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NUWEP ISSUE PAPER

(b)(1)



(TS) ISSUE: The current method for defining and limiting (b)(1)  
(b)(1).

(TS) BACKGROUND: Since 1974, (b)(1) weapons employment policy has specified that our (b)(1) should be planned, where possible, to limit unwanted (b)(1), (b)(1) and (b)(1). The purpose for this restriction is to reduce the probability that (b)(1) attack options would be perceived by the (b)(1) in the hope mutual restraint could be exercised. To support this objective, the current (b)(1) (b)(1) constraint was developed to provide the capability for withholding attack on targets (b)(1)

(TS) During development of the (b)(1) NUWEP, it was recognized that more explicit and refined guidance was required with respect to the (b)(1) criterion. While damage to (b)(1) may be an important factor relating to escalation control objectives, it was questioned whether (b)(1) (b)(1) criterion should be the only measure of merit for defining and limiting (b)(1). However, in the absence of a better criterion, (b)(1) damage guidance (b)(1), and the JCS were tasked to report (b)(1) ability to achieve attack option objectives."

(TS) In (b)(1), the JCS responded to the NUWEP tasking by recommending that (b)(1) continue to be defined as (b)(1) or (b)(1). "This recommendation was based upon a JSTPS analysis (b)(1). Instead of addressing whether a more meaningful measure of (b)(1) could be identified to supplement or replace the existing criterion, the JSTPS limited their study to a (b)(1) and concluded that the current criterion was adequate.

(S) Recognizing (b)(1) JSTPS analysis and the resulting JCS recommendation to continue the (b)(1), two actions were initiated by USD/P.

- (S) First, a study was commissioned through DNA for an independent assessment to determine if a more effective criterion for (b)(1) could be identified.

(S) Second, the DepSecDef tasked the Chairman to continue to pursue development (b)(1), and to consider whether (b)(1) is the most effective

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measure of (b)(1) while also considering such factors as the (b)(1)  
(b)(1), the (b)(1)

measures.

(TS) However, during development of the (b) NUWEP, a better alternative to  
the existing guidance regarding (b)(1)  
Consequently, (b)(1)

will remain in  
effect until revised criteria are developed and approved. (b)(1)

(TS) DISCUSSION: There is now general recognition that the current (b)(1)

Consequently, the OJCS (b)(1), has  
worked closely to support the DNA study, and has tasked (b) to conduct a similar  
study as an independent assessment stressing (b)(1)  
as well as the (b)(1)

(TS) The most important factor regarding the current (b)(1) criterion  
is that it is defined only in terms of (b)(1). (b)(1)

(b)(1)

If, during the weapons  
application process, the JSTPS planner finds that the attack of a target would  
result in at (b)(1)

military attack option.

(TS) As an example, consider the illustration below of an actual (b)(1)

also shows a hypothetical weapons application against targets (b)(1)

. As indicated by the circles labeled A and B (assumed to represent  
weapons radii), (b)(1)

. While some damage would result from the lower weapon (circle B) to the  
largest (b)(1), the (b)(1) damage criterion would  
not be exceeded, and the two weapons would not be subject to the (b)(1)

. However, a third weapon, represented by the circle labeled C,  
would cause damage in excess of the (b)(1) criterion  
and, consequently, would be subject to the (b)(1).

\*(S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)



(S) Our (b)(1) application illustrates that, using the (b)(1) targeting constraint, (b)(1), i.e., the third weapon (red circle) would not be executed, (b)(1). Further, it (b)(1) that the (b)(1) and that the (b)(1) ."

(TS) Turning to the study results, DNA evaluated the current (b)(1) in or around (b)(1) each in the (b)(1). The attack options developed corresponded to (b)(1) respectively. The DNA Study concluded that the current methodology (b)(1) because the (b)(1) probably could not (b)(1). This conclusion is based upon two primary factors. First, the current methodology, as discussed above, (b)(1). Second, for the (b)(1) and attack options studied, a relatively small difference (b)(1). For example, as the table below illustrates for the (b)(1) attack, the use of the (b)(1)

(b)(1)

|                             |
|-----------------------------|
| *CURRENT CRITERIA SATISFIED |
|-----------------------------|

(S) The (b) Study emphasized (b)(1) and the (b)(1) in arriving at the following conclusions:  
 (a) the current (b)(1) would be ineffective from an escalation control perspective because we're (b)(1) upon which the (b)(1); (b) the (b)(1) would play an important role given strategic warning, and the (b)(1) even further the importance of (b)(1) as a measure of merit for (b)(1); and  
 (c) given (b)(1) doctrine, it is questionable whether any (b)(1)

(S) Although the JCS have not yet reported to the SecDef (b)(1) [redacted], the following conclusions appear to have been reached.

- (S) The (b)(1) [redacted] currently used for (b)(1) [redacted] are (b)(1) [redacted] for the purpose of (b)(1) [redacted].
- (S) The (b)(1) [redacted] scenario; an (b)(1) [redacted] should be used (b)(1) [redacted].
- (S) Some form of (b)(1) [redacted] constraint is required to provide the (b)(1) [redacted] the option of (b)(1) [redacted]. Although we cannot know whether the (b)(1) [redacted] (especially in (b)(1) [redacted]). Such an option would permit the (b)(1) [redacted] to (b)(1) [redacted] and would provide an appropriate response (b)(1) [redacted].

- (S) The use of the (b)(1) [redacted] in place of the (b)(1) [redacted] will provide a better approach for (b)(1) [redacted]. The use of (b)(1) [redacted] would mean that (b)(1) [redacted] (and those (b)(1) [redacted]) would be subject to (b)(1) [redacted], depending upon the specific attack option. Further, the "cost" of exercising the (b)(1) [redacted] in terms of (b)(1) [redacted] should be available to the decisionmaker

- (TS) The (b)(1) [redacted] included in the (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted]. It appears that a more effective measure for the relative importance of various (b)(1) [redacted] can be established in place of the current (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] that could be used for limiting (b)(1) [redacted] in our (b)(1) [redacted]. Further, a subset comprised of approximately (b)(1) [redacted] could be used for (b)(1) [redacted]. (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] expand the (b)(1) [redacted] objectives, and should (b)(1) [redacted] constraint.

- (S) Study is continuing with respect to the specifics of the proposed (b)(1) [redacted] criterion. A determination must be made regarding how (b)(1) [redacted] is to be measured, (b)(1) [redacted], and (b)(1) [redacted] for the various (b)(1) [redacted].

(S) PROPOSED GUIDANCE: Recommend (b)(1) [redacted] be revised to read as follows for the (b)(1) [redacted]:

"F. (TS) (b)(1) [redacted]: (b)(1) [redacted] options will be planned to (b)(1) [redacted]. Wherever appropriate, ((b)(1) [redacted]) plans will include the option of (b)(1) [redacted]. This (b)(1) [redacted], should demonstrate (b)(1) [redacted]. For (b)(1) [redacted] for area as defined by (b)(1) [redacted]. The specific damage criteria will be as proposed by the JCS and approved by the Secretary of Defense."