



The President's Daily Brief

12 September 1973



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

12 September 1973

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Chile's President Allende is dead and the armed forces, together with the carabineros, are working to consolidate their successful coup. *(Page 1)*

The Soviets have suddenly stopped jamming some US, British, and West German radio broadcasts. *(Page 2)*

The Japanese have told the reluctant Soviets that they want to discuss the Northern Territories during Prime Minister Tanaka's trip to Moscow. *(Page 3)*

West Germany plans to negotiate directly with the Soviets on issues holding up the renewal of Bonn's ties with Moscow's allies. *(Page 4)*

The Soviets have trained Iraqi air crews for the TU-22 medium bomber. *(Page 5)*

The nonaligned conference broke little new ground and demonstrated no new unity. The Soviets lost ground to the Chinese. *(Page 6)*

As a result of a major reshuffle of the armed forces leadership, General Krit Sivara has become an important political power in Thailand. *(Page 7)*

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CHILE

The armed forces, with the help of the national police, have assumed control of Chile. A four-man junta, composed of the chiefs of the armed services and the carabineros intends to govern with advice from civilians. The junta's plans for political reform indicate that such civilians will be businessmen and professional guild leaders responsible for recent anti-government shutdowns, rather than political leaders who had opposed Allende. The new rulers have declared Congress to be in recess.

The three military members of the junta only recently assumed command of their respective services, replacing chiefs ousted for various reasons. They are all respected and experienced leaders. The acting national police chief has much closer relationships with the military than do most top carabinero officers.

President Allende is dead, but reports that he committed suicide have not been confirmed. The junta is taking precautions not to be blamed for Allende's death, and is arranging for a private family burial in his native Valparaiso today.

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There was no massive worker support for Allende in the face of the well-organized military coup. Some of his armed followers in the slums of Santiago fought the troops, and there was extensive and effective sniper fire directed against the attackers on the presidential palace. Military raids early yesterday on factories held by armed workers, however, deterred a strong leftist reaction. Junta leaders are concerned about the possibility of disorder in Valparaiso today.

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Many supporters of the Allende administration were taken by surprise and may be lying low until chances for retaliation are better.

The only strong reaction from among Latin American governments has come from Cuba. The Castro government has charged that its embassy was attacked by Chilean forces and has complained because the Chileans tried to stop by force a Cuban ship hastily leaving Valparaiso yesterday. The junta has announced it will break relations with Havana.

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USSR

On September 10 the Soviet Union stopped jamming VOA broadcasts in Russian and minority languages. Jamming of Russian-language programs of the BBC and Deutsche Welle also ceased. Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are still being jammed.

This is the first break in jamming since it was resumed during the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It coincides with the letup in the propaganda campaign against Sakharov and other Soviet dissidents which has provoked extensive protest in the West.

At least for the moment, the regime has swung from public excoriation of Sakharov and other dissidents to conciliatory moves aimed at quieting the outcry in the West and avoiding serious problems at CSCE, which reopens on September 18.

The swings in Soviet policy reflect the leadership's difficulty in balancing efforts toward detente abroad and discipline at home. They may also indicate uncertainty or disagreement over priorities in pursuing these two objectives.

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JAPAN-USSR

Prime Minister Tanaka yesterday was quoted in the Tokyo press as warning the Soviets that progress must be made on the Northern Territories issue if his visit to Moscow next month is to be a success and economic pacts are to be signed. Tanaka suggested that he might come home "empty handed" if he cannot make progress on the Northern Territories issue, thus preparing the Japanese public well in advance.

The Prime Minister's tough stand may be intended in part to prod the Soviets to conclude the drawn-out negotiations on the agenda for Tanaka's visit. The Soviets have so far refused to agree that Brezhnev will even discuss the Northern Territories, thus casting a cloud on Japanese hopes. Continued Soviet occupation of these four islands north of Hokkaido is especially resented by the Japanese since the US returned Okinawa in 1972.

Tanaka's position probably also reflects disenchantment with the prospects for Japanese participation in Siberian economic development opportunities. After months of discussions on building a pipeline for the Tyumen oil project,

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only 25 million tons of oil per year would be available to Japan, not the 40 million tons the Japanese had hoped for.

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WEST GERMANY - USSR

Special Minister Egon Bahr has restated Bonn's contention that progress in the deadlocked negotiations with several East European states is dependent upon reaching an understanding with Moscow on the Berlin agreement.

Bonn's negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria remain stalled over the issue of whether West Germany can represent the interests of West Berlin institutions. The Soviets now admit that they have instructed the East Europeans not to give in.

Bahr stated that arrangements have been made for him to begin negotiations with Soviet Ambassador Falin, who is expected to return to Bonn later this month.

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Foreign Minister Scheel might also discuss the Berlin issue with Foreign Minister Gromyko at the UN General Assembly.

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Soviet officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, reportedly suggested to West German representatives earlier that the scope of the negotiations be broadened to include other problems hampering their relations.

It is possible that the Soviets only wish to use the meetings to complain about alleged West German violations of the Quadripartite Agreement. If they are willing to discuss implementation of the agreement with Bonn directly, however, this will signal a change in their tactics, if not policy. Moscow previously has declined to discuss Berlin-related matters with Bonn, on the grounds that Berlin is a political entity independent of West Germany.

The revelation by Bahr and the Foreign Office representative of Bonn's plans is in part an attempt to pressure the Western Allies to intervene with Moscow. Earlier requests by the Foreign Office that the Allies consider an approach to Moscow were turned down as premature. Bahr last week bluntly remarked that since the Allies are not willing to talk to Moscow, he will do so himself.

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USSR-IRAQ

Four Soviet transports that flew from the USSR to Baghdad over the past few days probably took Iraqi Air Force personnel home from training in the USSR.

Some of these personnel may have learned to fly and service the TU-22 medium bomber.

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Although the Soviets have not yet exported TU-22s, it is likely that they will give some to Iraq soon.

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NONALIGNED CONFERENCE

After a day's extension, the meeting broke up Sunday in a cloud of clichés, with several leaders--including King Faysal--scrapping their plans to speak. The final resolutions largely repeated the work of the previous three nonaligned conferences, condemning US policies in Israel and Indochina as well as colonialism and apartheid.

The US nevertheless came off reasonably well; most speakers attacked a nameless imperialism and colonialism. The Soviets seem to have lost ground with the nonaligned movement, most of whose members lumped the USSR with the US as rich, powerful, and menacing states. Fidel Castro's overenthusiastic espousal of the Soviet position backfired against both the USSR and Castro. The Chinese stayed in the background, while their views on big-power hegemony gained ground.

The Middle East resolution had been somewhat watered down. It nevertheless demanded immediate, unconditional withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, condemned the US--and unnamed other powers--for giving support to Israel, and called on the non-aligned states to work on measures for a full boycott of Israel: diplomatic, economic, military, and "cultural." Only Cuba actually broke relations with Israel, but Tel Aviv was more isolated than ever; no one was willing to speak out publicly in its support.

In addition, the assembled leaders

--supported peaceful reunification of Korea and withdrawal of all foreign troops;

--backed Puerto Rican independence and Panama's claim of sovereignty over the Canal Zone;

--unanimously stood behind African liberation movements, and sharply criticized various Western countries, as well as South Africa and Japan, for supporting colonialism and racism in Africa; and

--recognized the right of every state to nationalize its own resources, as well as the right of developing countries to break agreements imposed by force.

Although the leaders reportedly established a special fund to promote the economic and social development of nonaligned states, they failed to set up a permanent secretariat to make their collective views known to the great powers. The Algiers meeting did, nevertheless, focus attention for a time on third world concerns.

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THAILAND

In a major reshuffle of the armed forces leadership, General Krit Sivara, who has been the number two man in the army under Field Marshal Praphat, moves up to become commander-in-chief.

A number of loose ends remain to be sorted out. For one thing, Prime Minister Thanom may step down from the largely honorific position as supreme commander, in favor of Praphat. Thanom and Praphat, however, evidently will retain their positions as prime minister and deputy prime minister, respectively, and thus will continue to exercise the real power. Krit's promotion also opens up more room at the top, which should ease the growing unrest among senior officers over long delays in advancement.

While it is not a foregone conclusion that Krit is the designated heir-apparent to the Thanom-Praphat regime, he is now clearly the front-runner. He will probably have to contend, however, with Thanom's politically ambitious son, Colonel Narong.

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