

Transcription of 3/28/79 FRG TV (ZDF) Broadcast SIAS
On Pak Nuclear Program

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

Some reports on the efforts of the Libyan chief of state Qadhafi, who is known to have an especially radical attitude, to gain possession of atomic weapons, which towards the end of last year also appeared in German newspapers, have caused us to make inquiries which finally resulted in the following documentary, which contains downright sensational facts on the cooperation between Libya and Pakistan. This could possibly lead to atomic weapons falling into the hands of forces in the Middle East, who, on the basis of their past record, can certainly not be considered especially responsible. The facts involved should not only give food for thought to some firms in England, Holland and West Germany, but are a challenge to their respective governments, since the starting point for a Pakistani project in which the material for atomic weapons is to be produced, is a German-British-Dutch project in the framework of Euratom near the Dutch border, where modern techniques for the enrichment of uranium are practiced. There, they serve only peaceful means and are carried out under the strict supervision of all international organizations created for that purpose. However, there seem to be gaps everywhere, even in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, signed on July 1, 1968 simultaneously in London, Moscow, and Washington in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Up to now, the treaty has been acceded to by 105 states. Forty-four states, however, did not join, among them states with considerable nuclear programs like India and Pakistan.

CONFIDENTIAL
-2-

Ernst Martin reports: When during the administration of Prime Minister Ali Bhutto on May 18, 1977, neighboring India announced its first nuclear explosion, Pakistan made a great effort to start a massive nuclear program. Ever since, it seems, the Pakistanis have also been working towards the manufacture of nuclear explosives in their country. In August 1978, under strong pressure from the United States, France stopped the delivery of a plant for the reconversion of used nuclear fuel (producing plutonium, among other things) agreed on by treaty in 1976. Such a plant would have enabled the Pakistani leadership under General Zia-ul-Haq to produce sooner or later its own nuclear weapons. Could it be that Pakistan used the spectacular rescission of the French-Pakistani agreement simply as a bluff, so that, undisturbed by any international protests, it could develop a processing capacity of highly enriched uranium, which can also be used for the production of bombs through the construction of a uranium enrichment plant in the framework of a top secret project? Its model is the uranium enrichment plant in Almelo, Holland. This project, built jointly by Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany, employs the at present most economical method, the so-called gas centrifuge process (Gaszentrifugalverfahren). Here, it serves only peaceful purposes, like the supply of light water gas-cooled reactors or high temperature reactors with enriched uranium 235, which occurs in natural uranium only in a concentration of about 0,7% and which has to be raised to about 3%. Natural uranium is fed into centrifuges that revolve at more than twice the speed of sound. This is how enriched uranium 235 is produced. The enrichment capacity of each individual centrifuge is rather low, therefore thousands of centrifuges

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
-3-

have to be connected. Such combinations, called cascades, are under certain conditions able to produce almost pure uranium 235 as it is needed for the production of atomic weapons. The experts consider it simply a matter of time until developing countries, too, have such plants.

Question to the managing director of Uranit, the German partner in the Almelo project: "Do you think it is possible that a country which is not a party to the non-proliferation treaty can buy the components for such a plant in various places?"

Answer: "I am convinced that a country that wants to enrich uranium for these purposes and which possesses a technical capability to build, for instance, an automobile, would also be able to develop and build at least a primitive centrifuge, which could be facilitated by such shopping around for parts but this is not the basic breakthrough, this is only a time factor; it would accelerate the process. But we are not concerned with the question of whether one can enrich uranium or not."

Question: "So this means that, for instance, developing countries, too, would sooner or later be in a position to produce nuclear fuel, highly enriched uranium, and atomic weapons?"

Answer: "It isn't all that simple either, that a developing country with the most primitive capabilities could do this with the most primitive means. But, Mr. Martin, I think it is essential to realize that in nuclear technology, as in others, there are no technical "fixes". I think the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is a political question, a question of cooperation between the states, a question of controls, as we have them in the IAEA in Vienna, this is a question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons treaty and not a question of technological prevention.

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-4-

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Apparently, there are loopholes in the control mechanisms of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons treaty, for the Pakistanis were able, by an interesting, circuitous route, to gain access to the top secret technology of the gas centrifuge process. The Pakistani scientist Dr. Aku Khan, after studying in Delft and Leuven, was introduced into the Amsterdam firm of FDO, [unintelligible phrase], which is engaged in the development of the ultra-centrifuge on commission from the Dutch government. In this firm, he gained knowledge of secret processes of the Almelo plant. Today, Dr. Khan is the director of the top secret project for the construction of a similar plant in Pakistan. The project operates under the aegis of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Agency and the Pakistani army in the person of Brigadier General Amis Ali Said. His address is: Special Works Organization, 169 Kiston [Keystone?] Rd., Westridge, Rawalpindi. The Pakistani commercial mission in Brussels, which is now located in Bonn, tried to procure large quantities of the materials and equipment necessary for the construction of a uranium enrichment plant. So it has to be assumed that the Pakistani authorities already have an exact knowledge of the plant. Just how far the secret Pakistani project has come along, is proved by references in international magazines like "Nucleonics Week" of October 12, 1978: "Pakistan may be about to complete gas centrifuge systems for the enrichment of uranium for military purposes." These reports were prompted by a question raised in the British Parliament by the group leader of the Labour Party by which he drew the attention of the British Trade Secretary to the possibility of a military use of the goods delivered to Pakistan by the firm Emerson Electric. Emerson Electric at the time was

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

supplying so-called inverters to Pakistan which supply the necessary high-frequency current to the centrifuges. The Pakistani embassy insisted that these supplies were intended for a textile mill in Pakistan. Only after the question raised by the Labour leader, the British government tightened the export regulations for secret materials.

Question to the leader of the parliamentary group of the Labour Party, Mr. Frank Allaun: "Do you have knowledge of the fact that the inverters delivered to Pakistan by Emerson Electric were used or are to be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons?"

Answer: "Yes, I have. Because these inverters are of a type, a frequency, which is used by the British Atomic Energy Agency and are not suitable for textile mills. And secondly, because just at that time the prime minister of Pakistan, Ali Bhutto, stated publicly in October of last year that his country was on the verge of securing the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons."

Question: "Mr. Allaun, I have heard that a German firm is involved in these sales. Is that true?"

Answer: "Yes, and I can disclose this for the first time, that a German firm is working for the Pakistani government as a supplier. The firm is called Team Industries, with headquarters at Leonberg-Eltingen. And I think that this unusual method of procuring equipment supposedly for a textile mill, is somewhat suspicious, when we know that it is not for a textile mill."

Team Industries of Leonberg-Eltingen has confirmed the deal with the British firm Emerson Electric and has insisted that under the export regulations in force it was perfectly legal. Probably this is not the only German

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

-6-

firm involved in such transactions.

It is especially disquieting that Pakistan has close contacts with radical Arab states like Libya. Libya may well be financing this and other, similar, deals. In spite of its membership in the non-proliferation treaty, Libya is trying to get atomic weapons. Already in 1974, the Libyan head of state Qadhafi stated during a visit to the Pakistani reactor "Canoub": "We must gather together all our forces to fight our enemies!". As was variously reported, Qadhafi, in 1976, offered to finance the reprocessing plant that France had promised to Pakistan on the condition that Pakistan would let Libya have some of the plutonium. This offer was transmitted in September 1976 by two Libyan emissaries. According to further Arab publications, the Libyan prime minister Jalloud, in October 1978, on a visit to Pakistan, restated Libya's readiness to finance Pakistani nuclear projects.

How little Pakistan can afford the luxury of an atomic bomb is demonstrated by its present effort to finance the fight against starvation at home by a massive program through credits from the whole world.

These last pictures illustrate the report that Pakistan has ordered 32 Mirage fighter planes from France, an order valued at about 600 million DM. Quite apart from the financial aspect, we see here that a country which is not a member of the non-proliferation treaty is constructing a highly up-to-date uranium enrichment plant. The technical information is acquired abroad by sending a scientist to the Dutch firm which is prominently involved in the development of the process. The necessary parts are also bought circuitously abroad. I am satisfied that the European firms involved did not know what the final use of their

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products would be in Pakistan, and that they acted within the framework of the export regulations presently in force. The whole thing is financed by an Arab politician whose hatred for Israel and for all who desire peace in the Middle East is known to the whole world. Especially with regard to the conclusion of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel this takes on a special meaning, for the idea that Colonel Qadhafi, and therefore almost automatically the fanatical Palestinian leader Arafat, may possess atomic weapons, will not let anyone in the West feel safe any more. In February, details of the close cooperation between Pakistan and the PLO were published in London, which show among other things that Palestinians are trained in Pakistan as pilots, submarine crews, infantry commandos, and paratroopers, and that increasingly PLO couriers are using forged Pakistani passports to transport weapons and explosives. The passports are forged with the knowledge of the Pakistani authorities, so that if someone is caught with one of them, they can easily disclaim responsibility. As I said, all this was published in London.

As concerns Libya, I find that the most interesting piece of information comes from Bonn. It says that the Federal Government has guaranteed a credit for an order placed with German firms to build military camps in Tripoli and Bengasi in Libya. The order was placed by the Libyan army. The Federal Government is guaranteeing 348,9 million DM, and further orders are expected. The Federal Government has further agreed to guarantee deals that are still being negotiated for a projected value of 5.6 billion DM. Of course, I am all for as many export deals as possible; but when it comes to entering areas of such tension, there are a whole lot of questions that ought to be raised. Our example of Libya and Pakistan and the close ties between Pakistan and

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-8-

the PLO should make all those with any responsibility think twice.

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