

LS

~~Secret~~

~~NOFORN~~
~~NOINTEL~~
~~NOCONTRACT~~

Military Intelligence Summary, Volume VIII, Latin America (U)

Defense Research Reference Series



Defense Intelligence Agency

[Handwritten signature]
1/16/89

RB



P0007783

DDB-2680-108-88
December 1988

~~Secret~~

14 FEB 1989

74322

DISSEMINATION CONTROL MARKINGS

~~WNINTEL (WN)~~ ~~Warning Notice Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved~~

~~ORCON (OC)~~ ~~Dissemination and Extraction of
Information Controlled by Originator~~

~~NOCONTRACT (NC)~~ Not Releasable to Contractors/
Consultants

~~PROPIN (PR)~~ ~~Caution-Proprietary Information Involved~~

~~NOFORN (NF)~~ Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

(b)(3):10 USC 424

~~Secret~~

~~NOFORN~~
~~WHINTEL~~
~~NOCONTRACT~~

**Military Intelligence Summary (MIS),
Volume VIII, Latin America (U)**

Defense Research Reference Series

*This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document
Prepared by the West Europe/Latin America Division,
Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency*

*This publication supersedes
MIS Volume VIII, DDB-2680-108-86, October 1986*

Information Cutoff Date: 1 August 1988

~~Classified By: Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassify On: OADR~~

DDB-2680-108-88

~~Secret~~ PROPERTY OF DIA LIBRARY

~~Secret~~

PREFACE

~~(C)~~ The *Military Intelligence Summary* (MIS), published in eight volumes, is a synopsis of military intelligence worldwide. Intended to serve as a ready reference, the MIS presents a compilation of intelligence on those forces that contribute to the military security of each country, and on the political and economic factors affecting the country's military capability. Published annually, the MIS serves to update information in other DIA publications.

(U) Information summarized in the MIS is available in detail in numerous DIA publications. A list of related publications, both completed and scheduled, is published in the *Register of Intelligence Publications* (DRS-2600-37-86) and the *Defense Intelligence Production Schedule* (DDB-2600-35-87) (Vol VI).

(U) Each classified title and heading has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.

(U) Typing support was provided by (b)(3):10 USC 424

(U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (b)(3):10 USC 424 Washington, D.C. 20340-0001. Requests for additional copies should be forwarded through command approval channels, as appropriate, to DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424 in accordance with DIA Manual 59-1, *DIA Intelligence Dissemination/Reference Services*.

(Reverse Blank)

iii

~~Secret~~

Marker Index
To use, bend book and follow
margin index to page with black edge marker

- Argentina
- Belize
- Bolivia
- Brazil
- Chile
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Cuba
- Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- El Salvador
- Guatemala
- Guyana
- Haiti
- Honduras
- Jamaica
- Mexico
- Nicaragua
- Panama
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Suriname
- Uruguay
- Venezuela
- Eastern Caribbean States

Unclassified



DDB-2680-108

PERU

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
1. GOVERNMENT	1
a. Key Government Officials	1
b. Type and Stability of Government	1
c. Internal Threat	2
d. External Threat	3
e. Communist Influence	4
f. Economic Factors	5
g. Military and Political Alignment	5
h. Key US Officials	6
2. MILITARY, GENERAL	6
a. Key Military Officials	6
b. Position of Armed Forces	7
c. Military Trends and Capabilities	8
d. Military Budget	9
e. Population	9
3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES	9
a. Army	9
b. Navy	17
c. Air Force	22
d. Paramilitary Forces	29
e. Total Military and Paramilitary Personnel Strength	30
f. Foreign Military Presence	30

APPENDIX

Installation BE List	31
--------------------------------	----

~~Secret~~

PERU

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President: Alan *Garcia* Perez

First Vice President and President of the Senate: Luis Alberto *Sanchez*

Prime Minister, and Minister of the Presidency: Armando *Villanueva*

Minister of Economy and Finance: Cesar *Robles* Freyre

Minister of Foreign Relations: Louis *Gonzales* Posada

Minister of Interior: Adm (ret.) Juan *Soria* Diaz¹

Minister of Defense: General of the Army (ret.) Enrique *Lopez Albuja* Trint

Director, National Intelligence Service (SIN): Lt Gen Edwin *Diaz* Zevallos

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) Peru has been under a constitutional, civilian system of government for nearly 8 years, following almost 12 years of rule by a military junta. A new constitution, written by an elected Constituent Assembly in 1979, entered into force at the same time that the civilian government took office in 1980.

~~(C)~~ In July 1985, Fernando *Belaunde* Terry completed a 5-year presidential term and was succeeded by the charismatic leader of the center-left American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), Alan *Garcia* Perez, who received 45.7 percent of the vote in free and fair elections held in April 1985. Although the Constitution specifies that the President needs a majority to be elected, Garcia's prospective runoff opponent, Marxist Lima Mayor Alfonso *Barrantes* Lingan, withdrew, and the National Elections Board declared Garcia the winner. APRA also won a majority in Congress: 60 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and 53 percent of the Senate. The Marxist United Left (IU) party was the second largest vote getter, with 21.2 percent in the presidential election.

~~(C)~~ The 1985 elections were a milestone in the development of Peruvian democracy as they marked one of the few constitutional changes of government in Peru's history; the succession was the first transfer of power from one elected government to another in 40 years. The new government moved immediately to check inflation, limit foreign debt repayment, and reduce arms purchases, while declaring its intention to promote agricultural development, respect human rights, have a nonaligned foreign policy, and end government corruption. The Garcia government has, thus far, had limited success in accomplishing these goals. Economic problems continue to plague the country and a feeling of political crisis, perpetuated by Garcia's governing style, hinders stability.

~~(S)~~ The Peruvian Armed Forces have a long history of active involvement in the political system of the country. There have been numerous coups and unsuccessful uprisings throughout the years since Peru gained its independence in 1826. For long periods of time, military leaders and dictators have held the reins of government. In recent history, Peru

¹(U) Controls the Guardia Civil and Guardia Republicana.

PERU

~~Secret~~

Secret

has been governed by the military during 1948-56, 1962, 1963, and 1968-80. During periods of civilian government, the Armed Forces have always been the final arbiters of political power. Of the three services, the Army is dominant.

c. Internal Threat

~~(C)~~ Peruvian democracy faces a serious threat from insurgents and drug traffickers, while the current economic crisis inhibits the execution of costly, yet vitally needed, nation-building projects to help eliminate the root causes of insurgency. In addition, austerity measures and low demand for Peruvian exports have created continuing labor unrest and popular discontent that are likely to continue until the employment situation and real wages begin to improve.

~~(C)~~ The fanatical Maoist-oriented *Sendero Luminoso* (SL — Shining Path) has clearly become the most visible insurgent organization in Peru. It has attracted a substantial number of recruits who have taken a violent path to discredit and bring down the central government, and disrupt national and municipal elections. A second group, *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru* (MRTA — Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) has emerged as a dangerous urban terrorist group.

~~(C)~~ The primary insurgent objective is to destroy productive infrastructure. Terrorism, combined with the economic recession and natural disasters, has increased the pressure on what is still a fragile democratic political system. The national elections in April 1985 and municipal bi-elections in November 1985 represented victories for Peruvian democracy. Both provided evidence of widespread support for the democratic system and for Alan Garcia's APRA and its program of social change.

~~(C)~~ By law, the Civil Guard, the Republican Guard, and the Investigative Police (PIP) are responsible for internal security. The Armed Forces can only become involved if the President declares a state or area of emergency and orders military participation in maintaining order. Terrorist activity led President Belaunde to declare such states of emergency in 1982.

~~(C/NF)~~ As part of its counterinsurgency campaign, the Peruvian Government has opened two regional Emergency Zones since December 1982. One, known as Emergency Zone 5 (EZ-5), lies in the south central mountains and consists of 15 provinces in 3 Departments (Aurimac, Ayacucho, and Huancavelica). The other, known as Emergency Zone 7 (EZ-7), lies in the drug growing and drug trafficking region in north central Peru and consists of four provinces in Huanuco Department. In February 1986, in response to increasing subversive attacks in the capital, President Garcia declared a state of emergency and curfew in the Province of Lima and the port of Callao. Army, Navy, Air Force, and police patrol the city streets to enforce the 1:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. curfew.

~~(C/NF)~~ In EZ-5 a military force, primarily Army, of approximately 6,000, assisted by a 2,000-man force of Civil Guard, Republican Guard, and Investigative Police, bears the brunt of the fight. The Air Force provides rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft for reconnaissance and transportation of supplies and personnel from Lima to the Zone, as well as a small air security detachment. The Marine Corps provides about 300 men who are trained in commando tactics. In EZ-7 a military and police force of approximately 2,000 men battles the insurgents.

~~(S/NF)~~ Peruvian military and civilian leaders recognize that Peru's growing internal security threat cannot be combated by repressive means alone. Military leaders continue to believe that military civic action and national development programs (construction of roads, schools, clinics, etc.) are vital parts of efforts to pacify areas threatened by the insurgents.

PERU

~~Secret~~

Human rights groups allege that security forces were responsible for 1,300 disappearances in 1982-85, as well as committing other violations. Beginning in 1985 and continuing into 1987, the government has taken steps which have dramatically reduced allegations of human rights abuses.

(U) Peru, producing some 60 percent of the illicit coca leaf supply, is the world's foremost cultivator and leading source country for coca paste and cocaine base. Most of this is exported to Colombia for conversion to refined cocaine hydrochloride (HC1) and international distribution. A lesser amount is refined in Peru or smuggled through Ecuador, Brazil and other South American "spillover" countries. Illegal coca products are smuggled out, chiefly by air from clandestine airstrips, or by boat utilizing the expansive Amazonian river basin.

(U) An estimated 98,000 to 121,000 hectares of coca were cultivated in Peru in 1987, over 90 percent of which were illegal. The Huallaga Valley in central Peru is the principal growing area, with other remote areas beyond government control also being used. Coca, the largest source of foreign exchange earnings, generates \$700 million in foreign exchange annually and serves as the economic base in regions where cultivated.

~~(S/NF)~~ The widespread presence of Shining Path and Tupac Amaru insurgents in the Huallaga Valley caused the area to be declared a military emergency zone in November 1987. The military presence in the region has in general not enhanced security for antidrug operations. Clear jurisdictional lines do not exist among security agencies, and there appears to be minimal coordination and increasing friction between the Army and police. Further, drug money and bribes provide an enormous temptation to both military and police officers in the area. It is not believed that there is institutional corruption or extensive security official participation in narcotrafficking schemes; rather, some officials are suspected of taking no action to stop illegal activities in return for monetary remuneration.

~~(C)~~ The Garcia administration, with US assistance, is pursuing an interdiction and eradication effort against traffickers with mixed success. Peru's severe resource constraints prevent adequate manpower and material support for effective law enforcement activities. The 500-member Civil Guard Anti-drug Police (CGAP, formerly UMOPAR), with the support and policy direction of the Ministry of the Interior, is assigned the lead in suppressing the trade. Narcotraffickers often have a clear operational edge in equipment, firepower, mobility and intelligence.

d. External Threat

~~(C)~~ The Peruvian Government considers the most significant external threat to be that posed by possible hostile activities emanating from Ecuador, Chile, or Bolivia, each of whom, in former times, has been involved with Peru in border disputes.

~~(C)~~ The longstanding border dispute between Peru and Ecuador erupted in late January 1981 into 5 days of fighting in the Condor mountain range where 78 kilometers of border are still unmarked. Ecuadorean forces were driven back by the Peruvians. The conflict coincided with the 29 January anniversary of the signing of the Rio Protocol, which ended the 10-day war between Peru and Ecuador in 1942. The outbreak of fighting has been ascribed to Ecuador's efforts to publicize the border dispute, have it adjudicated by the Organization of American States, and open the 1942 Rio Protocol to further mediation. Peru, for its part, insists on the validity of the Protocol and has succeeded in limiting membership of the OAS Investigating Committee to representatives of the four guarantor countries — Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. Internal problems in both Ecuador and Peru cannot be discounted as possible reasons for the outbreak. Recurring incidents illustrate the volatility

PERU

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

of the border issue. Peru is prepared to enforce its position militarily if Ecuador should resort to military means to press its claim.

~~(C)~~ The perception of a threat from Chile, which appears to have peaked in the mid-1970s, probably stems from the psychological impact left by the War of the Pacific (1879-83), in which Chile soundly defeated and humiliated Peru and Bolivia. The Peruvian Armed Forces do not believe that Bolivia is a military threat, but they are concerned that Bolivia's efforts to obtain access to the sea may heighten tensions in the Andean Region. President Garcia has played down the external threat and sought to improve relations with Ecuador and Chile. He reportedly confronted his top military commanders with the statement that Peru's true enemies are hunger and misery. Garcia has declared his intention to cut back Peru's arms purchases, preferably under terms of mutual reductions negotiated with Ecuador and Chile. He has indicated that, if necessary, the Peruvian Government will make unilateral cutbacks in order to fund its development plans.

e. Communist Influence

~~(S/NF)~~ Overall Communist influence in Peru is considered high. Peru maintains diplomatic relations with nearly all the Communist countries, the exceptions being Mongolia, Vietnam and, at the moment, North Korea. Since 1968, when radical leftist elements of the military seized power, 11 Communist countries have established relations with Peru, and four — the Soviet Union, Cuba, German Democratic Republic, and the People's Republic of China — maintain defense attache offices in Lima. Under President Garcia, Peru has returned to the aggressive Third Worldism which characterized the military regime. Peru and Cuba have announced plans to upgrade relations to ambassadorial level, but the exchange has apparently been postponed over a dispute about Cuban asylees in the Peruvian Embassy.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Soviet Union provides 60 to 100 scholarships per year to Soviet universities. About 600 Peruvians are believed to be studying in the USSR. The most influential returnees are professors at San Marcos and San Martin de Porras Universities. Their numbers are relatively small, but they contribute to the network of Soviet-trained professors who seek out bright candidates to follow in their footsteps.

~~(S/NF)~~ Soviet influence can frequently be seen in the Lima daily newspapers: Communist *Unidad* and leftist *La Republica*, *El Nacional*, and *El Diario Marka* (now defunct). The Soviets appear also to be heavily subsidizing the distribution of Russian language books in Lima through at least three different publishing houses. These books are sold at a number of stores at prices that seem well under the cost of publishing. Cubans in Lima operate closely with the Soviets and take the lead in pushing Communist propaganda lines.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Communist Party of Peru (PCP — also known as PCP-Unity — PCP/U) is the Soviet-line Communist Party in Peru. Its membership consists of about 1,500 active (and aging) formal party members. Its secretary-general is Senator *Jorge del Prado Chavez*. Although the PCP is submissive to Soviet direction (and receives a small monthly Soviet subvention), Moscow finds it to be an asset of limited utility. A number of other leftist parties, which together with the PCP constitute the United Left (*Izquierda Unida* — IU), are more able competitors for disaffected Peruvian youth. These parties usually incorporate the terms "Communist," "Socialist," or "revolutionary" in their titles, to signify their antiestablishment and at times anti-American views, but in no way signifying subservience to foreign direction. What political weight the PCP enjoys comes from its domination of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP), Peru's largest labor central.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Soviet Union considers Peru one of its most promising long-term targets in

PERU

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

South America. Beyond their significant stake and position within the Armed Forces, the Soviets maintain close ties to the United Left (IU), Peru's "democratic" Marxist coalition, and are attempting to build a solid relationship with the center-left government party, APRA. Moscow-line elements do not dominate the IU, but the Soviets regard increased strength for the left in general in Peru as a favorable development. Similarly, the Soviets stand to benefit from increasing violence associated with SL and MRTA terrorism. Although the Soviets categorically denounce and disassociate themselves from the Maoist-inspired SL, the fact remains that SL is a revolutionary group, whose destructiveness and perturbation of the democratic order assist the Soviets to realize their long-term objectives in Peru.

~~(S/NF)~~ Soviet goals in Peru are to expand relationships with the APRA government; establish useful friendships within leftist, and particularly Marxist parties; keep the military as a moderate friend and at times politically helpful ally; and encourage a viable Marxist opposition poised to come to power in a polarized political environment.

f. Economic Factors

(U) Peru's economy deteriorated sharply in 1988 as the government virtually ran out of cash and lost control over inflation. Despite some improvement in agricultural and fishing exports, manufacturing, mineral and energy production are declining. Peru, which has been a net oil exporter for the past ten years, will become a net oil importer by 1989 as oil wells continue to be depleted. With the economy again unraveling, popular discontent is growing. An increasing number of terrorist attacks against economic and political targets is plaguing Peru as a rising number of young people turn to subversion as living standards deteriorate further.

(U) Much of Peru's economy is geared for illegal coca production. Revenues of over \$500 million annually make cocaine Peru's single largest cash-earning industry.

~~(C)~~ Peru's foreign debt bill includes over \$15 billion owed to Western creditors and almost \$900 million owed to the USSR. President Garcia's policy of limiting repayment of foreign debt to 10 percent of exports has made Peru virtually ineligible for further loans from Western lenders. Peru has repaid nearly \$200 million of its Soviet debt with trade, and recently refinanced the balance of this debt through a multi-year trade agreement with the USSR.

~~(S/NF)~~ Peru does not have sufficient industrial capacity to support its Armed Forces. Its naval construction capability is increasing, and Peruvian shipyards are now capable of building merchant ships up to 70,000 tons. One Lupo Class frigate was completed in 1984 with extensive material and technical assistance from Italy. A second unit became operational in January 1988. Ordnance produced includes submachineguns, handgrenades, ammunition, and mortar and artillery rounds. Historically, the Free World has been the main source of military assistance to Peru, but since 1973, the USSR has been the chief single supplier to the Army and Air Force. Soviet contracts are valued at over \$2 billion and account for approximately one-half of Peru's military assistance agreements. Total Free World sales of \$2.0 billion are led by France with agreements totaling nearly \$700 million. Total US deliveries are valued at \$246 million.

g. Military and Political Alignment

~~(C/NF)~~ Peru is a member of the Inter-American Defense Board, which plans for the joint defense of the hemisphere. Additionally, it is a signatory of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (Rio Treaty), under which it assumes the obligation to support other signatory American states whenever they are threatened by aggression. Peru entered into a bilateral military agreement with the United States for specific military

PERU

~~Secret~~

cooperation (the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 26 April 1952), through which it has received US military assistance. The agreement was modified in 1969 when the US Service Missions were asked to depart, leaving only a small mission in Peru. Argentina has had close military cooperation with Peru, which became even more evident during the 1982 Falkland Islands war. During and after the conflict, Peru provided political and military support to Argentina. The latter included transfer of 10 Mirage 5 aircraft and associated spare parts to Argentina, training of Argentine pilots in Peru, and testing and evaluation of Argentine armor for possible procurement by Peru.

~~(C/NF)~~ Peru owes a massive debt to the Soviet Union, primarily for military equipment purchased under a former leftist military regime. An estimated 40-60 Soviet military advisers and technicians are in Peru to provide assistance to the Peruvian Army and Air Force in tank, artillery, aircraft, and helicopter maintenance as well as air defense operations.

~~(C)~~ Peruvian Government leaders maintain a firmly pro-Third World outlook and adhere to APRA's "anti-imperialist" philosophy. Most share the ideals of democratic government, individual liberty and others bases of Western culture. However, pragmatic considerations generally outweigh ideology in GOP foreign policy. The closeness of its relations with Western, Soviet Bloc, and other countries has largely been based on the government's perception of benefits it stands to gain from the relationship, either in material terms or domestic popularity.

h. (U) Key US Officials

- Chief of Mission: (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
- Defense and Naval Attache: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- Army Attache: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- Assistant Army Attache: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- Air Attache: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- Assistant Air Attache: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- Chief, MAAG: (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
- Army Section Chief: (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
- Navy Representative: (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Joint Command of the Armed Forces:

- President: Lt Gen German *Vucetich Zevallos*, Air Force
- Chief of Staff: Maj Gen Carlos *Mauricio Agurto*
- Chief, Division II (Intelligence): RAdm Jaime *Carrera Rivera*

Army:

- Commander: General of the Army Artemio *Palomino Toledo*
- Chief of Staff: Lt Gen Alejandro *Antunez de Mayolo*
- Director of Intelligence, Army General Staff: Maj Gen Juan *Campos Luque*

PERU

~~Secret~~

Inspector General: Maj Gen Julio *Valasquez* Giacarini

Navy:

Commander: Adm Oscar *Anderson* Noriega

Chief of Staff: VAdm Augusto *Fernandez* Hidalgo

Chief of Naval Operations: VAdm Daniel *Mariscal* Galiano

Director of Intelligence: RAdm Julio *Raygada* Garcia

Inspector General: VAdm Gonzalo *Gambiriazio* Martini

Commandant, Marine Corps: RAdm Manuel *Reyna* Mendoza

Air Force:

Commander: Lt Gen German *Vucetich* Zevallos

Chief of Staff: Lt Gen Cesar *Gonzalo* Luzza

Director of Intelligence, Air Force General Staff: Maj Gen Armando *Llosa* Alvarez

b. Position of Armed Forces

~~(S/NF)~~ The President of the Republic, as commander in chief of the land, sea, and air forces, presides over the Ministry of Defense, the highest organization concerned with National security. Created in January 1988 over the vehement objections of the Navy and Air Force, the Ministry of Defense has replaced the former Supreme Council of National Defense. It has a mandate to establish national security and defense policies. It also controls civil defense- and armed forces-related socio-economic development projects. It coordinates and establishes budget allocations, manpower strengths and personnel policies for the three branches of the Armed Forces. The Ministry also is mandated to subsume the "decentralized public organizations" (the various industries owned or operated by the armed forces) by 1989.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Ministry of Defense is out of the operational chain of command. The command line goes directly from the President of the Republic to the President of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces. The Joint Command consists of the three service commanders, one of whom serves as its president. This body is tasked with planning and coordinating joint service operations. In case of emergency, the President of the Joint Command is to assume command over all military and police forces.

~~(C)~~ Joint service theaters of operations were authorized in 1969 but in general were inactive until 1975. Peruvian military doctrine for joint combat operations provides for four of the five Army Military Regions (MR) (I, II, III, and V) to convert to theaters of operations (respectively, northern, central, southern, and northeastern). The commanding general of the region becomes the theater commander, and his joint staff comprises the region's general staff for plans. The deputy commander of the region becomes the ground force commander for the theater, and his army staff comprises the region's general staff. In Military Regions I, II, and III, the commander of the air wing becomes the deputy commander of the theater. In Naval Zones I, II, III, and V, the naval zone commander becomes dual-hatted as the naval adviser to the region. No joint operations are contemplated within Military Region IV. The Armed Forces probably do not yet have the ability to put this doctrine into practice in an effective manner. Joint operations were not undertaken during the 1981 border conflict with Ecuador which was primarily an Army affair supported by air and naval units.

(U) There are two-star, three-star, and four-star flag officers in the Armed Forces. There is no one-star officer rank. In the Army, a two-star *general de brigada* is equivalent to a

PERU

US major general and a three-star *general de division* to a US lieutenant general. In the Air Force and the Navy, a two-star *major general* and *contralmirante* are equivalent to US major general and rear admiral, while a three-star *teniente general* and *vicealmirante* equate to a US lieutenant general and vice admiral. In December 1984, a new four-star rank was established for the two top positions of each service: *general del ejercito* (general of the Army), *almirante* (admiral), and *general del aire* (general of the Air Force). Seniority is determined by the date of rank or, in cases of equal date, by position on the promotion list. The officer at the head of the list is senior.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

~~(C/NF)~~ Modernization of the Peruvian Armed Forces began in 1967 with the apparent purpose of increasing the size and capabilities of the forces before the Centennial (1979-83) of the War of the Pacific. Since 1979, the rate of modernization has decelerated, however, some equipment purchases have continued from both the USSR and the West.

~~(C)~~ The Army's main priority is to upgrade the combat capability of its air arm through purchase of a combination of observation, attack, and transport helicopters. Army leaders have decided to try to reduce army dependence on the Soviet Union for equipment and training. They realize that to do so precipitously would probably jeopardize readiness and are therefore implementing a long-term program to reduce this dependence.

~~(C)~~ The Air Force began its modernization program in the 1960s with the acquisition of Canberra bombers and (b)(1),1.4 () fighters. Major deliveries of Soviet equipment for the (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

as armored personnel carriers equipped with antitank missiles for base defense. To offset the purchase of fighter/interceptor aircraft by neighboring Ecuador and Chile, the Air Force purchased (b)(1),1.4 (c) which were delivered in 1986. Soviet-made Mi-25/HIND helicopters for the Air Force were delivered in 1983. The Air Force's modernization program has included a program to expand and upgrade its airfields, ranging from revetments for its aircraft to modern instrument landing systems.

~~(S/NF)~~ The principal objective in the Peruvian Navy's modernization program is construction of a new naval base in Chimbote in order to ease congestion in the main naval base of Callao. The first phase of the navy program to upgrade former Dutch combatants with missiles, new fire control systems, and enhanced antisubmarine warfare capabilities began in 1985 with the cruiser (b)(1),1.4 (c) . The Navy would like to replace its aging Daring Class destroyers with two modern destroyers. To date, the Navy has refused to acquire Soviet equipment. Since 1973, it has received cruisers, destroyers, and inland minesweepers from the Netherlands, two Lupo Class missile frigates from Italy (two others have been constructed in Peru), missile patrol boats from France, submarines from Germany, and leased LSTs from the US.

~~(C)~~ The Naval Aviation Force has been upgraded with the purchase of (b)(1),1.4 (c) (b)(1),1.4 (c) 1977, (b)(1),1.4 (c) ,

and AB-212 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopters from Italy in 1979. Two Bell 206B Jet Ranger helicopters were received from the (b)(1),1.4 (c) were received from the US in 1983. The Navy would like to acquire a high-altitude-capable helicopter to use in its counterinsurgency operations.

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

only one EW company in Lima. The Peruvian Army, however, plans to establish an EW system in the future.

d. Military Budget

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

No service allocation available.

e. (U) Population

21,269,074 (excluding jungle Indian population, estimated at 101,000 in 1961) as of 1 July 1988

Males (ages 15-49): 5,233,000 physically fit, 3,543,000; 227,000 reach military age (20) annually

Ethnic division: 45 percent Indian, 37 percent mestizo, 15 percent white (mostly Spanish), 1 percent black, Japanese, and Chinese

Literacy: est. 80 percent

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) The mission of the Army is to guarantee the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the republic, comply with the Constitution and the laws, and, if called upon by the President, assume control of public order during a state of emergency. Its primary military duties are to protect the territorial integrity of the nation and guarantee public order.

(2) Capabilities

~~(C/NF)~~ The Army as currently structured and equipped is minimally capable of performing the dual mission of conducting internal security operations and defending the country from a conventional attack by Ecuador or Chile. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) Peru's airborne units are capable of air assault operations in support of a main attack. The major factor limiting conventional operations is an overall logistic weakness. Peru would not be capable of protracted offensive operations or support of maneuver elements over long distances. There are indications that full-scale operations could be sustained only 10 days without major resupply from foreign sources.

~~(C)~~ The Army's capacity to structure an effective counter insurgency campaign is constrained by a variety of factors. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) The Army has not received the authority, funds, manpower, equipment nor training needed for such a program. Further, many within the Army insist upon maintaining a conventional capability focused on the traditional threat emanating from Chile and Ecuador. As a result, there is a reluctance to deploy more than 10 percent of the army's total assets in the Emergency Zones to counter the internal threat.

~~(C/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

exercises, and low educational level of its conscripts. To improve the professionalism of its enlisted men, the Army offers specialized training to those conscripts who reenlist.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(C)~~ The Commander of the Peruvian Army is responsible for the operational command and control of the Army. He is assisted by the Army General Staff, which is organized into directorates, staff, and commands and is headed by the Chief of the Army General Staff. The

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

The regional headquarters control most of the forces located within their respective areas of responsibility. The major exception is Military Region II where the Academic Centers fall directly under the control of the Commander of the Army.

~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

a services battalion, a signal company, an engineer company, and 1 or 2 antitank companies. The one Jungle Division, however, has no artillery unit. There are five reserve infantry battalions, one each assigned to two military region headquarters, two armored divisions, and the airborne division.


~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

The army air defense organization is designed to protect the armored units. Three ADA battalions, each equipped with 12 self-propelled tracked (b)(1),1.4 (c) in Moquegua and Camiara in (b)(1),1.4 (c) and in Tumbes in Military Region I. The Jose Galvez SAM Group (SA-3), consisting of four firing battalions and support units, is deployed to Ilo and Camiara. The air defense organization in the future (b)(1),1.4 (c) each comprising one SA-3 missile battalion, (b)(1),1.4 (c) and possibly one SA-7 battery. In January 1988, the air defense assets of the Army were officially transferred to the Air Force. The effective transfer is as of yet incomplete.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Ground Units

(b)(1),1.4 (c)




(c) Army Aviation

1. General

~~(S/NF)~~ Army Aviation was formed in 1975 with a mission to provide troop lift and light transport in support of airborne and light infantry air mobile operations. It is also tasked with providing VIP, troop, and cargo transport and resupply to remote army outposts. It has approximately 65 pilots. It is organized into a helicopter reconnaissance and attack squadron, two helicopter assault and transportation squadrons, and a services battalion. All are based at the Callao Army Air Base, which is located on the north ramp of Jorge Chavez International Airport. (b)(1),1.4 (c) deployed from time to time to provide direct support to combat units in (b)(1),1.4 (c) can be armed and is capable of carrying 24 troops at sea level, 12 at 2,000 meters, and 6 at 4,000 meters. The Alouette II helicopters are armed with AS-11 antitank missiles received from France in 1976.

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ Summary of Units

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



(d) Deployment

~~(S/NF)~~ About one-fourth of the Army is deployed in the central region, which contains the capital and important railroads to the interior as well as the terrorist-ridden central highlands. Less than one-third is located in the far south near the Chilean and Bolivian borders, while well over one-third is stationed on the north border adjoining Ecuador.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

~~(C)~~ The Army is equipped with a heterogeneous assortment of materiel. Prior to 1968, this equipment was a collection of US and European arms, mostly of World War II vintage. The Army began a modernization program in mid-1967. In 1973, the Peruvian Army became a client of the Soviet Union and acquired T-55 tanks, combat cars, field artillery, air defense artillery, antitank missiles, and transport helicopters. The Army has a variety of field hospitals, including (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) an incomplete US hospital (only medical equipment), and 12 German mobile surgical units.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Ground Weapons and Equipment

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(6) Logistics

~~(C/NF)~~ Procurement from numerous foreign suppliers greatly complicates the Army's logistic system. At present, (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c) The Peruvian Army is far from satisfied, however, and is striving to improve its weakest points.

~~(C/NF)~~ War reserves are thought to be limited, but there are sufficient reserve stocks of necessary munitions — repair parts, small arms, and consumable supplies — for at least 10 days of combat. All stocks are kept in covered, well-guarded, restricted areas. (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(C/NF)~~ Although varying widely from one unit to another, the quality of maintenance for the peacetime Peruvian Army seems to be generally good. The two main problems are the small number of well-trained maintenance personnel and the inadequate supply of spare parts. Maintenance and supply problems have been impacting on the availability rate of the Soviet equipment. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) The problem of the shortage of maintenance personnel is being resolved through increased emphasis on maintenance training in units and as graduates of the Army Technical School are effectively used.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) Except for a few specialists from civilian universities, officers are commissioned from the Military Academy. Their retention rate is high. Men and women are required to register for the draft upon reaching the age of 17. All male citizens 18 to 50 years old, and women 18 to 45, are subject to peacetime military conscription. All persons between those ages are considered to be members of the reserve. At present, only men are conscripted. The military services assign conscripts to serve in units within their own geographical area so that they do not have a problem of acclimatization in the dense jungle and high-altitude regions of Peru. In accordance with Peru's Military Service law, conscripts are inducted for a period of Service of 24 months. Upon completion of service, a conscript may reenlist, entering into a contract for service of successive periods of 1 to 2 years. The normal tour of duty for inductees is 1 year for those with 5 or more years of primary education and 2 years for those with less than 5 years of primary education. Industries are held education. Inductions are held four times annually (three in the jungle area).

~~(C/NF)~~ There is a token volunteer women's force. These volunteers are designated as part of a mobilization reserve force and will be used to augment the Regular Army in case of national emergency.

~~(S/NF)~~ Subordinate to the Army Mobilization Directorate are 5 military preparatory schools and 131 recruiting offices — 25 in MR I, 50 in MR II, 22 in MR III, 16 in MR IV, and 18 in MR V. Reserve infantry battalions are activated and assigned to divisions and regions as needed.

(8) Training

~~(C)~~ Conscripts begin their 2-year stint following induction. All personnel entering the Army are required to undergo 10 weeks of basic training oriented toward military indoctrination and training for the job that they will perform. There are no specific training units that conduct only basic military training. Each unit is responsible for providing training for its new recruits. Enlisted specialists (*tecnicos*) are usually trained in the units

to which they are assigned; however, a few selected men are sent to various branch and service schools as well as to some civilian technical schools.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Army has a comprehensive school system for officers and noncommissioned officers, culminating (for the officers) in the Army War School (*Escuela Superior de Guerra*). The quality and effectiveness of military training have improved steadily over the last decade. Annual joint Army-Air Force maneuvers are conducted in the military regions, and triservice maneuvers are held in the coastal regions.

~~(C/NF)~~ Since 1973, training in the Soviet Union has been provided for both officers and enlisted personnel. Courses in intelligence, helicopter maintenance, pilot training, ordnance, missiles, armored vehicle maintenance and supply operations have been offered. Training of enlisted personnel has been primarily in the area of maintenance, although some have also received intelligence training. The exact number of Army officers and enlisted men who have been trained in the Soviet Union is unknown, but at least 200 have been positively identified. It is estimated that more than 1500 Army personnel have attended courses in the USSR since 1973.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(C/NF)~~ All Peruvians of military age who are not on active military duty are members of the reserve. Until 1971, the Peruvian Army's trained reserve was a mostly unregistered manpower pool of former Army personnel. In 1971, registers were compiled, and in 1972, reservists were called for field exercises. Courses were also instituted for university students desiring reserve commissions. The Army has both an active and an inactive reserve. The active reserve consists primarily of former members of the Army, while the inactive reserve is made up of the registered military-age populace and is only a manpower pool. Training for the active reserve is conducted annually and, in some cases, semiannually, in all military regions. Active reservists apparently have specific unit assignments, normally in their former unit. This continued emphasis indicates that the reserve system is an important complement to the Army.

(b) Mobilization

~~(C/NF)~~ During the late 1970s, (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) This concept has been tested and found workable in most units. High-priority units, such as those on the Chilean and Ecuadorean borders, are maintained near full strength, with troops who were discharged during the previous year being designated to be called up as replacements for anticipated casualties in the event of conflict. In addition, most divisions have reserve motorized infantry battalions already integrated in their organizations. The cadres of these battalions are Regular Army officers and NCOs, with reservists who have been called up for training filling out the troop strength. As logistics are the major factor limiting the mobilization potential of the Army, it is doubtful that an attempt will be made to form a significant number of additional units.

~~(C/NF)~~ Under emergency conditions, mobilization capacity is estimated as follows:

Personnel	Divisions	Detachment
(b)(1),1.4 (c)		

b. Navy

(1) Mission

~~(C/NF)~~ The mission of the Navy is to defend the coastline, enforce Peru's claim to the 200-nautical-mile limit of territorial waters, protect coastal shipping, and patrol the inland waters. The Marine Corps participates in counterinsurgent operations in the Emergency Zone of south central Peru. The Navy also engages in civic action missions and commercial shipping in the Amazon Basin.

(2) Capabilities

~~(C/NF)~~ The Peruvian Navy is capable of defending Peru from attack by the naval forces of any immediate neighbor. Its submarine force is one of the largest in Latin America. However, these ships plus those assigned to the surface fleet are aging and suffering from a lack of maintenance due to budget shortfalls. The Navy possesses a significant capability in submarine, antisubmarine, and surface warfare areas. Its strengths include high morale, and good tactical proficiency. The major shortcoming of the Peruvian Navy is the paucity of surface-to-air missiles ^{(b)(1),1.4 (c)} as only the Lupo Class guided missile frigates are equipped with ^{(b)(1),1.4 (c)}. Other shortcomings include the diversity of the ship inventory; a lack of passive ASW capability; poor utilization of electronic warfare information; no planned maintenance (PMS) program in effect on some ships; a lack of minesweeping capability; and a lack of amphibious equipment.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Peruvian Navy is an annual participant in the ^{(b)(1),1.4 (c)} ^{(b)(1),1.4 (c)}. However, it did not participate in 1982 because of Peruvian resentment over the US position in the Falkland Islands conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom. With few exceptions, performance in these exercises has consistently demonstrated that the Peruvian Navy is capable of effective integration with US naval units in providing assistance in the defense of the Western Hemisphere. ^{(b)(1),1.4 (c)} provide only a brief sampling of Peruvian Navy performance, but they do demonstrate the capability of individual units at specific times.

~~(C/NF)~~ Within the Navy are Naval Police and Marine Corps units, which provide a modest capability to support the ground and air forces in the maintenance of internal order. Three navy hospital ships, which have regular schedules along the Amazon River and its tributaries, carry out the Navy's civic action program of routine medical attention to villagers, and transportation of material and technical assistance.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S/NF)~~ 27,500 (2,610 officers, 14,200 petty officers, 10,700 enlisted men and conscripts); total includes 120 pilots, 60-65 Coast Guard officers, and 4,000 Marines (includes estimated 100 naval officers who are technically qualified as Marine officers). The total does not include 526 cadets, 400 Coast Guard petty officers and nonrated enlisted personnel, and 6,278 civilian employees.

(4) Ship and Aircraft Strength

(a) ~~(S)~~ Ships

^{(b)(1),1.4 (c)}

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

In addition, the Coast Guard has 24 patrol (b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(b)~~ ~~(S)~~ *Aircraft Strength*

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General Service

~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

He exercises command over the operational forces through the Commander of Naval Operations and the Commander of the Amazon Naval Force; and over land-based facilities and the personnel of five naval zones. The Commander General of the Navy is assisted by the Navy General Staff, organized into three departments with subordinate divisions, and headed by the Chief of the Navy General Staff. The Inspector General of the Navy, the Directorates General of Personnel, Material, Economy, and Maritime Interests (which includes the Coast Guard), as well as the Directorates of Communications and Intelligence, all report to the Commander General. Naval schools and training centers are subordinate to the Directorate of Instruction.

~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

All major combatants are assigned to the fleet under the Commander of Naval Operations and are based at Callao Naval Base. A few river gunboats, small craft and barges are located in and near Iquitos on the Amazon. The Navy deploys two submarines, two destroyers, and two corvettes to Paita Naval Base on a monthly basis.

~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

PERU

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b) Marine Corps (Infanteria de Marina)

(C) The Peruvian Marine Corps is responsible for amphibious and counterinsurgency operations as well as naval installation security. Often referred to as a brigade, it consists of two infantry battalions. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

The battalions consist of between two and six companies. There are at least four independent companies, two of which were formed in 1984. With the addition of artillery, engineer, transport and support elements, a battalion can be tailored for amphibious operations. Marine Corps headquarters and training elements are located at the main Marine Corps Base at Ancon, about 35 kilometers from Lima. Detachments of approximately 40 men (platoon size) are deployed on port security duties throughout the country. Companies of about 250 men each are assigned to the Tumbes area in northern Peru, to Piura and Talara, and to the jungle regions. Under the operational control of the Commander of the IId Naval Zone and commanded by a Naval Commander, two companies (300 men each) rotate on 2-month counterinsurgency duty into Emergency Zone 5, along the Apurimac River in La Mar Province, Ayacucho Department.

(c) Naval Aviation

(C) The Naval Aviation Force is responsible for aerial antisubmarine and antisurface warfare at sea as well as airborne patrol and surveillance. Naval Aviation is organized into six squadrons, all stationed at the Naval Air Base at Jorge Chavez International Airport (Callao) except for two which conduct pilot training from San Juan de Marcona Naval Air Station. The Command has about 120 pilots and qualifies 15 to 17 pilots annually. An unknown number of enlisted personnel are assigned to the Naval Aviation Force. A summary of Naval Aviation units follows:

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(C) Organizational-level maintenance for aircraft based at San Juan de Marcona NAS is performed there. All other organizational-level, intermediate-level, and some depot-level maintenance is performed at the Callao Naval Air Base. The Air Force's SEMAN facility provides maintenance support on request. In late 1982, the Navy purchased three S-2F ASW aircraft from the US Navy; the aircraft were to be overhauled in the US before delivery in Peru. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

were added in 1979-80. Peru has purchased several

PERU

(b)(1),1.4 (c) Exocet [redacted] surface-to-surface missiles and in 1982, purchased at least four Exocet [redacted] (b)(1),1.4 (c) air-to-surface missiles. Two of the four SH-3D helicopters have the capability to carry and (b)(1),1.4 (c) launch two Exocet [redacted] air-to-surface missiles each. They must, however, be configured for the requisite mission at the Callao Naval Air Base, and armed with either missiles or torpedoes prior to deployment. Two separate incidents have been reported of a helicopter firing an Exocet to a range of approximately 36-40 kilometers. In addition, the helicopters have the capability to guide missiles fired from surface ships. Five Beechcraft B-200 maritime patrol aircraft ordered from the US in 1981 have been received. The aircraft are used for (b)(1),1.4 (c) both training and maritime reconnaissance. Three [redacted] ordered from the US in mid-1981 have not yet been delivered. Currently, due to a lack of spare parts and money Peruvian Naval Aviation Units are at a low level of readiness.

(d) Coast Guard (Direccion General de Capitanias y Guardacostas)

(C) Established in 1969, the Coast Guard is responsible for patrolling Peru's coastal waters out to a 200-nautical-mile limit, and for controlling Peruvian ports. A branch of the Peruvian Navy, it is commanded by the Director General of Ports and Coast Guard, a rear admiral, who is subordinate to the Director General of Maritime Interests. The service, with a normal strength of 500 personnel (including 60-65 naval line officers), is augmented with 30 line officers and approximately 600 Navy enlisted personnel in order to man all positions in the major Port Captaincies and the patrol boats; however, the 24 patrol boats in its inventory are manned only by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is moderately able to complete its assigned missions under noncomplex circumstances. Although charged with suppression and interdiction of smuggling, the Coast Guard has committed little effort to countering narcotics trafficking.

(6) Status of Equipment

(C) Surface ships are of US, UK, Italian, and Netherlands construction. The two cruisers have an average age of 30 years and were both purchased from the Netherlands. The Peruvian Navy plans to upgrade the weapon systems on the cruiser *Almirante Grau* and the Friesland Class destroyers with Exocet surface-to-surface missiles, new fire control systems, and enhanced antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Complete overhaul of the cruiser at a cost of \$130,000,000 is being performed at a shipyard in the Netherlands during the years 1985-88. Two destroyers are modified UK Daring Class ships. In 1973, these two had their weapon capabilities significantly enhanced by the addition on each ship of eight Exocet surface-to-surface missile (SSM) launchers. The Navy is upgrading its fleet with the addition of Lupo Class guided missile frigates (FF) equipped with (b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted]. Two constructed in Italy were delivered in March and September 1979, while two others began construction with Italian support in the naval shipyard in Callao. The first of the latter pair — the *Montero* — was laid down in 1978, launched in October 1982, and commissioned on 29 July 1984 and began sea trials in 1987. The (b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted] (b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted] and commissioned on 28 December 1987. In (b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted], Exocet-equipped, missile patrol boats and 20 Exocet missiles were received from France. The submarine force, the largest in South America, traditionally has been the best equipped part of the fleet. Of the 12 submarines in the Navy inventory, 6 were obtained from the US — 2 Guppy IA and 4 Tiburon Class. Six are the German Type 209, probably the most favored submarine sold for export in the Free World. In early 1984, the Peruvian Navy leased four Amphibious Vehicle Landing Ships (LST) from the US Navy. The ships arrived in Callao in March 1985. The LSTs were provided under a 5-year no-cost lease, renewable for a second 5-year period. Cost of reactivation was borne by the Peruvian Navy. This action was the first transfer of ships to Peru by the US Navy since 1974.

PERU

~~Secret~~

(7) Logistics

(U) The Peruvian Navy has some problems maintaining its force at sea for any extended period of time, but (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

The Navy uses fresh food due to the high cost of frozen, canned, and dried food. Otherwise, without underway replenishment of stores, onstation time is estimated to be approximately 10 days. POL — fuel, gasoline, and common lubrication oils — are locally available. Special lubrication oils, and oils and greases for ordnance equipment and other special uses, must be imported. A shortage of funds affects essential items such as fuel oil. Spare parts must be obtained from foreign sources, often at high cost. Maintenance capability of the Peruvian Navy is excellent, however spare parts shortages and budgetary restraints have reduced overall readiness to below sixty percent. In February 1984, the Peruvian Navy's only naval base, Callao, was severely damaged by flood waters. The high cost of the cleanup probably forced postponement, or elimination, of many of the Navy's planned programs.

(S/NF) Levels of ammunition stocks are unknown. The missile inventory is believed to include (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(C) Three facilities (Callao, Iquitos, and Chimbote) of the Peruvian Navy Shipyard (SIMA — *Servicios Industriales de la Marina*) work under contract for the Navy and for other government and private agencies. SIMA has the capability to construct small patrol ships and large auxiliaries — 25,000-ton freighters, 80,000-ton tankers, and oceanic scientific research ships. SIMA does repair and maintenance work on the Navy's submarines and surface ships. In 1981, SIMA initiated a new arms production line including designing and manufacturing 10,000 submachineguns for the Civil Guard and Republican Guard.

(C) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

(U) Except for officer specialists who have received direct commissions after they have graduated from civilian universities, officers are commissioned from the Naval Academy.

(C) Petty officers are drawn from conscript and volunteer enlisted ranks. They are developed to handle administrative and technical tasks, and do not assume leadership positions.

(U) Enlisted personnel are mostly volunteers or conscripts who have expressed a desire for Navy duty on their registration forms. The inducements of specialized training in trades, basic education, and the appeal of the seagoing life are sufficient to keep recruitment at the needed level.

(U) A program similar to that of the US Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps, under study, would supply some non-Academy line officers. All combatant units appear to be adequately manned. In 1983, for the first time, the Peruvian Navy added females to its ranks, albeit only in reserve units.

PERU

(9) Training

~~(C/NF)~~ The low educational level of most enlisted recruits requires that much training time be expended on elementary education. Nonetheless, the Navy has a fairly effective training program in which all recruits receive basic naval training. Training of officers is accomplished in the Naval Academy at La Punta, near Callao, which has an effective 4-year program patterned after that of the US Naval Academy. Officers may receive technical instruction to qualify them in the different naval specialties at the Naval Technical Instruction and Training Center located in Callao and Iquitos. The Peruvian Navy also trains its members in other civilian and military, national and international institutions, and uses US Navy training opportunities for both officer and enlisted personnel.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserve

~~(C/NF)~~ The strength of the Naval Reserve is unknown. However, naval reserve battalions, composed of both men and women, participated in a December 1984 parade celebrating the "Day of the Reservist." In April 1986, a navy captain was assigned as Director of the Naval Reserve Program. A 1971 decree requires all students of university-level schools who have opted for naval service in their conscription registration to register for 30 days of instruction each year for 4 years. This training is conducted both at the Naval Academy and on board naval units, presumably integrated with that of midshipmen from the Naval Academy who normally take midshipmen cruises during January and February. Although there are no reserve ships, the crews for operational units can be augmented with reservists. On 1 March 1985, seven privately owned sailboats (25 feet to 36 feet in length) were incorporated into the naval reserve.

(b) Mobilization

~~(C/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) At least 39 ships aggregating 424,000 DWT have a military support potential. Four petroleum tankers with an estimated capacity of 2.2 million US barrels of petroleum and related products could provide significant fleet oiler support to the Navy. There are an additional 625 ships of from 300 to 999 GRT in the Peruvian register that could provide local logistic and auxiliary support. Under emergency conditions, with foreign logistic assistance, the mobilization capacity of the Navy is estimated as follows:

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

~~(C)~~ The mission of the Air Force is to defend the country against external aggression. Secondary responsibilities are to assist the ground forces in the preservation of internal order, assist the government in the economic and social development of the country, provide

a government aerial photographic service, a government school of civil aviation, and a government aeronautical industry.

(2) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ The Peruvian Air Force has a limited capability to defend its airspace but its capability to provide effective air cover and close air support for Peruvian ground forces is growing. Air defense capabilities against (b)(1),1.4 (c) and the Ecuadorean Mirage F-1 are being improved by the receipt (b)(1),1.4 (c) from France. Capabilities are still hampered by limited radar coverage in the coastal area of Peru, and by the location of the air force aircraft. In daylight visual conditions, the Air Force could reach targets in Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile with its Canberra bombers. The (b)(1),1.4 (c) fighter-bomber aircraft comprise a formidable fighting force. The Air Force can provide effective support to ground forces for the maintenance of internal security. Air force capability to support internal security operations was enhanced in 1983 and early 1984 by the delivery of (b)(1),1.4 (c)

It could provide significant daylight, fair-weather support of naval operations. Overall light transport capability was improved with the arrival of Soviet An-26s beginning in 1977. The An-26, however, is limited to coastal and jungle operations because of its poor high-altitude and short-field capabilities. By mid 1988, the Air Force had received 15 An-32/CLINE aircraft from the Soviet Union. These will probably eventually replace the An-26 fleet. The Air Force has rehabilitated its DHC-5 Buffalo fleet in order to be able to operate in the mountainous regions and to provide a primary personnel airdrop capability. The Air Force's heavy transport capability consists of two DC-8s, five L-100-20 (C-130) Hercules, and six Mi-6 helicopters that provide substantial heavy vertical lift capability.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(4) ~~(C)~~ Aircraft Strength

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

communications and electronics squadron, a logistics squadron, a maintenance squadron, and an airbase squadron. In addition, one group of four squadrons is assigned to the Air Academy.

~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) Operations are conducted primarily from nine air bases — the civil/military airfields of Jorge Chavez International (at Callao), Capitan J.A. Quinones G. (at Chiclayo), Pisco, Capitan Montes (at Talara), and Capitan Concha (at Piura); and the four military air bases of El Pato (at Talara), Mariano Melgar (at La Joya), Vitor (near Arequipa), and Iquitos. Training is conducted primarily from Las Palmas Air Base near Lima. The four wing headquarters are located at El Pato Air Base (Wing I), at Callao Air Base (Wing 2), at Arequipa (Wing 3), and at Iquitos Air Base (Wing 5). Air Wing 4 has not yet been activated at Puerto Maldonado Air Base.

~~(C/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c) There has been no established mechanism to coordinate the air defense systems, and interservice rivalry has inhibited effective joint control of the systems. Currently, the Air Force Air Defense Command is absorbing Army air defense assets. The Air Defense Command, with a strength of about 2,000 men, was formed in 1977 to meet the Air Force's air defense mission of protecting population centers, industrial facilities, airfields, and air force installations. The air defense network consists of early warning/ground-controlled intercept sites, surface-to-air missile (SA-3) sites,² and tactical towed air defense artillery (ZU-23). One of the Air Force's current priorities is to acquire an air defense system which would integrate with its inventory of Soviet radars. The desired system would include two or three three-dimensional air defense radars, six or seven two-dimensional gap filler radars, complete communications systems, and command and control centers.

~~(C/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c) The Air Defense Radar Group is headquartered at Las Palmas, with squadrons at La Joya and El Pato Air Bases; detachments are deployed to Tacna and Ilo in the south, and to Chiclayo and Tumbes in the north. The Commando School is based at Vitor Air Base. Incorporation of Soviet radar and ADA into the Peruvian inventory in the late 1970s introduced a well-balanced air defense system into the area; one of the most effective in South America. Major deficiencies in the system include the lack of doctrine, trained personnel, and appropriate communications.

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

²~~(S/NF)~~ Of 11 active SA-3 missile sites, the Air Force formerly operated 7 and the Army operated 4.

maintenance and training are accomplished. Helicopters operate in all parts of Peru, are active in search and rescue activities, and do extensive contractual work in support of oil exploration and development in the Amazon jungle basin. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(C/NF)~~ The air facilities of Peru are limited in number (about 300), are poorly distributed, and are inadequately equipped for all-weather and night operations. Only 29 of the airfields have paved runways. Thirty runways are less than 300 meters long; 221 are between 305 and 1,520 meters; only 40 are between 1,450 and 3,048 meters; and 6 exceed 3,050 meters. One airfield has a radar approach facility (Jorge Chavez International), four are equipped with military GCA, three with standard ILS, and three with Soviet ILS. Only 15 airports have an instrument approach procedure, and just 10 are equipped with runway lighting. Of the 16 major airfields, 1 is for civil use, 5 are for military use only, and 10 are joint military-civil installations.

~~(b)(S/NF/WN)~~ Summary of Units

Unit	Aircraft ¹ Type	Total	Principal Base
(b)(1),1.4 (c)			

Unit	Aircraft ¹ Type	Total	Principal Base
(b)(1),1.4 (c)			

¹(C) Aircraft assigned to administrative units are not included.

²(C/NF) As of early 1986, only six were flyable.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ Aircraft are of US, UK, French, Canadian, Netherlands, Swiss, Italian, and Soviet design. The operational readiness of Peru's combat aircraft ranges from 40 percent to 60 percent in the (b)(1),1.4 (c) from 30 percent to 50 percent for the Mirages, and from 25 percent to 35 percent for transports, helicopters, and trainers. Peru experiences delays in obtaining spare parts from the United States, France, and particularly from the Soviet Union. The Air Force has developed a capability to perform depot-level maintenance on most systems, but it is hampered by an inefficient supply system.

~~(S)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) These were (b)(1),1.4 (c) Later purchases included nine overhauled (b)(1),1.4 (c) in 1976 and three (either new or overhauled) (b)(1),1.4 (c). In 1982, 10 Mirage aircraft were sold to Argentina during the Falkland Islands conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Twelve (b)(1),1.4 (c) ordered in 1984 were delivered in early 1987. In mid-1976, the Air Force placed orders with the Soviet Union for (b)(1),1.4 (c) swing-wing fighter-bombers. The Soviet sale included spare parts and provision for an instructor group in Peru for training and maintenance. These aircraft were delivered between April 1977 and mid-1978. Sixteen additional Su-22 aircraft (b)(1),1.4 (c) J — ordered in October 1979 were delivered by April 1981. Under the terms of the 1979 contract, the Air Force was also to attain its long-held desire to have the capability to perform depot-level maintenance on its (b)(1),1.4 (c) Other acquisitions since 1977 have included (b)(1),1.4 (c)

PERU

~~Secret~~

turboprop transports, and at least 2 surveillance radar systems. Fourteen (b)(1),1.4 (c) assault helicopters were delivered beginning in 1983. In January 1984, the Air Force received six unarmed (b)(1),1.4 (c) helicopters that it had purchased for use in the counterinsurgency fight in high mountainous regions of Peru. It has also negotiated for the purchase of 15 Blackhawk helicopters and 15 or so BO.105LS helicopters for use in the same campaign. The Peruvian Air Force has no in-flight refueling capability; however, it has acquired a Boeing 707, now being modified by Israeli Aircraft Industries to be a refueling aircraft. Paradrops using the An-26 transport have been successful. However, the high airspeed required by the An-26 for airdrops has resulted in the Buffalo and the L-100-20 aircraft being the ones primarily used in this role. Of the eight (b)(1),1.4 (c) purchased, only seven remain operational. The Buffalos are experiencing a low in-commission rate as a result of severe shortages of engines and spare parts.

~~(C/NF)~~ In July 1980, in an effort to solve the serious problem caused by a lack of advanced trainer aircraft for its fighter pilots, the Peruvian Air Force purchased (b)(1),1.4 (c) (b)(1),1.4 (c). In 1982, 16 were delivered and assembled in Peru. The Air Force purchased only (b)(1),1.4 (c). Engine overhaul requirements have left several aircraft out of commission, thus reducing the number of student flying hours.

(7) Logistics

~~(C)~~ The Peruvian Government Aviation Industry Enterprise (INDAER) has very little capability at this time (see paragraph 2.c. on page 10). It is almost completely dependent on foreign sources for aircraft, spare parts, armament, and all related equipment. Its primary sources have been the United States and, to a lesser degree, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, the USSR, and recently, Italy. Aircraft ordnance has been obtained from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. Communications equipment has been obtained from the United States and Israel.

~~(C)~~ Aircraft maintenance and overhaul capabilities generally are good. Some technical assistance, particularly in the overhaul of jet aircraft, is provided by French, Soviet, and US technicians under contract from the manufacturers. Maintenance at the air bases generally has been fair. The Air Force's primary depot maintenance facility — SEMAN, located at Las Palmas — is the only facility in Latin America that overhauls the Mirage aircraft. SEMAN performs almost all maintenance on the Canberra bombers and has the capability to overhaul the Hercules aircraft and the (b)(1),1.4 (c) and reportedly (b)(1),1.4 (c). The facility has the capability to perform depot-level maintenance, to rebuild wrecked aircraft, and to refurbish aircraft that have been out of service for several years.

~~(C)~~ With the exception of aviation gasoline, most aviation fuel in Peru such as jet fuel and special lubricants, is produced by the refinery of the government-owned oil monopoly — PETROPERU at Talara. Storage facilities at most airbases are adequate. Except at Iquitos, where fuel is brought in by river transport, air force fuel is transported over highway and road networks that interconnect most of the major towns and airfields. These networks are adequate to support the peacetime transportation needs of the Air Force. Stocks are believed to be sufficient for 60 or more days of combat operations. (Other shortages and equipment failures would almost certainly ground most of the aircraft in considerably less than 60 days.) The Air Force also has access to commercial stocks and the considerable PETROPERU reserves.

~~(C)~~ Ammunition stocks are adequate for training. War reserve stocks are kept in the Air Force arsenals at Las Palmas Air Base; on San Lorenzo Island, Callao; and at Punta Lobos Air Force Base. Punta Lobos is a joint facility of the Peruvian Air Force and Peruvian Commission for Aerospace Research and Development (CONIDA).

PERU

~~Secret~~

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(C)~~ Almost 30 percent of air force personnel are conscripts with very little education who enter the Air Force for a 2-year term. Volunteer enlisted men and noncommissioned officers are obtained largely by permitting the more capable conscripts to enlist. Peruvian Air Force noncommissioned officers and technicians are products of the Air Force Training Center (CEFAP). In 1977, the curriculum of the Center was lengthened from 2 to 3 years, increasing the number of students by one third to 980. The poor quality of enlisted personnel constitutes a major problem for the Air Force, because few have the necessary backgrounds to become good technicians.

~~(C)~~ Approximately 84 percent of the officers in the Peruvian Air Force are graduates of the 4-year Air Academy. The remainder are university graduates who volunteer for commissioned service. However, they can only enter staff and professional specialties, such as medicine and law, and are not given flight training. All combat (flying) officers must be Academy graduates. Since 1974, the Academy has been programmed for an annual total enrollment of about 550 cadets, with an annual graduating class of about 95. Between 30 and 40 combat arms cadets (pilots and navigators) are commissioned each year. The Air Force has consistently suffered from a shortage of officers and noncommissioned officers. Although there is an adequate pool of manpower in Peru, the Air Force encounters difficulties in finding, and attracting, qualified personnel who meet the Air Force's high academic standards.

(9) Training

~~(C/NF)~~ Peruvian Air Force training, although considered superior to that of most other Latin American air forces, suffers from shortages of suitable students, qualified instructors, facilities, equipment, and funds. The steady acquisition of fighter and transport aircraft since 1976 has created a critical pilot shortage. In addition, the pilot training program is strained for lack of operational trainer aircraft and an adequate number of instructor pilots. In recent years, the Air Force has suffered a fairly high accident rate. Errors point to poor aircrew training, poor mission planning, and poor crew discipline.

~~(C/NF)~~ Professional military education for officers consists of basic, command and staff, and higher studies. Approximately 15 percent of the officers complete their professional military education in one of several Western nations, particularly the United States. Enlisted personnel training consists of basic military, technical, on-the-job, and systems training. Further systems training, which is provided to technicians when a new system is acquired, is generally in the country of the contractor. One notable exception is the systems training for Soviet equipment, of which a large percentage was provided in Peru.

~~(S/NF)~~ Since 1973, as many as 2,000 Peruvian Air Force personnel are believed to have received training in the Soviet Union. Courses included helicopter pilot, fighter-bomber pilot, transport pilot, early warning radar, air defense artillery, surface-to-surface missile, air controller, commando operations, paratroop operations, armored car (BRDM-2), and intelligence. Except for intelligence training, the Air Force has stopped sending trainees to the Soviet Union as it believes that the Air Force can obtain better results at lower cost by training its own personnel on Soviet-made equipment in Peru.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(C/NF)~~ Efforts have been made since 1971 to organize reserve units, and a Reserve and Mobilization Command (*Comando de Reserva y Mobilizacion*) was formed within the

PERU

Ministry of Air. The Command was abolished in 1981 and its functions transferred to the Personnel Command and to the office of the Chief of Staff. There is no Air Force Reserve Program that would train reserve officers or require reserve officers to serve an obligated period with the regular service. The reserve program that does exist is only for mobilization purposes. The reserve consists of students in training at the Civil Aviation School at Collique, ex-Peruvian Air Force officers, the pilots of Peru's aero clubs, and the Civil Air Patrol. Some of the Reserve pilots have received training as forward air controllers.

~~(C/NF)~~ The Air Force's transport capability could be enhanced considerably by the requisition of all Peruvian-owned civil aircraft, as provided by law, in the event of a national emergency. Approximately 30 civil transport aircraft of 9,000 kg or more in gross weight are registered, owned, or operated in Peru. Of these, 19 aircraft are long-range, 6 are intermediate-range, and 5 are short-range. There are over 900 currently licensed civilian pilots in Peru. Over 140 are employed by the major Peruvian airlines.

(b) Mobilization

~~(C/NF)~~ (b)(1), 1.4 (c)
(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

d. Paramilitary Forces

~~(C)~~ The Garcia administration published decrees on 5 February 1986 providing for long-awaited police reform. The reorganization places three separate police forces — paramilitary Civil Guard (*Guardia Civil* — GC) and Republican Guard (*Guardia Republicana* — GR), and plainclothes Investigative Police (*Policia Investigadora del Peru* — PIP) — under joint command with generals no longer belonging to a specific police service branch. For the present, personnel will retain separate service identity up to the grade of colonel, with the division of labor being based on current specializations. The plan combines all police intelligence units into a single organization, creates a joint training school for new recruits, and turns passport matters over to civilian authorities within the Ministry of Interior. The Minister of Interior "retired" 1503 police officers from the three branches by the end of March 1986. There is considerable tension between the Garcia regime and the police forces due to the latter's wage-increase demands and perceived lack of recognition for their efforts. A police strike of major proportions in May 1987 threatened the country's stability and was only resolved by forceful action by the President. Following are the paramilitary forces in Peru.

(1) Civil Guard (*Guardia Civil*)

~~(C)~~ The Civil Guard, a force of 37,500, is charged with the maintenance of public order, protection of persons and property, and border patrol. The Civil Guard is geographically organized into five regions covering the entire country. Each region is subdivided into

PERU

Comandancias. Major tactical units consist of one cavalry regiment and five infantry battalions (two motorized). A separate 200-man unit, the 48th *Comandancia* (airborne), located about 300 kilometers east of Lima, in Mazamari, has a counterinsurgency mission. The Civil Guard is capable of maintaining internal security for all but the most serious outbreaks of violence. However, even with logistic support from the Armed Forces, it is incapable of containing or halting terrorist activities conducted by the SL or the MRTA. It has initiated an equipment modernization program, which should further improve its capability. An element of 100 women was activated in January 1978 to work primarily with youths, women, and urban traffic problems. In the case of a national emergency, the Civil Guard would come under the Commander of the Army.

(2) Republican Guard (*Guardia Republicana*)

~~(C)~~ The Republican Guard, a force of 15,000, is charged with the protection of government property, the security of national frontiers, and the operation of prisons. The Guard is capable of fulfilling these duties and of assisting in the maintenance of public order when necessary. Its headquarters is in Lima. Major units consist of 1 regiment (including 1 counterinsurgency battalion of about 300 men in Lima) and 1 service battalion. The largest concentration of force is in Lima. The remainder is generally in small detachments throughout Peru, principally in various types of public installations requiring a permanent guard force. The Guard is equipped only with standard light infantry weapons. Transportation and communications equipment are inadequate. In the case of a national emergency, the Guard would come under the Commander of the Army.

e. ~~(S/NF)~~ Total Military and Paramilitary Personnel Strength

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

f. Foreign Military Presence

(U) There are no military missions currently in Peru except for the US MAAG and the Soviet Military Advisory Group. Argentina maintains one naval officer attached as an adviser to the Peruvian Marine Corps.

~~(C)~~ Soviet military assistance to the Peruvian Air Force and Army is administered through the Economic Mission of the Soviet Embassy in Lima. There are approximately 60 Soviet military advisers, technicians, and translators in Peru. In addition, technicians in specialized functions come from the USSR on an "as needed" basis. The majority of the Soviet personnel are assigned to Air Force units and the remainder work with the Army.

(U) In addition to the Soviet presence, other foreign military personnel are present in Peru. French, UK, Italian, US and (possibly) Israeli technicians assist in maintenance of French, British, Italian, and US aircraft. Each year other countries — Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, South Korea — send military, students/instructors to Peruvian Command and General Staff-level military schools.

PERU

Consumer Questionnaire

This *Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VIII, Latin America* is designed for use by a wide variety of consumers. Please help us improve the quality of this publication by filling out the questionnaire and dropping it into the mail.

1. Name, Organization, Mailing Address and AUTOVON number (optional).

2. Did this publication relate to the needs, mission, or interests of your organization?

Yes No

3. Was it useful to you?

Yes No

4. How would you rate the following aspects of this publication? (Check one)

	EXCELLENT	GOOD	FAIR	POOR
a. Scope	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Level of Detail	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Readability	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Photos and Diagrams	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

5. What is your overall evaluation of this publication?

6. What improvements/changes would you recommend for the next (revised) edition of this publication?

7. Are there any other West Europe/Latin American geographic areas or products which you would suggest for future publication?

8. Are there any additional comments you would like to make about this publication?

Date Product Received _____

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-0001

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, \$300



NO POSTAGE
NECESSARY
IF MAILED
IN THE
UNITED STATES

BUSINESS REPLY MAIL
FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 12964 WASHINGTON, D.C.

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ATTN: DB-3
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-6617



DISTRIBUTION LIST

ODD AND JOINT ACTIVITIES

A010 1 AFS COLLEGE LIB
A015 1 ASD R&D/DARPA
A054 1 DGSC
A055 1 DIA
A085 1 NAT DEF UNIV
A086 1 NAT DEF UNIV(SCDC)
A102 0 OUSDP
A110 1 DISAM
A117 1 OSD/PA&E
A124 1 OSD/OUSDP/NA
A205 1 DHAHTC CODE SDSC
A210 1 DMAAC
A246 1 JCS/J-3 (JOD)
A300 1 CLIC
A302 1 JCS/CHAIRMAN
A305 1 JSOC
A306 1 SFDD-D
A307 2 USAISA
A310 1 JCS/J-3 SPECOPSDIV
A315 2 JCS/J-8
A335 1 JCS/J-4
A340 2 JCS/J-5 MIL SEC
A353 1 JSTPS
A355 1 US DEL IA DEF BD
A365 1 US DEL (OH MSG)
B003 1 DIA/DR (PROD REV)
B004 1 DIA/DI-1
B032 3 DIA/JSJ
B040 1 DIA/DID
B050 1 DIA/DAH-5
B060 2 DIA/RTS-2AS PENT
B091 1 DIA/DIA REP NMCC
B100 1 DIA/DB
B110 1 DIA/JSCJ-2
B111 1 DIA/JSCJ-1
B126 1 DIA/DX-2 (GROUND)
B137 1 DIA/DE-3
B150 1 DIA/DY
B287 2 DIA/DC-3C
B312 1 DIA/JSO-2
B329 1 DIA/JSO-1
B341 1 DIA/RTS-2B
B344 1 DIA/RTS-2C
B345 1 DIA/RTS-2C (VJ)
B351 1 DIA/RTS-2AF
B352 100 DIA/RTS-3A STOCK
B370 1 DIA/DB-4G4
B501 1 DIA/OS-1
B503 1 DIA/DB-5C2
B505 1 DIA/OS-2D
B544 1 DIA/DB-5E3
B547 1 DIA/CSP-1A
B548 1 DIA/DB-SPD
B551 1 DIA/DB-SPD/P
B593 2 DIA/DB-1E
B602 1 DIA/OSCI-1B
B617 1 DIA/DB-3
B625 4 DIA/DB-3C3
B627 1 DIA/DB-3C4
B629 1 DIA/DB-3C
B630 10 DIA/DB-3C2
B631 7 DIA/DB-3C1
B632 1 DIA/DB-4G2
B634 1 DIA/DB-5E1
B639 2 DIA/JSI-4B
B640 1 DIA/JSI-3
B673 1 DIA/DB-5A2 (DICC)
B675 1 DIA/DB-5B1
B676 1 DIA/DB-5B2
B681 1 DIA/DB-6C
B688 1 DIA/DB-5C1
B702 1 DIA/DX-5
B706 1 DIA/DX-5A1
B716 1 DIA/DX-5D
B718 1 DIA/DX-5A
B731 1 DIA/DX-6
B735 1 DIA/DX-7B2
B737 2 DIA/RTS-2B (LIB)
B738 1 DIA/DX-7B1
B742 1 DIA/RTS-4C
B801 1 DIA/DB-8E
B802 1 DIA GP ANMCC JSJ-3
B806 1 DIA REP USTRANSCOM
B857 1 USDAO LA PAZ
B867 1 USDAO SAN JOSE
B873 1 USDAO SANTODHINGO
B874 1 USDAO QUITO
B895 1 USDAO KINGSTON
B910 1 USDAO MANAGUA
B914 1 USDAO ASUNCION
B945 1 USDAO PANAMA CITY
B951 1 USDAO BELIZE
B953 1 USDAO BRIDGETOWN

U.S. ARMY

C020 1 DCS-OPS & PLANS
C045 1 US ARMY INSCOM
C066 1 INSCOM-CI
C100 1 17TH MI CO (II)
C170 1 1ST CORPS SUPT COM
C201 1 HQ I CORPS
C202 1 III CORPS
C227 4 101ST AIRBORNE DIV
C231 1 2ND ARMD DIV
C233 1 AF-TCAE
C234 1 1ST CAV DIV
C239 1 203D MI BATTALION
C242 3 US FORCES COMMAND
C243 1 FIFTH US ARMY
C244 1 11TH ADA BRIGADE
C300 1 6TH INF DIV (LIGHT)
C305 7 18TH ABN CORPS
C306 6 82ND ABN DIV
C307 1 24TH INF DIV
C320 1 197TH INF BGE(S)
C323 1 224TH MI BN (AE)
C325 2 470TH MI GP
C346 1 466TH MID (STRAT)
C349 1 449TH MID (STRAT)
C358 1 474TH MID (STRAT)
C361 1 467TH MID (S)
C400 1 10TH RHM DIV
C411 4 CISESEC SPBN FSH
C412 1 CISESEC SPBN PSF
C415 1 5TH INF DIV (N)
C418 1 7TH TRANS GP
C425 1 7TH SIGCOMMFT RCHE
C441 1 USAFS KEY WEST
C446 1 USAFS SAN ANTONIO
C454 1 FLD ARTY SCH
C459 1 COMD-GEN STF COL
C460 1 ENGINEER SCH
C461 2 INFANTRY CENTER
C468 1 QUARTERMASTER SCH
C470 2 ARMY WAR COL
C500 2 TRADOC
C505 1 MATERIALS TECH LAB
C511 1 NATICK RD&E CTR
C512 1 ARMY MATERIEL CMD
C522 1 YUMA PG
C523 1 LABCOM
C535 1 AVIATION SYS CMD
C545 1 ARCOM
C550 1 CERCOM
C553 1 COMMUNICATIONS CMD
C568 1 AIR DEF SCH
C588 1 DUGHAY PRV GRD
C590 1 USATAC
C617 3 CONCEPT ANALY AGCY
C620 1 SRD
C623 4 USAOG
C625 9 DET O USA OPS GP
C632 1 CHEMICAL CENTER
C635 1 USA ADA CMBT DEVEL
C639 1 CMBT&NG DEV DIR
C641 1 AVIATION CTR & SCH
C644 1 LOG CTR
C646 1 CACDA
C649 1 SIG CTR&FT GORDON
C687 4 USAJFKSNC
C683 8 INTEL CTR&SCH
C684 4 USAISD
C702 1 6TH ARMY CTF
C753 1 AFCITC
C754 1 USAFCA
C755 1 902D MIG
C756 1 902D MIG HIBN(S)
C759 1 INSCOM-HUMINT
C766 1 HQDA DAMI-FIC
C768 6 ITAC (LIBRARY)
C786 2 HQDA DAMI-FJM

U.S. NAVY

D002 1 OP-81(DHM)/CNA
D007 1 COMNISCOM
D029 1 COMNAVRESFOR
D039 1 FOURTH MAW/MARIC
D043 1 NAVFITWEPSCOL
D058 1 OP-65
D100 130 NPFC PHILADELPHIA
D140 1 NR RPLM 0187
D141 2 RESATKRONLNT(42K3)
D150 1 CMC (INTP)
D153 1 PACHISTESTCEN
D184 1 NAVSTYMARCEAN
D202 2 NAVMARCOL

D204 1 NAVMARCOL/IO
D224 1 MAG-49
D228 1 MAG-42 DET C
D229 1 MAG-49 DET A
D243 1 MAG 41 DET A
D246 2 NAVSMC CODE D22
D248 1 NAVSEASYSKOM
D255 1 COMINWARRESU 0208
D258 1 DTNSRDC
D263 1 NDESC
D359 1 FLECOMBATRACENLANT
D431 1 NAS GLENVIEW
D437 1 NAS WILLOW GROVE
D443 1 NARU ALAMEDA
D507 1 COMINWARCOM
D590 1 NR USCINCSO-0270
D591 1 NR USCINCSO-0111
D599 2 NAVTECHTRACEN/
D604 1 NAVTS-1
D640 3 EW TBU CHARLESTON
D642 3 NMITC
D710 1 CC 4TH MAR DIV
D711 1 CC 4TH FSSG
D766 1 NAVCDASTSYSCEH
D781 2 NSGA HOMESTEAD
D900 2 NAVOPINTCEN
D902 1 NAVOPINTCEN DET NP
D925 1 NAVSEASYSDET C84B
D947 1 NIC-10
D971 2 DNI/OP-092

U.S. AIR FORCE

E016 1 HQ AFIA/INIA
E018 2 USAF/INA(RAND-C)
E020 1 HQ AFIA/INOP
E021 1 DET-1 AFIA
E022 1 HQ AFIA/INT
E043 1 HQ AFIA/INH
E044 1 HQ AFIA/INUA
E046 1 AFSAC/INDE
E048 1 CSAA (AFSAC)
E054 1 HQ AFIA/INA
E077 1 DET 21 AFSAC
E100 85 TAC 480 RTG/INPPD
E104 1 4513 TFG/INDI
E130 1 SE AIR DEF SECTOR
E141 1 NE AIR DEF SECTOR
E144 1 NW AIR DEF SECTOR
E202 1 21 TAC FIGHTER WG
E226 1 AFDOS/IVDA
E280 1 AFTAC/DOO
E294 1 HQ USAF/XOOS
E298 1 HQ USAF/XO-CYC
E301 1 HQ AFIA/INXK
E310 1 HQ USAF/XOKA
E317 1 AFCSA/SAMI
E350 1 HQ USAF/XO00BD
E401 5 AF LOG CMD/IN
E402 1 DO-ALC-XRO
E403 1 AF SYSTEMS CMD/INA
E405 1 AF ASTRONAUTIC LAB
E406 1 SM-ALC/HMCE
E407 1 BALLISTIC MSL DFC
E410 1 HQ AD/IN
E411 1 AERONAUT SYS DIV
E412 1 SA-ALC/XRO
E413 1 ELEC SYS DIV/IND
E415 1 OC-ALC/XRO
E416 1 HQ AFSC/INJ(G)
E418 1 DG AIRLOGCTR-HMCCR
E425 1 WR AIRLOGCTR/MNR-2
E427 1 ROME AIRDEVCTR-INA
E429 1 HQ SPACE DIV/IND
E436 3 AFENC/ESRI
E438 2 3480 TCHTW/TTVLSI
E450 1 AIR UNIVERSITY/IN
E451 1 AUL/LSE
E452 1 CADRE/WGOI
E470 1 AFIS RES DTS 29
E474 1 AFIA/RE IRD 04
E478 1 AFIS RES DTS 8
E496 1 AFIS RES DTS 33
E500 2 3480 TCHTW/TTVLC
E501 1 453 FLIGHT TRNG SQ
E502 1 3636 CCTW/DOTD/I
E563 1 6948 ELEC SEC SQ
E706 3 HQ ESC/INAH
E726 1 USAFTAC/IN
E730 1 HQ USAF/XO0IR

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

F005 2 HQ MAC/IND
F006 1 USAF SPEC OPS SCH

F010 1 HQ 23RD AIR FORCE
F012 1 39 SOW/DOI
F013 2 41 RRRW/IN
F014 1 35 ARRS/IN
F018 1 21 AF/IN
F019 1 22 AF/IN
F020 1 42ND MAW/IN
F021 1 89 MAW/DOI
F022 1 109 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F023 1 118 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F024 1 130 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F025 1 133 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F026 1 135 TAG/IN
F027 1 136 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F028 1 139 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F030 1 143 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F031 1 144 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F033 1 146 TAG/IN
F034 1 153 TAG/IN
F035 1 165 TAG/IN
F036 1 165 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F038 1 167 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F039 1 172 MAG (ANG)/DOI
F040 1 176 CMPGP (ANG)/DOI
F043 1 314 TAG/IN
F045 1 317 TAG/IN
F050 1 436 MAW/IN
F051 1 437 TAG/IN
F053 1 463 TAG/DOI
F057 1 61 MAG/DOI
F058 1 1 SOW/IN
F062 1 DET 2 MACOS/CATS
F063 1 919 SOW/IN
F064 1 71 SOW/DOI
F065 1 403 RRRW/IN
F068 1 305TH ARRS/DOI
F071 1 459 MAW/DOI
F074 1 4 AF/AFRES
F077 1 ANG AATTC/IN
F079 1 HQ 445TH MAW/DOI
F080 1 60 MAW/DOI
F081 1 438 MAW/DOI
F083 1 94 TAM (AFRES)/DOI
F084 1 302 TAM (AFRES)/DO
F085 1 440 TAM (AFRES)/DO
F086 1 911 TAG (AFRES)/DO
F087 1 913 TAG (AFRES)/DO
F088 1 927 TAG/DOI
F089 1 928 TAG (AFRES)/DO
F090 1 105 MAG/DOI
F095 1 934 TAG (AFRES)/DO
F096 1 943 TAG (AFRES)/DO
F097 1 303 ARRS (AFRES)/D
F098 1 189 TAG/DOI
F099 1 907 TAG (AFRES)/DO
F101 1 446 MAW/DOI
F102 1 914 TAG/DOI
F103 1 349 MAW (AFRES)/DO
F104 1 433 MAW(AFRES)DOI
G005 4 HQ AFSPACCOM/INXS
G020 1 1013 CCTS/DOO
H525 2 HQ VII CORPS

OTHERS

I005 2 USCINCCENT
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
J005 3 USCINCLANT
J006 1 LANTDAC
J009 1 COMSCLANT
J010 1 COMUSFORCARIB
J011 1 USFORCARIB USARAUG
J037 1 COMTACWINGSLANT
J402 1 TENTH MAR
J413 1 MAG 29 46C1
J414 1 MAG 26 46C1
J415 1 MAG 31 46C1
J416 1 MAG 32 46C1
J501 1 USCOMSOLANT
J502 1 COMSECDEFINT
J503 1 NR CONSTRKFLANT
J504 1 NRCOMSECDEFINT 113
J505 2 COMNAVAIRLANT
J515 1 COMNAVSRFLANT
J517 1 COMNAVSRFLANT
J520 1 COMNAVBASE GTMO
J525 1 COMNAVFORCIB
J575 1 FMFLANT
J576 1 COMPHIBGRU 2
J577 1 22ND MAU
J579 1 4TH MAB
J581 1 6TH MAB

J582	1	II MAR AMPHIB FOR	K945	1	COMFIT/AENWINGPAC	L144	1	922SS/DOXI	Q043	2	AFMIC
J586	1	SEAL TEAM FOUR	K954	1	FASOTGPACD HOFFETT	L147	1	319 BHM/IN	Q420	3	FTD/SIIS
J614	1	2D MARINES	K966	1	VFA-125 (42GG)	L149	1	321 SMW/DO22I	Q592	3	FSTC (IS-1)
J618	1	SIXTH MAR	L005	1	HQ SAC (INO)	L151	1	341 SMW/DO22I	Q619	1	MSIC REDSTONE
J620	1	EIGHTH MAR	L041	1	544 IAS/IAR	L152	1	351 SMW/DO22I	R066	1	USCG OIS
J654	1	TACTRAGRULANT	L042	1	544 IAS/IAA	L154	1	379 BHM/IN	R067	4	USCG COMMANDS-ATL
J667	1	CG SECOND FSSG	L044	2	HQ SAC/INA	L157	1	384 BHM/IN	R069	1	USCG ICC
J668	1	SECOND RADIO BN	L045	1	544 SIM/DIA	L159	1	410 BHM/IN	R145	2	ACDA
J802	1	COMCRUDESGRU(28B1)	L050	1	544 IAS/IAD	L162	1	509 BHM/IN	S030	3	FRD LIB OF CONG
		CRUDESGRU B ONLY	L051	1	544 IAS/IAI	L166	1	2 ACCS/DOCI	S031	1	FRD/JSOA LIB CONG
J806	1	COMNAVSPESWARU 4	L099	1	SAC TACTICS SCH	M005	6	USCINCSO			
J810	6	CG SECOND HARDIV	L102	1	2 BHM/IN	M007	1	1ST PSYOP BN FWD			
J844	1	COMCARGRU B	L103	1	5 BHM/IN	M100	1	USAFSO			
J989	1	HELMINERON 12	L104	1	6 SM/IN	M301	1	CDRUSARSO			
K115	1	5TH AF	L106	1	7 BHM/INS	M303	1	JTF-B			
K300	1	IPAC (LIBRARY)	L107	1	8 AF/IN	M305	1	29TH MI BN (CEWI)			
K305	1	25TH INF DIV	L108	1	9 RTS/INOE	M310	1	SEC ASST FOR LA			
K365	1	HUMPTRAGRUPAC	L109	1	9TH SRN/INCC	M500	1	COMUSNAVSO			
K412	5	HAG 11 46CI	L112	1	22 AREFW/DOXI	N005	7	USCINCSOC			
K414	1	HAG 13 46CI	L113	1	28 BHM/IN	N015	1	COMNAVSPESWARCOM			
K416	1	HAG 16 46CI	L114	1	42 BHM/INS	N020	1	1ST SOCOM			
K421	1	HAG 39 46CI	L116	1	44 SMW/DO22I	N100	2	4TH PSYOP GROUP			
K435	1	COMPHIRGRU 3	L117	2	55 SRW/IN	N120	5	7TH SFG(A)			
K514	1	COMTHIRDFLT	L118	1	48 AREFW/DOXI	N130	1	75TH INF RANGR REG			
K516	1	CG I HEP	L119	1	90 SMW/DO22I	N132	1	2D BHC(RANGER)75INF			
K525	2	COMNAVAIRPAC	L121	1	92 BHM/IN	N155	1	129TH SOAC			
K603	1	THIRDMAN	L122	1	93 BHM/IN	N190	1	2ND PSYOP GROUP			
K608	1	11TH MEU	L123	1	94 BHM/IN			OTHERS			
K611	1	CG 1 MEB	L125	1	55 SRW/INV						
K622	1	CG 5TH MEB	L127	1	124 AREFW/DOXI	P002	2	NPIC/IB			
K623	2	FMFPAC BATTALIONS	L128	1	128 AREFG/DOXI	P055	25	CIA/OCR/DSD/DB			
		01 TO 3D ASSLT AMP	L129	1	134 AREFG/DOXI	P085	5	STATE			
		BN + 1ST FDRCONCO	L130	1	141 AREFW/DOXI	P090	15	NSA			
		3D ASSAULT AMPHIB	L131	1	151 AREFG/DOXI	P100	2	NAT SEC COUNCIL			
		BN ONLY	L132	1	157 AREFG/DOXI	P111	1	WH SIT ROOM			
K650	1	COMNAVSRFPAC	L133	1	160 AREFG/DOXI	Q008	2	NTIC			
K690	1	COMMATVAHQINGPAC	L135	1	170 AREFG/DOXI						

OPERATING FORCES PACIFIC FLT

Y077	1	ANTIETAN CG 54
X101	1	CONSTELLATION CV64
X103	1	ENTERPRISE CVN 65
X107	1	RANGER CV 61
X109	1	MIDWAY CV 41
X123	1	CARL VINSON CVN 70

OPERATING FORCES ATLANTIC FLT

Y025	1	MOUNT WHITNEY CC20
Y102	1	CDRAL SEA CV 43
Y118	1	INDEPENDENCE CV 62
Y122	1	EISENHOWER CVN 67
Y125	1	SARATOGA (CV-40)
Y127	1	T RODSEVELT CVN-71

TOTAL DISTRIBUTION: 864
STOCK: 100
TOTAL PRINT: 964

DISTRIBUTION LIST (MICROFICHE)

DOD AND JOINT ACTIVITIES

A096	3	NEACP
A301	1	USA0SEB
A309	1	STSC
A354	1	C3CM JTF
B352	25	DIA/RTS-2F STOCK
B809	1	902ND HIGP (099)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

U.S. ARMY

C441	1	USAFS KEY WEST
C464	1	ACADEMY HEALTH SCI
C500	2	TRADOC
C513	1	ARDEC
C515	1	CHEMICAL R&D CTR
C562	1	TRANS SCHOOL
C568	1	AIR DEF SCH

C617	1	CONCEPT ANLYS AGCY
C684	1	USAISD
C768	1	ITAC (LIBRARY)
C772	1	HQDA DAMI-PIO
C788	1	HQDA DAMI-FIL/S

U.S. NAVY

D100	20	NPFC PHILADELPHIA
D150	1	CHC (INTP)
D642	1	EW TGU CHARLESTON

U.S. AIR FORCE

E079	1	DET 23 AFSAC/CC
E083	1	AFSAC ALBROOK
E100	90	TAC 480 RTG/INPPD
E120	1	HQ ESAA/INOR
E200	1	AAC
E362	1	DET 12 ESAA
E422	1	AGHC/XRS
E436	1	AFENC/ESRI
E563	1	6948 ELEC SEC SQ
E699	3	USAF FLD LIASH DFC
E706	1	HQ ESC/INAM

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

F015	1	1550 CCTW/IN
F017	1	71 ARRS/DD
F029	1	137 TAW (ANG)/DOI

F032	1	145 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F034	1	153 TAG/IN
F037	1	166 TAG (ANG)/IN
F041	1	179 TAG (ANG)/DOI
F042	1	313 TAG/IN
F054	1	616 MAG/IN
F058	5	1 SOW/IN
F061	1	193 ECG/IN
F063	1	919 SOG/IN
F064	1	71 SOS/DOI
F073	1	14 AF/AFRES
F093	1	908 TAG/DOI
F094	1	910 TAG/DOI
F100	1	514 HAW(AFRES)/DOI
F509	1	FAIRECOMRON TWO
J412	3	HAG 14 46CI
J578	1	34TH MAU
J580	1	TWO SIX MAU
J593	1	COMOPTEVFOR
K115	1	5TH AF
K300	1	IPAC (LIBRARY)
K603	1	THIRDMAN
K746	1	FIRSTRADB
L048	1	544 SIM/DIA
L051	2	544 IAS/IAI
L106	2	7 BHM/INS
L107	1	8 AF/IN
L110	1	15 AF/IN
L111	1	9 AREFW/DOXI
L124	1	97 BHM/IN
L126	1	101 AREFW/DOXI

L129	1	134 AREFG/DOXI
L133	1	140 AREFG/DOXI
L134	1	171 AREFW/DOXI
L138	1	190 AREFG/DOXI
L140	2	305 AREFW/DOXI
L150	1	340 AREFG/DOXI
L155	1	380 BHM/INZ
L160	1	416 BHM/IN
L161	1	452 AREFW/DOI
L163	1	434 AREFW/DOI
L164	1	940 AREFG/DOXI
L184	1	178W/IN
N005	7	USCINCSOC
N185	1	305TH PSYOP BN

OTHERS

P002	1	NPIC/IB
Q592	1	FSTC (IS-1)

OPERATING FORCES ATLANTIC FLT

Y115	1	AMERICA CV 66
Y120	1	J.F.KENNEDY CV 67

TOTAL DISTRIBUTION: 225
STOCK: 25
TOTAL PRINT: 250

Secret



Secret