

Date

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
National Intelligence Officer for		
1. Warning		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post) [Redacted] Acting SA/NPI	Room No.—Bldg.
	Phone No.

5041-102

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SECRET

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

NFAC 5646-80/1
22 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [Redacted] 25X1
Acting Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation
Intelligence

SUBJECT: Warning Report—Nuclear Proliferation [Redacted] 25X1

1. Action Requested: None; for your information only. [Redacted] 25X1

2. Background: The Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation met on 20 August 1980 to discuss warning matters. Attached is my report based in large part on the discussions that took place. [Redacted] 25X1

Attachment:
Warning Report

[Redacted] 25X1

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[Redacted] 25X1

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NFAC-5646-80
22 August 1980Warning Report: Nuclear Proliferation*

25X1

Israel/Iraq. There have been no developments that would cause changes to be made in the key judgements of the recently-issued SNIE The Iraqis now appear to be disposed to blame the Israelis, almost automatically, for any bombings or other destructive actions taken against foreign nuclear materials and equipment bound for Iraq. The Iraqis evidently expect some such actions to be directed at the nuclear facility at Tuwaitha: security at the facility recently was reinforced. 25X1

Argentina. There are new signs that Argentina might be disposed to free itself from reliance upon US nuclear supply and cooperation, thereby enhancing its ability to preserve an option to develop nuclear explosives. There have been no indications of any moves toward ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and Argentina reportedly is to construct a research reactor that will use domestically-produced fuel (unenriched uranium). Argentina earlier had warned the US that it would build the reactor if it could not obtain fuel (enriched uranium) from the US for an old research reactor. The new reactor would become a source of plutonium suitable for use in nuclear explosives. 25X1

India. The possibility of a cessation of nuclear cooperation with the US might not be regarded by Indian nuclear and other officials as a very serious setback to Indian nuclear programs. India probably has already developed its options for alternative arrangements which would be in keeping with its overall objective of self-sufficiency for its nuclear programs. India may now see a break in nuclear relations with the US as inevitable, but it probably does not wish to be seen as the party responsible for precipitating any break. It might perceive that it could force the US into making any such decision by an early filing of an application for shipments of US nuclear fuel that would follow deliveries now awaiting US Congressional action. 25X1

*This memorandum is produced periodically by the Special Assistant to the DD/NFA for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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