Saddam
Hussein: More Secret History
Compiled
and introduced by Malcolm Byrne
December
18, 2003
Twenty years ago, on December 20, 1983, Donald Rumsfeld, currently
the U.S. Secretary of Defense, met
with Saddam Hussein during the first of Rumsfeld's two now-famous
visits to Baghdad. At the time, the United States was courting
Iraq as a buffer to the greater threat the Reagan administration
perceived in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As has now been widely
reported, the U.S. had already been providing the Iraqi regime
with intelligence and other support in its war with Iran. Within
a year of Rumsfeld's first visit, Baghdad and Washington had re-established
diplomatic relations.
In light of recent developments in Iraq, most importantly the
capture of the former dictator himself, the National Security
Archive is posting a compilation of newly declassified documents
from American and British sources as part of its new Web product,
The Saddam Hussein Sourcebook. The documents below, which
come from the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S. National Archives
and the British Public Record Office provide further fascinating
details about the secret history of U.S.-Iraqi relations from
the late 1960s, when Hussein emerged as the real power in Iraq,
to the 1970s, when Henry Kissinger began probing Baghdad about
a warming of relations, to the 1980s, when the U.S. government
and private businesses forged ahead with improved ties despite
widespread proof of Iraq's repeated violations of international
law through its use of chemical weapons.
The full record of the U.S.-Iraq relationship is not yet accessible
to the public. But as the situation on the ground in Iraq and
the Persian Gulf continues to evolve, and as American understanding
of the nature of U.S. alliances and allies deepens, the need for
fuller access to the historical record will only grow. As the
Houston Chronicle noted in its December 17, 2003, editions, "a
spirited examination of our nation's murkier alliances needs to
be constantly, and most often publicly, re-examined. Attention:
Riyadh, Cairo, etc."
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1: Biographic sketch
of Saddam Hussein by British Embassy Baghdad, November 15, 1969
Source: Public Record Office, London, FCO 17/871.
Saddam Hussein's rise to leadership of Iraq took a significant
step in November 1969 when he assumed a number of senior posts
in the Ba'ath Party and Iraqi government. Those promotions occasioned
this brief sketch of Hussein by the British embassy in Baghdad,
which described him as a "presentable young man" who
although seen initially as a "Party extremist" might
"mellow" with added responsibility.
Document 2: Telegram from British
Embassy Baghdad to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Saddam
Hussein," December 20, 1969
Source: Public Record Office, London, FCO 17/871.
The British ambassador to Baghdad wrote this fascinating assessment
of Saddam Hussein soon after his "emergence into the limelight"
as "the recognized heir-apparent" of the Iraqi president
in November 1969. At first, Hussein comes across as "singularly
reserved" but eventually begins to speak "with great
warmth and what certainly seemed sincerity" about various
subjects. He insists Iraq's relationship with the Soviet bloc
"was forced upon it by the central problem of Palestine,"
and he reveals an apparently "earnest" hope for improved
ties with Britain - "and with America too for that matter."
Paragraph 7 of the ambassador's account provides a remarkable
portrait of Hussein - "young," with an "engaging
smile," "a formidable, single-minded and hard-headed
member of the Ba'athist hierarchy, but one with whom, if only
one could see more of him, it would be possible to do business."
Document 3: Transcript, "Secretary's
Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting," April 28, 1975 (Excerpt)
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Department of State Records,
Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings,
1973-1977.
As part of a routine review of world events, Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger and his State Department advisers briefly discuss
a recent spate of diplomatic activity coming from Baghdad. Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Alfred
L. Atherton, Jr. mentions Iraq's nascent attempts at "patching
things up" with neighbors and generally "projecting
the image of a country that wants to play a very dynamic and accurate
[sic] role in the Arab World." Kissinger says this new activity
"was to be expected anyway when they cleared [the] Kurdish
thing," a reference to the March 1975 preliminary agreement
between Iraq and Iran that settled the two countries' border dispute
at the expense of cutting off Iranian (and U.S.) support to the
Kurds -- with tragic results for the Kurds. Atherton specifically
mentions the relatively youthful, 38-year-old Iraqi leader, Saddam
Hussein, as someone who bears closer scrutiny by the United States.
"Hussein is a rather remarkable person ... he is running
the show; and he's a very ruthless and ... pragmatic, intelligent
power."
Document 4: Memorandum of Conversation,
Henry Kissinger et al with Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Sa'dun
Hammadi, December 17, 1975
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Department of State Records,
Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973-1977, Box 13, Dec 1975 NODIS
Memcons.
This memorandum records the first face-to-face meeting at the
foreign minister level between the two countries' governments
in several years. Kissinger asked for the meeting in order to
probe the prospects for normalizing relations with Baghdad as
part of a larger campaign to warm up to the Arab world. He tells
Hammadi "we do not think there is a basic clash of national
interests between Iraq and the United States." Hammadi responds:
"We of course have different views." Chief among them
is Iraq's opposition to the state of Israel. Kissinger repeatedly
declares that Israel's existence is not up for discussion. "But
if the issue is more normal borders, we can cooperate." He
paints a picture of diminishing Israeli sway on U.S. policy, partly
because of "our new electoral law" which will mean "the
influence of some who financed the elections before isn't so great."
The two ministers discuss other regional issues and agree there
are no obstacles to improving bilateral economic and cultural
ties. Hammadi declares: "On the political level, we broke
relations for a reason [the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war] and we
think the reason stands." However, he agrees to stay in touch.
Document 5: Cable from U.S. Interests
Section Baghdad to State Department, "Ismet Kittani's Reaction
to US Chemical Weapons Statement and Next Steps in US-Iraq Relations,"
March 7, 1984
Source: Freedom of Information request.
On March 5, 1984, the State Department issued a public statement
criticizing Iraq for using chemical weapons in violation of the
Geneva accords. This cable describes Iraq's behind-the-scenes
reaction delivered by Iraqi Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Ismet Kittani to William Eagleton, head of the U.S. Interests
Section in Baghdad. Kittani's complaint has less to do with the
substance of the statement than with Washington's "timing
and ... manner" of delivering it. Kittani's sophistication
in the use of diplomatic techniques to soften the impact of public
criticism, and his awareness of the importance of the media are
notable. The bottom line for both sides is that the incident should
not stand in the way of improving bilateral relations; formal
diplomatic recognition followed in November 1984.
Document 6: State Department
Cable to Embassy Amman and U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, "Kittani
Call on Under Secretary Eagleburger," March 18, 1984
Source: Freedom of Information Act request.
During a visit to Washington, Iraqi Under Secretary Kittani met
at some length with U.S. Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.
The administration's explicit goal for the meeting was to blunt
the impact of the State Department's March 5 public criticism
of Iraq's use of chemical weapons. As this cable puts it: "[T]he
main message of the U.S. side [is that] our condemnation of Iraqi
CW use was made as part of [a] strong U.S. commitment to long
standing policy, and not as a pro-Iranian/anti-Iraqi gesture."
To "reinforce" the point, Secretary of State George
Shultz dropped in on the meeting briefly. "The U.S. will
continue its efforts to help prevent an Iranian victory, and earnestly
wishes to continue the progress in its relations with Iraq,"
Eagleburger told his counterpart. Among other steps to improve
Iraq's position, Eagleburger indicated he had spoken with Export-Import
Bank Chairman William Draper about the importance of financing
projects in Iraq - at a time when internal bank objections threatened
to scotch plans to provide loans for the Aqaba pipeline.
Document 7: State Department
Cable to Donald Rumsfeld Party, "Briefing Notes for Rumsfeld
Visit to Baghdad," March 24, 1984
Source: Freedom of Information Act request.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made two trips to Baghdad
as Ronald Reagan's special Middle East envoy. The first visit
took place in December 1983 (see the National
Security Archive's electronic briefing book, "Shaking Hands
with Saddam Hussein"), the second in March 1984.
This cable offers Rumsfeld some background information in advance
of the latter visit, and includes the suggestion that he reinforce
the message delivered by Secretary of State Shultz and Under Secretary
Eagleburger in their March 15 meeting with Iraqi Under Secretary
Kittani (previous document). The cable indicates Kittani remains
"unpersuaded" by private U.S. assertions that the recent
public statement against Iraq's chemical weapons use was necessitated
"by our strong opposition to the use of lethal and incapacitating
CW, wherever it occurs." The State Department wants to reassure
Baghdad of its interest in improving bilateral ties "at a
pace of Iraq's choosing." The Department tells Rumsfeld,
"If Saddam or Tariq Aziz receives you . . . it will be a
noteworthy gesture of the GOI's [Government of Iraq's] interest
in keeping our relations on track." On March 26, Tariq Aziz
received Rumsfeld during a brief, six-hour visit to Iraq. (National
Security Archive freedom of information requests related to this
meeting are still outstanding.) The cable also makes a passing
reference to Saddam Hussein's "support and sanctuary for
the Abu Nidhal [sic] terrorists" but gives no indication
that Rumsfeld should raise the subject with the Iraqis or that
it might stand in the way of warmer relations with Baghdad. One
version of this document was previously published as Document
48 in "Shaking Hands with
Saddam," but that version was entirely missing the second
page with the crucial instruction to Rumsfeld that U.S. interests
in improving U.S.-Iraq ties "remain undiminished" despite
revelations of Iraq's use of chemical weapons.
Document 7a: State Department
Cable to Middle East Posts, "Department Press Briefing March
9, 1984," March 10, 1984
Source: Freedom of
Information Act request.
Donald Rumsfeld's March 1984 trip to Iraq and other Middle Eastern
countries followed speculation earlier in the month that he was
returning to his regular job, running the pharmaceutical firm
G.D. Searle & Co. As of the March 9 State Department press
briefing partially reproduced in this cable, the Department either
had no indication that he was even planning a trip, or was for
some reason keeping it quiet. "I think he . . . has nothing
in mind for the moment," spokesman John Hughes said, "but
we'll see how that turns out." Perhaps because of the speculation
that Rumsfeld was "backing off the Middle East and backing
into Searle," his visit to the region did in fact take place
before the end of the month. Two months later, on May 18, Rumsfeld
finally resigned as special envoy.
Document 8: Cable from U.S. Interests
Section Baghdad to State Department, "Iraqi Attitude toward
an Israeli Embarace [sic] on the Aqaba Pipeline," April 16,
1984
Source: Freedom of Information request.
A major project on which U.S. officials worked closely with Baghdad
in the mid-1980s was construction of a pipeline to transfer Iraqi
oil to the West via the Jordanian port of Aqaba instead of via
the Persian Gulf, which was vulnerable to Iranian attack. U.S.
officials took various steps, including negotiating with Israel
to guarantee the security of the proposed pipeline which would
either cross or come near Israeli territory. But as this cable
shows, the underlying hostility between Baghdad and Tel Aviv was
so acute that U.S. efforts came close to back-firing. So sensitive
was the entire subject of dealing with Israel that Saddam Hussein
was reported to be "offended" by the fact that Middle
East Envoy Donald Rumsfeld had even raised it at an earlier meeting
with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Hussein reportedly had
wanted to meet with a high-level official - Assistant Secretary
of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs Richard Murphy
- during a recent visit to Baghdad "to let him know the depth
of Iraqi feeling about Israel."
Document 9: Cable from U.S. Embassy
Amman to State Department, "Hussein on Mubarak's Visit and
Their Joint Trip to Iraq," March 19, 1985
Source: Freedom of Information Act request.
One of the key intermediaries between Baghdad and Washington
in the period prior to reestablishment of diplomatic ties in November
1984 was Jordan. This cable shows King Hussein's continuing efforts
on behalf of Iraq in its war with Iran and on behalf of Arab solidarity
- as witnessed by his invitation to Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak
to join him at a recent meeting with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad.
The king tells the U.S. ambassador in Amman that the Iraqis are
"very pleased" with American diplomatic support "and
with their overall cooperation with the U.S."
Document 10: Cable from U.S.
Embassy Baghdad to State Department, "Views of the Jordanian
and Egyptian Ambassadors on Iraq: the War, the Peace Process,
and Inter-Arab Relations," March 28, 1985
Source: Freedom of Information Act request.
Providing further information on the recent visit to Saddam Hussein
by Jordan's King Hussein and Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak (see
previous document), the Jordanian and Egyptian ambassadors to
Iraq offer their views on Iraqi regional policies. They believe
that Baghdad has taken a more moderate course generally and has
given "active support" to the Arab-Israeli peace process.
Along the way, they offer other insights into Saddam Hussein's
current thinking about the Iran-Iraq War and the uneven support
he is receiving from the Arab world.
Document 11: Cable from U.S.
Embassy Baghdad to State Department, "Minister of Industry
Blasts Senate Action," September 13, 1988
Source: Freedom of Information Act request.
This cable from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie reports
on a haranguing by Saddam Hussein's Minister of Industry and son-in-law,
Husayn Kamil, to representatives of construction giant Bechtel
following the U.S. Senate's passage of the "Prevention of
Genocide Act of 1988." The Senate's move, on September 8,
came on the heels of a series of Iraqi chemical weapons assaults
against Kurds - most notably in Halabja in March of that year
- atrocities Kamil denied had taken place. Kamil "vented
his spleen for one and a half hours," according to the report.
The reason for his vehemence was that the Senate Act called for
strict economic sanctions against Baghdad including blocking all
international loans, credits and other types of assistance - actions
that "caught his government completely by surprise."
Kamil, the report notes, "insisted that a clear pattern of
'Zionist undermining of Iraqi-U.S. relations' is now apparent."
Two days later, representatives of Bechtel, which remains a major
presence in post-Saddam Iraq, met with Glaspie to describe Kamil's
outburst. Glaspie made note of the fact that as "one of Saddam
Hussein's closest advisors, some say his closest
we take
Kamil's angry reaction
to be an accurate reflection of
Saddam's own reaction." But the ambassador failed to comment
on Bechtel's intention to move ahead with its $2 billion project
in Iraq regardless of the provisions of the Act. "Bechtel
representatives said that if economic sanctions contained in Senate
Act are signed into law, Bechtel will turn to non-U.S. suppliers
of technology and continue to do business in Iraq." In April
2003, Bechtel won USAID's largest grant at the time - worth up
to $680 million - to help in the reconstruction of Iraq.