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SECRET



The DCI Strategic Warning Committee's

Atrocities Watchlist

CINIC AL 2004-02

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FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

AL 2004-02 June 2004

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he DCI Strategic \	Warning Comi	nittee's Atroc	cities Watchl	ist ^a
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Sudan. Arab militia along	with government forces ar	e being accused of ethnic	c cleaning and nerbans	
genocide: humanitarian disa	ster looms as the rainy sea	son begins.	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
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	Special Warning Notice		(b)(3)
	Sudan		(b)(3)
ac ge dis du de	oth sides in Darfur almost certainly are still committing atrocities. Government tions over the past sixteen months reflect characteristics associated with past nocides. A major humanitarian crisis in which nearly 1.2 million civilians have been splaced and some 10 to 30 thousand civilians have died is expected to grow worse ring the ongoing rainy season. The security situation also may deteriorate further spite the cease-fire between Khartoum and the two major rebel factions and the tival of 120 international observers.		
•	Since early 2003 military operations by government forces and militia, including a systematic scorched-earth campaign, have resulted in damage or destruction of an estimated 600 or more villages.		
•	Hundreds of thousands more could die if fighting flares and massive aid is not forthcoming. with the loss of the last growing season major humanitarian assistance will be needed for the next 18 months.		(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3)
to	any atrocities can be attributed to the Jenjaweed, a militia numbering between 11,000 15,000 fighters from regional Arabs tribes. Khartoum has been using the Jenjaweed destroy the rebels' support base within Darfur's ethnic African villages. the government provided arms to the	(b)(1) (b)(3)	(b)(1)
Jei	njaweed and continues to support their attacks on villages, including air strikes.		(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3)
•	Neither side has the capability to militarily defeat the other, yet the government seems determine to try to eliminate the insurgency, and the rebels show no inclination to lay down their arms.		(b)(1) (b)(3)
•	militia members may be joining Sudanese army units to hide their identity from international observers.	•	(b)(1) (b)(3)
•	The rebels continue to engage government forces and last month appear to have shot down a government helicopter. The government is accusing the rebels of taking advantage of the ceasefire by seizing territory.		(b)(3)
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