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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20305		
National Intelligence Offic	19 June 1981 Copy No. / O	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
VIA:	Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment National Intelligence Officer for Warning	
FROM:	Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA	
SUBJECT:	Monthly Warning Meeting - June 1981	
1. The meeting focused on the implications of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility at Tuwaitha and the possibilities of Iraq/Arab retaliation. Representatives did not think it likely that an Iraqi reaction would take the form of an attack against either Israel or the US.		
Baghdad recognizes the improbability of military success		
Saddam Hussein sees himself "on the side of the angels" while Israel increasingly is viewed as the international pariah. He is anxious to perpetuate that perception.		
Iraq increasingly is stressing the diplomatic option and is not likely to soon slide back into historical pattern of terrorist thuggery.		
Iraq may, however, try to use radical Palestinians to engage in acts of terrorism if they are willing to do Baghdad's bidding.		
2. Attendees also saw as unlikely an Iraqi attempt to deal a knockout punch against Iran in an attempt to recoup lost prestige. Iraq has no stomach for a military offensive and Saadam appears more than ever anxious to get the war over with. Saddam also is likely to pursue efforts to patch-things up with Syria; similar pro forma efforts may be made with Libya but Iraq expects no meaningful results with Tripoli.		

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3. Of considerable concern to participants was the impact of the raid on US relations with the Arab world. The environment has soured: we have placed	
our moderate Arab friends in a difficult position and although US cooperation with Iraq on the UN resolution will help smooth over recent abrasions, we	
should not rule out the possibility of concrete actions against US interests	
in the future.	25X1
4. The internal Iranian scene remains confused with analysts unable to	
provide more than clues as to the impact of the Bani Sadr affair on the Iranian political equation. The possibility exists that his ouster will more	
clearly polarize opposing forces, making likely a "reign of terror" that could erupt as early as this summer. The possibility of the rise of some as yet	
unidentified military strong man to challenge the Khomeini cli <u>que h</u> as caused	
the IRP to firmly warn the military to stay out of politics.	25X1 l 25X1
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6. Israeli action to take out the missiles in Lebanon was seen as unlikely in the period prior to the 30 June Israeli election.	25X1
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SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - J	June 1981	
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