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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
3/20/70; 7:09 p. m.

- P: How are you getting along on the [] thing. Is it done?
- K: I don't know if you talked to Ziegler. We gave him some guidance that provides a cushion for you.
- P: Why didn't State put that out instead of kicking it over here. They threw it to Ziegler and now Ziggler had to throw it to me.
- K: Did Ziegler tell you what we told him to say?
- P: He said it was a modest amount.
- K: The details of any [] participation would have to come from [] Vietiane.
- P: The newspaper stories are wildly exaggerated -- we had nothing to do with it.
- K: Well, we paid for it.
- P: But they don't know that.
- K: We provided two answers to you tomorrow -- you can say:
(a) this is an application of the Nixon Doctrine -- they are Asians in trouble which we are helping out.
- P: Also, North Vietnamese in Laos []
We are going to put Harriman right on the... we really have to slug them on that.
- K: I don't think we have to be too defensive on the [] thing. It has been known. It's just []
- P: How long did they have it there?
- K: Just two weeks -- but it was agreed to be sent there in October.
- P: I remember there was some discussion about it when I was there.
- K: [] asked you about it.

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- P: Did Elliot help you today?
- K: Yes, he was good. Marshall Green collapses when things are tough.
- P: I am not going to be defensive on [] Laos. I really feel the briefing book has alot of material --didn't we cover it in the statement?
- K: It is just so you have it in mind just in case you get asked about it.
- P: Let's keep Laos out of the thing.
- K: Yes. You fully stated your position in your statement of two weeks ago.
- P: What about this order? I just want it to be sent over ^{as} ~~for~~ an order to be signed by me.
- K: It is being drafted and I will have it for you....
- P: They don't have to put out a press release.
- K: I have given the strictest instructions not to say anything.
- P: They say these things can't be done -- for a year we hit Cambodia but no one knew.
- K: Dick Helms sent over a memorandum from the Station Chief in Laos that said without the B-52's the whole thing is going to fall apart.
- P: Why is B'52 so important?
- K: B-52's bomb with radar, they fly with reconnaissance.
- P: If anybody asks me about that I will say yes, we will continue to do that. The thing to do is not to be a bit defensive about it. We have to say that the enemy is threatening our position in Laos.
- K: I still hope this thing in Paris will work out -- certainly after two more meetings something should.

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P: I don't know if we can wait that long -- you can't let them vacillate. I think they may be diddling.

K: But they aren't getting any publicity from these talks.

P: But they know that we won't hit them if we are talking to them. The Laos thing should be some message to them.

K: Oh, they will notice that. I don't know what they are up to, but they can't just be diddling us along.

P: Two good happened. The Brandt reception in East Germany and the Cambodia thing. The Brandt thing has sent shivers up their back. Can't you imagine the kind of reception I would get if I went there. I just may go. If Brandt wanted it, I would go.

K: The outcome would be unpredictable -- you know the East German is tough.

P: They are much tougher than the Hungarians. Even the American press reported the Brandt visit that way even though they hated to do it.

K: German situation is dangerous.

P: If it is dangerous to us, it is dangerous to the Soviets. How long would it take them to get weapons?

K: I would not comment on the Cambodian thing directly.

P: I will just say we noted the change and recognized the Government because it was selected by Parliamentary means.

K: You might say we expect Cambodian neutrality.

P: He may come back and take it over again -- you never know this may be a help to us, too.

K: The Cambodian development is a plus. The weakening of the menu series The B-52 strikes, keep them going. I want SAM sites hit soon. Is the weather okay?



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K: The weather is awful but they should be able to do it soon. April should be much better. We should be able to get uninterrupted periods of two weeks.

P: Our press on three networks made grave mention of the fact that casualties were over 100. There is no mention of the fact that they are 1/3 or 70% lower than last year -- 350.

K: Possibly about 400.

P: Basically the people in the press are not loyal to this country.

K: They can't bear the thought that you can come out all right.

P: We are either going to do it at Paris or we will do it the other way -- but we are going to do it. I have been reading these figures over the last three months -- if we killed one-third of what they say, there wouldn't be anyone left in North Vietnam.

K: The fact that no one has ever come back from North Vietnam -- the impact on South Vietnam must be enormous -- there is a breaking point (?) I was doing some preparations for my next meeting. They just aren't talking in these meetings as they were before. They aren't going to make it last for another three years.

P: You are going to meet them on the 6th.

K: 4th or 5th and then on the 18th.

P: I would tell them to fish and cut bait.

K: When you read the transcript, you will see that they have given a hell of a lot more than we have. We told them we would go out in 12 months.

P: They have not given us anything.

K: They don't insist on the 10 point anymore. If they don't say anything about the military thing next time I will not go back.

P: That's right, what we have to do is create a provocation to hit them.



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P: We are not going to hit them the way Johnson did. If we provoke we are going to kick the shit out of them -- anything ... everything short of nuclear weapons. That's why I approved the B-52 thing so fast. We are already being blamed for being in Laos, what difference does it make if we hit them with little planes or big ones. We may as well use the big ones.

K: I will give them an ultimatum that if they don't give us something I will break off. ~~The~~

P: The talks are important to them.

K: Although you deflated the talks to the point that they are not getting out of them what they used to. It's even off American TV. Habib is never on TV. Laos is a good diversion for the timebeing.

P: You mean for the US -- in the sense we are not talking about Vietnam. If we talk about Laos, people will think we are engaging in another war. This press is unbelievable. I told Ziegler everyone is bad -- they are all your enemy. They came up to me after the Gridiron and said something about new relations. I told them to forget it, it was just for one hour. You feel you have to get along with them socially -- I can't feel that way. I just don't want to associate with them.

K: I see them rarely.

P: They bore the hell out of you. As a group they are slobs. I will see Joe Alsop.

K: Quality of people going into journalism isn't high.

P: I don't know about their intelligence they write well and quickly -- they just don't have loyalty.

P: Let's come back on the Laos thing -- the diversion.

K: The Muskie speech?

P: Who picked it up.

K: No one.



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P: The only problem we have now is whether the public will think the whole thing is one package.

K: Basically, the people who are attacking Laos -- Hugh Scott said they are the ones who failed on their attack on your Vietnam policy and are now looking for another way to attack it.

P: I am going to work the balance of the evening on the press thing. If you have anything, make sure I have it by 10:00.