

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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April 11, 1977

NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION -- IN PART. 10/5/07

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: SALT and Other Arms Control Issues Addressed  
in Moscow

The following summarizes the outcome of the SCC meeting of  
April 7, 1977.

SALT

Our public posture will be to make clear that SALT is a long-term  
process requiring our patient efforts to try to achieve an agreement.  
We will not underplay the potential difficulties, and we should avoid  
over-optimistic assessments. We should play down the significance  
of the May meeting between Gromyko and the Secretary of State. In  
this connection, it was decided to propose that the Geneva discussion  
be resumed as soon as practical under Paul Warnke's chairmanship  
of the U. S. Delegation to address remaining SALT technical issues  
(verification data base, etc.) and to provide a possible channel for  
exchanging views on our proposals. Guidance on the technical issues  
will be developed by the SCC Working Group.

In our private discussions with the Soviets, we should emphasize our  
preference for the comprehensive approach. We should try to obtain  
a more specific Soviet critique of our proposals and Soviet counter-  
proposals. These discussions with the Soviets should be guided by  
PD/NSC-7.

State Dept. review  
completed

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The SALT Special Coordination Committee and its Working Group will undertake a detailed examination of the phasing of reductions in the comprehensive proposal -- the time at which the Soviets can be expected to exceed our proposed 550 limit for MIRVed ICBM's, the kinds of constraints that might apply to TRIDENT, the B-1, and Soviet SLBM and strategic bomber forces. There should be a systematic and comprehensive examination of all possible constraints on Backfire. There should be an analysis of the number of missile flight tests that would be appropriate to our comprehensive proposal, including the question of the definition of what is a test. There should be an examination of the definition of cruise missile range.

The elements of the comprehensive proposal should be examined to determine the sensitivity of changes of individual elements and how they would impact on U.S. and Soviet interests. There should also be an examination of how elements of our comprehensive proposal could be added to the deferral package, ranging from establishing agreed principles for SALT III to undertaking specific commitments to keep aspects of our comprehensive proposal viable, such as a limit on the number of MIRVed ICBM's. In this connection, there should be a careful examination of those cruise missile and Backfire constraints that might be acceptable.

OTHER ISSUES

CTB: It was agreed that there would be an experts meeting on the CTB following the closing of the CCD in Geneva in late April. To prepare for this meeting, the SCC Working Group, with Paul Warnke attending, will review the issues on the Comprehensive Test Ban to determine whether a full SCC meeting is necessary.

Indian Ocean: We will defer following up with the Soviets for several weeks.

[REDACTED] A draft Presidential memorandum will be completed and reviewed by the SCC. Consultations will be undertaken with the interested countries in the region on the basis of the decisions reached on the Presidential Review Memorandum.

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Anti-Satellite Systems, Notification of Missile Launches, and Civil Defense: These should all be discussed on a combined basis in a single working group. Anti-satellite systems would be discussed last on the basis of the PRM on Space Policy. We would look forward to handing over some of these issues to other forums, such as notification of missile launches to the SALT SCC. The Director of ACDA will develop the terms of reference for this discussion which will be reviewed by the SCC.

Chemical Weapons and Radiological Warfare: Discussion of chemical weapons limitations will continue in the CCD. We will take the position that we are willing to discuss both of these issues with the Soviets, but we will leave the initiation of discussions to them.

Conventional Arms Transfers: Discussion with the Soviets on this subject will be deferred until after the Summit. In the meantime, we will complete our own work in the SCC and undertake consultations at the Summit.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation: We would agree to regular high-level meetings on non-proliferation. No further substantive preparations are necessary. The level will be that of the Director of ACDA.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

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