoning their perimeter and attempting to exfiltrate piecemeal during the chaos. The 104th no longer existed as a fighting unit.

While Soviet military commanders attempted to regroup their forces on the battlefield, the Kremlin launched an impressive political and psychological attack. Propaganda links to every conceivable outlet were flooded with pictures of suffering civilians and the atrocities of nuclear burns.

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Radiation danger and destruction fanned the fears of the world. Soviet efforts to alienate the United States from its allies portrayed the United States once again as a reckless despoiler of world peace. Leftist governments vociferated their charges against the United States. From India and Japan came earnest appeals for an end to the nuclear nightmare. Demonstrations proliferated again in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and on several university campuses in the United States -- led mostly by SDS activists. Socialist students and workers denounced the "imperialist US killers of innocent Iranian peasants." Nonetheless, most of the anguished pleas for peace also noted that Soviet aggression in Iran was the real casus belli.

North Atlantic Council fears strained the limits of the Alliance as members pressed the United States to prevent a widened nuclear war. American diplomats continued to plead for joint defense, including Reinforced Alert and preparation of the ACE Mobile Force for immediate deployment. In spite of US entreaties, the NAC pointedly refused to deploy the ACE Mobile Force or to declare a Reinforced Alert.

The Soviet Union issued its own warnings and exhortations while steadfastly ignoring US proposals. The only response from the enemy camp surfaced in Bucharest where President Ceausescu remarked that the US note, which made a veiled threat to vital oil interests, raised the specter of another Ploesti. He urged the Kremlin not to provoke the "emotional Americans" to carry out useless acts of revenge on helpless victims.



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Turkey, already the target of abusive Soviet propoganda, received an ultimatum to deny US military use of its

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territory -- or suffer the consequences. A threatened attack by Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces increased the gravity of the warning. Not willing to become the next zone of conflict, President Koruturk politely assured the Soviets that no US troops, other than those presently contributing to Turkish territorial defense, would be permitted to use its bases. Also, Turkey declared that the Bosphorus would remain open to international shipping. At the same time, US and Turkish diplomats quietly agreed to emplace ADMs under CINCEUR control along its northeastern border with the Soviet Union.

Darkness at Noon.

By mid-day, with the completion of the US nuclear strikes, Soviet forces still had not replied with their nuclear weapons. They had, however, seriously attrited the Iranian Army; only two-thirds of its fighting forces remained to continue the defense. Nevertheless, Iranian leaders were jubilant. The capital had been spared a Soviet takeover. Although sporadic fighting continued on the northeastern and northwestern fronts, the three-pronged Soviet attack had been stopped. The one dour mark in an otherwise brightening picture was the report of civilian casualties. Fallout was reported in northwestern locales and along the Caspian Sea coast. Civilians were beginning to suffer the effects of radiation. Because of widespread refugee evacuations, no precise casualty figures were possible but Soviet propaganda already claimed that well over 30,000 Iranian civilians had perished. Those who still lived began to sort out the debris and resurrect their hopes for survival.

To many Iranians and Americans the absence of a nuclear reply was considered an inchoate sign of victory. When early warning sites and air defense centers in Iran flashed a new wave of approaching Soviet aircraft at 1300, the Iranian High Command was inclined to treat it as another conventional attack. The aircraft, identified as Soviet medium bombers, feinted towards the southeast and disappeared over Afghanistan. USAF air defense fighters were alerted, but most of the available aircraft were undergoing maintenance following the morning sorties and had not yet rearmed. Thus, most of the US and Iranian aircraft were on their ramps at 1400 -- when the first nuclear warheads of Soviet SS4 and SS5

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missiles impacted on airfield runways with no tactical warning. Every major airfield in Iran was struck by the Soviet weapons. Except for a few combat air sorties aloft when the attack began, the bulk of remaining air forces in Iran were destroyed. A few of the airborne aircraft recovered on Turkish bases where they were stranded without weapons or support equipment.

Closely coordinated with these airfield attacks was a series of tactical strikes by Soviet FROG and SCUD missiles, supported by tactical air delivered nuclear weapons. Principal victims of these smaller weapons were three Iranian divisions still relatively intact: the 77th in the north-east, the 16th defending the northwestern highway to Teheran, and, the 31st recently deployed near Hamadan. Command and communication links were destroyed along with command posts, equipment, and troop reserves. American advisors feared that more than half of the remaining forces were decimated. Missile strikes against airfields and against the command posts of the Iranian divisions also caused widespread collateral injuries to civilians who were just vacating their makeshift morning shelters.

US naval units on the high seas were not spared the nuclear holocaust. Within a space of 15 minutes, separate but apparently coordinated attacks involving hundreds of Badger aircraft, supported by submarine-launched missiles and surface combatants, struck five US naval carrier task forces in the Pacific, eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea. The Chief of Naval Operations received an extract of a message from the task force in the Gulf of Oman:

COMTASKFORCE OMAN 281420Z JUN 76.

"Soviet aircraft and submarines attacking Kitty Hawk and supporting ships. Despite evasive maneuvers and high casualties to enemy forces, have experienced two nearby surface detonations. Serious fires and damage to propulsion system hampering defensive efforts. Bainbridge and Biddle have been sunk. Attempting to clear to southeastern waters."

The two naval task forces in the Pacific (Oriskany and Coral Sea Groups) faced the same concentrated attack as the

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task force in the Arabian Sea. A stream of casualty reports poured in. Approximately 30 Soviet Badgers and subsurface forces attacked each task group. The Northern Task Force in waters adjacent to the Soviet Maritime Provinces, lost two destroyers; two destroyers and two frigates were badly damaged. The CVA was also badly damaged and dead in the water. Eight Badger aircraft were downed. The Southern Task Group, east of Honshu, fared better. One cruiser was damaged extensively, one destroyer sunk, and a frigate and two other destroyers incurred light to moderate damage. The CVA was rendered ineffective with heavy flight deck damage. Twelve enemy aircraft were shot down and two enemy SSGNs and one SSN were sunk. Simultaneously, with the attacks in the Pacific and Middle East, Soviet naval strike forces engaged the Independence and Forrestal Carrier Task Forces in the Ionian Sea. A combined strike force of an estimated 16 submarines and 27 surface combatants was accompanied by more than 100 Badgers, many of which carried air-to-surface missiles. Shortly after 1400, COMSIXTHFLT reported:

COMSIXTHFLT, 291420Z JUN 76.

"At 1330, pickets detected ELINT from BEAR/MIG aircraft.

Radar acquisition made at 1343 on 14 unidentified aircraft. US RECON/CAP reported a Soviet naval force approximately 86 miles and closing. At 1400, USS Standley reported sonar contact and visual observation of underwater launched missiles clearing water. By 1410 numerous missile hits sank 2 DDs and damaged four support vessels. Forrestal burning with little hope. Independence also severely damaged but still fighting. Soviet air and naval units observed retiring toward Alexandria at 1418. Light casualties inflicted on enemy sources. Probability of reattack remains."

Information was lacking, but so far as it could be determined, three of the five carrier task forces had been seriously damaged and were fighting for their survival. The remaining two carrier task forces had fought off the first wave of nuclear strikes with some damage but the outcome was

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uncertain. Thousands of US lives were lost. Naval SIOP assets were greatly reduced. Few US tactical units were immediately available for support of Iran.

Ashened-faced military staffers and political leaders huddled with the President attempting to grapple with this Soviet response. The Soviets had chosen to retaliate not only in Iran but also against US naval forces worldwide. In the first wave of nuclear blows, they had spared the US homeland. Although no other reports were received of nuclear detonations in either the Middle East or Europe, mental shock waves compressed the terrible events into a single fear -- "expect the worst."

As the President agonized over his greatly reduced courses of action, another crushing piece of news arrived from Hawaii and was quickly confirmed by the AEC:

CINCPAC 281430Z JUN 76

"Two nuclear detonations of possibly one megaton size each have destroyed Anderson AFB and Apra Harbor Naval Facilities on Guam. Contact with survivors being established. Collateral damage to Agana population appears minimal but initial recce confirms that military installations obliterated. Details on destroyed forces at these installations not known at this time."

Into the inspissated atmosphere of dismay which gripped Washington came another series of communications from Moscow. Tass originated a propaganda release calling upon Europeans to restrain the "American nuclear aggressors" and urged that the United States accept proposals to end hostilities and negotiate concerning the conflict in Iran. The UN General Assembly incredulously heard the Soviet Ambassador explain that the USSR had taken measures to protect its forces from further nuclear attacks by the United States. He claimed, also, that Soviet attacks had avoided the territories of other sovereign nations and that the Soviets desired to limit the spread of the conflict. He proposed that the United States join in an early cease-fire.

The Soviet General Secretary addressed his own pointed appeals for peace to the US President:

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MOLINK 281445Z JUN 76

Dear Mr. President:

Your latest actions and threats have created a situation of the gravest peril. You should understand that the USSR considers its vital interests to be directly threatened in the present crisis.

You will shortly learn from your commanders the military counteractions which we have been forced to take. I must, at this time, tell you that we consider the USSR and the United States to be on the very brink of total nuclear war, for which history -- if it does not come to an end -- will place total responsibility upon the American Government.

Your last message speaks of vulnerable Soviet resources. Are we to regard this as a US threat to launch attacks against the territory of the Soviet Union? Can anyone imagine that the Soviet people would tolerate such an attack? Please consider well, Mr. President, the uncontrollable consequences of such an action. We, for our part, have never threatened the resources of other countries, nor do we do so now.

We warn you directly that this war cannot expand further and still remain under human control. Should you refuse to join with us in bringing hostilities to an immediate end, we will not allow the USSR to receive the first blow.

In the name of humanity, we urgently appeal to you for an immediate cessation of hostile acts and the immediate opening of negotiations concerning the disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces in Iran. These negotiations should be directed at the restoration of peace and be based upon respect for the sovereignty of the nations involved.

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Pending your reply to this proposal, we have ordered our forces to refrain from further attacks and to remain in a maximum state of readiness.

A. KIRILENKO

The time is now 281500Z Jun 76.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 301

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 301

DTG 281500Z JUN 76

1. IMPACT OF CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS.

a. US interests. Basic US interests have not changed; the Soviet challenge has been met; the US position in the world has not been eroded. However, although the USSR has been checked in Iran, the problem facing the United States has broadened greatly and relations with NATO and Japan have been made more difficult.

b. USSR interests. The Soviet interest is now to avoid general nuclear war and to withdraw from Iran without seeming to back down in the face of US pressure.

c. Iranian interests. Iran's interests are unchanged but have become less critical in the overall problem.

d. Iraqi interests. Iraq's interests are unchanged but have become of secondary concern in the broad problem.

e. Interests of Others.

(1) NATO and Japan: Their primary concern appears to have been to avoid any involvement.

(2) Peoples Republic of China: Unchanged.

2. OBJECTIVES.

a. US immediate objectives.

(1) Immediate.

(a) To attain negotiating leverage.

(b) Avoid massive nuclear exchange between the United States and the USSR.

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(2) Near Term.

(a) Restore peace/order while defending our naval forces at sea.

(b) Insure continued flow of Middle Eastern energy resources to the United States and its allies and deny Soviet control of Middle Eastern oil.

(c) Limit Soviet influence.

(3) Long Term.

(a) Preserve/protect the NATO Alliance.

(b) Preserve/protect the CENTO Alliance.

(c) Maintain viability of US commitments.

b. US perception of USSR's immediate objectives.

(1) The USSR will continue to withdraw without appearing to back down.

(2) The USSR has an immediate objective of capitalizing upon NATO's inaction, with a longer term objective of becoming dominant in Europe.

c. The USSR will likely perceive that the United States does not wish to continue a nuclear war and that the United States has an appreciation of the risks of continued escalation.

3. POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES.

a. Military attack option to be executed.

(1) Immediately initiate strikes against all Soviet shipping.

(a) Initially employ only conventional weapons. Selected nuclear release will be considered, if required and requested, however, nuclear weapons are releasable for self-defense.

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(b) Conduct all attacks in international waters.

(c) Both military and commercial shipping of Soviet and Bloc countries are targets.

(d) No attacks are to be made on Soviet homeland bases or in territorial waters.

(2) Blockade or militarily close or seal various international waterways.

(a) Deny entry or exit through the Bosphorus/Dardanelles, Straits of Gibraltar, Skagerrak/Kattegat, and other restricted waterways.

(b) NATO support should be anticipated, however, make preparations for unilateral actions.

(3) Immediately commence mining of all possible Soviet ports, restricted waterways, and navigational channels.

(a) Mines are to be conventional.

(b) Mine fields should be designed to deny the use of selected ports and bases for exit and entry of shipping.

(c) CINCs are allowed to employ any assigned forces except strategic alert forces.

(4) Rationale/constraints/risks.

(a) The limited military response enhances US bargaining position during negotiations.

(b) Action is not considered escalatory as it is taken in defense of naval forces.

(c) Destroyed Soviet/Bloc naval and shipping forces are not readily recoverable.

(d) The naval action will aid in possible congealing of NATO support for US position.

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(e) Military action is to be conventional except in self-defense.

(f) No attacks on Soviet soil.

(g) Risks are primarily to other sea going forces.

b. Associated Political Responses.

(1) Associated political responses are reflected in the messages at Attachments 1-4. In addition, the desired political signals are reflected in the military actions selected.

(2) The President would go to New York to deliver message at Attachment 3 to the United Nations.

c. Likely perceptions/responses of protagonists.

(1) Soviets may well perceive US offer to negotiate as a sign of relative weakness.

(2) Soviet response to US conventional attacks against Soviet naval forces may well evoke further Soviet attacks on US naval forces, more probably with conventional means than nuclear (naval war of attrition).

(3) Soviets may terminate negotiations due to US attacks on Soviet naval forces.

(4) Soviets willing to accept temporary setback in their quest for control of Middle East and Middle Eastern oil. This does not defeat their long range goal for such hegemony.

(5) The United States is willing to deescalate, but remains ready for possible escalation.

(6) The United States will undertake vast measures to resupply/rehabilitate Iran to insure continuance of viability of GOI.

(7) Iran will attempt to regroup and restore order in their country.

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(8) Iraq may perceive relative weakness of Iran and exploit same by attacking Iran, or possibly re-energize the efforts to take over Kuwait.

d. Other international reactions and domestic responses.

(1) International.

(a) NATO countries.

1. In the main, remain "stand offish" to preclude any further erosion of their POL supplies.

2. Possibly seize this opportunity, now that the fighting has been temporarily halted, to align more strongly with the United States, at least from a "moral support" standpoint.

(b) Middle East countries.

1. Turkey will remain obstinate, vying for the best possible post-hostilities position.

2. Arab nations not directly involved will tend to become as neutral as possible, neither favoring Soviet dominance or Western alliance.

(c) Far East countries.

1. Japan will welcome cessation of nuclear hostilities, become internationally vocal in support of continuance of same, and actively promote nuclear disarmament. GOJ will also press hard for open flow of oil supplies from Middle East.

2. The PRC reaction is quite unpredictable, i.e., on one hand they may wish to exploit the situation against the USSR while on the other hand they may become more cautious due to a perceived failure of the United States to act more forcibly.

(2) Domestic.

(a) A mixed but unbalanced reaction of domestic public opinion can be anticipated.

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(b) A minority will decry US overseas involvement and cite lack of allied support as evidence of the lack of responsible leadership.

(c) Majority of populace will close ranks behind Presidential effort to de-escalate and uncouple nuclear engagement. Although appalled by military losses through Soviet nuclear attack, the citizenry will strongly support negotiations motivated by fear of nuclear strike on the United States.

(d) Continued civil defense actions stimulate fears and force continued awareness of overall thrust.

e. Other options considered but rejected.

(1) Accede to Soviet demand for immediate cessation of all hostile acts and opening of negotiations.

(a) Represents United States failure to respond to a major escalatory move by USSR. Soviet attack on US territory and US forces on high seas unchallenged.

(b) Leaves the United States in very weak position for follow-on negotiations.

(c) Would undoubtedly result in serious long term erosion of US position of world influence.

(d) Soviet "good faith" in offer to negotiate withdrawal from Iran not yet established. The United States not capable of enforcing in near term.

(2) Conventional strikes against Soviet bases in Middle East and Soviet naval forces in Middle East ports.

(a) The US capabilities to accomplish are severely limited.

(b) Runs counter to our desire to establish cessation of hostilities in Middle East as basis for negotiated withdrawal and restoration of peace and order in the area.

(c) Would inflict casualties on Arab forces (e.g., Egyptian) as well as Soviet forces and facilities.

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(3) Nuclear strikes against Soviet naval/air base(s) on perimeter of Pacific (e.g., Petropaveousk) or Koln Peninsula -- "tit-for-tat" with respect to Soviet attack on Guam.

(a) Would not contribute directly to our immediate objectives in Middle East.

(b) Considered too escalatory at this time.

1. Attack of Soviet "homeland."

2. High level of civilian casualties.

3. Would likely result in strikes on the United States itself.

(c) Withholding at this time demonstrates United States restraint but reserves option for future use.

(d) Would significantly narrow the scope of remaining options available to the United States, short of massive nuclear exchange.

(4) Nuclear strikes against Soviet airfields and other military targets in Caucasus and Turkistan.

(a) We still desire to limit the conflict.

(b) Considered too escalatory at this time.

(c) See also rationale for rejecting option 3e(3), above.

(5) Nuclear strikes against high-value industrial targets in USSR, including Soviet oil fields.

(a) Too escalatory at this time.

(b) See also rationale for rejecting options 3e(3) and 3e(4) above.

(6) Strike Soviet bases in Warsaw Pact Nations.

(a) Too escalatory at this time.

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(b) Inconsistent with our desire to limit area of conflict.

(c) Invites nuclear retaliation against NATO allies.

(7) Execute comprehensive strikes against Soviet strategic targets wherever located.

(a) We could not limit damage to the United States which would accrue from retaliatory strikes.

(b) Inconsistent with basic objective of avoiding massive nuclear exchange.

4. CONTINGENCIES.

a. Actions by USSR.

(1) If USSR strikes selected military targets in the United States.

(2) If USSR makes further nuclear attacks on US Fleet and forward deployed forces.

(3) If USSR attacks US and naval shipping worldwide with conventional forces.

(4) If USSR continues the invasion of Iran using conventional forces.

(5) If USSR attacks NATO bases from which US forces have attacked Soviet shipping.

a. Actions by US.

(1) The United States would execute selected nuclear options.

(2) The United States would execute selected nuclear options.

(3) The United States would sustain a conventional war at sea.

(4) The United States would execute nuclear attacks against selected military targets in the Caucasus.

(5) The United States would be assisted in developing concerted NATO retaliatory action.

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b. Actions by Arab
Oil Producers.

If Arab Nationalist
Movement (ANM) sweeps United
Arab Emirates (UAE).

c. Actions by Allies.

(1) If EEC members
propose dissolution of NATO
military union as being
counterproductive.

(2) If Japan proposes
Russo-Japanese economic pact
to guarantee oil supplies with
parallel abrogation of US-
Japanese Security Treaty.

b. Actions by US.

The United States
would do nothing.

c. Actions by US.

(1) The United States
would prepare to withdraw
to fortress America.

(2) The United States
would do nothing.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 301

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 301

DTG 281500Z JUN 76

TO NATO

INFO Japan
Korea
Taiwan
Philippines
Political/Mil Action Team in PRC

1. The government of the United States, in light of recent events, urges the members of NATO to recognize the grave implications for the Alliance. Soviet attacks on US naval bases and men-of-war on a worldwide basis jeopardizes US and NATO security, particularly US ability to re-enforce and support forces in Europe.

2. NATO failure to assist in subsequent actions to deter aggression and to mobilize for its own defense jeopardizes both NATO survival and that of the United States. The USG, therefore, urges the governments of NATO to take steps immediately to assure their continental defense. In the absence of such preparations, the nations of western Europe are to see to their security without those US forces both in or scheduled to enter European NATO defenses so that these US forces may be redeployed to areas more advantageous for US defense.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 301

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 301

DTG 281500Z JUN 76

FROM US

TO USSR

1. The USG is pleased to concur in the request of the government of the USSR to permit withdrawal of its forces from the territory of Iran, and will likewise reduce US forces introduced to halt aggression against the GOI. This reduction of forces combined with the removal of Iraqi forces in Kuwait will serve the cause of world peace, reduce the threat of greatly expanded nuclear warfare, and reduce the military threat to US and West European oil supplies.

2. The accomplishment of the above force reduction will open the door to immediate peace negotiations which could lead to the total discontinuance of hostilities.

3. The Soviet attack against the US territory of Guam and US forces at sea has greatly shocked the people of the United States and has prompted fear for continued US freedom of the seas. The USG regrets that pending the completion of peace negotiations, several minimum steps will be continued to insure the defense of US forces.

4. It is US intention that these defenses be conducted without resort to nuclear weapons.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 301

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 301

DTG 281500Z JUN 76

FROM US

TO UN

1. The United States welcomes the request of the USSR to withdraw its forces from the territory of Iran to clear the way for negotiation of real peace. We regret, however, that the unprovoked aggression against the US territory of Guam and the worldwide attack on US naval resources warrants the continuation of defensive measures to insure world freedom of the seas. However, these defenses will be restrained and non-nuclear to the degree permitted by Soviet actions.

2. The USG guarantees the immediate cessation and neutralization of naval defenses concurrent with the success of peace negotiations.

3. Further, the USG considers that the UN should explore steps to accomplish the complete dissolution of national offensive forces and urges immediate UN aid to devastated areas. US rebuilding contributions will equal those of the USSR.

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MESSAGE NO. _____ 301

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. _____ III

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 301

DTG _____ 281500Z JUN 76

FROM US

TO Arab Nations

1. The grave world situation jeopardizes world peace. This situation centers, unfortunately, on the oil resources of the Arab world. This situation gives the Arab nations an influential voice in determination of the course of world affairs. The USG strongly urges that these governments use their good offices to halt Soviet and Iraqi aggression.

2. The USG greatly fears that a failure to halt Soviet aggression could lead rapidly to actions to achieve the destruction of Soviet forces and military facilities on Arab soil, thereby, jeopardizing the lives and resources of the Arab peoples for generations to come. Such needless destruction in the Arab world would sorrow the USG and people who have a history of long-standing affection for the Arab people. US interests are demonstrably humanitarian since the United States is rapidly approaching self-sufficiency in energy sources.

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 302

TO RED

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE RED MSG 201

DTG 290100Z JUN 76

SECOND SCENARIO PROJECTION

Zephyrs for Zoroaster.

The Soviets recognized that the massive nuclear second strike delivered by the United States against their divisions in Iran had momentarily degraded conventional capabilities. Not even major division reserves could change the immediate situation. In fact, it was deemed prudent that the movement of new Soviet troop units into Iran should not provoke another US nuclear response. Accordingly, Soviet Commander of the Caucasus Front was ordered to take appropriate defensive measures to limit his losses and to establish a defensive position. All reinforcements were to avoid giving the impression that additional Soviet forces were being deployed. Medical assistance and equipment resupply continued.

Although it had escaped nuclear baptism, the 104th Airborne Division was fighting for its survival on the outskirts of Teheran. The Division was promised close air support, including the screening use of tactical nuclear weapons, to assist its withdrawal and evacuation. Unfortunately, by midmorning on the 28th, the 104th remnants after barely avoiding being overrun by the Iranians and under heavy fire, were forced to abandon their perimeter and exfiltrate piecemeal during the chaos. Attempts to maintain contact with the beleaguered division failed, and it was considered either lost to the enemy, or functioning in small groups struggling solely to gain freedom. The 104th ceased to exist as an effective unit before it could be helped.

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While Soviet military commanders regrouped on the battlefield, the Kremlin launched a dramatic political and psychological attack. For several hours TASS flooded its subscribers with pictures of suffering Iranian shepherders, which it claimed were among more than 30,000 victims of the atrocious American nuclear attacks. Radiation dangers and fear of nuclear destruction were expressed by peace-loving groups around the world. Even though Soviet efforts had little, if any, initial success in alienating the United States from its allies, loyal leftist governments intensified their charges of irrationality against the United States. Demonstrators earnestly appealed for peace, blaming the United States for its reckless despoiling of the world environment.

The Soviet Union also issued its own warnings and exhortations to Warsaw Pact members as well as to Western European NATO members. Of particular interest to the Kremlin was an editorial in the Manchester Guardian which asserted that the fear of nuclear war had strained the limits of the North Atlantic Alliance. As evidence, the editorial referred to the continuing debate among the members over the appropriateness of the increased alert posture urged by Americans.

Along with the general warnings aimed at all of the US circle of friends, Politburo decisionmakers paid special attention to Turkey. The Soviet Ambassador in Ankara delivered an ultimatum to Turkey to prevent US military use of bases -- or suffer the consequences. The Soviet diplomat threatened the country with a possible attack by Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and alluded to Soviet reconnaissance overflights, as if the ultimatum needed additional emphasis. Nevertheless, the plucky Turks politely assured the Soviets that no US troops other than those presently contributing to Turkish territorial defense would be permitted to use its bases. Turkey also agreed with the Soviets' desire that the Bosphorus would remain open to international shipping under present conditions.

Disaster for the Domain of Darius.

By midday of the 28th, Soviet Divisions in Iran had survived the worst of US nuclear strikes. Field reports indicated diminished attacks ending at approximately 1130

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hours. Ground forces confirmed destroying four US aircraft and claimed damage to numerous others. Fortunately, only two or three surface-to-surface missile launchers were destroyed. As planning proceeded to mount a worldwide coordinated retaliation, the surviving Soviet tactical nuclear strike units in Iran were in position ready to execute attacks.

Soviet leaders prudently surveyed previously ordered worldwide preparations for their retaliatory operations. Fleet deployments continued into advantageous locations. Warsaw Pact forces were at their assembly areas. Nuclear capable units continued staging at Warsaw Pact airfields. Finally, at 1400 hours, Soviet SS-4 missiles from Groznyy and Maykok, plus SS-5 missiles from Gelli, impacted on every operational airfield in Iran. The Soviet rocket forces caught most of the Iranian and US air force units with no tactical warning. Except for a few sorties aloft when the attack began, the bulk of enemy air forces was destroyed. At the same time, Soviet FROG and SCUD missiles, supported by Soviet Tactical Air Armies, delivered nuclear weapons against Iranian ground forces. They concentrated mainly on the 77th in the northeast, the 16th defending the northwestern highway to Teheran, and the 31st recently deployed near Hamadan. The damage to Iran's army was not known immediately, but low-level sources in Teheran reported that the inner council of palace advisors had been unable to console the Shah over the widespread suffering and destruction. It was rumored that entire populations of small towns near the 81st Iranian Division Command Post and Esfahan Airfield had been incinerated, and that total casualties could be greater than a half million Iranian civilians.

OKEAN Occurs.

At H-hour minus, Soviet naval air forces lifted off on carefully orchestrated missions against US naval carrier task forces. Diligent exercises over the years were reflected in a precise execution -- and the operation brought multitudinous returns.

The Soviets, within a space of 15 minutes, conducted separate but coordinated attacks involving hundreds of TU-16s, TU-22s and TU-95s, supported by submarine-launched

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missiles and surface combatants. These forces successfully engaged five US naval carrier task forces: two in the Pacific, two in the eastern Mediterranean, and one in the Arabian Sea.

The US aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea was not seriously damaged, but two cruisers were sunk. Subsequently, the force withdrew into the Indian Ocean. The naval task forces in the Pacific faced the same kind of heroic attack. Approximately 30 TU-16s plus surface forces engaged each task group. The Northern Task Force, which had intruded into waters adjacent to the Soviet Maritime Province, lost two destroyers, and its CVA was badly damaged. The Southern Task Force, attacked east of Honshu, suffered a loss of one destroyer and heavy damage to other vessels. The aircraft carrier was damaged but still able to conduct air operations. The Pacific attack resulted in the friendly losses of 35 aircraft and three submarines.

Simultaneously with the attacks in the Pacific and Middle East, Soviet naval strike forces engaged two US carrier task forces grouped for protection in the Ionian Sea. A combined strike force of six submarines, 27 surface combatants, and more than 100 TU-16s, TU-22s and TU-95s, armed with ASMs, badly damaged both carriers, sank several of the screening destroyers, and damaged four other support vessels. However, the combined defenses of the US Navy proved more effective than anticipated by inflicting severe battle damage on 60 percent of the striking force. TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft confirmed that three of the five carrier task forces were seriously damaged and fighting for survival. Specifically, three CVAs were ineffective and another was operating at reduced capability.

In the midst of the Soviet naval attack, the capstone of the Soviet retaliation arched down on two military targets at Guam Island. Submarine launched cruise missiles destroyed Anderson Air Force Base with an air burst and severely damaged the harbor facilities at Apra. The ground burst there caused only light damage to the sub-base.

Interlocking Initiatives.

Hewing closely to a coordinated political-military plan, Soviet leaders awaited reports of success from their nuclear

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attack forces. At 1415 hours, Soviet communications confirmed their expectations. Out of the Kremlin emerged a coordinated series of political actions designed to capitalize on the shock resulting from its decisive military actions. TASS originated a propaganda release calling upon Europeans to restrain the American nuclear aggressors. US allies were urged to implore the United States to accept proposals to end hostilities and negotiate concerning the conflict in Iran. The Soviet Ambassador told the UN General Assembly that the USSR had taken measures to protect its forces from further nuclear attack by the United States. He claimed that Soviet attacks had avoided the territories of other sovereign nations and that the Soviets desired to limit the spread of the conflict. He further proposed that the United States join in an early cease-fire.

Through private channels, the Soviets warned Peking not to respond to the pending American high-level visit. They reminded the Chinese that their populous country would be particularly vulnerable to nuclear devastation if a war engulfed the world, but assured them that the nuclear strikes in the Pacific were to eliminate a direct threat to Soviet security as well as to their own security.

At 1430 hours, General Secretary Kirilenko directly informed the President of the United States that the two nations stood on the very brink of total nuclear war and warned the President of the uncontrollable consequences should the war expand beyond human control. He appealed for immediate cessation of all hostile acts and the opening of negotiations concerning disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces in Iran. He told the President that pending his reply, he had ordered Soviet forces to refrain from further attacks but to remain in a maximum state of readiness.

Intervening Irascibility.

Assured and confident, the Soviet leaders considered possible American responses to their offer to negotiate while they awaited Washington's reply. Within an hour following the Soviet nuclear attacks, a US Presidential message to Secretary Kirilenko was translated:

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"The USG is pleased to concur in the request of the government of the USSR to permit withdrawal of its forces from the territory of Iran and will likewise reduce US forces introduced to halt aggression against the Government of Iran. This reduction of forces, combined with the removal of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, will serve the cause of world peace, reduce the threat of greatly expanded nuclear warfare, and reduce the military threat to US and West European oil supplies.

"The accomplishment of the above force reduction will open the door to immediate peace negotiations which could lead to the total discontinuance of hostilities.

"The Soviet attack against the US territory of Guam and US forces at sea has greatly shocked the people of the United States and has prompted fear for continued US freedom of the seas. The USG regrets that pending the completion of peace negotiations, several minimum steps will be continued to insure the defense of US forces.

"It is US intention that these defenses be conducted without resort to nuclear weapons."

For several hours the Kremlin sifted the evidence of world reaction to their nuclear strikes attempting to understand the US response. Among the conflicting torrents, the world press reverberated with reports from the American domestic scene. There was shock and dismay at the bombing of American territory. The New York Daily News splashed its afternoon edition with a headline, "Another Pearl Harbor? -- Another World War?" Nearly every television broadcast carried reports of the latest incidents garnered from survivors and official sources. The capitalist press, while calling for a display of "patriotic nationalism," forecast another Munich, if the United States failed to pick up the Guamanian gauntlet.

Some Kremlin analysts predicted that strong US action was likely. They pointed to the latest US contacts in

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the NATO camp, where American diplomats apparently had laid down an ultimatum for NATO support, or else! At the same time, however, several NATO ministers publicly expressed the hope that both superpowers would take immediate steps to avoid creating any more nuclear wastelands.

Other US political actions were reported by friendly Arab nations to the effect that the US Ambassadors had begged the host governments to use their good offices to halt Soviet and Iraqi "aggression."

Naval Nuances.

Additional bilateral actions surfaced in Korsor, Denmark, and Gulcuk, Turkey, where covert sources indicated that US naval attaches had visited the Danish and Turkish navies' minelaying units. It was surmised that the United States might try to coerce its allies into executing a NATO contingency to mine the waters of the Skagerrak/Kattegat and the Bosphorus. KGB intelligence operatives in Japan also were alerted to report any indications that the United States or Japanese planned to mine or blockade Japan's contiguous international waters.

Soviet naval intelligence reports provided further evidence of US activities. In contrast to the relatively quiet and routine command and control activity exhibited by most US strategic forces, tactical naval communications crackled with numerous reports of activity. These intercepted messages were thought, at first, to be the aftermath of Soviet nuclear blows against US Navy carrier task forces. It was soon apparent, however, that the US Navy was being alerted for new actions. Satellite-based sensors began to show some US surface movement toward Gibraltar and the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap in the North Atlantic Ocean. Unconfirmed information from US Navy wharves in Naples and Pearl Harbor referred to high priority activities at mine depots. One submarine in Pearl Harbor was observed offloading some of its torpedo ordnance. Although it could not be confirmed, US attempts to mine or blockade various international waterways and Soviet ports were also expected.

At 2300 hours, Soviet intelligence insights were justified. A Soviet Kashin class frigate and guided missile submarine (Juliett class) trailing the US Navy task force in the Bay of

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Biscay reported that they were under a US attack with conventional weapons; intercepted messages indicated the US task force was under orders to seek and destroy Soviet naval units.

Piecing together these accounts and the other evidence collected throughout the day, the Soviets began to identify the main features of US intentions. Foremost in the picture was SIGINT data which revealed that the US Navy had been ordered to initiate strikes against all Soviet and Bloc commercial and military shipping. No attacks were to be made on the Soviet homeland bases or in territorial waters, and all US attacks would use conventional weapons. (Naval intelligence believed that US forces would continue to use nuclear weapons for defensive purposes.)

As an exclamation point to this estimate, a flash message at 2400 hours informed the Kremlin that a Soviet merchant vessel had been sunk approximately 60 km southeast of Santiago, Cuba. Cuban naval elements were responding to its international SOS, and they confirmed that US surface combatants had conducted the attack.

Dialectical Dichotomies.

Presented on the one hand with an agreement to their offer of negotiations, and on the other with an impending US naval attack, Soviet party leaders waited for the next signal from the United States. It came as President Nixon addressed the UN at the evening session:

"The United States welcomes the request of the USSR to withdraw its forces from the territory of Iran to clear the way for negotiation of real peace. We regret, however, that the unprovoked aggression against the US territory of Guam and the worldwide attack on US naval resources warrants the continuation of defensive measures to insure world freedom of the seas. However, these defenses will be restrained and non-nuclear to the degree permitted by Soviet actions.

"The United States Government guarantees the immediate cessation and neutralization of naval defenses concurrent with the success of peace negotiations.

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"Further, the United States Government considers that the United Nations should explore steps to accomplish the complete dissolution of national offensive forces and urges immediate UN aid to devastated areas. US rebuilding contributions will equal those of the USSR."

The time now is 290100Z Jun 76.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 301

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 302

DTG 290100Z JUN 76

1. IMPACT OF CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS.

a. USSR interests. The crisis offers opportunities while presenting certain dangers.

(1) Opportunities:

(a) Extend Soviet influence and improve world power position.

(b) Facilitate decline and eventual demise of our imperialistic competitors, not only the United States but Japan and Western Europe as well. However, at the same time, it increases the possibility of a strategic nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States. Such an exchange would not be in the interest of the Soviet Union. The crisis could also adversely affect our position vis-a-vis the PRC should the crisis result in diminished power/influence for the USSR.

(c) The United States had initiated action against Soviet naval and merchant shipping which could force the USSR to commence defensive and/or offensive actions which could further expand the area of hostilities beyond that desired by the Soviets.

(2) Dangers:

(a) A military defeat in the Middle East would be detrimental to Soviet influence worldwide.

(b) The United States could exploit the current crisis by strengthening its relations with China.

b. US interests. The United States shares with us the primary interest of avoiding strategic nuclear warfare between our two nations. The United States recent actions clearly indicate that it intends to use tactical nuclear

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weapons in whatever numbers it feels necessary to halt Soviet military operations in Iran. The United States clearly recognizes that Middle East oil is at stake and it also could see in the crisis its potential decline as a viable political and military superpower. It will thus need to maintain as many allies as possible to forestall such a demise. Overall, the United States clearly sees its stakes as high enough to take drastic measures to prevent collapse of US imperialism.

c. Iranian interests. Iran faces a situation in which the Shah's influence has been denigrated with the destruction of the armed forces and the weakening of the Iranian government. The crisis presents an increased opportunity for dissidence, although Iran will act to preserve its present form of government and leadership in the region. Its primary interest is seen as national survival and freedom from coercion and outside influence.

d. Iraqi interests. Iraq also has a primary interest in national survival and freedom from outside influence. In addition, its actions indicate a desire for territorial acquisition and a leading role in mobilizing radical movements in the region. The United States continued use of nuclear weapons may affect Iraq's resolve as an ally of the USSR. However, with pressure on Iran eased as a result of US support, the Iraqis may feel more dependent on the USSR.

e. Interests of others.

(1) Western Europe. While recognizing that their basic security is tied to the United States, West European nations may have increasing doubts about the wisdom of the US action and its subsequent impact upon Western European security. These nations will reexamine their alliances as they seek to avoid direct involvement in the conflict. Disruption of oil shipments from the Middle East could cause short range economic losses. Should the disruption continue, it might be necessary to turn to Moscow for oil. All Western European nations are becoming increasingly concerned about US nuclear weapons stored on their territory and fear nuclear strikes by the USSR against such sites -- as well as against other US and NATO bases in their countries.

(2) Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The PRC will see an opportunity to exploit the situation in order to

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maintain its relative power position vis-a-vis the USSR and prevent either of the superpowers from gaining hegemony in the Middle East.

2. OBJECTIVES.

a. USSR immediate objectives.

(1) Improve/maintain the credibility of the USSR as a world power.

(2) Improve/maintain Soviet influence in the Middle East by:

(a) Protecting and strengthening Iraq while politically influencing Iran.

(b) Establishing permanent land access through northwestern Iran and Iraq to connect the Caucasus with the Persian Gulf.

The exact political arrangement to achieve this is incidental so long as a secure, modern land transport link is established.

(3) Protect USSR and bloc shipping (naval and maritime) and discourage future US attacks by open threat of reprisal.

(4) Prevent escalation by passive measures or return to nuclear war while political efforts to consolidate current gains continue.

(5) Continue exploitation of opportunities to separate the United States from its allies.

(6) Exploit/increase momentum of world opinion against the United States.

(7) Avoid strategic nuclear warfare with the United States.

(8) Avoid nuclear strikes on Soviet territory.

b. USSR perception of US immediate objectives.

(1) Avoid return to nuclear escalation.

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- (2) Reduce USSR naval and maritime power.
- (3) Force withdrawal of USSR forces from Iran and Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
- (4) Maintain Iranian independence under present Shah's Government.
- (5) Preserve/protect US imperialistic oil interests in the Middle East.
- (6) Improve naval supremacy.

c. The United States is likely to perceive the immediate objectives of the USSR to be:

- (1) Avoid strategic nuclear warfare.
- (2) Dominate Iranian negotiations.
- (3) Maintain Soviet presence in Iran and Iraq (politically and militarily).
- (4) Protect naval and maritime forces.

3. POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES.

a. Military attack options and associated political signals.

(1) Actions in Iran/Iraq.

(a) Undertake necessary military measures to consolidate and secure territory presently occupied by Soviet forces in northwestern Iran. Specifically, direct Commander Caucasus District to:

1. Redeploy existing forces to secure a defensive line running approximately from Mishjav on the border to Bandar-E Pahlavi on the Caspian Sea.

2. Assure, throughout execution, that vulnerability to further nuclear attack is reduced; such actions should also signal to the enemy that the movement is purely defensive in nature.

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3. Continue low-profile Soviet troop movement from Caucasus into Iraq through northwest Iran. Improve highway from Marageh to Irbil.

4. Emphasize importance of friendly relations with local nationals; develop appropriate civic action programs to reduce hostility and/or gain support.

5. Direct Soviet forces northeast of Teheran to commence immediate phased withdrawal back to the USSR.

(b) Rationale, constraints, risks, and consequences for the military and political options selected.

1. Rationale.

a. The clear demonstration of US purpose in Iran counsels defensive rather than further offensive action at this point.

b. Holding territory presently occupied in northwestern Iran gives USSR stronger posture for subsequent negotiations; offers a trade-off for US concessions in the negotiations; reduces loss of credibility in Soviet will and military effectiveness; and offers land access through Iraq to the Persian Gulf.

c. Retention of Iranian territory offers the opportunity to establish, quietly, an indigenous administration with which the USSR can deal. This should be considered as an initial step leading to eventual subversion and replacement of the Shah's government with one more acceptable to Soviet interests.

d. Withdrawal of Soviet forces elsewhere in Iran should demonstrate a positive, conciliatory attitude and a willingness to meet the United States part way on the road to a negotiated settlement.

2. Constraints.

a. Care must be exercised with respect to military execution and associated political actions to insure this move is perceived as purely defensive and unprovocative in nature.

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b. Considerable attention must be paid to precluding possible guerrilla activity, particularly on the part of tribal groups in the occupied area.

3. Risks.

a. United States may not regard partial withdrawal as satisfying pre-negotiation conditions.

b. Military commanders face difficulty of effectively controlling the occupied area without introducing significant and provocative reinforcements.

(2) Actions involving shipping.

(a) Strongly condemn -- through UN, diplomatic channels and Press -- US sinking of Soviet merchant and naval vessels on the high seas (Atchs 1 & 2).

(b) Order all Soviet merchant ships to proceed immediately to nearest friendly or neutral ports.

(c) Issue stern warning to the United States that further attacks will be met by appropriate response (Atch 1).

(d) Warn US allies that any assistance to United States in attacking Soviet shipping will jeopardize their own freedom of the seas (Atch 1).

(e) Stern warning to all nations (especially Turkey) that any mining of international waterways would be a serious act and would be met with appropriate responses. Osa and Komar patrol boats will be deployed to international straits as signal of Soviet earnest (Atch 2).

(f) Rationale, constraints, risks, and consequences for the political and military options selected.

1. Rationale.

a. To deter United States from further attacks on Soviet merchant and naval vessels.

b. To place United States in poor political light.

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c. Further divide United States from its allies.

d. Establish political basis for Soviet attacks should United States fail to heed warnings.

2. Constraints. Soviet naval forces must be postured in manner which will make threats appear real and credible but which will not be perceived as provocative.

3. Risks. That United States will ignore warnings and require Soviets to invoke threats.

4. Consequences.

a. Soviet threats could deter further United States attacks.

b. In the event of continued attacks, USSR would be required to at least retaliate in kind.

(3) Naval actions.

(a) Instruct the USSR Navy surface ships at sea to assume a defensive posture and protect themselves. Defend USSR and Pact commercial ships against possible US attack. Proceed to a friendly or neutral port as necessary for support.

(b) Instruct attack submarines to proceed to sea lanes -- especially in the Middle East and await further instructions.

(c) Instruct reconnaissance elements to increase surveillance over US naval activities with satellites, aircraft, submarines, and KRZ. Emphasize coverage of possible mining operations and blockades.

(d) Rationale, constraints, risks, and consequences for the military and political options selected.

1. Rationale.

a. By avoiding a direct confrontation with the US Navy, USSR avoids getting involved in the type of tactical situation in which the United States holds a clear advantage.

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b. By placing attack submarines near sea lanes, USSR will be in a posture to sink US commercial ships if the United States fails to respond to warning.

c. By maintaining a close surveillance over US naval operations, USSR should obtain a clear understanding of US intentions regarding mining, blockades, and continued hostile actions against Soviet/Pact ships in ample time to take appropriate countermeasures.

2. Constraints. There is a need to ensure that these actions are interpreted by the United States as being defensive in nature but not a sign of weakness.

3. Risks. There is a possibility that the United States may not immediately rescind their order to "seek and destroy Soviet naval units." In this case, it will be necessary for the USSR to implement the contingency plan.

b. Associated political signals.

(1) Offer Iran in place cease-fire and negotiations on disengagement, withdrawal and reconstruction. Make credible by token withdrawals in northeast and local withdrawals to consolidate positions (Atch 3).

(2) Protest sinking of Soviet merchant ship. Threaten retaliation on US merchant ships if further Soviet or Warsaw Pact ships are attacked. Also threaten ships of nations who help US Navy (Atchs 1 & 2).

(3) Respond in UN to US call for arms control by proposing, through UN, general and complete disarmament. Propose as a first step, withdrawal of armed forces to national territory (Atch 2).

(4) Offer Iraq through visiting Soviet diplomats:

(a) Replacement and modernization of military equipment.

(b) Economic assistance to include construction of a north-south railway and highways.

(c) Technical assistance to run oilfields and refineries.

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(d) Guaranteed world market for its oil --
i.e., payment in gold if free world market fails to develop.

(5) Offer to other oil producing Arab States
(except Kuwait) through visiting Soviet diplomats:

(a) Replacement and modernization of military
equipment.

(b) Economic assistance, to include construction
of a north-south railway and highways.

(c) Technical assistance to run oilfields and
refineries.

(d) Guaranteed world market for their oil --
i.e., payment in gold if free world market fails to develop.

(6) Through diplomatic action guarantee free access
to Middle East oil for Japan and Western Europe -- providing
they stay out of conflict.

c. Likely perceptions/responses of protagonists.

(1) Iran.

(a) Will welcome opportunity to cease hostili-
ties and consolidate her internal position.

(b) May recognize that our remaining in
country poses future threats to her; however, there appears
to be little she can do except appeal to the United States
and the United Nations.

(2) Iraq.

(a) Will consolidate her position in Kuwait.

(b) Will reluctantly accept additional Soviet
assistance.

(3) Turkey.

(a) Will quietly maintain the status quo.

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(b) Will ask the United States to limit military operations from her bases.

(c) Will ask the United States not to mine international waters.

(4) United States.

(a) Will accept our attempts to pacify the situation at sea.

(b) Will not strike Soviet forces in Iran.

(c) Will attempt to initiate peaceful negotiations.

(d) Will make bellicose noises as to Soviet withdrawal from Iran.

d. Other international reactions and domestic response.

(1) Generally, the world should note Soviet readiness to negotiate and preclude general nuclear war. By contrast, the world should regard the US performance as a series of provocations and unrealistic ultimatums -- to which the USSR has responded with moderation, and from which the USSR has emerged with its credibility as a world power virtually intact.

(2) US NATO allies should be further inclined to question the efficacy of the Atlantic Alliance and the utility of continued ties with the United States.

(3) Both US NATO allies and Japan should be sufficiently appalled by US brinkmanship to refrain from aiding and abetting the United States in any further escalation of the crisis.

(4) The crisis, dramatized by the US sinking of a Soviet ship in Caribbean waters, should result in increased Latin American disenchantment with the belligerent giant to the north.

(5) All nonaligned and neutral nations are likely to condemn both superpowers for the current crisis. On the positive side, the crisis may generate support from these

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nations for the longstanding Soviet initiative of a World Disarmament Conference.

(6) Given the specter of Iran's nuclear battlefield, other Middle East and South Asian nations are likely to become increasingly skeptical of either superpower as a protector.

(7) The PRC is likely to use the current crisis to reinforce its credentials as the spokesman for the Third World and pose as the only responsible and peace-loving representative of the three superpowers.

(8) Within the UN, Third World Nations are likely to extend their influence by condemning the Security Council peace-making/keeping apparatus, giving a greater peace-making role to the General Assembly, and giving the UN a role in the peace negotiations between the United States and USSR.

(9) In contrasting the naked imperialism of the United States with the more responsible, measured response of the USSR, Warsaw Pact countries are likely to take an increasingly ominous view of the United States and more benign view of the USSR.

e. Other options considered but rejected.

(1) Renew offensive in Iran.

(a) Likely to produce re-escalation by United States.

(b) USSR already has military presence in Iran that cannot be dislodged by Iranians.

(c) Long-term prospects are excellent so option not required.

(2) Immediate prosecution of war at sea.

(a) USSR is at naval disadvantage.

(b) Increases risk of expanding conflict.

(3) Use of nuclear weapons on US merchant ships.

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(a) Not necessary to accomplish objectives.

(b) Increases risk of re-escalation.

(4) Immediate conventional attacks on US merchant ships.

(a) Prolongs conflict that, if ended now, ends in Soviet advantage.

(b) Can be commenced quickly if the United States persists with substantial offensive activities.

4. CONTINGENCIES.

Action by US.

a. If the United States attacks Soviet forces remaining in Iran.

b. In the event the United States uses nuclear weapons against targets on Soviet or Warsaw Pact soil.

c. If the United States continues attack against our merchant or naval ships.

d. If the United States/allies mine international waterways.

e. If the United States introduces troops into area.

f. If the Shah of Iran refuses to negotiate.

Actions by USSR.

a. We will use nuclear weapons against launch sites wherever they are located.

b. We will initiate theater nuclear attacks.

c. We will attack US naval/commercial shipping worldwide on a reciprocal basis.

d. We will maintain surveillance of the mine-laying vessels in international waters.

e. We will take no action as this will legitimize Soviet forces in the area.

f. We would negotiate with a Provisional Government of Zanzibar -- to be created in the occupied territory.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 301

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 302

DTG 290100Z JUN 76

FROM USSR

TO USG

(Note to US, published after delivery.)

1. The Soviet Government sternly protests the criminal attack by US naval elements on the Soviet merchant ship Mir in Cuban waters. Should other attacks of this kind occur, the USSR will retaliate on a reciprocal basis against US commercial ships. Soviet submariners will not lack countless targets in such a conflict.

2. The Soviet Government takes note of the US threat to attack vessels of the friendly socialist states. Throughout the present conflict, the USSR has striven mightily against American efforts to involve other countries in the hostilities. It should be clear, however, that if Soviet allies or their ships are attacked, the allies of the US cannot escape the same fate. A similar fate awaits those who make their facilities available to the marauders of the American Navy.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 301

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 302

DTG 290100Z JUN 76

SPEECH OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR BEFORE UN

(Immediate Release)

The Soviet Union is well aware of the grave situation which now faces the world as a result of the aggressive act of the United States and her lackey supporters. This action has twice brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust; and if it were not for the restraint and understanding of the USSR, the world would by now be embroiled in a death struggle. The Soviet Union deeply regrets the loss of lives which has occurred to peace-loving peoples in Iran, Guam and elsewhere as a result of the actions which the Soviet Union found itself compelled to take against the forces of the warmongering United States. The Soviet Union took these actions only as a last resort to prevent the spread of this holocaust.

Despite the restrained actions of the USSR, the United States and her allies even now may be preparing to continue the conflict by striking innocent merchant vessels upon the high seas and by blockading those international waterways through which the life-blood of so many nations flow. The USSR condemns such dastardly acts and asks that all peace-loving nations from which the US aggressor navies have operated in the past deny their ports and facilities to these forces. Rest assured the USSR will not fail to protect its naval and other vessels from these US attacks as well as those waterways which lead to the Soviet heartland.

We Soviets are prepared to begin immediately negotiations aimed at the withdrawal of foreign troops and an end to this unwanted conflict. Even now preparations are underway to begin negotiations for a settlement with the Shah of Iran, the ruler in whose country the conflict was initiated by the United States. We are also prepared to rush food, medical

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supplies and other forms of assistance to the Iranian peoples to relieve their suffering and anguish.

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FROM RED

MESSAGE NO. 301

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 302

DTG 290100Z JUN 76

FROM SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY

TO SHAH OF IRAN

The Soviet Government urgently approaches the Government of Iran with a proposal for immediate negotiations. These negotiations, which we propose should begin in Moscow on 2 July 1976, should aim at an immediate cessation of hostilities, the exchange of prisoners, the restoration of peace, and the disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces. The Soviet Government further proposes that, within one month, negotiations for the reconstruction of war damage be undertaken between the USSR and Iran.

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Reviewed Chief, DoD OSR
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SCYLLA III-73 CRITIQUE

The following is an edited transcript of the SCYLLA III-73 Critique. Minor changes and deletions of non-substantive material have been made to insure syntax. In consonance with SAGA's policy of non-attribution, references to individual team members have been removed.

GEN STRACK: I want to thank the participants in the exercise who gave so generously of their time, energies, patience, and understanding of our goals. I would in particular want to thank the members of the Control Team who worked the better part of the three weeks and gave unstintingly of their time and their interest. Next, I briefly want to dwell on what it was we were really trying to do. The name of the game was to develop Blue selected nuclear attack options and from them determine what might be Red perceptions and responses. For this reason the scenario was written as it was with the question of the probability of the use of nuclear weapons eliminated. Thus the character of the entire exercise moved from a point of nuclear confrontation. There were quite a few differences from the typical "politico-military simulations" or even previous SCYLLA iterations. Among the major things that one might dwell upon is the fact that in about 19 calendar days of simulation we covered only about 5 crisis and war days. That is contrary to the way a politico-military simulation usually runs, so you have to keep your clock and calendar in view. Also, as opposed to earlier iterations, the teams were asked to come up with a single preferred option instead of a shopping list of options. This allowed for a little more detailed material from both the Blue and Red Teams. Because of this, it was incumbent upon the Control element to accept the decisions of each of the teams. This was done rather faithfully with minimal Control arbitration. In fact, Red really was working against Blue and Blue was really working against Red.

Finally, I would note that throughout five SCYLLA exercises, we have gained an aggregate experience and an overall



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recourse to any other military means and vital national interests are considered to be at stake. At the same time, we have learned that there are other ways of looking at possible selected nuclear attack options. Thus within the range of partial force applications that one might make, there really is not a precise predictability as to what a given team might do--what the assessments and responses might be. With that as my brief back drop I would like to call upon the Conference Director, to press on with the conduct of the Critique.

CONFERENCE DIRECTOR: Thank you General Strack. Gentlemen, as you know, there is a lot of interest in nuclear options--how our governmental leaders will use them and how the Soviet leadership will perceive and react to their use. The purpose of SCYLLA III has been threefold. First was to explore the nuclear options available and the associated considerations. Next, and I think this was particularly important, was to enlighten the participants as to the intelligence problems, decision factors, opportunities, and risks involved in adopting any nuclear option. It is important that our military and civilian leaders become educated in the problems, risks, opportunities, and intelligence concepts involved. Third, we have to gain insights into the Soviet perception of US use of nuclear weapons and likely Soviet responses. I think we have succeeded in all these objectives.

The purpose of this Critique, then is to entertain the ideas and thinking that went on, to elaborate on them and expand them. In this way we hope to shed further light on the total objectives outlined.

At this time I would like to call on the Blue Team Captain for his comments.

BLUE TEAM: We had one advantage over Red in that we were supported by a military staff. This was a decided advantage when we looked at the nuclear options, particularly in Move I; they gave us a rich range of options from which to draw. This is indeed very close to the way the National Command Authorities would operate in a real crisis; so not only were they very helpful to us in game terms but I think we had a chance to exercise a mode of operation which very likely would be similar to the mode of operation that would be used in a real crisis.

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In Move I there was one matter in which we had no choice. We had been [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Therefore, the issue before us was to assess our situation and determine what the appropriate response would be to the Soviet aggression in Iran.

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We saw this as essentially a two-pronged threat to US interests. First, we saw it as a move by the Soviet Union to exercise their traditional goal of dominance over the Middle East, and control of the oil supplies of the Middle East. Second, and more broadly, we saw it as a threat to the US position worldwide. We made a key political judgment in the first move--we had to evict the Soviet forces from Iran. We were not going to evict these forces through negotiation, since if we achieved a cease-fire in place we would find it difficult if not impossible to evict them at the negotiating table. Therefore our first move was designed to evict Soviet forces prior to negotiation. This was a critical judgment, one we should come back and talk about since it was that judgment that led to greater escalation. On the other hand, it was a correct judgment since if we had simply called for a cease-fire in place the negotiations would not have been successful in evicting Soviet forces. We would have had an ally who had its territory invaded. We would have been shown impotent in not being able to prevent a fait accompli. That was a very key dilemma that the Blue Team faced and a critical judgment that we made. That justified our relatively large initial use of nuclear weapons.

We indicated to the staff that we wanted to stop the leading elements of the Soviet advance, attack their LOCs, and avoid damage to civilians and population centers. In order to show restraint we limited numbers and collateral damage. We limited the attacks in both Move I and II to Iranian territory. We used forces that were solely based in Iran or on the aircraft carrier just off the coast of Iran. All of these actions were intended to demonstrate the desire to limit the scale and scope of the conflict. There was one minor miscalculation in Move I. I think we brought in somewhat more aircraft than we needed to deliver the 40-some odd air weapons that were used.

There may be some in the group who questioned whether we should have used the carrier aircraft. They were the most immediately available [REDACTED] They were there,

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ready to go and could be used without having to re-deploy units or weapons to Iran. This is an important point to note in our Critique--naval air that is within range of the target area is likely to be the most readily utilizable. On the other hand, some of us were concerned about the vulnerability of that carrier. It presented a tempting target for Red retaliation. We were persuaded to use the carrier by the argument that no matter where it sat it was going to be a tempting target for Soviet retaliation. In Red's Move II it became clear that whether the carrier was in the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean or in the Pacific it was vulnerable to attack.

We felt that after we completed our move a Soviet nuclear response was more likely than not. We considered this contingency and were just a little surprised when the initial Red response was not nuclear but conventional. In retrospect it seemed to make a lot of sense. Under the circumstances Red still had the predominant conventional superiority in the area. This factor really dominated the whole game. We felt that the threat and US objectives remained unchanged. Too, the challenges were unchanged. So, based on this, plus our lack of conventional capability, the only course open during Move II was more of the same.

We again tried to demonstrate restraint by limiting our use of nuclear weapons to Iranian territory. We even went to some length to bring additional air into Iran from Turkey rather than to fly missions from Turkey. This time, however, we extended the time period for execution because when we questioned our military staff we learned that the six hours allowed for the first exchange was insufficient to properly use the weapons. In Move I we had instructed them to mount an attack which would inflict 50 percent casualties on the invading Soviet forces. The result of our initial attack was only 35 percent casualties on one column and very little on the other. Two reasons for this low effectiveness were our desire to limit collateral damage and the short time allowed for the attack phase. A conflict between goals and limitations existed. Therefore, we felt we had to extend the second strike period to 24 hours, which enabled us to use all of the weapons that were authorized. We generally achieved the military effectiveness that we expected to have with the second strike.

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Again we anticipated that the Soviets would respond with nuclear retaliation, however, I am not sure we anticipated quite the character of that response. We were appalled at the selection of Guam as a demonstration by the Soviets. We had a dilemma because clearly we had suffered a psychological blow. At the same time, however, we received an offer to negotiate which we appreciated since it allowed us an opportunity to realize our number one objective--to get the Soviet forces out of Iran.

Our task then was to come up with an option which in our view redressed the psychological imbalance and let us get even. We elected to do that by accepting the offer to surrender which is the way we attempted to treat the offer to negotiate. To redress the psychological imbalance we elected to continue a non-nuclear war of attrition at sea to include mining and blockading of Soviet ports. Our purpose was to provide the negotiators with leverage against the Soviets and to encourage the Soviets to negotiate in good faith. It was our view that as negotiations progressed and Soviet forces withdrew, the pressure on Soviet merchant ships and naval forces at sea would be decreased. We were, of course, appreciative to note that the Soviets in effect accepted that offer.

RED TEAM: I am very much impressed with what the Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency continues to attempt to do. I think the value, both actual and potential, of these kinds of exercises is enormous. What we expose and then what we do with the issues in subsequent exercises and work is the essence.

We may have failed to explore some situations which could have tied some knots of reality into Uncle Sam's coattails. However, throughout the exercise the Red Team did try to follow what we perceived to be many of the basic tenets of Soviet political and military philosophy, broad strategic doctrine and grand strategy.

One of these was the Soviet proclivity to keep all options open as long as possible. This implies trying to take a long range view and play the long range aspect of each situation. Secondly, we tried to adhere to the principal that once the Soviets elect to use military force in achieving an objective their tendency is to use these forces in an overwhelming manner. This approach tends to cancel out getting into a

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quid pro quo or tit-for-tat exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States. Third, we conceived the Soviets as always striving to maximize their bargaining position. Accordingly, you may find them relying for the moment more on long term political progress than on an immediate military or purely tactical gain. Fourthly, we should note that the Soviets frequently alternate between political and military actions in a coordinated fashion designed to baffle and bewilder the opposition. Finally, we did endeavor to exhibit the Soviet propensity to present the unexpected.

In applying these principles to our actions and reactions we were trying to build on the natural strengths and natural advantages of the Soviet Union. At the same time, we were trying to exploit any apparent US weaknesses. In addition, true to Soviet style, we did treat Soviet territory as inviolate and were gratified to note that the US read the Soviet position loud and clear.

We believe that the national interests and objectives which the Red Team laid out accurately reflect the Soviet design in the Middle East. There is no doubt the Soviets desire to broaden their influence in this region, to diminish US influence, to force the United States out of the area, and eventually to gain a position from which they can influence the long term trend of events in Iraq and Iran.

We were in a box as we started Move I. There was no question about that. The United States had achieved the initiative. We were surprised by the magnitude of the initial US response to the Soviet ground force invasion of Iran. It seemed to us, thinking as Soviets, that this was a rather heavy handed use of nuclear weapons, particularly since nuclear weapons had not been used previously in this area. The net effect was to limit the options available to the Soviet Team and to move us immediately several rungs up the escalatory ladder. It left us relatively little in terms of a face-saving way out.

We opted to respond to this situation by the use of a rather heavy conventional attack endeavoring to play to our strength and against what we regarded as the American weakness. We felt that we could bring an overwhelming force to bear on the US elements and Iranian forces in the area.

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Too, we could, through a concentrated political and propaganda campaign over a period of time, marshal world as well as US domestic opinion against the US policymakers to the extent that it would be quite difficult for the United States to reinitiate the use of nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately the scope of the Soviet attack did not come through in our messages. We made some assumptions but did not state them. We made some broad brush moves on the map and did not reflect them clearly, so they did not come through as we should have got them through to you. Had the Soviet conventional attack been successful the United States would have been backed into a corner. With no way of responding in a conventional manner and with world opinion aroused against the further use of nuclear weapons the United States might very well have been limited to two choices. Either to escalate to some form of a strategic exchange or to negotiate. This was the kind of box which we were trying to put the United States in in our moves.

Unfortunately we did not develop the situation as cleanly as we should have. I worry lest in the future someone looking at this exercise might make the assumption that a Soviet conventional attack can be defeated solely by the use of US tactical systems.

In Move II we expected a further nuclear response because the United States did not have any other feasible options except to call for a cease-fire. Once again we were taken back by the magnitude of the attack. At this point we felt that we had no recourse but to punish the United States and punish it hard. Not only were Soviet objectives at stake as far as the Middle East was concerned but the defeat and humiliation of the Soviet armed forces as well. Again, the Soviets had been left without any face-saving way out and there was only one direction in which they could move.

This was the coordinated attack on the US carrier forces in the Gulf of Oman, in the Mediterranean, in the Pacific, and the military facilities on Guam. It was designed to take the pressure off the Soviet forces in Iran, to reduce the capability of US and Iranian forces to continue with the conflict in Iran, to demonstrate to the United States the Soviet Union's resolve to carry the war to the door

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step of the United States if necessary, to warn others, particularly the PRC, to stay out of the conflict, and to deny assistance to the US.

This attack may have appeared to have bordered on over-kill but once again it would appear to us to be a characteristic Soviet response to move in an unanticipated direction and to respond at a higher level. Although there may have been some tendency for the team to want to insure that the magnitude of the nuclear response was properly understood, we should not be lulled into thinking that the Soviets would not take such a course of action. As to the attack on Guam, the team debated the pros and cons to some considerable length but concluded that the American people would not consider an attack on Guam an attack on the US homeland per se. They also believed that this attack would cause the United States to move toward a cease-fire to avoid further nuclear exchange. It seemed unlikely that the United States would escalate the conflict into a strategic exchange.

The impact of these attacks, including the one on Guam, did appear to have the effect that was desired by the Red Team. Although the Blue Team elected to continue the conflict in Move III, it did so by reverting to conventional means. For the first time the United States seemed to be moving toward a negotiated cease-fire arrangement in a more conciliatory fashion. Prior to this, all of the US overtures appeared to be ultimatums. It also appeared to us rather unlikely that the American public would really support the President and continue a nuclear war in Iran which really did not threaten the very survival of the United States but which was beginning to threaten US territory.

The actions of the Blue Team in Move III provided us with an excellent opportunity to bring this conflict to some sort of phase where some of the Soviet objectives in the Middle East were satisfied. The Soviets rather than being expelled from Iran still occupied some of the northern tier of the country. The Iranian government had been greatly weakened by the loss of much of its armed forces and its country was in ruins. The Soviets had gained access to the Persian Gulf through northwestern Iran and Iraq. In addition, the Iraqis were occupying oil rich Kuwait, and it could be construed that the Soviet Union had pushed the United States

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to the very brink of a strategic exchange from which the United States and not the Soviet Union had backed down. The Soviets from this point would be branding the United States as an aggressor and would still be endeavoring to drive the United States and her allies farther apart.

Although we felt that the exercise left the United States in a somewhat vulnerable position, I think this is a situation we military planners must scrutinize lest something like this should come to pass.

It seemed to me that in this exercise the central thesis --I gather this also from the statement of the exercise objectives--is can the sophisticated use of tactical nuclear weapons systems serve to defeat significant conventional forces on the ground? A very key point we have debated in many other forums. And secondly, on the politico-military side, is the United States prepared to pay the price both internationally and domestically for the massive first application of nuclear weapons when full justification for the use of these weapons may not be perceived by the American or the world audience? I think these are central problems which emerge from this simulation and ones which usefully could be discussed and considered at another time by other people.

CONFERENCE DIRECTOR: I would hope that there would be some questions and thoughts on why specific moves were taken.

BLUE TEAM: From a political and propaganda point of view one of the statements that the Soviets made in Move I intrigued us; and we thought it gave us a handle on their objectives. They said to the United Nations that the Soviets were ever mindful of the threat of the cold and misery that the brash actions of the imperialist warmongers had imposed on many peace-loving peoples of the world; the Soviet Union would work to lessen this threat by maintaining a continuous supply of vital oil to its friends in Western Europe and to Japan. We thought that this was a tip off as to Soviet objectives, maybe it wasn't intended as such because they couldn't live up to that promise without seizing a good deal of Middle Eastern oil. I don't think it was reflected quite as much as it might have been in our message. We tried to use that to point out to the countries of Western Europe and the Middle East that the real Soviet

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intention was to seize the oil, otherwise they couldn't have made such a promise. We tried to use that to some extent in our propaganda. The other ploy that I neglected to mention was the PRC ploy which I think was seen by the Red Team. This was to be a rather visible, high level, US delegation to the PRC which would show the Kremlin that we were attempting to develop cooperation with the PRC. It would have made the Soviets a little bit nervous about that threat on their flanks and might have pinned down as many forces as possible on the Chinese front.

RED TEAM: I think that was a very good move.

BLUE TEAM: In some recent studies, we have talked about war termination as an objective of the limited use of nuclear weapons; however, we haven't thought enough about the political objectives of war termination. There is no doubt in this circumstance that getting the Soviet forces out of Iran had to be a US objective; however, there is serious doubt whether that was an objective that warranted the use of nuclear weapons. In a sense we created a defeat just by establishing publicly--an objective which we were not able to achieve militarily.

Another aspect which is closely related is Allied and public support. We drew from the scenario the assumption that we were doing reasonably well in terms of Allied support although in the last move the Allies failed to respond to our request for a Reinforced Alert. It was a tip off that we were running into some difficulties. What would have happened in the real world is uncertain, but we were somewhat encouraged to push ahead in Move II on the assumption we were getting at least some support from our Allies and no violent or widespread domestic opposition. Does the team have any other comments they might want to make?

BLUE TEAM: We were a little surprised that the Red Team felt that the first offer to negotiate the withdrawal of their forces allowed for the permanent establishment of a Soviet enclave in Iran. That wasn't our understanding.

RED TEAM: It didn't necessarily allow for it; but if a physical presence could be maintained or partially maintained while negotiations were taking place, we could stall. Moreover in the event the Iranians would not negotiate, we were considering establishing a provisional administration of Zanjan and negotiating with its leaders.

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BLUE TEAM: We expected the stall.

RED TEAM: If we in the stalling created no situations against which you could use nuclear weapons, then the United States would be presented with a rather difficult nut to crack since the United States had no other way of physically sweeping Soviet forces out of Iran.

BLUE TEAM: True, but we were going to sweep them out in a rather indirect fashion, using the one true asset we had going for us, that being use of the natural geographical constraints which historically have denied the Soviet conventional forces access to the rest of the world.

RED TEAM: We felt the return to the conventional environment at sea, in fact, played into our power since it is the United States that is most vulnerable when merchant shipping is involved. We depend upon ours very little. Our strength at sea is in attack submarines, and we didn't think you could keep the attack up for two months, particularly if you attacked bloc shipping, and we began to go after Allied shipping.

CONTROL TEAM: There was clearly a difference of opinion on the effectiveness of that particular option.

BLUE TEAM: Concerning the pros and cons of the option; we knew we couldn't continue it very long, however, we didn't feel that we had to totally bar shipping on the sea. We would prevent rearmament and the like and at the same time attrite the submarine force through lack of support and lack of rearming capability. The blockading of the area was going to limit what the Soviets could get out. You assumed that they were all out; we didn't really have that in the scenario. We were looking for military options that were viable. How valid, how effective the option would be was argued back and forth but at that time we had very limited choices.

BLUE TEAM: A couple of other perceptions that we noted fit with the modern times. We always informed our NATO allies yet really never consulted with them which really seems to be one of their complaints today. In keeping with this, we also noticed that Control gave us little support, if any at all, from our NATO allies--this is probably very

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realistic. Too, we noticed that the Red Team didn't particularly apply any pressure on our Allies.

RED TEAM: In the various messages, we did warn the NATO Allies that if they supported the Americans we would take rather drastic action against them. In Turkey particularly, we applied a lot of pressure. Therefore, I think you either misread the traffic or else it didn't get through properly.

RED TEAM: One thing that was highlighted by this exercise was the basing system of the United States. We all understood each others signals about limitation, brinkmanship, and who's got the guts to threaten to go further. In Move II we felt threatened by your feints at Baku. Moreover, we were worried that you had misinterpreted our Move I action as a sign of weakness and as unwillingness to go nuclear. We began to think of a way to impress you and bring you to your senses--that we were as gutsy as you were if not more so. In doing this, we found lots of intermediate targets in what the Soviets would call FBS (Forward Base Systems)--sort of anonymous semi-territories that we could hit that would impress you for which you had no equivalent. You had nothing but the Soviet homeland to strike at. The American system of bases provides a lot of targets that are halfway to the US homeland, for example the US facilities in Rota, Holy Loch and of course Guam. Attacks on these would impress the United States and do some damage to its war fighting capability but would not evoke all of the emotion and feeling that would result from attacks on the US homeland. The American basing system does provide an asymmetry which we as Americans have generally thought of as giving the United States a lot of extra capabilities. Looking through Soviet eyes I was struck by the vulnerabilities of the United States that emerge as you play this kind of game.

RED TEAM: May I refer back to the oil guarantee option in which we said we would guarantee the flow of oil to our friends. We were primarily trying to get as much support as we could from the US Allies since it was totally in their interest for the conflict to end. We were trying to put it in the guise that it is hard to keep soft production facilities going in the midst of a conflict in general, aside from any particular threat. You just don't do business as

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usual in the middle of a war zone. In Move III we even went further in guaranteeing to the Arab producing states a market for their oil no matter what happened.

BLUE TEAM: That's true anyway. There is nothing you could do to make it untrue. As long as there is oil, there will be markets for it.

RED TEAM: We also said that if it got complicated with shipping, if all the tankers got sunk, we would pay them for X number of years in foreign currency or gold or whatever they wanted. This would in a sense provide a pseudo-world market. Again, it was to their interest to be as nice to us as they could insofar as that lever could be used.

Next, concerning the US objective to evict Soviet forces from Iran, we were never convinced we were going to get thrown out of there. Our version was that with small unit activity, produced through guerrilla activity, if necessary, over the long haul, we could stay in Northwestern Iran indefinitely and that nuclear weapons were not a satisfactory means to achieve eviction. Our goal was to get a land route to the Persian Gulf. We were somewhat indifferent as to what political arrangements went with it. Looking into the future, say even over a period of ten years, all things are possible. Thus, there was a tremendous amount of self-confidence.

CONTROL TEAM: May I just elaborate a bit on this getting out of Iran. Initially, if I understand Red, you had some problem in understanding why the Soviets invaded Iran. It appears that somewhere during the play of the exercise you decided that it was a paramount Soviet interest to have Soviet forces remain in Iran. Did you see your vital national interests as involved? Were there some considerations of national pride that influenced your actions?

RED TEAM: Our problem was not that we didn't think it was a grand idea to have a land bridge to the Persian Gulf; we just weren't sure that going in with such a minor force as five divisions was the way we, thinking as Soviets, would have gone about it had we decided from the outset to go militarily. We felt it was a poor middle ground between a long term political activity which now, following Move III,

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would get underway and a real first class invasion. That was our problem. Given that the Soviets had invaded Iran, we looked for those factors which would have prompted the move and seized on the land bridge as an immediate objective. It was consistent with overall Soviet goals and consistent with the given military actions.

RED TEAM: There was one move which we did not play up as much as we might but was very key in our decision--that was to start the side-slipping of the rear forces in North-western Iran into Iraq directly and to improve the existing all-weather road as a sort of a symbol and to get an Iraqi link up so that the Iraqis became as tightly coupled to the Soviet Union as possible.

With regard to Guam, we didn't know if things were really going to get tough in China. There was always the possibility that the whole scene of confrontation would shift to China. We didn't want a war with China. We thought China might give us a hard time in the maritime provinces. We were in terrible shape over there, particularly if the [redacted] were brought to bear. Therefore, Guam was taken as a straight-forward, prudent military move to minimize US capability to support China, plus it would dissuade the PRC from adventurism because it didn't have direct American support.

CONTROL TEAM: I would like to ask a question about both Blue and Red actions toward the PRC. Blue sent a high level politico-military team to the PRC. Red saw their attack on Guam as sign to the PRC. I wonder given the objectives stated by both Blue and Red in Move I and the fact that the central focus was the struggle in Iran whether or not these side moves geographically escalated the conflict away from Iran. Did Blue and Red find themselves in a struggle over "backing down"? Had you begun to forget about the Iranian problem?

BLUE TEAM: We saw the crisis in Iran from the very outset as worldwide problem. US interests, US stature worldwide were challenged by the Soviet invasion of an allied and friendly country.

RED TEAM: We agree. Although we were delighted to have the crisis stay in Iran where we thought we had by

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far the best military position. We felt a similar engagement of prestige in the American use of nuclear weapons. We didn't want the United States thinking that tactical nuclear weapons would stop us, that we would be forced to roll over and play dead all around our borders. Then they could have permanently intimidated us. So we had the same worldwide approach to the crisis.

BLUE TEAM: If the initial US use of nuclear weapons had been more limited and if we had called for a cease-fire, would the Soviet reactions have been different?

RED TEAM: I think it was too limited.

RED TEAM: So do I.

RED TEAM: I think if Blue had used nuclear weapons in a symbolic move, there would have been much more room for maneuver on both sides. In reality we would have had a different situation, had the United States not gone to those levels. In reality--I don't know if anyone in the room agrees--the United States would not have used that number of weapons initially. It probably would have used fewer and then would have held to see what was going to happen and played it from there. We zipped up the ladder awfully fast.

BLUE TEAM: It would have been a different game if we had been more careful with our instructions on the first use. The first use was so important to us that I don't understand how we wrote instructions or allowed our military staff to execute without having been absolutely certain they were going to use [REDACTED]

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because they would not have been able to reconstitute their forces as quickly.

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RED TEAM: The political message we received from the United States was what really drove us--when you announced that total withdrawal was the only acceptable term for cessation, that ended the question of cessation right there.

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CONTROL TEAM: When you made up your options, what kind of consideration was given to maneuvering room for your opponent. You talked about reaching a point where there was no more maneuvering room, no other option but to escalate. In your deliberations was this a factor?

BLUE TEAM: It is not all that certain as to how important face-saving would have been either after the initial Soviet invasion or after the initial US use of nuclear weapons, but certainly it will play a part. There was a lot of talk by our team in Move III about the tit-for-tat aspect of it, i.e., we had to do something to get even for Guam. Nevertheless that didn't hold true by the time we decided what we were going to do. In other words, we weren't as much concerned with saving face as we were about bettering our position. Another point, we were kind of loaded into a losing position from the beginning by several events, many we brought on ourselves and many were brought upon us. For the Soviet Union to have invaded Iran suggests from the very beginning that the Soviets felt it was to their advantage. If I read the Soviet mind right, they wouldn't have started it if they felt they were going to lose. So this was their strong area. The only alternative that the Blue Team had throughout was to find some place where we could exert some strength while at the same time at best halting that invasion. This is why China was important to us. This is why NATO, which hasn't been talked about much today, was extremely important to us. From the very outset, it was vital that NATO mobilize to create a threat on the Soviet's western front. If we could get China that would have been three fronts. The one thing we couldn't afford was to give the Soviet Union a clear sweep with anything they had at Iran. We had some trouble with the Soviet military capability in Iran. Four divisions in the beginning didn't impress us very much. There was no Army; there was nothing behind those divisions. We frankly didn't see how they could do as well as they did. Too, we didn't recognize the Soviet ability to reconstitute so rapidly. The last thing that didn't get too much play was our last note to the Arabs which was a thinly veiled threat that if they didn't get the Soviets out of there they might be next. I imagine the nuclear devastation in Iran made not only an impression in New York and Moscow but in the capitals of the Arab world as well. The threat that they could be next would have gone a long way.

CONTROL TEAM: Yes, I think the fact that some 700,000 Iranians were killed should have been highlighted. That may have had some long-range impact on the Arab nations.

CONTROL TEAM: Would the use of nuclear weapons followed by conventional warfare have an impact on either the NATO or Warsaw Pact countries? Do you think perhaps, politically, Warsaw Pact countries would say we can splinter now --this is a good time to move or would our NATO countries say the US nuclear umbrella is a myth?

RED TEAM: I think it is more of a problem for NATO than it is for the Warsaw Pact by the very nature--the different natures of the two alliances.

RED TEAM: Along that line, the comment about a second front in NATO was of no concern to us whatsoever for we had no fear that NATO would launch an invasion since we were very careful not to provoke any NATO interests. We leaned over backwards not to do anything other than threaten Turkey.

BLUE TEAM: Well, of course, we did not really expect NATO to begin firing shots. The minimum that we wanted, and didn't get, was NATO to mobilize in its own defense, thereby, eliminating the seven day disadvantage which NATO invariably has. It would have presented within three days a different picture on the western front. Secondly, after the exercise opened with some unrest in eastern Europe, we envisioned a situation whereby NATO, and particularly West Germany, would be in a position to "aid their brothers in the East." It would have provided a distraction, at least for a while.

RED TEAM: We did disperse forces simply for sheer prudence. We alerted all of our forces, deployed our naval commands, deployed our submarines, that is, assumed a normal state of alert that would preclude any uprising in East Europe. We proceeded on the general assumption that the first nuclear detonation froze everybody, and they wouldn't want to get involved. Our Warsaw Pact allies would not see this as an advantageous time to revolt.

BLUE TEAM: We had quite a bit of discussion on NATO. NATO has been sitting for all these years thinking that if they are attacked we will execute the SIOP umbrella. They

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see in Iran an attack going on and they see how we are helping the Iranians yet they may not be too anxious to have that kind of help on their own soil.

RED TEAM: Both sides did a skillful job of avoiding any serious consideration of a confrontation in Western Europe. If the Soviets avoided the use of nuclear weapons in response to the Blue's use in Iran, they would have come out much better in the long term. First of all, they would have shown that they could handle the United States and that American nuclear weapons were ineffective in controlling the situation. The second thing is that if they didn't use nuclear weapons world public opinion would have been against the United States for having initiated the use. This would have put the Soviets in a very decided political advantage. As a matter of fact, we tried in Move I to have that occur.

BLUE TEAM: Did you actually give consideration to the loss of a number of divisions in that objective?

RED TEAM: We really didn't care if we got five or six divisions chewed up. You would have been placed in a situation where the pressures on you not to use nuclear weapons again was so extensive that it would have been most difficult to resume a nuclear attack.

CONTROL TEAM: You reinforced the divisions which had been decimated. That is unlike the normal Soviet doctrine; they would just pull that group out and bring some more in.

RED TEAM: We got caught by asking for two things which were mutually exclusive. We wanted to have those divisions dispersed so they would be poor targets but we also wanted them to move to the link up.

CONTROL TEAM: The Soviet divisions were completely dispersed up until they resumed their attack.

RED TEAM: The purpose of the airborne division was to make the Iranian forces turn and run to the defense of the capital. We underestimated the strength of the Iranian resistance. Our plan worked on one front but not on the other the way the game was played. Our whole strategy was to make it as difficult as possible for the United States

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to make a case in its own inner circles as to the efficacy of its use of nuclear weapons. That didn't work out as well as we thought it would.

RED TEAM: Our goal in Move I was to continue with the conventional attack. It might have been a more interesting game if Control had forced Red to continue the conventional attack--without Blue knowing that Red was required to do so. It would be interesting to consider US options in light of a more successful conventional Soviet attack.

CONTROL TEAM: To explain what happened during that 60 hour period--we tried to give Blue the picture that Red wanted presented. That is, there were no Soviet mass movements to the combat area thus Blue did not have any logical targets to hit. We tried to get them to take some action for a couple of hours. We used a two-phase scenario projection. In the first phase Blue was told that Soviet forces had paused, that there were no indications of unit replacements but there were signs the Soviets were reinforcing the divisions in Iran through infiltration and were moving some forces into Iraq. Blue was also told of the Soviet worldwide propaganda campaign.

We moved Blue into the second phase of the Red plan, i.e. the resumption of the Soviet conventional attack, when as lunch time approached Blue had not yet reached any decision on a follow-on attack. When Blue received the message indicating the Soviet conventional attack had resumed and an airborne assault had been launched on Teheran, they made the decision to conduct the second nuclear attack.

RED TEAM: We did not throw away the airborne division by any means. In our minds the reinforcements that would have been made before the Soviets ever entered Iran had been made. We didn't think we had to spell that out. Therefore, we expected that the air head which we established just outside Teheran was by no means a throw away; we had all the expectations that it would have worked and we would have had air superiority. We could have presented our plan a little more clearly. Probably what would have occurred was that we would have reconstituted our forces and initiated an attack from east of the Caspian Sea and got some momentum going until we were within a feasible link-up distance of the Teheran air field. Then timed our

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airborne operation to take place so that a link-up feasibly could have been achieved. We would at the same time try to avoid using such massive forces that we would automatically ask for reinitiation of nuclear attack. So it was a balanced proposition.

RED TEAM: Probably that was the crucial point in the Red Team's actions. If we had had a three or four man group sitting behind us we would have said, "Look this is what we want to do. Lay it out, time it, give us distance factors, movement factors, tell us what we can achieve against the Iranian elements while moving in the nuclear mode in other words a dispersed mode as opposed to a conventional mode. Tell us at what point, time we can introduce the assault elements of one airborne division, or two airborne divisions or one division than the other in order to make the attack work."

CONTROL TEAM: It has been alluded that a tit-for-tat exchange is not characteristic of Soviet actions. Did Blue perceive that their actions would get a much larger Soviet response?

BLUE TEAM: We were mixed on that. Some of us felt that there were targets within the Soviet Union that we could hit without initiating a nuclear response. Generally, the perception on the Blue Team was that the Soviets could respond in one of four ways. First they could stop. We didn't think that was very likely since Soviet forces were committed in Iran. Second, they could continue to use conventional weapons, third they could respond in kind and fourth they could respond massively. However, there is no way to really know precisely how they would have responded.

CONTROL TEAM: It is interesting to note that one of the Red contingencies in Move III was that if you did hit one of the Soviet's homeland sites they would swallow it.

BLUE TEAM: The Soviets did in fact escalate, and I wonder whether this was considered by the Red Team when they finally launched their nuclear attack. It was pointed out that there were certain advantages to the Soviet side because there were US overseas bases with no comparable Soviet facilities. On the other hand Red used Soviet based weapons--was there any concern that you were leaving yourself

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open for retaliation by using weapons based on home territory which we on Blue studiously avoided during Moves I and II.

RED TEAM: We didn't think about that much, for a fairly simple reason, by accident of nature we didn't have anything else. I don't think the question of whether it would inhibit Soviet actions really came up for active discussion. We thought about it from your point of view. We very early on recognized that the best way to keep a nuclear attack off our forces was not by force of arms but by presenting you with a politically difficult situation and at the same time a minimum military target. We did not believe you would shrink from using, at least, bombers.

CONFERENCE DIRECTOR: I notice the time is about up. We have had a good exchange and a lot of good points have been made, yet there is a lot to learn--perhaps these exercises will aid in that task. Thanks once again.

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