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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

27 October 1995

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 30 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: SPECIAL DEFENSE REPORT

**Russia/Bosnia** I had a breakthrough experience with Grachev this week, which was highlighted by his agreement on a multilateral "special operations unit" in Bosnia of U.S., Russian and perhaps third country forces, his agreement on our proposal on how to handle the CFE flanks problem, his participation in the explosion of a Minuteman silo and his joining me in a visit to U.S. and Russian troops at the Peacekeeper '95 exercise.

Our first seven hours with Grachev, spent in a plenary meeting at the Pentagon, were quite tense. His opening presentation on Bosnia was a significant walk back from the agreement you had reached with Yeltsin. I insisted that Option 2, the reconstruction effort, should be the starting point for the discussion, because of the intractable problem of NATO operational control implied by Option 1, the IFOR peacekeeping effort. However, Grachev dismissed Option 2 as insulting and not serious work and proceeded to press hard for Option 1, Russian participation in the IFOR, but not under NATO operational control. He put forward an interpretation of the Hyde Park meeting that sharply disagreed with Strobe's. We went around the block several times on the NATO chain of command issue and finally proposed to him, as a long shot, that the Russians should subordinate their battalions to a U.S. division commander, since their primary interest appeared to be in form rather than substance and they expressed a willingness to work for Americans on a bilateral basis. They could regard their subordination to the U.S. division commander as being to him in his U.S. capacity. This was rejected. The battalion(s) had to be working for GEN Joulwan with a Russian deputy, and they could not be in the NATO chain of command. Meanwhile we did our best to keep the dialogue going.

The next morning, on the airplane trip to Fort Riley, I had a one-on-one with Grachev. I repackaged Option 2 to include all of the features he wanted in Option 1, especially teaming with U.S. forces, and told him we would start Option 2 a month after Option 1. That I could not agree to his proposal for Option 1 at this time, but if he agreed to participate in Option 2 as now packaged, and agree to keep Russian involvement in Option 1 down to 500 men, I would agree to keep Option 1 open and meet with him in Brussels in a few weeks to try to wrap up. This formulation allowed us to reach the agreement that we announced to the press at Ft. Riley. We agreed on a joint U.S.-Russian "special operations unit" of about 2-3000 troops each, with the possibility of adding troops from another nation. They would enter Bosnia at the beginning of what Grachev calls Phase 2, within a month or so after the IFOR stands up and the combatants separate. The tasks will be assigned directly by Joulwan in his U.S. hat. Joulwan will have a Russian deputy. The tasks will include engineering, road building and clearing, bridge construction, etc. We will have GEN Joulwan and Grachev's representative, GEN Shevtsov, work on details. We agreed to a follow-up Perry-Grachev meeting to be based on a briefing by Joulwan and Shevtsov on the plans for this joint unit. That has the affect of keeping open discussions on Option 1, which serves both our interests. I think it is likely that I will find a formulation that will allow the Russians to participate in the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia at the level of 500 troops without admitting they have subordinated themselves to NATO, but I will have to check this out with some key NATO allies. (We have, for example, the possibility of a non-NATO peacekeeping operation in East Slavonia).

Grachev told me that Yeltsin's health is far worse than reported, and that a bypass is probably required. I offered to make available Walter Reed's superb capability for open-heart surgery, either for examination in Russia or surgery at Walter Reed. He was grateful for the offer and quite positive about the prospect.

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
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He was familiar with the remarkable success that Dr. Berry of Walter Reed had with the Russian Economic Minister, who had a triple bypass at Walter Reed about 6 months ago. He will convey our willingness directly to President Yeltsin, but I recommend that you call Yeltsin to make the offer. It would be a politically damaging, but accurate statement for Yeltsin to make about Russian medicine. His acceptance—and soon—would dramatically change his probability of survival; indeed he has a reasonable shot at complete recovery if he accepts.

The visit to Ft. Riley was a smashing success. In addition to making the announcement about a joint force for Bosnia reconstruction, we visited U.S. and Russian troops in the field where they have begun a peacekeeping exercise. This is the first U.S.-Russian peacekeeping exercise on U.S. soil and the first U.S.-Russian exercise of any kind in the continental U.S. (We have done a search and rescue exercise in Alaska and a tidal wave relief exercise in Hawaii.) Grachev spoke warmly to the troops, emphasizing the need to avoid a return to the conditions of the Cold War and encouraging them to exchange addresses and maintain friendships. That evening at a banquet including many local citizens he made similarly effusive comments about his commitment to U.S.-Russian partnership.

On Saturday, we flew to Whiteman AFB in Missouri. There Grachev and I jointly pressed the trigger ( a dual key!) that blew up an American Minuteman missile silo. By this time he was in rare form and he fully caught the historic symbolism of this action by a Russian Defense Minister on U.S. soil. He spoke emotionally about making sure his children and grandchildren understood and remembered the significance of this day. He also committed himself to fighting for START II ratification by the DUMA and predicted success. Before he left, he also took a close up look at a B-2 bomber, inspecting the cockpit and bomb bay, and joked with the crew.

On the return trip we worked out an agreement on CFE flanks, a problem that has been bedeviling us for some time. We have backed them off their request for bigger adjustments in the north, in exchange for some additional flexibility in the south. I said we would support this position in the negotiations with NATO, if they present it.

Grachev changed visibly over the three day visit. When he arrived on Thursday he was forceful and blustering. By the time he left he was relaxed, jovial and in the mood to make deals. I suspect we did not give him much beyond his bottom line, but he clearly had been worried he would not even get that much. I came away with the lesson that "show and tell" always helps. Getting Grachev to the field to see U.S. and Russian troops in action together and the opportunity to strike a blow for nuclear disarmament -- and be seen doing such -- as compared to one or two days of formal meetings in the capital, made a difference. He must be uncertain about the Moscow to which he returns (although he is scheduled to leave again immediately for Greece), but he did not show it.

*Bill Perry*

cc: Vice President Gore & Leon Fuerth  
State: Sec. Christopher & Strobe Talbott  
CIA: DCI Deutch  
White House: Chief of Staff Panetta, Asst. to President Lake, Sandy Berger  
JCS: CJCS Shalikashvili & VCJCS Owens

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