

Dis-

1 Jan01

Memo To : The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Defense Secretary Designate

Subject : Transition Opportunity/Issue : Pentagon Bureaucracy

From : M. R. Hoffmann

In a change of Administration, particularly when the whole National Security establishment needs such a major reorientation (weak word), the question of the copious overstaffing of the Pentagon needs quick attention. ✓

There are a number of devices to do this, such as consolidation of the functions of two offices, the retention of an incumbent individual in a job which is then abolished; leaving jobs unfilled and then abolishing, etc. Distinction must be made between statutory positions (required by Congress) and those over which the Executive Branch has control for this purpose.

The problem will be sorting out the really key positions (as opposed to those positions in which the incumbent was not up to the job). People like Hamre, Perry etc from the recent Administration may be helpful, as well as recently retired Military and Civilians among the various self-styled experts in Washington in whom you have particular confidence (CSIS and others may have material already "in the can" which could be helpful). Proposing Legislation abolishing certain jobs gives the opportunity to leave them unfilled until the resulting legislative issue is resolved .

snowflake



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 19, 2001 10:43 AM

TO: Rich Haver
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Interview w/Hayden

020234

Take a look at this interview with Mike Hayden and tell me what you think about this,

Attachment .

DHR:dh
021901-12

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

19 FEB 01

U03284 /01

there are such close quarters in that area that when anyone needs to walk by you, you have to, you know, move aside. It contains a lot of equipment. It's the hub of the control of the ship.

GJELTEN: Navy officials are not releasing the names of the civilians who were aboard the *Greeneville* last Friday, citing privacy concerns. They insist there's no reason to conclude the visitors contributed to the accident. Controlling the helm is a relatively simple task on a submarine, often assigned to an inexperienced crew member. Captain Tom Kyle (sp), Deputy chief of staff of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, last night emphasized that visitors sitting at the controls of the *Greeneville* would hardly have been responsible for the ship's actions.

CAPT. TOM KYLE [U.S. Pacific Fleet]: If there were civilians on watch or standing at any of these stations on the ship, they were under the direct control of a qualified military submarine person. So that that person, that military person could take control of any action that was initiated by a civilian.

GJELTEN: Still, neither the Navy, nor the NTSB investigators have come up with an explanation for why the *Greeneville* collided with the Japanese vessel. Today, a Pentagon official said the Navy's own investigation could possibly lead to criminal charges being filed against the commander or other crew members if there is evidence of negligence.

Tom Gjelten, NPR News, Washington.

60 MINUTES II CBS TV

9:00 PM FEBRUARY 13, 2001

Interview with NSA Director Gen. Mike Hayden

SCOTT PELLEY, co-host: How strong is America's national security? We have a sobering answer tonight from a man who knows. The head of the National Security Agency admits that we're at risk and terrorists like Osama bin Laden may have some advantages. That sort of candor is unprecedented and so is what you're about to see--the inner workings of the most secretive spy agency in the world, a place where news cameras have never been permitted until our national security correspondent David Martin got inside.

DAVID MARTIN reporting: If you think the CIA is this country's biggest, most powerful spy agency, think again. The biggest by far, twice as big as the CIA, is the National Security Agency, which eavesdrops on communications all over the world. A phone call intercepted by NSA is often the first warning a terrorist like Osama bin Laden is planning an attack against Americans. To find that one threatening phone call or fax or e-mail or radio transmission, among the billions being made each day, NSA relies on rooms full of supercomputers. But the NSA has fallen on hard times and in many ways is facing a national security nightmare. One example, the night General Mike Hayden, the director of NSA, got a call from the agency's watch officer with the word that every single one of those computers had crashed.

Mr. MIKE HAYDEN: I went through a series of questions in kind of disbelief and think, 'How many computers are down?' And the answer was, 'All of them.'

(Footage of traffic; snowstorm; Hayden; woman)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) It was January of 2000, and while much of the East Coast dug out from a surprise snowstorm, Hayden went on closed circuit television to warn his work force what was at stake.

Gen. HAYDEN: I said, 'This is secret,' OK? This cannot be the second half of a sentence that begins, 'Honey, you won't believe what happened to me at work today,' because the knowledge that we were down would increase the risk significantly to Americans around the world.

MARTIN: The NSA was essentially brain dead.

Gen. HAYDEN: NSA headquarters was brain dead. We had some residual ability at our locations around the world, but I don't want to trivialize this. This was really bad.

(Footage of computers; Hayden; woman; NSA; aerial view of NSA; barbed wire; guard dog; man; Director's Suite)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) The computers were back up in three and a half days, but there was no denying the enormity of what had happened or other problems Hayden had discovered when he took over NSA. But before you can understand just much trouble NSA is in, you have to understand what it does. For five decades that was next to impossible, because outsiders were almost never allowed inside this compound surrounded by barbed wire and guard dogs. Too much secrecy was part of NSA's problem, Hayden decided, so going public is part of his solution.

Gen. HAYDEN: You're sitting in the headquarters, David, of a very powerful and a traditionally very secret organization.

(Footage of listening post; map)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) An organization which operates listening posts all over the world. Simply put: You eavesdrop on people's communications.

Gen. HAYDEN: That would be simply put. It's not the way--it--it's not the phrase that we use. But again, we're involved in signals intelligence.

(Footage of signals intelligence; listening post; satellites; antennas)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) Here's what signals intelligence looks like. The exact location of this listening post is secret, but it is one of many intercepting radio transmissions, phone calls, e-mails and faxes. NSA eavesdrops on the communications of both enemies and friends of the US, but Hayden will never tell you exactly who all these antennas are listening to.

Gen. HAYDEN: If the target didn't think he or she was communicating privately, they wouldn't communicate. And so the key to this business is actually doing what your adversary believes to be impossible.

(Footage of NSA's epicenter; flashing light; workers; Beraradino)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) This is the epicenter of NSA, a room so secret we were ordered to turn off our microphones, And those lights are flashing to warn everyone we are in this inner sanctum. Intercepted communications are funneled through this operations center 24 hours a day, seven days a week, under the

direction of Richard Berardino.

Mr. RICHARD BERARADINO: It's quite frankly intelligence that's flowing from the horse's mouth, so to speak.

MARTIN: The horse's mouth being the adversary.

Mr. BERARADINO: Correct.

MARTIN: So you're hearing, real time, what some of our adversaries are saying?

Mr. BERARADINO: Correct.

(Footage of man; text on screen; NSA workers at computer stations)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) For example, the actual conversations of Iraqi air defense gunners getting ready to take a shot at an American plane are monitored and warnings are sent out via a top-secret chat room. This is as close as you'll ever get to what NSA really does.

Computerized Voice #1: Attention! Attention!

(Footage of man walking down hallway; entering a room)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) NSA has a gauntlet of security devices to keep outsiders out.

Unidentified Man #1: It's a fingerprint identification system.

MARTIN: So instead of typing in your password...

Unidentified Man #1: Simply present your finger to gain access.

(Footage of scanner; man; picture of eyeball)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) There are scanners that recognize the eyeballs of those who work here...

Computerized Voice #2: Identity confirmed. Access granted.

(Footage of Martin at security scanner)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) ...and screen out those who don't.

Computerized Voice #3: Please move forward a little. Please move forward a little. We are sorry. You are not identified.

(Footage of woman at keypad; woman cyberscanned)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) Office keys are never taken home; they're issued by machine each morning.

Unidentified Man #2: OK. Stand still.

MARTIN: (Voiceover) Some of what goes on here is straight out of a James Bond movie, This is called a cyberscan.

(Footage of 3-D image)

Mr. DAVE MURLEY: (Voiceover) That actually generates a three-dimensional capture of her face.

(Footage of Q; Murley; Martin)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) There is even a real life Q named Dave Murley, who is searching for a foolproof way of preventing imposters from logging on to NSA's computers.

Mr. MURLEY: Right now the system is locked so you can't type anything on it. But as soon as I change to a position where I would be using the system...

(Footage of circles around Murley's face on screen; Martin)

Mr. MURLEY: ...you'll see the red circle came around my face. That indicated it found a face. Now there's a green one there. That indicates that it recognized my face.

MARTIN: And now you can type on the computer.

Mr. MURLEY: Now the computer is mine to do with what I wish.

(Footage of Martin at computer)

MARTIN: Right.

Mr. MURLEY: Now you can try to be me, and when you come into the...

MARTIN: Where am I?

Mr. MURLEY: Just step in front of it. It has recognized that there is a face present, but it's not my face and you're not allowed to use the computer.

MARTIN: Wrong face.

Mr. MURLEY: Wrong face.

(Footage of fake Dave)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) But what about a more clever imposter?

Mr. MURLEY: This was done by one of those companies that does masks for Hollywood. A number of special techniques have been used to match the coloring and to produce material that looks a lot like flesh. Now we'll use the fake Dave to come in and try and enter the system.

(Footage of fake Dave on screen)

Mr. MURLEY: And there you can see the fake Dave has been recognized as a face. It's thrown the red

circle around it, but the circle does not go green. And it does not recognize the fake Dave as the real Dave.

(Altered footage of government trash; man; recycled pulp; Vern Shifflett)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) At NSA, even the trash is a government secret. We had to alter these pictures to prevent secret codes and frequencies from seeing the light of day. NSA has to get rid of 40,000 pounds of classified documents each day, recycling them into pulp that is shipped off to become tissue paper.

Mr. VERN SHIFFLETT: We clean this out.

(Footage of Martin and Shifflett)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) Vern Shifflett makes sure no secret gets out of here alive.

Mr. SHIFFLETT: We call this non-qualified pulp.

MARTIN: I'd call it the dregs.

Mr. SHIFFLETT: Well, in our minds, it's still classified material.

MARTIN: You're kidding me now. This stuff is still classified?

Mr. SHIFFLETT: Right. It could just be one small portion in there.

(Footage of NSA employees)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) Until recently, NSA employees were forbidden to tell their neighbors, even their families, what they did for a living. That kind of fanatical secrecy is one of the reasons the public almost never finds out what NSA is up to.

NSA officials say that on any given day, the majority of intelligence that shows up in the president's morning briefing comes from here. If NSA is that important to what the president knows about the rest of the world, then it might alarm you to learn that according to one classified report NSA is quite literally going deaf. Hayden insists it's not that bad, but he concedes his agency has a very big problem.

Gen. HAYDEN: We're behind the curve in keeping up with the global telecommunications revolution. Yes, we are.

(Footage of Hayden; Martin)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) NSA is now playing catch-up to Silicon Valley and all the cell phones and computers that have proliferated around the world.

Gen. HAYDEN: In a previous world order, our primary adversary was the Soviet Union, an oligarchic, slow-moving nation-state. Our adversary communications are now based upon the developmental cycle of a global industry that is literally moving at the speed of light. Cell phones, encryption, fiber optic communications, digital communications, it--it goes on and on. Just--just think of all the ways that you and--and your viewers communicate, OK? Those are all available to people who would do harm to the United States of America.

(Footage of fence; satellite; inside NSA; supercomputers)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) And neither does NSA. No organization has spent more time and money on breaking codes. After all, if you can't break the code, there's no point in intercepting the message, which is why NSA is armed with an arsenal of supercomputers, some of them capable of performing more than one trillion operations per second to help decipher unreadable jumbles of letters and numbers,

NSA has always had state-of-the-art computers, but they were increasingly hard pressed to keep up with the sheer volume of traffic. As the demands grew, the system was stretched thinner and thinner...

(Footage of supercomputers)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) ...until finally, on that night in January of 2000, it crashed.

Gen. HAYDEN: We actually were down. We were dark. Our ability to process information was gone.

MARTIN: Was this the ultimate wake-up call?

Gen. HAYDEN: Of course. Of course.

(Footage of Hayden in his office)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) It wasn't Hayden's first wake-up call. When he became director two years ago, he commissioned two studies of NSA and got back a scathing indictment of a stagnant and unwieldy government bureaucracy. There is "confusion and paralysis," the reports said. "We have run out of time."

Some of these descriptions are descriptions of a dysfunctional agency. 'Civilian personnel wrote their own promotion reports and supervisors endorsed the reports, even if they did not agree.' Now that's crazy.

Gen. HAYDEN: Yeah, I would agree with that.

(Footage of Hayden)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) Instead of hiding those problems--easy to do in a top-secret agency--Hayden made sure those damning reports were posted on the Internet for all to see.

Gen. HAYDEN: I had these reports and they were almost like a license.

MARTIN: A license to break some china?

Gen. HAYDEN: Exactly. And--and I--I--David, I actually told the work force that, 'We're going to move.' People had to understand that standing still was not going to be an option.

(Footage of building; vehicles traveling down street; workers; Hayden)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) The high walls that kept NSA's secrets safe for half a century also kept out the innovative spirit of the information revolution. Now Mike Hayden is trying to stir up a revolution of his own inside the least known, most powerful institution in America, and he has only one year left before his tour of duty ends.

Gen. HAYDEN: This isn't about people doing bad things. This is about an agency that's grown up in one world, learned a way to succeed within that world and now finds itself in another world and it's got to change if it hopes to succeed in that second universe,

(Footage of 60 MINUTES II clock)

Announcer: (Voiceover) For the history of codes and code breaking from *Mata Hari* to the Cold War, log on to cbs.com.

snowflake

February 27, 2001 2:29 PM

TO: The Honorable Rudy de Leon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Homeland

The word "homeland" is a strange word. "Homeland" Defense sounds more German than American.

Also, it smacks of isolationism, which I am uncomfortable with.

Third, what we are really talking about, I suppose, is "population" as opposed to "homeland."

Let's visit about this.

DHR:db
022701-21

.....

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

381

27 Feb 01

March 13, 2001 8:39 AM

TO: William Schneider

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Maintenance

I read in the paper this week that it takes 40 hours of maintenance to keep an F- 16 in the air after a flight.

Would you have someone take a look at that?

DHR:dh
031301-4

11-L-0559/OSD/1227

snowflake

April 10, 2001 8:31 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **7**
SUBJECT: Pentagon Bureaucracy

What do we do about the Pentagon bureaucracy? Please take a look at this memo from Marty Hoffmann and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
1 /1/01 Hoffmann Memo: "Pentagon Bureaucracy"

DHR:dh
041001-31

11-L-0559/OSD/158

snowflake

~~F #~~

April 25, 2001 8:34 AM

SUBJECT: Outsourcing

The Marines are now outsourcing 100% of their mess halls.

Why don't the Army, Navy and Air Force do that?

I want to talk to the Service Secretaries about this.

DHR:dh
042501-2

→ ~~SECRET~~

7/18

AIR force Secretary
Response attached. I
am following up with Army/NAVY
to get you further info.
D. Rich

1/19
225

May 11, 2001 8:53 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim, Comptroller
Barry Watts, PA&E
Pete Aldridge, AT&L

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Defense Manpower Levels Over Time

Attached is some information on OSD personnel you might find of interest.

We certainly are going to want to reduce the size of OSD. As soon as you are confirmed, please respond to this memo with some suggestions for your area of responsibility.

The same principle, I think, goes for the Service secretaries.

Attach.

2/14/01 PA&E memo to SecDef re: Defense Manpower Levels Over Time
[U03088/01]

DHR:dh
051101-6

BCC:

GORDON ENGLAND
JAMES ROUTE
THOMAS WHITE
DAVID GUN
DOUG FEITH

020 OSD

11 May 01

U12606 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/1203

snowflake

TO: Mark Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 29, 2001

SUBJECT:

You might want to look at this article *Democracy and Foreign Policy*. I don't have time to read it, but someone said there were some good things in it.

Thanks.

DHR/tzn

052901.31

Attach. (Democracy & Foreign Policy by John L. Gaddis)

U10130 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/272

Democracy and Foreign Policy"

John Lewis Gaddis
Department of History

I want to begin with some simple statistics that illustrate what may be the most significant thing historians of future centuries will remember about the one through which we've just lived. In 1900 the world contained no democracies, if we can define that term, as the human rights organization Freedom House does, to mean states in which universal suffrage produced competitive multiparty elections. Not even the United States or Great Britain qualified, since both at that time denied the vote to women and, in the case of the U. S., to African-Americans and other minorities as well. Half a century later in 1950, after two world wars, 22 states qualified as democratic according to the Freedom House standard, comprising some 3.1% of the world's population. But by the year 2000, after a dangerous and protracted cold war, there were 120 democracies, which meant that 63% of the earth's people now lived under democratic rule.¹

The history of states goes back about 500 years, and the history of empires goes back about ten times further. Democracies in the modern sense, then, have therefore existed only for something like one fiftieth of the history of human governance – and for only about a third even of Yale's history. For democracy to have spread so far and so fast is, by any standard of historical judgment, a remarkable development. It's all the more remarkable that it did so in a century filled with so much violence, for at no other time had people perfected the techniques of killing one another with so much efficiency, and on such a scale.

How was it, then, that the predominantly democratic world that exists today arose from such unpromising circumstances? What has been the role of the United States, if any, in bringing all of this about? These are themes I want to try to address in this lecture. I'll have something to say at the end of it about where we may be going from here.

I.

The traditional American explanation for the spread of democracy goes something like this. The Founding Fathers, drawing upon their admiration for ancient Greek precedents while fearing the loss of their liberties within an all too contemporary British Empire, imported long-dormant seeds of democracy into a new world, where they immediately took root and flourished. The resulting democratic ideology then exported itself back to Europe, where it quickly undermined the most powerful continental empire – that of France – and set in motion a more gradual but no less significant political evolution within Great Britain itself. So when Woodrow

¹Prepared for the William Clyde DeVane Lecture Series, *Democratic Values*, on Saturday April 17, 2001. Freedom House, *Democracy 2 Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century* (New York: Freedom House, 1999), available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/democracy.html>. I have used revised statistics from this website, which show 120 democracies in the year 2000, rather than the 199 cited in the original published report.

Wilson brought the United States into World War I in 1917 with his call to "make the world safe for democracy," he was only continuing on a wider scale the process of democratic transplantation that Thomas Jefferson began in 1776 when he had proclaimed that "all men are created equal." The American Revolution was, thus, was the most potent of all revolutions, which explains why so much of the world today follows its example.

There are, however, several problems with this explanation. First, the Founding Fathers were far more republican than democratic in their thinking: to the extent that ancient precedents shaped it, they came more from Rome than Greece. Second, the idea of a competitive multi-party system badly frightened these leaders, and the prospect of universal suffrage would have astounded them. Third, the history of the United States during its first century would hardly have inspired democratization elsewhere. One of its central features, after all, was the persistence of slavery long past the time it had ceased to exist in most other advanced societies, together with the fact that one of the bloodiest wars of the 19th century had been required to eradicate it. For decades afterwards, the American practice of democracy retained glaring inconsistencies: Wilson himself, who spoke so grandly of extending democracy throughout the world, had not the slightest intention of extending that same right to the Former victims of slavery at home.

So let us scrap this traditional explanation of democratic diffusion and consider another one. It falls within the category of what we might call historical tectonics: those great underlying forces in history that are set in motion by no person and no state, but that nonetheless move all persons and states, rather as the great continental plates move all of us about on the face of the earth. Two in particular might plausibly have paved the way for the expansion of democracy in the 20th century.

The first of these was the emergence, in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, of an open market system which broke down the old patterns of mercantilism by which states had sought, however ineffectually, to control the economic lives of their citizens. The free exchange of commodities, according to this argument, cannot help but promote the free exchange of ideas: politics follows economics. The second tectonic shift was the communications revolution of the late 19th century – I mean here the expansion of literacy together with the development of mass-circulation newspapers and, in the telegraph and telephone, the first primitive forms of instant electronic communication – all of which made it harder than it had been for states to conceal information, or to keep people from sharing it among themselves. "The impulse of democracy, which began in another century in other lands, has made itself fully felt in our time," Lord Salisbury acknowledged in 1897, adding with evident relief that "vast changes in the centre of power and incidence of responsibility have been made almost imperceptibly without any disturbance or hindrance in the progress of the prosperous development of the nation."²

But there's a problem with this explanation as well, for it's possible to argue that it was precisely these two tectonic forces – market capitalism and mass communications – that paved the way for the most appalling authoritarian excesses of

² Andrew Roberts, *Salisbury: Victorian Titan* (London: Phoenix, 1997), p. 612.

the 20th century. Karl Marx anticipated the mechanism with his claim that because capitalism distributes wealth unequally, it also encourages social alienation; and most historians would see in such alienation, as it manifested itself during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the roots of both communism and fascism. The success of these movements, in turn, owes much to the skill with which their leaders—Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and especially Hitler—exploited the new means of mass communication. The tectonic explanation gets us little further than Jeffersonian transplantation in helping us to understand the spread of democracy, therefore, since it also helps to explain the spread of authoritarianism.

It's always worth remembering, as Yogi Berra didn't say but should have, that history isn't history until after it's happened. To see the logic of this, step into your nearest available time machine, set the dial back to any point in the past you choose, and check to see how many people there were then who accurately predicted what's happening now. Drop in, for example, on the ceremonies surrounding the Yale bicentennial a hundred years ago. How likely it would have seemed on that occasion—when no one in the world had a truly democratic form of government—that two-thirds of the world's population would have such governments by the time of this occasion? Had you suggested such a thing to the dignitaries assembled on this campus in 1901, the answer would have been, I imagine, something like: "don't bet your top hat on it."

II.

Let us switch, then, to an explanation which, while it does not neglect the impact of either the American example or the underlying tectonics, does not depend upon them either: it has to do with the role of contingency in history. Because great events determine so much that happens afterwards, we tend too easily to assume that they could only have happened in the way that they did. A prime example is World War I, or the Great War as it was known until an even greater one came along. Without this catastrophe, we can safely surmise, the remaining history of the 20th century would have been very different. But because we cannot know the nature of those differences, we too often rely on the dubious doctrine of inevitability in seeking to explain the origins of the war, and its subsequent evolution.

That makes one of its most important consequences—the emergence of Woodrow Wilson as the first world leader with a global democratic vision—seem far more predetermined than it actually was. After all, no one had expected a major European war to break out in the summer of 1914. Once it had, hardly anyone anticipated that it would still be stalemated three years later, or that the United States would then enter it and help to bring about an allied victory. Certainly Wilson had not foreseen, when he entered the White House in 1913, that he would be shaping a European peace settlement in 1918-19: it would be the greatest irony, he commented shortly after taking office, if his administration should find itself involved in any significant way in European affairs.

Wilson's commitment to "make the world safe for democracy," therefore, grew more out of circumstances than destiny. He seized an unexpected opportunity to project national power onto the international scene, but he had no plan in place to

implement his lofty vision. His reasons for invoking it, indeed, were less than lofty: he was trying to win the support of a still isolationist country for a war aimed at restoring the balance of power in Europe. The easiest way to do that seemed to be to portray adversaries as autocrats and allies as democrats, despite the fact that among these allies, had he not been overthrown only a few weeks earlier, would have been the greatest autocrat of them all at the time, the Russian tsar. What Wilson was doing, in short, was enlisting idealism in the defense of realism, a technique Jefferson would fully have understood.

It took another unexpected event—the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia several months later—to transform Wilson's tactics into a highly effective grand strategy. For although Wilson had welcomed the tsar's collapse, he had been horrified when the resulting chaos allowed a tiny band of revolutionaries to seize control of that country, withdraw it from the war, and then challenge the legitimacy of the existing social order everywhere else. Wilson and other allied leaders took the Bolshevik Revolution sufficiently seriously that, during the final year of the fighting, they gave almost as much attention to containing its effects as to defeating Germany.

That was the context, then, in which Wilson made his Fourteen Points speech of January, 1918, arguably the most influential public pronouncement by any leader at any point in the 20th century. For in seeking to counter the attraction of Bolshevism, Wilson pushed himself into proclaiming two great interlocking principles that would shape the American approach to the world for decades to come: political self-determination and economic integration. People should have the right, he insisted, not only to choose their own forms of government, but also to benefit from the open markets that would ensure their own prosperity. The world was now to be made safe for both democracy and capitalism.

In making this connection, Wilson was grounding his idealism in a more compelling realism than even those consummate realists, Marx and Lenin, were able to achieve. It's true that they, like Wilson, saw themselves as seeking democracy — what else would a classless society be? — but they did so by relying on dictatorships, whether in the management of politics or economics, to bring that condition about. They believed, almost as a matter of religious conviction, that coercion in the short run would produce liberation in the long run; that means disconnected from ends would not corrupt ends. It proved to be one of the costliest leaps of faith in all of history.

Wilson was far more practical. He sensed the need for *simultaneous* advance toward social and material well-being. He saw the danger of seeking one while postponing the other. He understood that economics sustains politics even as politics disciplines economics; that the relationship is symbiotic, not separate. There was, to be sure, nothing new about such thinking: it had been the basis for British liberalism throughout much of the 19th century, and for American progressivism in the early 20th century. But it was one thing to have it said by John Bright or Herbert Croly in a book or from a lecture platform. It was quite another to have it proclaimed by the most influential man in the world, as by the final year of the war Wilson had become. Or by the man of the century, a distinction future historians may well regard Wilson as having merited.

III.

But get back into your time machine for a moment, and run a reality check on that last proposition. Set your dial for 1920, Yale University, and the ceremonies dedicating the Woolsey Hall memorial to the dead of the Great War. Would Wilson have looked, to anyone there, like the man of the century? I very much doubt it, for not only had he failed to get the settlement he wanted at the Paris peace conference; he had not even managed to sell membership in the League of Nations – the institution critical to sustaining his global vision – to his own people. He would die broken in health and embittered in spirit four years later, with the events that would ultimately vindicate him nowhere in sight on the horizon.

Given the American withdrawal back into political isolationism in the 1920s and then into economic isolationism in the 1930s; given the demoralizing failures of both capitalism and democracy in Europe during those years; given the rise of authoritarian alternatives in the consolidation of communist rule in Russia, the emergence of fascism in Italy and Germany, and the rise of militarism in Japan: given all of these things, it was possible on the eve of World War II for many people to say and for more to believe that authoritarianism, not democracy, was the wave of the future. The organization America First, which attracted so much support on this campus after the fighting broke out in Europe in 1939, had as its goal insulating the United States from the rest of the world, not inspiring or leading it.

We tend to remember World War II today as a good war, in the sense that it so thoroughly crushed the challenges to democracy that the Axis states had mounted, and so decisively propelled the United States into the position of global hegemon. As a consequence, it's easy to forget two things: that the outcome of the war, until at least half of the way through it, was by no means assured; and that victory, when it finally did come, guaranteed little about the future safety of either democracy or capitalism.

Recent scholarship has tended to confirm, for World War II, what the Duke of Wellington said about the Battle of Waterloo: that it was "the nearest run thing you ever saw."³ The reasons for this reside not just in the improbable coincidence of the democracies having leaders like Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who rose magnificently to occasions neither of them could have anticipated; nor in the amazing shortsightedness of Adolf Hitler in declaring war on both the Soviet Union and the United States within a six month period of time; nor in the unexpected tenacity of the British, the remarkable fortitude of the Russians, the awesome technological prowess of the Americans, and the increasingly frequent military incompetence, as the war wore on, of the Germans and the Japanese. All of these things had to come together to produce victory, along with the incalculable moral effect of fighting enemies that had come to be seen as truly evil.⁴

Even so, the end of the war was no clear triumph for democracy or capitalism. For despite the fact that Roosevelt, in the Atlantic Charter, had sought to revive Wilson's vision, victory had come only through collaboration with an ally who in no

³Elizabeth Langford, *Wellington* (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1952), p. 322.

⁴For an excellent recent book that stresses how easily the war could have gone the other way, see Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (London: Pimlico, 1995).

way shared it. Stalin's Soviet Union had not engaged, as had Hitler's Germany, in purposeful genocide; but its record was bad enough. During the decade from 1929 to 1939 it had managed, through the brutalities associated with the collectivization of agriculture, the resulting famine, and the purges that followed, to kill something like twice the number of people who died in the Nazi Holocaust. And yet the war's outcome left this regime controlling half of Europe. The famous pictures of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin posing amicably together reflected no vanquishing of autocracy by democracy, therefore, but rather the desperation with which democracy had hung on by the skin of its teeth.

Fast forward your time machine, then, to 1950, Yale University, and the Woolsey Hall ceremony adding the World War II dead to lists of those killed in earlier wars. Ask the attendees on that occasion about the future they saw ahead of them. I suspect that, for many of them, it would not have been that of Wilson, but rather the one laid out in George Orwell's novel 1984, published only the year before. Big Brother was, of course, Stalin transparently disguised. The very indispensability of his role in defeating fascism now made communism seem close to invincible; with Mao Zedong's recent victory in China, that ideology dominated a huge stretch of territory extending from the Baltic to the Pacific. There were, to be sure, some 22 democracies in the world that year, but there were twice as many regimes that would have qualified, by the Freedom House standards, as either authoritarian or totalitarian.³ The world was hardly safe for democracy yet.

IV.

So did the Cold War make it so? That's an intriguing question, because promoting democracy is not exactly what the Cold War was noted for while it was going on. And yet the Freedom House statistics — the jump from 22 democracies in 1950 to 120 by the year 2000 — suggest some connection between the Cold War and the expansion of democratic governance: this did not all happen after that conflict ended. So did democracy spread because of the Cold War, or in spite of it? Correlations, it's worth remembering, aren't always causes.

The "in spite of" arguments will be familiar to you. They emphasize the division of most of the postwar world into Soviet and American spheres of influence; the extent to which that influence constrained the autonomy of those who fell within it; and especially the means by which Washington and Moscow chose to conduct so much of their competition — the nuclear balance of terror. This seemed the ultimate affront to democracy, because it risked the denial of life itself in the pursuit of geopolitical stability. The United States would win, one Air Force general is said to have commented, if after a nuclear war there were only two Americans left. "You'd better make damn sure, general," a civilian aide replied, "that one is a man and the other a woman."⁴

Critical to the "in spite of" argument is the assumption of moral equivalency: the claim that the two Cold War systems were equally repressive. It's easy to forget now what a popular position this once was. It grew out of the anti-Vietnam War and

³See note 1 for the source of these statistics.

⁴William Kaufman relates this story in an interview for the CNN television show *Cold War*.

anti-nuclear weapons protests of the 1960s and 1970s. It informed much of the revisionist historiography on the origins of the Cold War that was being produced during those years. It was why Ronald Reagan felt obliged so pointedly to characterize the Soviet Union, in 1983, as an "evil empire." And as late as 1984 — Orwell's year — it was still possible for that exquisite barometer of academic self-indulgence, the Oxford Union, to debate the proposition: "Resolved, there is no moral difference between the foreign policies of the U.S. and the USSR."

Such arguments began to lose their credibility, though, as people like Andrei Sakharov, Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa, Pope John Paul II, and ultimately Mikhail Gorbachev himself made it clear that they saw a considerable moral difference between the democratic governments that were flourishing on one side of the Cold War divide, and the autocratic regimes that were hanging on, increasingly desperately, on the other side of it. It became far more difficult to blame the Americans and their allies for maintaining an anti-democratic system when their erstwhile adversaries were so eloquently condemning — and effectively dismantling — their own. Even before the Cold War ended, then, moral equivalency arguments had lost much of their appeal; today hardly anyone makes them.

A more serious objection to the claim that the Cold War fostered the growth of democracy has to do with the underlying tectonics I mentioned at the beginning of the lecture. If late 19th century improvements in marketization and mass communication continued throughout the 20th — as they surely did — would they not have incubated democracies quite effectively whether there had been a Cold War going on or not? Is not what happens beneath the surface of events ultimately more significant than the events themselves?

The problem here, though, is the evidence from the first half of the 20th century that marketization and mass communication could as easily incubate authoritarianism. Using them to explain democratization during the Cold War requires showing that these processes had somehow changed: that at some point they began to reward only lateral but no longer hierarchical forms of political organization. I think it's possible to make that case, but only by bringing in what my political science colleagues would call exogenous variables. Did markets themselves generate safeguards against their own excesses, or did states learn, from the painful experience of the 1930s, that they had better impose these? Did the means of communication shift all that dramatically in the 1940s, or was it the war that sensitized people to their possible abuses? Tectonic determinism is always difficult to confirm, because the tectonics tend to manifest themselves in particular contexts, the effects of which can't always easily be distinguished.

There has been one attempt to link democratization to technological advance by way of the Cold War, though: it's what we might call the Teflon argument. The older people here will recall the justifications the National Aeronautics and Space Administration used to make for the space program when budgets looked likely to be cut: without it, we were told, housewives would never have had Teflon, since this better method of frying bacon had evolved from the need to avoid frying astronauts as their space capsules re-entered the atmosphere. The Teflon explanation has been

*John Lewis Gaddis, "On Moral Equivalency and Cold War History," *Review and International Affairs*, x(1996), 131-42.

expanded in various ways; without the inducements the Cold War provided to develop the necessary technology, it's often said, we would never have had such innovations as jet-powered airliners, interstate highways, 500-channel satellite receiving dishes, mobile phones, and of course the internet, which began as a supplementary command and control network for the Pentagon in the event of nuclear war. And without these things, we could never have had globalisation, which in turn has promoted democratization. Or so the argument runs.

I don't think much of it, though, for a couple of reasons. First, it reverses chronology: the movement toward democratization was well under way before most of these innovations were. Second, it assumes that what people have is more important than what they think. The perils of this approach became clear in 1999 when the *New York Times* columnist Tom Friedman published his "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Resolution," which noted that no state with a McDonald's franchise had ever gone to war with another one. Unfortunately the United States and its NATO allies chose just that inauspicious moment to begin bombing Belgrade, where there were an embarrassing number of golden arches.¹

All of these "in spite of" arguments – and, in their own way, the Teflon and Golden Arches explanations as well – disconnect democratization from the mainstream of Cold War history. They build a wall between domestic politics and geopolitics that seems unlikely to have existed in the minds of people at the time. They strike me, for that reason, as less than plausible. So what if we were to take seriously the alternative position, however unlikely it might seem, which is that the Soviet-American superpower rivalry actually promoted democratization? That the diffusion of democracy is at least in part an offspring, even if an unexpected one, of the Cold War itself?

V.

The case in favor of this argument would focus on the role of the United States, and especially on the differences in the way it handled its responsibilities in the two postwar eras. I spoke earlier of Wilson's insight that economic and political progress had to proceed simultaneously; that just as one could not expect prosperity without open markets and unconstrained politics, so one could not postpone prosperity – as Marxism, Leninism, and ultimately Maoism also attempted to do – and still expect to get democracy. Wilson's countrymen had not embraced this logic, though, after World War I, and as a consequence the United States made no sustained effort to implement his vision. It did after World War II. What made the difference?

Part of the answer, I'm sure, was simply guilt: despite their power the Americans had done so little to prevent the coming of the second war that they were determined after it was over not to repeat their behavior after the first war. But part of the reason also was that the world of the early 1920s had seemed relatively benign: there were no obvious threats to American security. The world of the late 1940s, in contrast, seemed anything but benign. We can of course debate the accuracy of the view that Stalin posed as great a threat to the European balance of power as Hitler

¹Friedman made this claim in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999).

had: the few Soviet documents we have are inconclusive on that point, and even if we had all the documents my fellow historians would still find ways to disagree as to what they showed. For our purposes here, though, what's important is not what Stalin's intentions really were, but what American leaders *believed* them to be. About that there's little doubt, and as a consequence the Truman administration had resolved, by 1947, to act very differently from the way in which its predecessors had acted a quarter century earlier.

What it did was to transform Wilson's idea of a world safe for democracy and capitalism into a strategy of containment, and then to sell it – as Wilson had never managed to do – to the American people. Stalin certainly helped, for although planning for the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system preceded the onset of the Cold War, it's not at all clear that the United States would have sustained these commitments to internationalism had there been no Soviet threat. There certainly would have been no Truman Doctrine, no Marshall Plan, and no North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And I suspect there would not have been, as well, what now looks to have been the single most important contribution the Americans made toward global democratization: that was a new and remarkably ambitious effort at democratic transplantation, aimed this time at two of the most persistently authoritarian cultures on the face of the earth, those of Germany and Japan.

Only Americans, I think, would have attempted something as rash as this. Only an innocence bordering on ignorance of the countries involved could have led them to consider it. Only authoritarian proconsuls like General Lucius Clay in Germany and General Douglas MacArthur in Japan would have bypassed a Washington bureaucracy more attuned to the punishment of defeated enemies than to their rehabilitation. Only the willingness to make distasteful compromises – to cooperate with recently hated adversaries – could have made the new policy work. And only the realization that a greater adversary was arising out of Eurasian heartland, and that the Germans and the Japanese, if not quickly integrated into the system of Western democratic states, could wind up as allies of the new enemy – only this, I think, could have provided a basis for justifying this new policy to the American people and to those other American allies who had themselves suffered at the hands of the Germans and the Japanese.⁹

Each of these improbabilities had to intersect with and reinforce the other in order to produce an effect we today take for granted: that these two formerly authoritarian states are now, and have long been, safe for democracy and capitalism. It was, however, another of Wellington's "nearest run things." The course of events could easily have proceeded otherwise. To see how, reset your time machine but now in the counter-factual mode that allows you to change a single variable, re-run a subsequent sequence, and see what difference this made.

Begin with the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt in April, 1945, but change just one thing: the new president, Harry S. Truman, decides to stick with and apply to both Germany and Japan the harshly punitive occupation policies laid out by the late president's influential Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., which FDR had at

⁹The best discussion of the American democratization of Germany and Japan is in Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 146-74.

one point himself endorsed. The scenario then proceeds as follows. After the sacking of Generals Clay and MacArthur, the American occupation authorities in Germany and Japan dutifully follow Washington's orders. The Germans and the Japanese quickly come to resent the resulting repression, combined with starvation, and communists in both countries begin to gain support for their view that the right to eat is more important than the right to vote. The resistance they generate makes the occupation so difficult to administer that the new Republican majority in Congress resolves early in 1947 to "bring the boys home" and to "stop pouring money down foreign ratholes."¹⁰

Truman and his advisers belatedly try save the situation by devising various plans which they name for themselves, but when the Soviet blockade forces the Western powers out of Berlin early in 1948, American authority crumbles throughout West Germany and the spillover effects are felt in Japan as well. Coordinated coups bring both countries into the communist camp that summer, just on the eve of a Democratic National Convention which feels it has no choice but to replace Truman with the only American who seems to have a chance of cutting a deal with Stalin, the former vice president Henry A. Wallace.

Having run successfully on the platform "He'll keep us out of the Cold War," President Wallace follows the example of Neville Chamberlain ten years earlier and negotiates "peace in our time" with a Soviet Union that, now that its ally Mao Zedong has triumphed in China as well, dominates the entire Eurasian continent. George Orwell's book is of course suppressed, but still it's his vision, not Wilson's, that turns out to have been the wave of the future. And at the end of our counterfactual time machine sequence, which is of course the Yale tercentennial in 2001, a group of distinguished professors are lecturing knowledgeably on the theme: "Authoritarian Vistas."

Outrageous, you say? Off the wall? Well, no more so, I think, than what any American would have said at the beginning of the 1940s, if told what the Americans would actually have accomplished by the end of the 1940s. That scenario would have seemed, not just counter-factual, but fantastical.

VI.

Those of you who are into chaos theory — or Tom Stoppard's theatrical renderings of it — will know about something about "butterfly effects": those tiny perturbations at the beginning of a process that can make an enormous difference at the end of it. The term originated in meteorology with the suggestion that a butterfly fluttering its wings over Beijing can, in theory at least, set off a hurricane over Bermuda; that's why weather forecasting is so difficult. It's since extended into the realms of physics, mathematics, paleontology, economics, and now even into politics with the very recently discovered Florida butterfly ballot.

What's implied in all of this is something historians have known all along but haven't always explained well: that under certain circumstances small events can set

¹⁰Which is what the newly-elected British Labour government did in fact decide to do with respect to both end Palestine that same year.

in motion much larger ones; that the relationship between causes and consequences isn't always proportionate; that there are great turning points in the past, and that the points upon which they turn on can be exceedingly small. The 1945-47 period was just such a turning point, I think, for Wilson's vision of a world safe for democracy and capitalism. Until that moment, the cards had seemed stacked against it. Even victory in World War II had not reversed a trend that seemed more likely to lead to authoritarian vistas than to democratic ones. But after 1947, the authoritarian side -- if you will pardon this profusion of metaphors -- began to recede. What it left behind was a slowly emerging democratic world.

For if two of the most authoritarian states in history were on the way to becoming democracies -- and if they were recovering their economic strength as they did so -- then that was as powerful a demonstration as can be imagined of the practicality as well as the principled character of Wilson's vision. The Soviet Union had nothing with which to counter it: all it could offer was an ideologically based promise that seemed increasingly at odds with practicality. It would take years -- indeed decades -- for the contrast to become so clear that it began to shape the Cold War's outcome; but in the end it did just that. The nuclear weapons and other instruments of war the super-powers piled up during that conflict did little to determine how it actually came out. But the distinction between a Wilsonian vision realized on one side and denied on the other turned out to be decisive.

Would it all have happened without the Cold War? I rather doubt it, for in the classic tradition of what free enterprise is supposed to do, it was the *competition that* forced the United States, in this critical instance, to do the right thing.

VII.

What's the right thing to do today, though, in a very different world in which there's so little competition? In which democracy is no longer the exception but the norm? How can the United States use its influence to help ensure that the world of 2101 -- the next logical stop on our time machine tour of Yale ceremonial occasions -- remains at least as hospitable to democratic institutions as is the present *one*? Several things occur to me, which I should like to list in ascending order of their importance.

First, *admit our shortcomings*. The Cold War was a brutal time, and the United States committed its share of brutalities in trying to win it. Paradoxically, the further we got from Europe, which was always the main arena of Cold War competition, the less scrupulous we were about supporting democracy: too many people in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia suffered as a result. Even in Europe we did not always prefer the democratic alternative, as our record in Spain, Portugal, and Greece clearly demonstrates. Our enthusiasm for capitalism was always more consistent than our enthusiasm for democracy, despite our ideological commitment to the principle that the two went hand in hand.

The historian's equivalent of truth in advertising demands that we acknowledge this, even as we should try to understand the reasons for it. They involved chiefly a lingering pessimism about the climate for democratic transplants -- a fear that these might not survive in places where the resentments generated by

poverty or injustice were too great. Some of this pessimism grew out of guilt over the extent to which the United States and its Western European allies had contributed to these conditions, whether through formal or informal imperialism. Some of it reflected a tendency to attribute to the Soviet Union and its allies a far greater capacity than they actually had to win friends and influence people in the Third World. Some of it resulted from a widespread habit within the U.S. government — understandable in a generation of leaders that had survived depression and war — of assuming the worst, even as one hoped for the best.

Three Americans, I think, should get particular credit for having reversed this long history of official pessimism about democratic prospects, although only one of them normally does. Jimmy Carter's achievement in making human rights the centerpiece of his foreign policy and mostly meaning it is justifiably well known. But I would also give credit to Henry Kissinger, who as he neared the end of his years in government, repudiated his own earlier policy of supporting white minority regimes in southern Africa; and to Ronald Reagan, who despite a dubious record in Central America had the imagination, with the Reagan Doctrine, to turn the table on the Soviets and begin demonstrating that it was they, not the Americans, who were more often the imperialists in a post-colonial world. What Carter, Kissinger, and Reagan were all moving toward — even if at different rates and under differing circumstances — was the view that the United States need not fear the choices the Third World, if freed from imperialism, would now make.

My second recommendation, after acknowledging our history, is that we *reacquire our humility*. Even Americans do not normally associate that quality with themselves, but if you go back and study carefully what everyone now acknowledges to have been our most creative period in our foreign policy — the one in which we were transplanting democracy to Germany and Japan, while seeking to revive it elsewhere in Europe — you'll find that we showed a remarkable sensitivity to interests and advice of others. There was *no* effort to transform the countries we occupied or supported into clients or even clones of ourselves. MacArthur presided, in Japan, over one of the few successful land redistribution projects in modern history. The Marshall Plan wound up reinforcing the European social welfare state. The movement for European economic integration, which we consistently supported, was intended to create competitors to ourselves. NATO was from the start a European initiative, and despite the disproportionate power we've always wielded within the alliance, it was the Europeans who largely shaped its evolution during the Cold War.

We exhibited this openness to the views of others, I think, for several reasons. One was that we often weren't sure what to do ourselves, and so needed all the help we could get. But there was also the sense, at least in Europe, that if we appeared too domineering, the Russians would only benefit from this. Their own arrogance and brutality in Eastern Europe, it was clear from the earliest days of the Cold War, was a liability for them. That made us all the more determined to treat our own allies with respect, to give them reasons for wanting to be within the American sphere of influence, and not to feel that they'd had it forced upon them. We allowed their interests to shape the disposition of our power. In short, we listened.

Since the Cold War ended, though, it seems to me that we've fallen into a different habit, which is that of instructing. This was one of Woodrow Wilson's last

attractive personal characteristics — perhaps growing out of his previous career as a professor — and it seems now that in its otherwise quite justifiable rediscovery of Wilson, our foreign policy is embracing it too. The Clinton administration expected the world to be impressed by its repeated claims of American “indispensability,” even as it failed to define coherently the purposes for which we were indeed indispensable. The new Bush administration hasn’t done any better: its recent humiliation of South Korea for attempting to remove remaining remnants of the Cold War, together with its unnecessarily abrupt rejection of the Kyoto Protocol at just the moment the scientific evidence on global warming has become compelling, suggest a disregard for the opinions of others that’s quite at odds with how we waged — and won—the Cold War. These tendencies, if I may sound instructive myself, need correction.

My third suggestion would be to *acknowledge* contingency. If the history of democratisation during the 20th century suggests anything at all, it is that this was a contingent, not a determined, process: there was nothing inevitable about it. An improbable combination of circumstances allowed what in the long sweep of history will seem like a relatively small push by the Americans—the democratisation of Germany and Japan—to have very big effects. No theory of which I am aware could have predicted this sequence of events, and that ought to caution us as we assess the prospects for democratisation in the future.

It would be a great mistake, it seems to me, to assume that democracy grows automatically out of any one thing. To say that it depends solely upon *support* from the United States ignores the uniqueness of the situation in which that *support* was indeed critical during the early Cold War. To say that it results from economic integration is to ignore the fact that the world was about as integrated at the beginning of the 20th century, when there were no democracies at all, as it is now.” To say that it grows out of capitalism ignores the role capitalists have played — and not just in Nazi Germany — in supporting authoritarianism. To say that it grows out of allowing people the right to determine their own future neglects the fact that some people are determined to deny other people any future at all: does anyone really believe that democracy, if fully practiced by all sides in the Balkan crises of the 1990s, or by the Israelis and the Palestinians today, would fully benefit all sides? And to say that because democracy turned out to be the wave of the future during the 20th century doesn’t necessarily make it so for the 21st.

It’s also the case that combinations of causes can have contradictory as well as complimentary effects. We tend to assume the compliment&y of Wilson’s great principles, economic integration and political self-determination, because they mostly were during the Cold War. But has not the post-Cold War era already exposed fault lines suggesting that these two tectonic processes are not in fact moving in the same direction? The backlash against globalization that has surfaced so conspicuously over the past couple of years at places like Seattle, Washington, Prague, and Davos, only reflects a basic reality that we should long ago have anticipated: it is that people do not always vote in the way that economists think.

My final suggestion, as we consider what we might do to sustain democracy in the face of these contradictions, is to remember *Isiah Berlin*. It was my privilege to

*For the arguments for and against this proposition, see Niall Ferguson, *The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000* (London: Allen Lane, 2001), pp. 308-12.

know the great man slightly when I was at Oxford eight years ago, and to witness at first hand his congeniality and conversational brilliance, his interest in everything and everybody, and his emphatic impatience with any effort to look at the world from any single point of view. He was, more than anyone else I've ever met or read about, a true *philosopher of democracy*. As befits a man who loved the distinction between foxes and hedgehogs, Sir Isaiah taught us many different things but also one big thing, and yet he avoided the contradiction this might seem to imply.

I have in mind his concept of the *incommensurability* of values: the idea that while we can and should pursue multiple goods, they are not all mutually compatible. Some will complement one another; some will contradict one another: we cannot, to the same extent and in all situations, have them all. The art of politics – certainly of democratic politics – is the art of balancing incommensurate goods, of making tough choices, of keeping the whole picture and not just part of it in mind, of taking an *ecological* view of our own existence.

For the word ecology, in this sense, implies the balance it takes to keep an organism healthy. We understand it well enough when it comes to our plants, our pets, our children, and ourselves: we know how easily there can be too much of any good thing, and how harmful the consequences can be. I'm not sure we know that yet, though, in a political world – to say nothing of an academic world – that so often encourages investments in single causes, even if in the name of democratic principles. For this is, as Berlin reminds us, fundamentally an anti-democratic procedure: "the search for perfection," he writes, "does seem to me a recipe for bloodshed, no better even if it is demanded by the sincerest of idealists, the purest of heart."¹²

This is, then, democracy's Achilles's heel: it's a disconnection of means from ends not all that different from the one at the top of the slippery slope that produced, at its bottom, the great anti-democratic movements of the century that has just ended. It's what ought to haunt us as we think about the century that's now beginning, and especially as we try to guess what may lie between us on this celebratory occasion for Yale University, and our descendants a hundred years from now upon the next one.

¹² "The Pursuit of the Ideal," in Isaiah Berlin, *The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays*, edited by Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996), p. 11.

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

Where in OSD do we have a policy planning staff?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.43

020 OSD

29 May 01

U10152 /01

07

snowflake

July 30, 2001 9:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Treaties

(Handwritten signature)

I need a briefing on what all these treaties are—IMF, CBTB, etc.-all the ones I am going to be talking to Ivanov about.

I need a paragraph or a single page, basically stating what each treaty does and what the principal provisions are that affect us and affect them-but not a lot of detail.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073001-1

(Handwritten: Copy BTM)

092.2

30 Jul 01

U13266 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/421

July 31, 2001 8:27 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Oil

We ought to have on our radar screen the subject of oil-Venezuela, the
Caucases, Indonesia-anywhere we think it may exist and how it fits into our
strategies.

Thanks.

DFR:dh
073101-16

463

3150101

U12665 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/424

snowflake

July 31, 2001 3:34 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reductions

I just noticed that the total **SecDef** office is civilian 27, military 29, for a total of 56. Why don't we get it down so it is roughly equal, military and civilian, and reduce the number down to at least 40-45. Why don't you come back with a proposal as to how you propose to do that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073101-48

020050

3150101

U12661 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/428

August 8, 2001 10:55 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Torie Clarke
Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 3λ
SUBJECT: Savings

Please give Larry Di Rita a specific list of things you have stopped or cut out and where you have saved money. We need to keep a running log.

I just read your memo of August 6, and you are obviously doing some things-but we need to capture them. You can't just do it and let it sink. We have to know it.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/6/01 Aldridge memo to SecDef re: "Detailees to AT&L"

DHR:dh
080801-9

040

In Rem: L

U12699 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/1026

snowflake

August 16, 2001 12:24 PM

SUBJECT: Anecdote for Missile Defense

Anecdote

Missile Defense

The United States does not today have the ability to defend against ballistic missiles. No nation currently has the ability to defend against ballistic missiles, except for Russia, where Moscow has a deployed missile defense system with interceptors armed with nuclear warheads.

Think back to England during the World War II "blitz," when they were on the receiving end of German V-1 and V-2 missiles.

In the 1980s, there was the SCUD war between Iran and Iraq.

Think back ten years ago, to the Gulf War, when Iraq was firing ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia and Israel and people were being killed—28 Americans killed and 99 seriously wounded by one ballistic missile into Saudi Arabia .

DHR:dh
081601-5

373,24

16 Aug 01

U12708 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/450

TO: Admiral Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: September 7, 2001

SUBJECT:

It took us five minutes to get connected to the Powell/Rice call this morning. And then when I was talking to Colin Powell, the COMs cut us off.

We have got something to improve the communication system around here.

DHR/ezn
090701.13

311

754 01

U13072 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/470

snowflake

September 10, 2001 10:15 AM

- Number of defense agencies-1 5
- Number of health care activities and surgeons general-3
- Number of inspectors general-14, plus thousands of assigned staff
- Number of separate legal functions-1 0
4 general counsels and 6 judge advocates general
- Congressional relations functions-17 in Services and Agencies
- Public Affairs Functions-16 in Services and Agencies

D20 D20

Is this all really necessary?

DHR:dh
091001-15

10 Sep 01

U12728 /02

snowflake

September 10, 2001 5:56 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Armed Forces Staff College

352

Jim Roche has suggested that they abolish the Armed Forces Staff College. Apparently, they have a 16-week program that is worth about 4 weeks, and they could cover the same subjects in the Army, Navy and Air Force Staff Colleges.

Please look into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091001-54

1050pp01

U12725 /02

snowflake

September 12, 2001 4:06 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Schedule and Recognition

There will be a national day of prayer on Friday, and I will be going to the National Cathedral.

Someone ought to be thinking through what kind of an event we are going to have for the people who died here.

293

DHR:dh
091201-2


1254901

U12729 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/476

snowflake

September 18, 2001 8:05 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: TV Interviews

In the future when I do these TV interviews from the Pentagon, I would like to be sitting down so I can lean forward, rather than standing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091801-2

U15457 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/487

000.1.100

1834
PO 1

snowflake

INTOP 9/26/07

September 24, 2001 11:45 AM

SUBJECT: NSC

The NSC is tactically, not strategically oriented. It is a problem.

DHR:dh
092401-16

33Y NSC

245 (5/20/07)

U13114 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/506

snowflake

Info *DHR*
1520

September 24, 2001 2:27 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Preparation for Meetings

337

I received four papers from Feith, Wolfowitz and others 30 minutes before I left for the PC meeting on Sunday.

I told them I thought they really ought to stop doing work for me if I won't have time to read it. It is good work, and it could be helpful, but often it arrives at a time where it does me no good. If I see it after the meeting is over, I assume it is OBE, so I never read it.

It concerns me to see these busy people wasting time. God bless them-they are smart, able people, they are working their tails off. Why don't we have a rule that unless they can get me a piece of paper 24 or 36 hours in advance, don't bother.

R4 Feith

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092401-15

U13115 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/505

snowflake

Info Agent Dick 1113
September 28, 2001 2:53 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Spy

Please look at this article about a spy-another person we let off with a sentence that is too light.

Attach.
9/28/01 Tampa Tribune, "Spy Sentenced to Life in Prison"

DHR:dh
092801-6

380.015

2850p01

U13138 /02

"The usage rate of precision-guided munitions has been growing," said Gregory Fetter, an analyst with Forecast International Inc. "They were the stars of the Balkans."

Chicago-based Boeing may have trouble increasing JDAM production because it already had been meeting a surge in demand because of conflict in the former Yugoslavia, he said.

An Air Force report said supplies of JDAMS were "depleted severely" after that conflict and production simulations showed that suppliers wouldn't be able to meet future surges in demand, according to Aerospace Daily, a trade publication. Boeing spokesman Robert Algarotti declined to comment.

Shares of Boeing rose 11 cents to \$34.40 today. They have fallen 48 percent this year, primarily on concern regarding the company's commercial-aircraft business.

Spare Parts

Boeing and other makers of missiles, including Raytheon and Lockheed, may have to boost production because missile inventories can be depleted quickly in wartime, analysts said.

Larry Dickerson, an analyst at Forecast International said missiles typically take about 10 months to make.

Aircraft engine makers General Electric Co. and United Technologies Corp.'s Pratt & Whitney also may see a boost because of more demand for parts and spares, analysts said.

Textron Inc., maker of Bell helicopters, may see sales rise if there is a protracted war. CEO Lewis Campbell wouldn't say if the military has asked for production increases.

"If and when the nation gears up for stronger military actions, there are many, many Bell helicopters," Campbell said in an interview. "That usually means an increase in spares and replacement part volumes going up."

Smiths Group Plc, a U.K.-based aircraft components maker expects an increase in orders for spare parts for F-16 fighter jets and Chinook helicopters, said CEO Keith Butler-Whelhouse.

"Aircraft are expensive beasts to maintain," said Richard Aboulafia, an analyst with the Teal Group.

New York Times
September 28, 2001

49. In A Military Town, Osama's Place Cafe Is Tasting Tolerance

By Stephen Knizer

SPRING LAKE, N.C., Sept. 26 — In a town full of soldiers, on the edge of Fort Bragg, there could be worse names for a restaurant these days than Osama's Place, but it is hard to think of any.

That, however, is the name of a homey little cafe here. An American flag now hangs near the front door, and only a few regular customers have stopped coming in.

Others say they feel sorry for the unfortunate owner and wish him well when they order their burgers or pita sandwiches.

The name Osama has long been an honorable one in the Arab world. It means "big cat," and the walls of Osama's Place are decorated with framed pictures of lions and tigers. But the fact that this is the given name of a most reviled terrorist has given it a tinge that sends shudders down some spines.

Osama's Place was opened in 1997 by Osama Yousef, a Jordanian who settled in North Carolina more than a decade ago.

It is a pleasant spot, with a handful of tables and, behind a Formica counter, a short-order grill. Roof fans turn languidly in the autumn warmth.

In 1999 Mr. Yousef sold the restaurant to another Jordanian, Ghassan Mustafa, who chose not to change its name.

"This was already a popular place, and people around here knew it by a certain name," Mr. Mustafa said on a recent evening. "Now I'm having bad luck."

Since declarations by American leaders that this month's terrorist attacks were probably planned by Osama bin Laden, some customers have urged Mr. Mustafa to change his restaurant's name. He seems uncertain how to respond.

"I'm not going to do it," he said defiantly at one point. "When Timothy McVeigh did that terrorism in Oklahoma, nobody who owned a place called Timothy's changed the name. So why should I?"

Later, however, one of Mr. Mustafa's waitresses, Tina Jeter, said several people she knows had urged her to quit.

She has heard others curse the restaurant's owner and suggest that he might have been connected to the attacks. A few, Ms. Jeter said, have even told her they would like to bomb Osama's Place.

Mr. Mustafa, a Muslim, looked surprised and hurt. "You never told me that," he said.

"I didn't want to get you upset or hurt your feelings," Ms. Jeter replied.

That sent Mr. Mustafa, who is 27, into silent reflection.

"Maybe I should think about changing the name," he said after a few moments. "People are very frustrated these days."

"I love this country as much as I love my own country. I work 12 hours a day, six days a week. People here all know me."

"But what if someone who isn't from here drives by and gets some crazy idea?"

Business at Osama's Place is steady for most of the day and evening. No one seems uncomfortable ordering house specialties like Osama's Steak Sub or Osama's Chicken Calzone.

"Muslims come in all shapes and colors," one woman said as she picked up a takeout order. "If anything happens while I'm in here, I hope I'd have the courage to stand up against it."

Many families in Spring Lake have at least one member who is posted at Fort Bragg. Dozens of them have been and still are regulars at Osama's Place.

"A lot of people might not want to come in here, but not necessarily people from the base," Sgt. Rick Young said as he waited for his pizza. "They're often more educated than you might think."

Mr. Mustafa's cousin Mohammed Mahmoud helps be-

hind the counter. He said he shared the anger that most Americans were now feeling.

"I don't think anything is going to happen to us," Mr. Mahmoud said, sounding less than certain. "American people are very smart, and they wouldn't do anything against us."

"But maybe a few of them are not smart. I don't know. What do you think?"

Tampa Tribune
September 28, 2001
50. Spy Sentenced To Life In Prison

By Paula Christian

TAMPA - A soldier known as the "perfect spy" stood at attention and, without displaying a shred of remorse, accepted his punishment Thursday for 25 years of betraying his country.

Life in prison. George Trofimoff won't be remembered as history's most-famous spy. But he goes to federal prison, at age 75, with dubious distinction.

Trofimoff, who passed military secrets to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, was the longest-working spy in U.S. history, federal prosecutors said. A retired colonel in the Army Reserve, he also is the highest-ranking officer ever convicted of espionage.

Trofimoff's spy work was so damaging, prosecutors said, that it might have changed the world if the United States and the Soviets had gone to war.

"The events of this past month really show how fragile our national security is," said Department of Justice prosecutor Laura Ingersoll. "What [Trofimoff] did for 20-plus years with ... the Soviet Union could have had consequences we can only be grateful we never had to face."

Trofimoff originally faced 27 to 33 years in prison. But he received a life sentence, in part, because President Bush asked for it.

Assistant Secretary of Defense John Stenbit wrote to the presiding judge on the president's behalf, asking that Trofimoff spend the rest of his life behind bars. Anything less,

snowflake

Approved Polz 0125 ✓

#27

October 1, 2001 7:55 AM



TO: General Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information Ops

We asked to see the leaflets and the radios to get our arms around that. I think the time is now.

Thanks.

091.412



DHR:db
100101-2

1 OCT 01

U12032 /02



Aracw 10/16
1113

October 15, 2001 8:20 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UAVs

Would you please get program decision memoranda drafted to instruct the Services to do what they should on UAVs. After you get them drafted, Pete Aldridge has gone over them and all of us are comfortable, let's just send them down. We need to quit begging them to do what is right and just tell them to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
10:501-7

452

1506101

U12906 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/537

SHOWITAKE



October 22, 2001 8:06 AM

① Aggen
10/25
DBAL

TO: RADM Quigley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if you can get this cartoon.

Thanks.

Attach.
| 0/2 1/0 | *Washington Times* cartoon

DHR:dh
102201-5

33580

22 04 01

U12923 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/554

...great, a terror-
...nical control.
...of terrorism is
...n. Over the past 50
...to 50 million peo-
...luted for having dif-
...views. Next to the
...committed ter-

...tion of the notorious "counter-
...revolutionary" crime used to put
...tens of thousands of Chinese dissi-
...dents to death since the Commu-
...nists took power.

Reports of arrests, trials and sen-
...tences of this nature can be heard
...nearly everyday, not to mention the
...295 confirmed deaths of Falun Gong

...ing as a potential partner in
...the war against terrorism. China
...wakes up smiling, Sept. 12 and on,
...at the windfall of the U.S. war on
...terrorism. It must be very thankful
...to Osama bin Laden.

But the Bush administration
...should not be fooled by China's
...jumping onto the bandwagon of anti-

...face-value for China, nor China's
...about-face in its stance on terrorism.

The Bush administration should
...not loosen up due vigilance on
...China's continued abuse of human
...rights, its crackdown on religious
...freedom, its suffocating of free
...exchange of ideas, its persecution of
...political dissidents.

...going.
...Ame
...aware.

...Gao
...sity st
...prison

king nd Laden

le East's worst ele-
...serious about elim-
...a-headed monster of
...rorism, we must
...Mr. Arafat is part of
...the solution.
...n't shift the blame.
...the terrorists carry
...ings of restaurants
...alls independently.
...stop, they stop. It
...e that when they go,
...very least, with his

for r prime min-
...n. His political
...to appease Mr.
...prepared last year
...st of Jerusalem, all
...k and some of Israel
...s ready to let Mr.
...ate that would have
...One, hostile to his

...ace" — Mr. Arafat's
...ied any real mean-



ing, Mr. Arafat would have agreed
...to that deal. But he couldn't,
...because the people he represents
...want no deal with Israel, no peace.

To them, the Middle East conflict
...ends only when the blue-and-white
...flag with the Star of David flies no
...more.

At least some Israelis know bet-
...ter than to believe Mr. Arafat. When
...he promises to round up those who
...commit terrorist acts, he either

never d
...for onl
...done li
...known
...Palesti
...al of w/
...Palesti
...Und:
...Arafat':
...to 30,0/
...limited
...Israel :
...force r
...50,000
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...Mr. J
...parochi
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ily values never more urgent

y of life, perhaps it
...e look back for a
...I ask ourselves,
...his country's pros-
...m?"
...art, it derives from
...rsity of its inhabi-
...Founding Fathers
...of Rights, they did
...zns into rigid cate-
...s or workers
...L Rather, they
...S of broad human
...e basic freedoms
...associate with lib-

Founding Fathers
...vernment, they did

not seek a ruling structure that
...would mold the people into what-
...ever suited the government's
...needs. They did not desire, nor
...could they justify a government
...that would exercise such despot-
...ism over its citizens' minds and
...bodies.

Instead, they did something
...quite extraordinary: They created
...a government that encouraged a
...free market of ideas, that encour-
...aged a diversity of perspectives
...and they trusted that through the
...friction of these diverse minds, we
...would achieve progress.

So when we think of America,
...we think of a broad tapestry of

perspectives, united by the com-
...mon belief in freedom, liberty and
...the pursuit of happiness under
...God.

With this liberty, however,
...comes a special responsibility.

Here, the government does not
...hammer its values into the youth.
...It does not fabricate principles and
...indoctrinate the young in a rigid
...pattern of being. Here, in Ameri-
...ca, we are given so much liberty
...that the heroic task of instilling a
...value system is left to each indi-
...vidual family.

This is an extraordinary act of
...faith.

With this liberty, we

leave it to each parent to demon-
...strate to their children, the ideas of
...compassion, human goodness and
...love. With our sense of self-gov-
...ernment, we leave it to each indi-
...vidual family to instill in their chil-
...dren a sense of individual striving
...and personal responsibility.

For this reason, we must never
...allow ourselves to be lulled into
...indifference when it comes to fam-
...ily values.

So it saddens me when I read
...that marriage rates have plum-
...meted to a 40-year low, or that
...divorce rates continue to hover
...just above 50 percent. It worries
...me when I read that parents now
...spend less time with their chil-
...dren, or that the children of dual-
...income families are left largely to
...raise themselves. Each day these
...children come home, they cook

their
...whethe
...gazing
...indeed
...the syn
...like tel
...games.
...our chl
...As v
...assess
...I think
...stand j
...mental
...ues" ar
...It is
...that in
...ours, t
...resides
...ily.

Armo
ally sy

Adm
10/23
11:54

October 26, 2001 8:02 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Briefings

00011

We have to avoid having briefers react to every single event. We need them to kind of cool it down.

The press needs news and, therefore, they are going to keep trying to get it. But we don't have to keep reacting to everything.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102601-6

Please respond by _____

1-1000P

U12949 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/576

snowflake

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: October 27, 2001
SUBJECT: **Pronunciations**

Adm 10/27/01

Attached is a memo that I am told is correct. Someone ought to check it out. If it is right, then we sure ought to make sure the President is given that information, as well as the folks in the Pentagon.

00013

Thank you.

DHR/azm
102701.06
Attach: Memo on Pronunciation

8:49 AM

2702101

U12954 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/578

snowflake

MEMORANDUM

10/27/01

We've got to say "Islam" with an "S" instead of a "Z" instead of "Izlam" and the same thing with Muslim. It's "Muslim" as opposed to "Muzzlum." It's got to be with an "S" instead of a "Z."

Thanks.

DHR/azn
102701.05

8:49 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/579

Agard
11/13/01

November 13, 2001 10:16 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich

237.2

Because of the way things are going in Afghanistan, I suggest we get Newt Gingrich to focus on something other than Afghanistan. That is to say, the rest of the world.

Thanks.

DHR:sh
111301-7

.....
Please respond by _____

13 Nov 01

U14702 02

ACTON
05 12/4
1620

December 3, 2001 10:40 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Next Case

I have a feeling we are going to have to make our case on anything we do after Afghanistan.

You have to get a team together and decide what we ought to say and shouldn't say for each of the items in our "Way Ahead."

Please do that and get back to me soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120301-26

Please respond by _____

AF: (11/12) (11)

3 Dec 01

U14760 02

11-L-0559/OSD/684

December 10, 2001 2:43 PM

ACTION
AS 12/13
1058

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Doug Feith
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Way Ahead

000.5

In connection with the way forward work each of you is doing, it seems to me that we ought to be thinking about Khobar. Let's factor that in, as well as the USS COLE.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
131001-26

Please respond by _____

10 Dec 01

U15079 02

11-L-0559/OSD/711

ISP

December 17, 2001 3:40 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Presence in Central Asia

Asia

We need to think through what presence we want in Central Asia when the war on terrorism is over.

Thanks.

DH:ldh
121701-16

.....

Please respond by 1/4

17 Dec 01

10
U04098 /02

snowflake

December 27, 2001 9:42 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
 cc: Gen. Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Looking Ahead

Saudi Arabia

Attached is an article from the *New York Times* from December 27 that is well worth reading.

It might give us some thoughts as to how we want our footprint arranged in the Middle East after things settle down. The time to get started may be sooner rather than later.

Thanks.

Attach.
 12/27/01 *New York Times*, Douglas Jehl, "Holy War Lured Saudis As Rulers Looked Away"

DHR:dh
 122701-24

.....
 Please respond by _____

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
SECDEF	/
SPLASST	/
EXCSEC	/
DEPSECDEF	
C&D	X
OOD	X
USDP	
CABLE CH	
FILE	

27 Dec 01

11-L-0559/OSD/893

U19857 /01

New York Times
December 27, 2001
Pg. 1

Holy War Lured Saudis As Rulers Looked Away

By Douglas Jehl

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia, Dec. 21 — In the last decade, as thousands of young Saudis left their country to wage Islamic holy war, Saudi leaders let them go, aware of the danger they might pose to the United States, but more focused on the danger they would pose at home.

At least four times in the last six years, Saudis who were trained or recruited in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kosovo or Bosnia have been among the terrorists who carried out bombings of American targets — in Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen. But not until October, after the American military campaign in Afghanistan began, did Saudi Arabia detain young men trying to join that fight.

Until then, the Saudi royal family performed a diplomatic and political balancing act. Choosing accommodation over confrontation, the government shied away from a crackdown on militant clerics or their followers, a move that would have inflamed the religious right, the disaffected returnees from other wars and a growing number of unemployed.

It appears to have been a miscalculation of global proportions, Western diplomats now say. As they look back to examine the roots of the Sept. 11 attacks, officials in Saudi Arabia, Europe and the United States describe a similar pattern. In country after country, Al Qaeda's networks took hold, often with the knowledge of local intelligence and security agencies. But on the rare occasions that countries did address the terrorist threat, they chose to deal with it as a local issue rather than an interlocking global network.

The result: for Osama bin Laden's most audacious strike against the United States, Europe was his forward base, Saudi Arabia his pool of recruits, the United States a vulnerable target.

In interviews here, former senior Saudi officials said they had recognized the exodus of warriors as a source for concern, for the kingdom and its American ally. But they insisted that they thought the danger could be contained.

Only after Sept. 11 did Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic ties to the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which was spreading a fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam dear to the Saudis even as it forged ever closer ties with Al Qaeda. The Taliban were recognized by just three countries.

The severing of ties appears to have been belated. In the waning days of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, a former Saudi official estimated this month that the number of Saudis there, as combatants, prisoners or casualties, probably numbered between 600 and 700, and possibly as many as 1,000.

As many as 25,000 Saudis received military training or experience abroad since 1979, according to estimates by royal Saudi intelligence.

Rather than prevent young Saudis from enlisting in military ventures abroad or silence the sheiks encouraging them, some officials say Saudi Arabia has mostly tried to deflect the problem outside its

borders.

"The Saudis' policies made the world safer for Saudi Arabia and the Saudi regime," said Martin Indyk, an assistant secretary of state for Middle East policy during the Clinton administration, who has become a prominent critic of the Saudi strategy. "I don't think it was their intention to make it unsafe for the United States. But that was the actual, if unintended, consequence of buying off the opposition, and exporting both the troublemakers and their extremist ideology."

Saudi officials say that an aggressive effort to stop the flow of holy warriors or halt financial transfers to militant groups or address the sources of a drift toward radicalism might have only inflamed the sentiment of extremists who saw both the Saudi government and the United States as their targets.

"There was absolutely no way and no reason to stop them from going," said one former senior Saudi official. He said that his government had "of course" seen the jihadis, or holy warriors, as a major problem, and had tried to monitor their travels with help from foreign governments. But he insisted that the young Saudis would have found a way around any barriers that were imposed.

Although a blanket ban on travel is clearly not enforceable, Western officials say that the Saudi government could have made a greater effort to identify potential terrorists or jihadis and disrupted their travel plans. Since Sept. 11, for example, the Saudi government has discouraged travel — especially those under suspicion — to countries like Afghanistan.

Among 15 Saudi hijackers who helped to carry out the Sept. 11 attacks, American officials say, some came from this new generation of jihadis, apparently recruited while traveling. Others were apparently recruited in Saudi Arabia itself. But none appeared on any Saudi watchlist, an American official said.

A former American ambassador to Saudi Arabia said that the problems posed by an exodus that exposed young Saudis to further extremism and to members of Mr. bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization should have meant that the issue was addressed directly. But he said the United States had never pressed for Saudi action.

"Alarm bells should have rung," said Wyche Fowler Jr., the former ambassador, who served in Riyadh until the beginning of this year. "Someone should have said, wait a minute, we can't have people marching off to choose their own jihad, without examining the foreign policy and security repercussions."

Through its history, Saudi Arabia has always tried to balance contradictory goals, preserving ties to the United States and the West, its defender in the Persian Gulf war, while accommodating what most analysts view as a deeply conservative majority that sees those ties as alien and potentially harmful to Islamic interests.

The United States, meanwhile, has tried to balance its heavy dependence on Saudi oil — it imports about 18 percent of its oil from the kingdom — with concerns about radicalism within the country. It has been wary of undermining or questioning the Saudi royal family. On both sides of a crucial alliance, hesitation and caution long prevailed over the confrontation of difficult issues.

Until Sept. 11, the Saudi balancing act seemed to be acceptable. The participation of its citizens in the earlier attacks had not received much attention in the West. At home, an internal terrorist threat that had flared in 1995 and 1996 seemed to have been shut down.

But with the attacks of Sept. 11, American and some Saudi officials say, shortcomings in the Saudi approach have become clearer.

In one of two 90-minute interviews for this article, a former senior Saudi official acknowledged that his government might have underestimated the extent of the problem, but he said the full dimensions of the problem had become apparent only with hindsight.

"That there were people calling for jihad against America, well, bin Laden had been calling for that for the last three years," said the former Saudi official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "The call had been there, the declaration had been there. But the fact that we had people who were willing not only to heed that call, but to go against everything Islamic, that was unimaginable."

A Sheik's Influence: Young Saudis Intent On Becoming Martyrs

In a cramped office at the rear of Princess Zohra Mosque, Sheik Saleh al-Sadlaan is dispensing judgments that carry enormous weight. On this night, his callers in person and by phone line up for his rulings on countless matters Islamic, from divorce to fasting and prayer.

The hardest questions, he says, include some that have become among the most frequent. Is it time, young Saudis want to know, to wage jihad in the defense of the Muslims, whose suffering appears nightly on their television screens, from places like Chechnya and the Middle East.

"If he says go, we will go, because he is our sheik," declared a prayer caller, Abdul Hadi, 24. In fact, Sheik Sadlaan said he had spent years trying to persuade his best young Saudis to stay home. But his advice seems tinged with ambivalence.

"If he truly wants to defend Islam, that is one thing," he said. "If he just wants to be brave, that is something else." In the last few years, he said, young men have come to him "more often than I can say," ready to leave their lives as students behind, having set their sights on martyrdom.

A half-blind man of 61, Sheik Sadlaan is a professor at the kingdom's leading Islamic university and a religious adviser to a senior member of the royal family. What he says carries the weight of the ulemaa, Saudi Arabia's official religious establishment, and what he says, carefully, is that the king is his in-ram, and the king does not currently advise young men to march off to holy war.

But asked about other scholars, like Sheik Hamoud al-Shuaibi, who since Sept. 11 and the American retaliation have openly called for jihad against the United States, Sheik Sadlaan stops short of condemnation.

"He made a mistake, but it was not a major one, and it does not detract from his reputation," he said of Sheik Shuaibi, a former teacher.

Even the Saudi government is not known to have taken action against Sheik Shuaibi, despite his statements that those who support infidels, or unbelievers, should be considered unbelievers themselves, a statement that would seem perilously close to treason in Saudi Arabia, still home to more than 5,000 American troops.

Out of roughly 10,000 religious scholars in the kingdom, perhaps just 150 embrace such a radical view, according to American estimates. But among this group, only a handful is known to have been detained by Saudi authorities since Sept. 11, and in the videotape recently broadcast in the United States, Mr. bin

Laden was eager to know how Saudi scholars had interpreted his actions.

'What is the stand of the mosques there?' Mr. bin Laden was heard to ask.

"Honestly, they are very positive," answered the visitor, identified by a senior Saudi official as Khaled al-Harbi, a veteran of conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Bosnia, who named several Saudi scholars as having spoken out in favor of Mr. bin Laden's campaign.

Even if only a small fraction of Saudi religious scholars are sympathetic to such causes, Sheik Sadlaan acknowledged that some Saudis saw their rulings as more credible than his own, because of his close ties to the government and the royal family. (The mosque is named for the mother of his patron, Prince Abdelaziz bin Fahd, a minister of state and the son of the king.)

In 9 cases in 10, the sheik estimated, juggling a visitor's questions with the demands of an insistent phone, he had persuaded young Saudis to set aside their dreams of jihad. But he wondered how often his advice made a real difference.

"If they don't like what I have to say," he said, "they'll go to some other scholar, who will tell them what they want to hear."

Bin Laden's Rise: An Early Glimpse Of Militant Forces

Shortly after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, Osama bin Laden approached Prince Sultan bin Abdelaziz al-Saud, the Saudi defense minister, with an unusual proposition. Mr. bin Laden had recently returned from Afghanistan, heady with victory in the drive, backed by Saudi Arabia and the United States, to expel the Soviet occupiers.

As recounted by Prince Turki bin Faisal, then the Saudi intelligence chief, and by another Saudi official, the episode foreshadowed a worrying turn. Victorious in Afghanistan, Mr. bin Laden clearly craved more battles, and he no longer saw the United States as a partner, but as a threat and potential enemy to Islam.

Arriving with maps and many diagrams, Mr. bin Laden told Prince Sultan that the kingdom could avoid the indignity of allowing an army of American unbelievers to enter the kingdom, to repel Iraq from Kuwait. He could lead the fight himself, he said, at the head of an group of former mujahedeen that he said could number 100,000 men.

Prince Sultan had received Mr. bin Laden warmly, but he reminded him that the Iraqis had 4,000 tanks, according to one account.

"There are no caves in Kuwait," the prince is said to have noted. "You cannot fight them from the mountains and caves. What will you do when he lobs the missiles at you with chemical and biological weapons?"

Mr. bin Laden replied, "We fight him with faith."

The conversation ended soon afterward, and the proposal was left to rest. But Saudi officials now say that the episode offered an early glimpse of several of the forces the kingdom would spend the rest of the decade trying to contain.

One such force was represented by Saudi veterans of the Afghan war, at least 15,000 men who had helped to drive the Soviets from Afghanistan in the name of Islam. Many returned to ordinary lives, but others did not.

Some remained in exile abroad, enlisting in other conflicts, in places like Bosnia. Others were jailed by the Saudi government.

In one sign of concern, a person knowledgeable about the kingdom said, the Saudi interior ministry conducted extensive psychological profiling of 2,500 veterans in an effort to identify those who were a potential security threat.

A second force was Mr. bin Laden himself, who soon returned to Pakistan. As early as 1992, Prince Turki said, "We started receiving information that he was active in recruiting Saudis to go there, and that he was in cahoots, so to speak, with some very unsavory characters, from Egyptian Al Jihad to Algerian groups, people who espouse terror as a means to carry out political ends."

A third was anti-Americanism, which gave further ammunition to Mr. bin Laden's cause, particularly when American troops stayed behind in Saudi Arabia after the Persian Gulf war. Mr. bin Laden was only one among the critics who said that the presence of "infidel" forces, for the protection of the kingdom, showed that the ruling al-Saud family was no longer legitimate, since its responsibilities included the protection of Islam's holiest sites at Mecca and Medina.

At the same time, Saudi officials concede, the problem of internal discontent was intensifying for other reasons: a surging population, stagnant revenues that sent per capita income plunging and growing unemployment.

Some of that disenchantment prompted direct criticism of the Saudi government. Royal profligacy and corruption were increasingly seen as indefensible.

The response was evasive. For decades, a former senior Saudi official said, the Saudi approach has been "to argue, and then to co-opt, in a way, and to act as if crimes weren't committed unless there were actual calls for an uprising against the government."

In the case of Mr. bin Laden, who by 1992 had in fact called for a toppling of the government, the Saudis moved slowly. They stripped him of his citizenship in 1994. But their attitude still betrayed uncertainty: for several years they relied on emissaries from Mr. bin Laden's family in the hope they could persuade him to change, officials said.

Among a series of shocks that brought extremism to the kingdom, the first came in November 1995, with a bombing in Riyadh that killed 5 Americans and wounded 37. Within months, four Saudis had confessed to the crime, including one who had served in Afghanistan, saying they had been inspired by Mr. bin Laden's calls to oust the nonbelieving forces from the kingdom.

Then in June of 1996 came a second attack. The bombing of an air base in the eastern city of Al Khobar, killed 19 American airmen and wounded hundreds more. Mr. bin Laden was long suspected of involvement, but Saudi and American investigators ultimately discounted that theory, blaming Saudi Shiite Muslims with ties to Iran.

Mr. bin Laden declared war against the United States in 1996, and two years later, he announced the forging of his "Coalition Against Crusaders, Christians and Jews." Yet it was not until June 1998 that

the Saudis sought his arrest.

On a trip to Afghanistan, Prince Turki won what he said had been agreement from Mullah Muhammad Omar to surrender Mr. bin Laden. Three months later, after the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Mullah Omar reneged.

"We didn't leave any stone unturned," Prince Turki said in an interview of the effort to secure Mr. bin Laden's arrest. He said his government had maintained relations with the Taliban even afterward, despite the fact that Mr. bin Laden's group had been implicated in the August attacks, in order to "leave a door open" for a Taliban change of heart. In fact, it seems clear that Saudi ambivalence toward a movement close to its own Wahhabi interpretation of Islam persisted.

Some American experts did question whether the Saudi government was prepared to bring Mr. bin Laden back home, and face a potential backlash from his admirers. "I think there was a conscious idea among the Saudis that they would rather have Osama in the Hindu Kush than anywhere else," said F. Gregory Gause III, an expert on Saudi Arabia at the University of Vermont.

In the Kenya attack, the terrorists included Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-'Owhali, a Saudi who later confessed to being recruited in Afghanistan. In the next major terrorist attack, the bombing in Yemen of the destroyer Cole in October 2000, another Saudi, Tawfiq al-Atash, who lost a leg in Afghanistan, has been identified by American officials as a likely leader.

In response to these events, the Saudis stepped up their supply of intelligence to the United States on Mr. bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network, officials from both countries said.

George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, traveled four times to Saudi Arabia between 1996 and 2000; Mr. Fowler, the ambassador, worked closely but secretly with Bakr bin Laden, the dissident's elder brother, to shut down sources of Al Qaeda's financing.

At the same time, the Saudis stepped up their oversight of money transfers. But one problem persisted: the charities whose funds sometimes found their way into the hands of extremists included prominent members of the royal family on their boards.

With more conflicts involving Muslims breaking out in Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere, many Saudis reached deep into their wallet. Since 1992, one Saudi charity, the Al Haramin Foundation, has increased twentyfold in size, distributing hundreds of millions of dollars over those years to schools and refugee camps in what officials of the group say are strictly humanitarian missions.

American officials say this largesse has been prone to significant "leakage," with money channeled to extremist causes and terrorist groups.

"The Saudi government never intentionally funded terrorism; that's nonsense," argued a former State Department official with long service in the region. "But what you had was a really serious command and control problem."

Sharing Intelligence: Cautious Cooperation But Strained Ties

Almost every day since Sept. 11, an F.B.I. official based at United States Embassy in Riyadh has met with Saudi counterparts to discuss the investigation, regular, face-to-face encounters that both sides regard as a major development in intelligence-sharing between the two countries.

But the two sides still walk on eggshells, the Americans careful in their questions, and the Saudis guarded in their answers, American officials said. Even in the post-Sept. 11 meetings, one senior Bush administration official said, the Saudis "dribble out a morsel of insignificant information one day at a time."

There are reasons for such caution, Saudi and American officials say. The very idea of close ties between the home of Islam's holy sites and the West remains alien to many Saudis. Since the Persian Gulf war of 1991, the partnership has come under increasing strain, because of differences over Israel and Iraq, over the American troop presence, and over terrorism, on which American requests for cooperation have often been perceived as insensitive to Saudi sovereignty.

"The United States sometimes expects Saudi Arabia to do publicly what they are willing to do only privately," said David Mack, a former deputy assistant secretary of state who served during the early 1990's as the top American diplomat in Riyadh. "They do not by inclination like to talk about what they're doing, whether it's good or bad."

Still, some American officials say the United States has leaned much too far in the direction of deference, thus failing to avert terrorist attacks.

In the mid-1990's, one administration official recalled, the Saudis would not acknowledge the existence of a Shiite Muslim group called Saudi Hezbollah, which was later acknowledged by the Saudis to have been among those responsible for the 1996 bombing in Al Khobar. "They would take our request and promise to get back to us and never did," the official said.

On the issue of Saudis heading off to holy war, Mr. Fowler, the former ambassador, said: "I'm willing to acknowledge up front that we missed it. It's the kind of thing that with hindsight, I wish I had thought to raise."

Even on terrorist financing, *Secretary* of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said during a visit to the kingdom in September that he had not asked the Saudis to freeze the assets of people and groups linked to Mr. bin Laden, even though the United States had asked all countries to do so. He said at a news conference that such matters were being handled by others.

"We understand that each country is different," he said, "each country lives in a different neighborhood, has a different perspective and has different sensitivities and different practices, and we do not expect every nation on the face of the earth to be publicly engaged in every single activity the United States is."

Not infrequently, Saudi and American officials say, the tiptoeing results in miscommunication. This month, a delegation led by a senior State Department official arrived in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, to discuss the issue of terrorist financing, only to find that the kingdom's most senior princes were already in or on their way to Jidda, for their annual retreat in the last 10 days of Ramadan.

For their part, Saudi officials say they were angry that the United States has not shared in advance some of its investigative findings, including the recent videotape showing Mr. bin Laden and a Saudi visitor.

Scrambling to respond, some Saudi officials mistakenly identified the visitor as a Saudi cleric who, it turned out, was still in the kingdom.

A former Central Intelligence Agency official said that American deference and other constraints, including efforts by the Saudis to discourage efforts by American diplomats to mingle with ordinary

people, had left the United States dangerously dependent on the Saudis for information that could affect American as well as Saudi security.

"It's not that there are divisions within the intelligence community about Saudi Arabia," said the official, Kenneth M. Pollack, who served on the National Security Council staff in the Clinton administration. "It's that the intelligence community doesn't know."

Undetected Danger: Hijackers Remain Mystery to Saudis

Saudi officials have revealed next to nothing about the Sept. 11 hijackers. The official position is that even the theory that Saudi citizens were involved remains unproven. But in private, Saudi and American officials say the real mystery to the Saudi government is not whether Saudi citizens took part, but how so many of them were able to evade detection by the Saudi authorities.

"All names that have been mentioned in the incident," Prince Nayef, the interior minister, said in an interview, when asked what his government had learned about the Saudis named by the Americans as hijackers, "they do not have the capability to act in a professional way." The statement amounted to yet another denial of Saudi involvement in the Sept. 11 attacks.

To the Saudis, American officials say, the fact that the Saudis involved in the assaults were unknown to them was almost as startling as the attacks themselves.

In recent years, the mubahith, the Saudi equivalent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, infiltrated Al Qaeda cells within the kingdom, while the monitoring of the Saudis fighting abroad was thought to have kept a handle on potential troublemakers.

American officials say it is now clear that Al Qaeda networks were more deeply entrenched in Saudi Arabia than either the United States or Saudi Arabia understood. But they also say the Saudis may have missed clues left by young men like Hani Hanjour, a reclusive, religious young Saudi who told his family that he was working as a pilot in the United Arab Emirates from 1997 to 2000, but never left a phone number, and is now suspected of having been in Afghanistan at least part of that time.

Among the Saudi hijackers, only two, including Khalid al-Midhar, ever turned up on the State Department's antiterrorist watchlists, American officials say, and not until after they entered the United States. They had been identified as suspicious, not by the Saudi authorities, but because they stopped in Malaysia to meet with Mr. Atash, the suspect in the Cole attack:

Some American officials say that the Saudis placed a higher premium on hounding potential troublemakers out of the kingdom than keeping tabs once they left.

"Isn't it better that they go off and fight a foreign jihad, rather than hang around the mosques without a job and cause trouble in Saudi Arabia?" said one such official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity in summing up what he called the Saudi view. "They've radicalized a group that wouldn't have been so radical had they stayed home."

At the Zohra mosque in Riyadh, Sheik Sadlaan said the end of Ramadan seemed like a good time for reflection. The news from Afghanistan had been disturbing, with the names of young Saudis killed in battle beginning to circulate around the kingdom, posted on Web sites but never mentioned in Saudi newspapers, which operate under close government supervision.

The dead included young men like Badr Muhammad al-Shubaneh, whose tearful relatives were telling callers that they still could not explain why the 22-year-old college freshman, a social studies student at King Fahd University in Riyadh, had abruptly left the kingdom a year ago, to end up killed in Afghanistan in the first week of December.

"It's a big problem," Sheik Sadlaan said of the zeal for jihad. "It will create problems for the country and beyond."

But with Muslims seen as under siege in so many places, he said, he could not imagine the militancy ending any time soon. "It's not just the Saudis," he said. "The strong desire to help and defend and fight for the Muslims — it's felt all over the Arab world."

snowflake

Action 53
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1550

December 29, 2001 1:49 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Info from Denny

*Denny
Complete 11/23
1502*
IRAA

Please ask Denny to get some information on the Iraqi Kurds in the north and the Shias in the south. I would like to know how many there are, how well they are armed, what they do, what their history is, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:db
122901-14

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29 Dec 01

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