

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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April 21, 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *W.*
SUBJECT: NSC Weekly Report #55

1. Opinion

A Contractual or Flexible Foreign Policy?

One thought has been gnawing at me recently that might be worth a minute or two of your reflection. As I think about our foreign policy, I am struck by the degree to which it can be rightly called a "contractual" foreign policy: i.e., the major thrust of it is on negotiating agreements or devising formulas. It is reminiscent of legal negotiations and it does not adequately take into account the need to manipulate and influence political processes.

We have thus put a lot of effort into negotiating new proliferation restraints, in negotiating new agreements with the Soviets, in negotiating new verbal formulas for dealing with the Middle Eastern problem, in negotiating and then ratifying the Panama Canal Treaties, etc., etc.

Yet foreign policy, though involving the foregoing, also involves the need to influence attitudes and to shape political events. This requires a combination of additional steps, none of which we have yet truly employed. In some cases, what is needed is a demonstration of force, to establish credibility and determination and even to infuse fear; in some cases it requires saying publicly one thing and quietly negotiating something else; in many cases what is needed is prolonged and sustained exchange of political views, so that even our enemies share or at least understand our perspectives. Often it does not require solving problems but striking the right posture and sometimes letting problems fester until they are ripe for action.

*Like Malaguez ?
Lying ?*

Examples of the foregoing would include quiet efforts to manipulate African leaders to obtain desired results; a willingness to back some friendly country very strongly, so that it in turn is prepared to use its force on our behalf (for example, I think there is a good chance that by tangibly

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backing Morocco with arms we could get Hassan to use his troops for us the way Castro is using his on behalf of the Soviets); readiness to use black propaganda to stimulate difficulties for our opponents, for example by encouraging national sentiments among the non-Russian Soviet peoples or by using deception to divide the Soviets and Cubans on African policy.

You'll be wasting your time
I will be developing some ideas for you regarding the above, but at this stage I simply wanted to register with you a basic point: namely, that our foreign policy has to operate on many levels and use many tools. The world is just too complicated and turbulent to be handled effectively by negotiating "contracts" while neglecting the need also to manipulate, to influence and to compel.

Asian Neglect

I have received recently a letter from a colleague who summarized for me some criticisms of our Asian policy, which are shared by a number of Asian specialists.

In summary form, his key points are these:

- Pacific Asia has been accorded too low priority.
- The Korean troop withdrawal has been unsettling; the timing was precipitate.
- Our naval posture is inadequate to deal with the growing Soviet presence.
- U.S. weakness vis-a-vis Moscow justifiably causes China to view us as a less attractive partner.
- We have not pursued our bilateral relations with China with sufficient vigor.
- Our emphasis on normalizing relations with Vietnam makes little sense, compared to the need to strengthen our ties with ASEAN countries.
- Our human rights policy has been poorly implemented, particularly its emphasis on punitive measures against the violators rather than providing incentives to those with improving records.
- We have failed to use the China card against the Soviets.
- Our weakened relations with Japan concern the entire region.

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-- In the absence of confidence in U.S. policy in Asia, normalization becomes more difficult, for our assurances to Taiwan of our continued commitment to its tranquility become less credible.

We will be correcting some of these shortcomings shortly: the meeting with Fukuda and the Economic Summit ought to improve the economic relationship with Japan and infuse new political vitality into the Alliance; the adjustment of combat troop withdrawals from Korea should be welcomed by the Koreans; the Vice President's trip to the ASEAN countries will properly place higher emphasis on collaboration with our friends than on our earlier (and in my judgment premature) efforts to normalize relations with Vietnam; we hope to activate step by step our relationship with China. In your comments to the press you might consider placing more emphasis on Japan, Korea, and China.

2. Facts

Egyptian Diplomatic Strategy

Ambassador Ghorbal has just returned from Egypt where he consulted extensively with the Foreign Minister and his top aides, as well as briefly with Sadat. He has summarized current Egyptian thinking as follows:

-- The arms package should clear Congress before the United States puts forward its own proposals. (Secretary Vance had mentioned mid-May, and this strikes the Egyptians as being too soon -- as already indicated to you, such a tactical delay is in my view justified.)

-- Egypt will be prepared to develop its own ideas on the West Bank/Gaza, but will explicitly state that Jordan and the Palestinians should assume primary responsibility for negotiations concerning the West Bank. It is understood that the initial Egyptian position will be tougher than the eventual U.S. compromise proposal.

-- The Egyptians understand the need for closer coordination, and they see the key element in our strategy as being the submission of a U.S. proposal which will ask both sides to make concessions and which Egypt will be able to accept.

While the general line of Egyptian thinking seems to be in accord with our own views, there is reason for concern over the difficulty of fully coordinating our moves. Unfortunately, Sayyid Marei will not be coming to Washington until June 19.

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Israeli Playback

We are beginning to hear some of our own words played back to us by the Israelis. For example, the Israelis now say, correctly, that we do not call for full withdrawal until 242 and that we can envisage long-term security arrangements which would permit Israeli military installations beyond Israel's political borders. We will need to be careful not to have our views interpreted as support for substantial border changes and Israeli military outposts. After all, if the Israelis are allowed to keep military positions in the West Bank, the need for major border changes on security grounds is reduced. The more significant the Israeli military presence in the West Bank, the less the justification for major border changes.

Impressions of Salisbury

Tom Thornton of my staff traveled with Secretary Vance on the African leg of his current trip. Tom's discussions in Salisbury left him with these impressions:

-- Militarily the insurgency has not slackened and the government has been unsuccessful in bringing the guerrillas back. Indeed it seems afraid to try.

-- The key to the credibility of the government is dismantling the protected villages and releasing detainees.

-- Politically Muzorewa controls, at the least, the cities.

-- The desire for peace is pervasive, so the internal settlement cannot be written off.

-- Neither side seems very confident than the political basis for compromise is present. If the present stalemate holds for a while, the prospects for an all parties conference increases.

3. AlertElectronic Surveillance Bill

The Senate version was passed on vote of 95 to 1 on Thursday afternoon. Meanwhile, the House Intelligence Committee has put off finishing up its markup until at least Monday. The Committee reportedly is split down the middle on the desirability of allowing warrants, especially when no U.S. citizens are involved. It is also believed that if the Supreme Court were in the Humphrey case to confirm your power to authorize electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes it would

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seriously erode support for the bill in the House. Thus, by winning the Humphrey case, we could help defeat the Administration's sponsored electronic surveillance legislation.

JCS Opposition to CTB

The Chairman, JCS (Dave Jones) has sent a memo to Harold Brown stating that they oppose a complete ban on nuclear testing because of stockpile reliability problems. They also oppose the concept of a CTB of potentially limited duration -- one that would have a review conference after five years or so, at which time the parties could opt out for less than supreme national interest reasons (e.g., the stockpile problem had not been solved).

Copies of this memo are floating around the bureaucracy already. The likelihood of it leaking to the press is a virtual certainty. This, of course, can have a very adverse impact on our CTB efforts. You may want to speak to Harold about it.

4. National Security Affairs Calendar (see Tab A)

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NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS CALENDAROngoing:

Ambassador Young serves as President of the UN Security Council for April.

Somalia President Siad in China.

Week of April 24-29

April 24

Meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in Sofia.

UN General Assembly Session on Namibia in New York, Ambassador Young heads US delegation.

Secretary Blumenthal attends 11th Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Vienna.

April 25

PRC on US/USSR Conventional Arms Transfer Talks.

April 26

SCC on Petroleum Supply Vulnerability Assessment.

SCC on NATO Summit and Special Session on Disarmament.

Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan visits US for talks in Washington.

April 27

Private US visit of Malawi President Dr. H. Kamazu Banda.

April 28

Secretary Blumenthal attends IMF Interim Committee meetings in Mexico City.

Looking Ahead

April 30-May 7

Prime Minister Begin in US for private visit in connection with Israel's 30th anniversary celebration.

Late April-Early May

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visits Rome.

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May 1 FRG Finance Minister Matthoefter in Washington to consult with Secretary Blumenthal and members of the Joint Economic Committee.

May 2-10 Vice President Mondale visits the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand.

May 2-3 Japanese Minister Fukuda visits Washington.

May 4 Secretary Vance begins two-day visit to Mexico; visit will mark the anniversary of the establishment of the US/Mexico Consultative Mechanism in May, 1977.

May 4-6 Brezhnev to visit Bonn.

May 15 Mexican President Lopez Portillo will begin a visit to the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.

US/USSR Anti-Satellite Arms Control Talks (tentative).

May 16 Dominican Republic holds presidential elections.

May 17-18 Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda makes state visit to Washington.

May 18-19 Secretary Brown to attend Defense Planning Committee meeting in Brussels.

May 20-June 5 US visit of Gambian President Sir Dawda Kairaha Jawara, in capacity as President pro tem of CILSS (Interstate Committee for the Struggle against Drought in the Sahel). To be in Washington and other points for discussion with AID and private organizations concerning aid to the Sahel.

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May 22-26	Queen Elizabeth will make a state visit to the FRG.
May 23-June 28	Ambassador Young heads US delegation to UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament.
May 30-31	NATO Summit.
May 31-June 7	Private visit by Senegalese President Leopold Senghor, to meet with you.
Late May-Early June	FRG Chancellor Schmidt to attend North-South "summit" in Jamaica.
June 8	President Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana in US to accept honorary degree from Harvard University.

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