

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 059082 261506Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000R

DRAFTED BY: EUR:TNILES:SES
APPROVED BY: S/S:WRPEARSON
S/P:WBURNS EUR:TNILES
S/S-O:KAUGUSTINE

-----1366CD 261508Z /38
O 261504Z FEB 92 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 059082

NODIS DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE
MINISTER SHAPOSHNIKOV; MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. JANUARY 29,
1992

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY BAKER, AMBASSADOR STRAUSS, MR.
ROSS, A/S TUTWILER, A/S NILES, GENERAL GOVEN; MARSHALL
SHAPOSHNIKOV, GENERAL LADYGIN, GENERAL PRONIN,

1. SUMMARY. AT THEIR JANUARY 29 MEETING, SECRETARY BAKER
AND DEFMIN SHAPOSHNIKOV AGREED THAT CHANGES IN
U.S./RUSSIAN RELATIONS, EXEMPLIFIED BY THE NUCLEAR
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 059082 261506Z
DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY PRESIDENTS BUSH AND
YELTSIN, HAD CREATED AN UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY FOR
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN U.S./RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
NONETHELESS, SHAPOSHNIKOV SHOWED CONTINUING SENSITIVITY
TO THE NEED FOR RECIPROCITY IN CUTS AND BALANCE AT END
POINT. HE DISCUSSED CONTROVERSIES WITHIN THE
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) OVER THE
DIVISION OF MILITARY ASSETS WITH A MIXTURE OF OPTIMISM
THAT SOLUTIONS WERE AT HAND AND SENSE THAT TIME WAS
RUNNING OUT. FOR AN OFFICER RAISED IN THE SOVIET
SCHOOL, SHAPOSHNIKOV DISPLAYED EXTRAORDINARY RESPECT FOR

DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO
SEEK AGREEMENT ON RULES FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS.
END SUMMARY.

2. IN WELCOMING SECRETARY BAKER BACK TO THE DEFENSE
MINISTRY, SHAPOSHNIKOV OBSERVED THAT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA
SHOULD TALK "MORE AND MORE. IT HELPS US AVOID
MISTAKES." THE SECRETARY STRESSED OUR ADMIRATION FOR

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Geoffrey Chapman, Senior
Reviewer

THE MANNER IN WHICH SHAPOSHNIKOV WAS CONDUCTING THE COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE CIS ON DIVISION OF MILITARY ASSETS. IN REPLY, SHAPOSHNIKOV INDICATED THAT IT WASN'T EASY. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FEBRUARY 14 MEETING OF CIS HEADS OF STATE IN MINSK AS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT STEP IN THE PROCESS. A PACKAGE OF 18 SEPARATE DOCUMENTS HAS BEEN DEVELOPED FOR THAT MEETING, HE SAID, AND HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT MOST, IF NOT ALL, WOULD BE ACCEPTED AT MINSK. "WE CANNOT DELAY FURTHER," HE SAID, IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON "NORMAL FORMS OF FUTURE EXISTENCE." ALTHOUGH HE SPOKE WITH SOME HUMOR OF THE
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 059082 261506Z
RECENT GATHERING OF 5,000 MILITARY OFFICERS IN MOSCOW, HE ADDED THAT SOME "HOT HEADS AMONG US SAY THAT WE SHOULD GIVE ULTIMATUMS TO THE PRESIDENTS. THEY CAN'T UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESIDENTS ARE ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE." (COMMENT: SHAPOSHNIKOV MADE THIS STATEMENT, TRULY REMARKABLE FOR AN OFFICER OF THE FORMER RED ARMY, WITH APPARENT SINCERITY. THERE WAS A CLEAR WARNING IN HIS REMARKS THAT ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY ARE REACHING THE END OF THEIR PATIENCE WITH THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES.END COMMENT.)

3. TURNING TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH UKRAINE ON THE BLACK SEA FLEET, SHAPOSHNIKOV OBSERVED THAT RUSSIA WAS NOT CLAIMING THE FLEET. ONLY UKRAINE WAS DOING THAT. RATHER, RUSSIA MAINTAINED THAT THE FLEET FELL INTO THE CATEGORY OF STRATEGIC ASSETS THAT SHOULD REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COMMONWEALTH. IN THIS SPIRIT, HE DISMISSED CRITICISM OF YELTSIN'S JANUARY 28 VISIT TO THE BLACK SEA FLEET WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT ANY OF THE OTHER PRESIDENTS OF CIS MEMBERS WOULD BE WELCOME ON BOARD. IN THE END, HE SUGGESTED, UKRAINE WOULD HAVE TO BE SATISFIED WITH 20 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ASSETS OF THE FLEET. ON THE ISSUE OF OTHER CONVENTIONAL FORCES, SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT ONLY MOLDOVA, AZERBAIJZHAN AND UKRAINE WERE COMMITTED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL ARMIES. UZBEKISTAN TENDED TOWARD THAT GROUP, HE ADDED. SHAPOSHNIKOV OBSERVED THAT IT HAD BEEN EASIER WORKING FOR ONE PRESIDENT THAN IT WAS FOR MANY.

4. TURNING TO STRATEGIC FORCES, SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THE

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 059082 261506Z
SITUATION WAS CLEARER. ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD BE REMOVED TO RUSSIA BY MID-SUMMER. AT PRESENT, TACTICAL WARHEADS WERE PRESENT ONLY IN RUSSIA, BYELARUS AND UKRAINE. SECRETARY BAKER STRESSED OUR GREAT INTEREST IN THE PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NOTING THAT WE LOOKED FORWARD TO FURTHER

DISCUSSIONS FEBRUARY 1 AT CAMP DAVID, THE SECRETARY GAVE SHAPOSHNIKOV A NON-PAPER ANALYZING PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER SHARP CUTS IN STRATEGIC FORCES. HE NOTED THAT WE DID NOT BELIEVE OUR PROPOSALS WOULD RESULT IN AN IMBALANCE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES, ALTHOUGH SOME OF OUR ASSUMPTIONS, SUCH AS THE DEPLOYMENT OF 500/700 SS-25'S AS OPPOSED TO THE 340 NOW IN THE FIELD, MIGHT PROVE WRONG, THE SECRETARY SAID, REQUIRING SOME RECALCULATIONS.

5. MOVING TO YELTSIN'S PROPOSALS, THE SECRETARY POSED SEVERAL QUESTIONS THAT HE SAID MIGHT BE DISCUSSED AT CAMP DAVID: 1) HOW WOULD THE RUSSIAN FORCES BE BROUGHT DOWN TO 2,000/2,100 WARHEADS? 2) WHAT DOES PRESIDENT YELTSIN MEAN WHEN HE SAYS RUSSIAN MISSILES WILL NO LONGER BE TARGETTED ON THE UNITED STATES? DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE WARHEADS WILL BE REMOVED? WILL THE MISSILES BE TARGETTED ON ANOTHER COUNTRY? OR WAS THIS SIMPLY A POLITICAL STATEMENT WITH NO IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS? IN REPLY, SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT CHANGES SUCH AS THOSE DISCUSSED BY YELTSIN COULD NOT BE INTRODUCED FROM ONE DAY TO THE NEXT. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT THE KEY QUESTION WAS NOT HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THESE CHANGES BUT RATHER WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN RESPONSE. THE
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 059082 261506Z

SECRETARY AGREED THAT THIS WAS A GOOD QUESTION. IN ORDER TO ANSWER IT, HE SAID, WE NEED ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS HE POSED REGARDING THE MEANING OF YELTSIN'S STATEMENT.

6. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT YELTSIN'S STATEMENTS CONSTITUTED A "SERIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT." THERE ARE VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION, SHAPOSHNIKOV ADDED, BUT RUSSIA WANTS CORRESPONDING STEPS BY THE UNITED STATES. HE SUGGESTED THAT REMOVAL OF SYSTEMS FROM ALERT STATUS AND RETARGETTING AWAY FROM BIG CITIES MIGHT BE INITIAL STEPS, BUT HE REPEATED HIS POINT THAT THIS PROCESS COULD NOT BE COMPLETED "IN ONE DAY." THE SECRETARY AGREED, ADDING THAT VERIFICATION COULD ALSO BE A PROBLEM. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD HAVE TO WORK ON THESE ISSUES. THE IMPORTANT POINT, HE SAID, IS THAT THE POLITICAL LEADERS IN BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE APPROACHED THE LEVEL OF MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING AT WHICH SUCH MOVES WERE POSSIBLE.

7. THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ONE OF YELTSIN'S PROPOSALS WAS TO REPLACE MIRVED SLBM'S WITH SINGLE WARHEAD MISSILES. THIS, HE SAID, WOULD BE A VERY COSTLY PROCESS AND WOULD RESULT IN A VERY COST INEFFECTIVE BASING MODE. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID HE HAD LEARNED WITH INTEREST OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROPOSAL TO

REDUCE TOTAL SLBM WARHEADS BY 30 PERCENT. HOWEVER, EVEN IF THIS WERE DONE, THE UNITED STATES WOULD STILL HAVE "TOO MANY" SLBM WARHEADS. SECRETARY BAKER SAID HE BELIEVED SHAPOSHNIKOV HAD MISUNDERSTOOD THE U.S.

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 059082 261506Z
PROPOSALS, AND FOR THIS REASON HE HAD GIVEN HIM OUR NON-PAPER. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT WE HAD NO INTEREST IN ACHIEVING AN ADVANTAGE OVER RUSSIA IN THIS AREA. HE AGREED THAT IT IS, AS SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID, A NEW ERA IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND WE CAN DO THINGS NEVER POSSIBLE BEFORE. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID HE BETTER UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. PROPOSALS. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PARITY, WITH THE U.S. EMPHASIZING SEA FORCES AND RUSSIA FORCES ON LAND. THE U.S. WILLINGNESS TO TAKE CUTS IN SLBMS, SHAPOSHNIKOV ADDED, IS A "VERY POSITIVE MOVE" AND ONE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. IN CONCLUSION, SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THE RUSSIAN SIDE WOULD WORK WITH THE U.S. NON-PAPER, WHICH WOULD FACILITATE A BETTER DISCUSSION AT CAMP DAVID. THERE ARE, HE SAID, "GREAT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PRESENT GENERATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS."

8. THE SECRETARY TURNED TO THE ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, NOTING THAT HE HAD PROPOSED EARLIER THAT DAY TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT THE TWO SIDES SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE "DO'S AND DON'TS" FOR SUCH TRANSFERS. REPORTS OF MAJOR RUSSIAN SALES TO IRAN, HE SAID, RAISE SERIOUS CONCERNS ON OUR SIDE AND MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE ASSISTANCE WE WANT TO PROVIDE TO RUSSIA AND THE OTHER NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT RUSSIA HAD "NO BUYERS" IN IRAN AND ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS SELLING ARMS TO TURKEY.

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 059082 261506Z
9. THE SECRETARY OBJECTED THAT TURKEY AND IRAN WERE HARDLY COMPARABLE IN TERMS OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES, BUT HE SAID THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA TODAY WAS SUCH THAT WE WOULD LIKE RUSSIA TO LET US KNOW WHEN OUR ARMS SALES CAUSE CONCERN IN MOSCOW. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT PRESIDENTS BUSH AND YELTSIN SHOULD DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT AT CAMP DAVID. HE ADDED THAT "WE NEED TO AGREE, NOT JUST TALK. IF YOU SELL TO VENEZUELA OR GUATEMALA, THIS IS NO PROBLEM FOR US. BUT WHEN YOU SELL TO OUR NEIGHBORS, THIS IS ANOTHER MATTER. OF COURSE, THIS DEPENDS UPON THE TYPE OF NEIGHBOR." TURNING TO IRAN,

SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN MEDIA REPORTS THAT IRAN WAS LAYING CLAIM TO PARTS OF AZERBAYZHAN.

10. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, THE SECRETARY RETURNED TO THE INTERNAL CONTROVERSY AMONG THE CIS MEMBERS OVER THE MILITARY ASSETS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND WISHED SHAPOSHNIKOV WELL IN HIS DIFFICULT TASK. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID HE DIDN'T MIND HAVING TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM, BUT HE ADDED THAT HE ENVIED HIS PREDECESSORS THE RELATIVELY EASIER TIMES THEY ENJOYED, WHEN THE ENEMY WAS CLEAR AND THE ISSUES SEEMED SIMPLE. BAKER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>