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United States Department of State



Washington, D.C. 20520

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
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RELEASED IN PART B1,
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DECL: 08/27/2014

TO: Under Secretary Grossman

FROM: AF - Michael E. Ranneberger, Acting

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee (DC) Meeting on Darfur, Sudan
September 1, 11:15 AM to 12:00 Noon

The DC will review the crisis in Darfur and consider next steps for achieving a new UNSC resolution and the deployment of an expanded African Union force.

Given the failure of GOS compliance with UNSC Resolution 1556, we seek passage of a robust new UNSC resolution that keeps the focus squarely on the GOS and lays out a clear path forward. The GOS, despite public commitments and protestations, has not taken the fundamental political decision to stop the violence and atrocities being perpetrated by the Jinjaweit. GOS compliance on security has been half-hearted and often duplicitous. There has been no disarmament of the Jinjaweit. There has also been no serious effort to arrest and bring to justice senior Jinjaweit officers responsible for the attacks and other atrocities. While the level of attacks against civilians in Darfur has diminished, there are confirmed reports of recent attacks, including involvement by Government forces. There has been improvement on the humanitarian side as the Government has removed obstacles to humanitarian access. As a result, conditions in the camps have improved, more relief workers are being allowed in and more assistance is being delivered. Continued insecurity and limited international capacity, however, mean that the humanitarian effort is not reaching anywhere near all in need. The GOS is also participating in the AU-sponsored talks with the rebels that began August 23 in Abuja.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE

REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L

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CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON:

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Classified by AF Acting A/S Michael

E.O. 12958: Reasons 1.4 (b)1.4(B), 1.4(D)

DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 AUG 2019

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UNSCR 1556 was adopted July 30 and asked the SYG to report on the GOS's progress in fulfilling its commitments in 30 days, after which the UNSC would consider further actions. SRSG Pronk subsequently signed a Memorandum ("Plan of Action") with the GOS committing it to take certain actions, but the memorandum generally lacked specificity on security steps. On the humanitarian front, Pronk's plan unhelpfully pushes for return of IDPs and refugees in the near term, despite insecurity's making such voluntary return impossible.

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In his final report, we expect that Pronk will nevertheless note that the GOS has not done enough to rein in the Jinjaweit and that GOS compliance has not been adequate.

Strategy and Options

Achieving a strong resolution will not be easy. There will be UNSC members who will use the Pronk report to argue that the GOS be given additional time. There is also little enthusiasm for the imposition of sanctions. Nevertheless, achievement of a strong UNSC is an essential objective. The situation on the ground in Darfur is desperate. USAID continues to project that as many as 350,000 people could die under current circumstances. Domestic public opinion in the United States has also been inflamed by reports of continued human suffering and attacks by Jinjaweit and Government troops.

In finalizing our strategy for tabling a follow-on UNSC Resolution, we will want to review Pronk's formal report and its recommendation and the assessment by A/S Newman regarding the situation on the ground in Darfur. Nevertheless, it is possible at the current time to sketch out the current resolution options: Endorsement of an Expanded African Union; Imposition of Sanctions, A Combination of Both. (See Tab A)

Agenda:

- I. Follow-up to UNSCR 1556 (Department of State)
- II. Status AU Protection Force (Department of State)

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Objectives:

- **Obtain general agreement to our approach to securing a new UNSCR on Darfur.** Obtaining majority support in the UNSC for a resolution with teeth will be difficult, in part because some members feel the GOS has made progress in improving the humanitarian situation on the ground and needs more time to tackle the tougher questions related to security. Nevertheless, we have a strong interest in maintaining international unity to exert pressure on the GOS.
- **Map out operational efforts to support an expanded AU Mission.** The AU has deployed over 115 monitors in Darfur, with about 155 Rwandan and 150 Nigerian troops to protect them. The AU has begun very preliminary planning for deployment of 2,000-3,500 troops to support a larger and more active monitoring mission. We have identified USG funding to support an expansion of both monitors and protection forces. If the AU decides to move forward with force generation and planning, we will need additional DOD support for AU planning and logistics and to identify sources of support.

Interagency Views:

Next Steps/UNSC Resolution

- Increasing public focus on the situation in Darfur, the continuing humanitarian demands and the failure of the Government to fulfil its obligations will serve as the backdrop for the Security Council's consideration of Darfur. Calls are increasing for more direct action, either by the imposition of sanctions or the deployment of an intervention force.
- *All agencies* support maximum effort to obtain a strong follow-on UNSCR.

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AU Force

- Questions will be raised about the effectiveness of the AU Mission and the focus on linking expansion of the Protection Force to the deployment of additional monitors. Some DC participants may suggest a more robust mandate to permit the direct protection of civilians and relief agency staff. While options 1 and 2 (see Tab 2) support the expansion of an AU mission and encourage an AU role in protecting civilians, neither option would mandate a direct AU role in these activities. There may also be discussion of direct UN intervention. Though perhaps desirable, both initiatives would be difficult to secure under the current circumstances. What we need now is to expand the force smartly so that forces and infrastructure are built up during a time of relative permissiveness, so that, should more external forces be needed later to ensure humanitarian access, the AU (or other forces) will be better able to implement an intervention.

Attachments

Tab 1 - Points

Tab 2 - AF/IO Options Paper on UNSCR

Tab 3 - Matrix of GOS Responses to Actions Requested by SecState
Matrix of GOS Commitments Made to UN

Tab 4 - Pronk Plan of Action

Tab 5 - AU Peacekeeping Force Concept and Costs Paper

Tab 6 - Humanitarian Needs Paper - USAID

Tab 7 - Status of International Support for AU Force

Tab 8 - UNSCR 1556

Tab 9 - Status of Summary of Conclusions for DC on Sudan July 28, 2004

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Clearances:

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AF/RSA: M Bittrick - ok

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