US Department of State Casemma y mm g Doc No C05327494 Date 03 03 2015 UNIDENTML IN Domestic Policy Council Proposed Guidance for Ozone Protocol Negotiations 1 Issue Chemical Coverage in Protocol Background Scientific consensus is that the most important ozone-depleting substances are CFC ll 12 113 114 115 and Halons 1201 and 1311 European Community BC and most recently Japan have accepted 11 12 and 113 in Chairman's text and probably will go along with the other chemicals We expect that the USSR will also accept all although they raised questions about Halons Because of defense uses of Halons we do not want to go beyond a freeze on them Recommendation 0 8 delegation should press for broad chemical coverage with Halons treated separately freeze only 2 Issue ' Control Article Back round Chairman's text gained general acceptance last month in Geneva as useful structure based on the original U S proposal in December If 0 8 were now to propose general aerosol ban which was 0 3 position in failed negotiations 1983 1985 it would risk re-opening equity or market allocation 1 proposals in which 0 5 has most to lose Option A - should negotiate within structure of Chairman's text Option --Same as A but attempt to add voluntary provision for aerosol ban thion should insist on general aerosol ban before any consideration of freeze reduction of CFCs REVIEW AUTHORITY Adolph Eisner Senior Reviewer gz w UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Doc No 005327494 Date 03 03 2015 431ED US Department of State Doc No 005327494 Date 03 03 2015 CONFIDENTIAL 2 3 Issue Freeze Background There is broad consensus that all controlled substances-should be frozen at 1986 levels soon after entry into force EIF U S industry favors freeze as early as possible Recommendation U S should endorse freeze at 1-2 years after EIF 4 Issue 20 Percent Reduction Background European Community EC has formally proposed 20% semi automatic reduction four years after EIF consistent with original U S proposal This could be reversed by 2 3 vote based on scientific economic and technological assessment Many parties Nordics Austria Switzerland Canada Egypt Argentina Japan and others--have informally accepted this in the Chairman's text USSR did not oppose in Geneva U S industry officially opposes reduction although informal contacts indicate they could live with it thion A should accept Chairman's text on this point thion B should propose that 20% reduction be subject to vote of approval 5 Issue 30 Percent Additional Reduction Background Chairman's text provides for two Options both based on assessment 1 reduction 6 years after EIF if majority of parties approve 0R 2 reduction 8 years after EIF unless 2 3 majority of parties reverses decision Both options would follow and be based upon scientific economic technological assessment Pending Congressional legislation and environmental groups very strongly favor semi automatic reduction Key policy questions are 1 whether the semi automatic feature providing greater certainty for industrial planning will be a greater stimulus for a of substitute products 2 whether 8 years after EIF about 10 years from now will provide adequate time for industry to bring substitutes on line and 3 whether domestic interests Congress CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Doc No C05327494 Date 03 03 2015 U S Department of State Casewh - g mzp s Doc No 305327494 Date 03 03 2015 CDNFIUENTIAL 3 - and environmental groups will force unilateral mandatory 05 reduction if this is not in the international protocol Option should accept majority vote to approve 30 percent cut favored by European Community and Japan 2W should advocate semi-automatic reduction favored by Canada Sweden Norway Finland Austria Switzerland New Zealand USSR was leaning toward this thion a - should attempt to remove this second phase reduction 6 Issue Further Reductions Background - The original U S proposal included an ultimate objective of a long term scheduled reduction of emissions of these ozone-depleting chemicals down to the point of eliminating emissions from all but limited uses for which no substitutes are available such reduction could be as much as subject to the review process described in 7 below The current Chairman's text includes a paragraph saying that Parties should decide at some point in the future by majority or two-thirds majority vote whether further reductions of 1986 levels should be undertaken with the objective of eventual elimination of these substances There were-no objections to this clause at the Geneva meeting Pending Congressional legislation calls for domestic U S reductions of 85 to 95% of 1986 levels I Option A --U S should attempt to include some target percentage reduction subject to future affirmative vote by Parties based on assessments CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Doc No 005327494 Date 03 03 2015 5 3 2 7 4 9 U S Department of State Doc No 005327494 Date 03 03 2015 CONFIDENTIAL 4 Option should accept existing or similar language in Chairman's text 7 Issue Assessment Process Background There is broad consensus for original U S proposal of regularly scheduled assessments to guide future actions of Parties in adding or chemicals to the control list or modifying the schedule for reductions Recommendation should ensure that final text adequately provides for these reviews with sufficient lead time before the decision-points on reductions 8 Issue Trade and Treatment of Developing Countries Background There is general recognition of the desirability of attracting into the protocol as many less developed countries LDC's as possible to prevent future pollution-havens However it is also recognized that these countries will require as an incentive to join some kind of grace period from the reduction schedule in order to increase somewhat their currently very low consumption of CFCs while substitutes are being developed Recommendation The U S should work toward effective trade and developing country provisions which will prevent trade distortions among Parties penalize countries which do not join by restricting their future access to our markets and provide some incentive for to join the Protocol without significantly offsetting the reduced CFC production from industrialized countries 9 Issue Voting Background The Vienna Convention provides that each country has one vote weighted voting as such would therefore be inadmissable The question of voting has not been considered to date during the Protocol negotiations There is consensus among agencies that if the U S and EC which together account for approximately 75% of current world production consumption together can agree on future decisions it would he undesirable for them to be outvoted by many small countries CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Doc No 005327494 Date 03 03 2015 43IED U S Department of State Casewh g m g Doc No 005327494 Date 03 03 2015 CONFIDENTIAL Recommendation The 0 8 should press for some system of voting on future control deciSions which would give due weight to the currently significant producing and consuming countries as an example a majority of Parties which together comprise 50% or two-thirds of 1986 production plus import levels 10 Issues Verification of Control Measures Background Traditionally international treaties outside of the Arms Control area rely on sovereign states to honor their obligations A system of on site inspections for the presence of new or expanded CFC producing facilities would be expensive and probably ineffective because of the large land areas involved Trade provisions could at least prevent entry of such production into international trade Recommendation U S should press for strong monitoring and reporting provisions U S should also explore feasibility and cost effectiveness of establishing 3 22 inspection teams to investigate any alleged violations of protocol CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Doc No 005327494 Date 03 03 2015 US Department of State Casewh g m g e Doc No 005327494 Date 03 03 2015 Drafted 0ES REBenedick st W0 843y 5 3 87 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Doc No 005327494 Date 03 03 2015                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu