

SSN-482

ONLY

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG & FC ONLY


INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ONLY

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 11 JULY 1995

NUMBER: 2280

SUBJECT: Situation in Srebrenica




REG. JUL 11 P 9:46
 OPERATIONS
 SREBRENICA

1. Thank you for the excellent reporting you have given us, by cable and on the phone, on the events in Srebrenica. It is an extraordinarily difficult situation for the mission and we here have nothing but praise for the competence and courage of the UNPROFOR personnel involved in it, as well as for the calm leadership you have provided them.
2. The policy approaches outlined in your Z-1139 are well understood here, though (as a separate cable explains) the Security Council is pursuing a somewhat different line in its draft resolution. The situation does, however, raise some serious questions of general significance for the Force. How was it that UNPROFOR was taken unawares again, as with Gorazde and Bihac last year, by the true extent of Serb intentions? What intelligence resources do you have and what information, if any, was provided to UNPROFOR by those troop contributing countries with intelligence-gathering assets in the area? I intend to meet with the Permanent Representatives of Contact Group Governments here on Wednesday to pose the same question. I find it difficult to accept that no "early warning" was possible when the evidence suggests that a major build-up of troops and heavy weapons by the BSA occurred prior to the offensive.

SRSG
FC

IT-02-54-T
 Milešević

Exhibit # 715
 Date Admitted: 28-JUL-04
 Reference #

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3. This raises the further question of whether, in your best judgement, the Serbs have deliberately embarked on a new phase in their military strategy. Is there a discernible pattern to their current conduct that might lead to the conclusion that Zepa and/or Gorazde will be next?

4. Please accept our best wishes in your efforts to negotiate an acceptable outcome in Srebrenica. We are conscious, from your Z-1138, of how crucial the next 48-to-72 hours will be. Despite the gulf between your repeated underscoring of the unviability of the safe areas and the "robust" signals that Governments wish to send in the Security Council, we are aware of the extremely limited resources and options at your disposal. You may be assured of our full support in the difficult decisions you may be obliged to make in the days ahead.

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