OPTIONAL FORMUNO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 5010-106 Assoc. Dir. . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Dep. AD Adm. __ Dep. AD Inv. ____ Memorandum TOP SECRET Asst. Dir.: Admin. . 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs ... Mr. W. R. Wannall DATE: 8/18/75 то Files & Com. Gen. Inv. .. 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar Ident. Inspection 1 - Mr. S. S. Mignosa) infeitie Mignosa SM FROM S. S. 1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff Laboratory ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED - Mr. C. H. McCarthy REALIN IS UNCLASSIFIED SENSTUDY 75 SUBJECT: Spec. Inv. STOEPT WHERE SHOWN Training . UTHERWISE Telephone Rm. Director Sec'y Reference is made to memorandum dated 7/24/75, captioned as above, which requested review, assessment and recommendations pertaining to the contents of pages extracted from a 693-page CIA document in order to fully identify the subject matter and to assess whether FBI operations were compromised. Section CI-3 conducted the following review and makes the assessment pertinent thereto: Page 00026, "Siesta" and pages 00059-61, captioned RE: "Subject: General: Office of Security Survey. <u>(</u>2) This matter concerns Orlando Nunez-Toro (Bufile 105-141367), a United States citizen of Cuban extraction, who was suspected by CIA of attempting to recruit for intelligence purposes CIA personnel, one By letter dated 8/4/70, the Miss Deborah Fitzgerald. first communication to the FBI by CIA relating to Toro-Nunez and Fitzgerald, the FBI was requested to advise whether it interposed any objections to CIA investigative action CIA deemed necessary to explore questions raised by the association of Nunez, Toro and Fitzgerald with CIA FX-IUI employees.(\leq) **REC-56** (:2 - 1) =In response to that inquiry, FBIHQ advised CIA by letter dated 8/14/70, that the FBI interposed no objection to CIA investigation for such a purpose. At the same time, CIA was specifically requested to provide the FBI with any information developed relating to FBI internal security , MDR 16 responsibilities CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM AUG 27 1975 62-116395 DECINSSIFY ON: 25) CHM: cla ch CONTINUED OVER (6) Classified by 6098 C Hm 5-7m Exempt from ODS, Categories 2 and 3 Date of Declassification Indefinite ROUTE IN ENVELOPE 84 AUG 28 1975 A NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 4




CIA communicated with FBIHQ by letters dated 7/6/71 and 2/24/72, concerning the Nunez-Toro and Deborah Fitzgerald matter, requesting each time records review of Bureau files of numerous individuals of interest On each occasion CIA was provided with the results to CIA. of such checks. However, by letter dated 3/2/72, FBIHQ responded to CIA letter dated 2/24/72, by stating, "We have made a study of our file concerning this matter (Nunez-Toro and Fitzgerald) and a detailed review of the referenced material. At the present time, it appears the paramount concern is whether Nunez and Deborah Jane Fitzgerald are obtaining intelligence information concerning your Agency, and you have established a network of sources to cover that aspect. As you indicate, there is no specific evidence that Nunez or Fitzgerald has any connection with a hostile intelligence service or a foreign government. We, therefore, will defer to your Agency until completion of your investigation or the development of information showing they are engaged in subversive activities within our primary jurisdiction." (5)

The FBI did not conduct an internal security-type investigation regarding the relationship of Nunez-Toro and Fitzgerald. The FBI did conduct an internal security-type investigation of Nunez-Toro in 1965 as a result of his reported disaffection for the United States while living abroad. We reopened that investigation in 1969 when it was reported that Nunez-Toro communicated with the Cuban Embassy, Ottawa, Canada. That investigation was closed when it was established his family desired to return to Cuba and his

A review of FBIHQ files contain no information that any FBI employee was knowledgeable, before or after the fact, of a surreptitious entry on the part of CIA personnel, into the premises of Nunez-Toro and Deborah Fitzgerald. That surreptitious entry by CIA personnel into the premises of Nunez-Toro and Fitzgerald located in Fairfax, Virginia, received considerable publicity recently, when it was alleged that Fairfax police assisted the CIA during the entry.


ASSESSMENT:

No compromise of an on-going FBI operation.



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<u>RE: Page 00026, "Paragon."</u>(S)

/This matter pertains to an alleged plot in 1972-73 to assassinate former Vice President Spiro Agnew and the Director of CIA by using two Latin American revolutionaries. A CIA informant abroad reported that one Elizabeth Boynton Millard, a New York City resident known for her Communist associations and her involvement with Latin-American revolutionaries, was scheduled "to finger" top United States Officials for assassination. The plot was allegedly conceived some time prior to 8/19/72, in Chile and was to be carried out sometime between 10/25/72 through 11/7/72.] The FBI investigated this plot thoroughly (S) and closed its investigation on 2/2/73, when it was concluded that none of the individuals reportedly involved had any connection with such activity.

ASSESSMENT:


No compromise of an on-going FBI operation.

RE: Page 00282, "28 October 1970."

During October, 1970, United States Government officials, including Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, who was then assigned to The White House, received cryptograms indicating bombings would occur in various cities of the United States on 11/29/70. The Soviet Military Attache, Washington, D. C., received a similar cryptogram reporting United States -Chinese activities against Russia. The sender of the cryptograms was identified and during our investigation other government agencies, including CIA, were requested to furnish the original cryptograms for fingerprint examination.

ASSESSMENT:

No compromise.



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RE: Pages 00290, 00292, 00295, 00310.

The contents of these pages concern the Daniel Ellsberg matter, all of which is of a public nature.


ASSESSMENT:

No compromise.

<u>RE: Pages 00334, 00361-363, 00368, 00371, 00373, 00376-379, 00384, 00385, 00468-470 and 00615.</u>

The contents of these pages concern the "Chilean Project." On 4/16/71, CIA proposed technical penetration of the Chilean Embassy, Washington, D. C., to collect foreign intelligence data and to compromise classified encrypted diplomatic traffic. CIA proposed that access be made through one of their covert contacts. The FBI declined. The Attorney General then requested FBI cooperation. On 5/13/71, a memorandum was sent to the Department of State for approval of that operation and such approval was obtained On 7/14/71, the Attorney General authorized on 5/17/71. activation of the microphone installation at the Chilean Embassy until 10/8/71. CIA requested continuation as the expiration date approached and on 10/15/71, the Attorney General authorized such continuation. The technical surveillance was discontinued as noted in memorandum to the Attorney General and CIA dated 2/7/72. The surveillance was reactivated on 12/27/72, and was eventually discontinued on 2/22/73.(\$)

On 6/19/73, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force requested FBI investigation of the alleged burglary of the Chilean Embassy, Washington, D. C., on or about 5/13/72. The Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C., conducted an investigation of that incident and submitted a complete report to the Office of the United States Attorney. That report was in the possession of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force and on 10/30/73, that Force advised the FBI that no additional investigation was desired. There is no connection between the "Chilean Project" and the alleged burglary of the Chilean Embassy on or about 5/13/72.(5)



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ASSESSMENT:

The above information refers to our special coverage of the Chilean Embassy which was discontinued in February, 1973, and has not been operational since that time.] Possession of such information by the Senate Committee (* will not interfere with any on-going FBI investigation. All activities engaged in by the FBI in connection with this project were conducted on the instruction of Attorney General Mitchell.

RE: Page 00361, captioned "Memorandum for: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee.


In addition to the "Chilean Project," the contents of this page also refer to FBI technical coverage of diplomatic establishments of Israel. It is pointed out that Watergate Defendant James McCord telephoned the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C., after his arrest, believing that his conversation would be overheard and he would be able to challenge tainted evidence. The date of his telephone call to the Embassy of Israel is not known but it is pointed out that our technical coverage of the Embassy of Israel was discontinued on 10/16/72, at the specific request of Secretary of State William Rogers. This matter is also public knowledge.

ASSESSMENT:

No compromise of FBI operations.

RE: Pages 00457 and 00458, concerning Item Number 3.

According to CIA, this matter involved surreptitious entries by CIA into a French diplomatic establishment, Washington, D. C., during the early 1960's. As is evident from reading Item number 3, there is no FBI involvement in or knowledge of such activities by CIA. (ς)



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It is pointed out that Philippe Thyraud De Vesjoli (Bufile 64-33606) a former attache of the French Embassy, Washington, D. C., and a former French Intelligence officer, cooperated with CIA and provided CIA with information in 1963 that French intelligence planned to engage in intelligence activities in the United States. This information was thereafter transmitted to the FBI. It is believed that De Vosjoli is identical with either Iden-122 or Iden-124 mentioned in Item number 3./5

ASSESSMENT:

There is no compromise of an on-going FBI operation.

Pages 00591-00593, captioned "MHCHAOS Program." ((5) RE:

This CIA program involved the clandestine collection abroad of information relating to foreign efforts to support and influence domestic United States extremism. The foreign-oriented activity in the United States was of two types; first, selected FBI informants who traveled abroad in connection with their extremist activity and their resultant debriefing by CIA with the cooperation of the FBI. Second, FBI sources with existing extremist credentials who were offered to CIA for dispatching abroad to collect information responsive to CIA requirements. (S)

There has been no compromise of such FBI informants and sources.

ASSESSMENT:

CHW JUNK

No compromise of any on-going FBI operation.

TOP SECRET

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ACTION:

For information and referral to Senstudy Group.

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