

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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October 20, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

SUBJECT: Principal Findings and Political Implications of Interagency Study of Soviet Civil Defense

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not
to P. 20

1. The interagency intelligence memorandum on Soviet civil defense now exists in a final draft of some 350 pages. It will be reviewed by the NFIB on November 1. The report reflects a general interagency consensus on key points, except for the State Department, which takes a more relaxed view of the Soviet program.

2. The key findings of the report are summarized in the attached statement, the gist of which you may wish to convey to the President.

3. Despite its high codeword classification, the report is bound to be leaked to the press and to become a focus of controversy. Indeed, the process has already started, as the attached story by Henry Bradsher indicates. Both the "alarmists" and the "relaxers" on this issue will find material in the report to support their position. The conclusions of the report about the meaning of the Soviet program to the Soviets tend to support the "relaxed" view which Bradsher articulates. On the other hand, alarm could well be aroused by some of the findings of the report, to wit:

(1) The Soviets have blast shelters for:

- all their top leadership (about 110,000 people);
- about 10 to 20% of their urban population.

(2) In three days, the Soviets could evacuate the bulk of their urban population and reduce their fatalities in a nuclear exchange to less than 20,000,000 and their total casualties to less than 50,000,000.

(3) In 7 days, the Soviets could fully evacuate their major cities and reduce their fatalities to less than 10,000,000 and their total casualties to less than 20,000,000.

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State Dept. review completed

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(4) The Soviets have 117,000 full-time civil defense workers.

(5) The Soviet civil defense program costs about 400 million rubles a year (or about \$2 billion if it were to be duplicated in the US, compared to less than \$100 million a year in current US programs).

These findings, once they become known, will become grist for those alarmed about Soviet capabilities and intentions. Inevitably they will have an impact on the SALT debate in this country. Given the almost total lack of a meaningful US civil defense program, these findings will clearly generate demands that we "do something" in this area. PRM-32 was launched just in time!

cc: David Aaron

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Summary of Major Findings of Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on
SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE: OBJECTIVES, PACE AND EFFECTIVENESS

1. The Soviet civil defense program focuses primarily on the protection of people: leadership, essential workers, general population, in that order. Other goals are the maintenance of the economic activity in wartime and post-attack recovery.
2. The pace of program increased substantially in the late 1960s.
3. A publicly recognized, highly-structured, military-controlled civil defense organization exists at all levels of the Soviet government and economy, headed up by a national organization led by a General of the Army and Deputy Minister of Defense. There are about 117,000 full-time Soviet civil defense workers.
4. The 1976 costs of the program are estimated at about 400,000,000 rubles. If the Soviet program were to be duplicated in the US, it would cost about \$2 billion.
5. Programs for the protection of leadership are well-advanced. The Soviets have command post shelter space for virtually all leadership elements at all levels (about 110,000 people).
6. A minimum of 10 to 20 percent of the total urban population can presently be sheltered. Assuming the continuation of current programs, 15 to 30% of the urban population would be sheltered by 1985.
7. Despite shelter construction, large-scale evacuation from target areas is the key to reduced casualties. Two to three days would be required to evacuate the bulk of the urban population and a week to evacuate fully the major cities.
8. While any projections are very uncertain, it is estimated that a US attack with 2,200 weapons directed at economic targets would produce the following results:

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| <u>Time for Preparation</u> | <u>Fatalities</u> | <u>Total Casualties</u> |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| Less than 2 hours | 50-70, 000, 000 | 120, 000, 000 |
| Less than 24 hours | Over 50, 000, 000 | Over 100, 000, 000 |
| 2-3 days | 15-20, 000, 000 | 50, 000, 000 |
| Over 7 days | 5-10, 000, 000 | 20, 000, 000 |

9. The Soviets cannot prevent massive industrial damage, a breakdown of their economy, and the destruction of their most significant material accomplishments.

10. The Soviets have a favorable view of their civil defense organization. They almost certainly believe that their present civil defense system would improve their ability to conduct military operations and enhance the USSR's chance of survival following a nuclear exchange. Given all the uncertainties involved in a nuclear exchange, they cannot, however, have confidence in the degree of protection their civil defense will provide them. Hence, their current civil defenses will not embolden them deliberately to expose the USSR to a higher risk of nuclear attack.

11. There is no reason now to believe that their judgments on the matters in Paragraph 10 will change in the foreseeable future.

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