



CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority WND949670
BOX 219

9.5 (25)
S/AE FILE COPY

Handwritten notes:
T/F
S/AE
~~WIGGINS~~
WC

February 25, 1960

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Philip J. Farley
Department of State

SUBJECT: RECORD OF SAFEGUARD DISCUSSIONS - PARIS, January 1960

I have attached two copies of the record of the Paris discussions on safeguards. If you consider it appropriate, a copy could be given to Mr. Wiggins of the British Embassy.

Handwritten signature: Joe all all

John A. Hall
Assistant General Manager for
International Activities

Attachment (2)
Record of Safeguard
Discussions, Paris, 1/20-22/60

SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE SECRETARY
S/AE
FEB 26 1960
AM 7,8,9,10,11,12,1,2,3,4,5,6 PM

Vertical handwritten notes:
already
Terry
what
etc.

When this document is released, it shall be this document
as **UNCLASSIFIED**
(Insert proper classification)

Handwritten note:
Copy of encl. given
to Mr. Wiggins,
British Embassy
3/15/60
mhm

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Philip J. Farley/State, S/AE

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECORD OF SAFEGUARD DISCUSSIONS
HELD AT THE ST. JAMES HOTEL, PARIS
January 20-22, 1960

THOSE PRESENT: Dr. Isador I. Rabi, United States
Mr. John A. Hall, United States
Professor V.S. Emelyanov, U.S.S.R.
Mr. Palenikh, U.S.S.R.
Sir John Cockcroft, United Kingdom
M. Francis Perrin, France
Mr. Bertrand Goldschmidt, France

In a private meeting at the American Embassy with Sir John Cockcroft and Mr. Goldschmidt on January 19, 1960, it was agreed that Dr. Rabi would lead the discussions but Cockcroft, Goldschmidt, and Perrin would assist in every respect. It was also agreed that to avoid confusion between safeguard discussions in Vienna and the basic objectives of the Paris meeting, the document GOV/463 under discussion in Vienna would not be discussed in Paris.

The objective of the Paris meeting would be to ascertain Soviet intentions and policy on safeguards. To achieve this end, it was agreed to discuss the larger and more serious problems of installations of 100 thermal megawatts and greater, including the reactor complex, i.e., fuel, chemical reprocessing plants, etc. It was finally agreed that in order to maintain an informal and non-governmental atmosphere, advisers would be on call but not be invited to the meetings with the exception of Mr. Hall. Dr. Rabi explained that while the others represented their governments, he really did not except through Mr. Hall.

The meetings took place at the St. James Hotel in a small private salon off the lobby.

Professor Emelyanov arrived by train from Vienna the morning of January 20th with Mr. Palenikh, one of the First Secretaries of the Soviet Embassy in Vienna, who acted as an interpreter. Emelyanov and Palenikh were met and brought to the St. James Hotel by Goldschmidt. (Word had been received from Vienna that Emelyanov was quite open about the meeting in Paris and announced before the full Board that he was attending a special meeting to discuss safeguards.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. Rabi opened the discussions. He stated that the meeting should be considered a continuation of the informal discussions commenced in New York in October at the time of the Scientific Advisory Committee meeting with the addition of the French representatives. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss in an informal fashion the desirability of having effective safeguards on Agency transactions and in bilateral agreements. Dr. Rabi recalled that Emelyanov had expressed a view that he had agreed in principle with safeguards but he also stated that safeguards should be simplified and expressed a willingness to hold further talks for this purpose. At this point Emelyanov summarized what was happening in the Board of Governors' meeting in Vienna and was exceedingly critical of the Secretariat document on safeguards. He emphasized that he did not believe Agency safeguards would be workable but was willing to go along on the basis of principles and procedures which were "logical and simple, and if "contradiction" were removed and "principles clarified", he would support Annex II.

Sir John Cockcroft raised the question of India and asked Emelyanov specifically whether the Soviet Union would apply safeguards in an Indian-Soviet bilateral. Emelyanov said that it was not the intention of the Soviets to include safeguards in any bilateral, and it would be difficult politically for the Soviets to ask the Indians to accept safeguards. However, the question of India was a political decision and in any event, he personally was not interested in selling a power reactor to India because of the press of internal commitments in the Soviet Union. He stated that many countries did not need power reactors, and recalled discussions with representatives of Indonesia. The Indonesians wished a reactor from the Soviet Union but Emelyanov stated he told the Indonesians that they did not need a reactor. However, the Soviet Foreign Office advised Emelyanov that if he did not do it, the United States would. (This excursion by the Professor is open to several interpretations: (1) he means what he says, or (2) it is a defense against the Soviet inability to sell many reactors abroad.)

and many others!

Professor Emelyanov was asked by Goldschmidt whether he would require safeguards on a reactor made by the Soviets and sold to West Germany. Emelyanov said he would not apply safeguards; he would simply not sell a reactor to West Germany. Rabi asked if the United States sold a power reactor to West Germany, would the Soviets be unhappy if the agreement contained no safeguard system. Emelyanov responded by saying what difference would it make inasmuch as the United States has given West Germany atomic weapons. After this point was clarified by Rabi, Emelyanov stated it did not make a great deal of difference inasmuch as you could not trust the Germans in any event. M. Ferrin raised the question of the attitude of Communist China if the Soviet Union sold a power reactor to India without safeguards. Emelyanov answered by stating that India was not capable of making weapons. However, he did state Japan was capable of producing weapons and, accordingly, he would not sell a reactor to Japan.

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

Dr. Rabi asked Emelyanov whether the United States should continue to strive for controls on uranium or should we give up. Emelyanov did not answer directly. Dr. Rabi stated the United States had 43 bilaterals, all with safeguards and these agreements, in a sense, provided security for all. Emelyanov agreed that it might be feasible for the next five to seven years to establish controls on uranium but the time was short.

At this point Emelyanov made another statement to the effect he thought under-developed countries should concentrate on the use of radioactive isotopes, and that they were not ready for power stations. In reference to Egypt, however, the Soviets probably would supply a power station but he did not think the Egyptians had the capacity to construct a weapon. However, this would be a political decision and not an economic one. Emelyanov, on several occasions, stated that the central problem was universal disarmament, not partial control through Agency safeguards. He pointedly raised the subject of East Germany and Communist China in regard to Agency safeguards. Dr. Rabi pointed out that this was a serious problem in the political area, and he recognized its importance.

Professor Emelyanov eventually admitted that the only reason the Soviets supported safeguards was because they were a member of the Agency. He stated that there had never been a study or any formal consideration of safeguards in Moscow. Decisions were made on a political basis. For example, Emelyanov said that the Soviets would have supported the Agency in 1956 without safeguard provisions. Article XII of the Statute was accepted by the Soviets in 1956 as a compromise with the United States and not because the Soviets were interested in the subject.

After two days of discussion, Emelyanov continued to display complete indifference to safeguards and complete skepticism to the effectiveness of any system. He cited pre-war German rearmament as a case in point.

The problem of disarmament was raised several times during the discussions, and it was made clear to Emelyanov by Cockcroft and Rabi, citing examples of India, Egypt, Japan and West Germany, that our objective was to develop safeguards as one of the important paths towards the reduction of armaments. Without safeguards, trade in the atomic field could cause serious international friction and promote dangerous suspicion.

At the conclusion, Professor Emelyanov agreed to the following points at the urging of Dr. Rabi:

1. To raise with his government the question of whether as a matter of policy, safeguards should be applied to civil reactors over 100 thermal megawatts, either arranged through the Agency or on a bilateral basis (this would cover the reactor complex, fuel, chemical processing, etc.).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2. The desirability of convening a panel of experts either from the four countries present or the seven countries of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the IAEA. These experts would meet as soon as possible to consider a system of safeguards with emphasis on developing techniques to simplify the problem of inspection and control.

3. The experts would report to four countries or seven members of the Scientific Advisory Committee, either before or after the April meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committee.

4. The United States and the USSR would be in communication on this subject (between Professor Emelyanov and Mr. McCone) with the United States representing the views of France and the United Kingdom.

Procedural

On several occasions Emelyanov stressed the difficulties he had within his country to maintain and develop relationships with the West in the field of atomic energy. He said that many people in his own office opposed this type of cooperation. He said the reason that he personally had to travel so much was that he did not have a spokesman who thought the same way he did on this subject. He pointed out that after forty years, the problem of rebuilding relationships with the Americans was difficult, and he was sure we had the same types of problems. He again emphasized on several occasions the Khrushchev "peace objective" and his access to Khrushchev.

As a matter of subsidiary interest in the field of high energy physics, he made the point that the Soviet Academy wished to build the accelerators, and Emelyanov told the Academy to go ahead and build the accelerators, but then Emelyanov, laughing, stated that his accelerator budget was ten times that of the Academy. He said that the Academy budget for accelerators was ninety million rubles.

At the conclusion of the meeting Emelyanov told Dr. Rabi privately that he understood and sympathized with the objectives of the United States. However, he stated he had many difficulties and found contradictory views in Soviet circles. He told a story to show that he had the "bear by the tail".

The next step is up to the Soviet Union through Professor Emelyanov to advise the United States that the Soviets are willing to proceed with further discussions on this subject. No adequate assessment of the Paris meeting can be made until we hear from Professor Emelyanov and see how far he has gone with his government on this subject. The Soviet attitude in the Agency drafting committee on Annex II on February 15th in Vienna might provide some evidence of Soviet cooperation or lack of cooperation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The objective of the meeting was achieved. Professor Emelyanov clearly and bluntly, in the presence of senior scientists, of whom he obviously has great respect, from France, the United Kingdom and the United States, confirmed the fact that the USSR does not consider safeguards a part of its security system. Soviet policy on safeguards is purely political and positions are taken on an ad hoc political basis. Since my first dealings with Soviet officials while in the Department of State in 1946, I have never witnessed a more open and frank discussion with a high member of the Soviet regime on this subject. But I am forced to conclude that if the Soviets seem to agree with us on Annex I or Annex II of the Agency safeguards system, the agreement is based not on an acceptance of common responsibility to achieve security in this field but merely to give an impression of a cooperative attitude -- a posture related to other motivations and not a security interest in Agency safeguards or bilateral safeguards. Pending further evidence from the Professor by way of progress on the points agreed to in Paris, I am exceedingly pessimistic about the sincerity of Soviet intentions in the field of safeguards.

In my judgment two points should be noted for future discussions with the Soviets:

1. Professor Emelyanov reacted favorably to the argument that a safeguards system was one of the several paths to the reduction of armaments;
2. Professor Emelyanov demonstrated a genuine concern over the possibility of West Germany and Japan producing atomic weapons.

To avoid closing with a completely pessimistic note, I must point out that Emelyanov has been put on the spot to the extent he agreed to raise these issues with his government. If he responds favorably, I would conclude that some progress has been made but at this stage very limited progress.

John A. Hall

CONFIDENTIAL

March 3, 1960

9.5
S/AE FILE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: G - Mr. Hare

FROM: S/AE - Philip J. Farley

SUBJECT: Proposed Belgian Sale of Uranium Ore to India

BACKGROUND:

The United States has been seeking the adoption of safeguards to ensure that atomic energy materials made available for peaceful uses are not diverted to military purposes. In general terms, the safeguards involve undertakings by the country receiving atomic energy materials: (1) to use such materials only for peaceful purposes; (2) to permit review by the sending country of reactor and equipment designs, etc.; (3) to keep operating records and submit reports to assist in accounting of materials; and (4) to permit inspections by the sending state or the IAEA to verify the reports and account for special nuclear materials or source material. In addition to including appropriate safeguards in all of our bilateral agreements, we have been seeking the adoption of safeguards along two lines: (1) by endeavoring to obtain the agreement of the supplier nations to voluntarily limit sales of natural uranium without safeguards; and (2) through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Following several meetings with the supplier nations, we had been led to believe by the Belgians that they would observe a tacit understanding to limit sales without safeguards to certain agreed de minimis amounts after first informing other supplier nations. However, in August of last year, the Belgians proposed to sell 26.5 tons of natural uranium to India without safeguards. On that occasion, Mr. Murphy called in the Belgian Ambassador on September 9, 1959, and expressed our strong opposition to the proposed sale. The sale was not consummated. The Memorandum of Conversation and the Briefing

CONFIDENTIAL



National Security Archive,
Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University,
2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037,
Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu