

COMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*SECRET2282
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

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S E C R E T PARIS 15735

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1967 APR 7 PM 6 46

EXDIS

VIPTO 106

BRUSSELS FOR VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT: MEETING WITH GENERAL DE GAULLE ON
APRIL 7- NON PROLIFERATION TREATYTHE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT WHILE WE KNEW FRENCH POSITION OF THE
NPT, HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT DE GAULLE THOUGHT SHOULD BE THE
GERMAN ATTITUDE.

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DEGAULLE REPLIED FIRST OF ALL THAT FRANCE WAS NOT TAKING ANY STAND
VIS-A-VIS OTHER COUNTRIES ON NPT. THEY CONSIDER THIS STRICTLY A
MATTER FOR EACH NATION TO DECIDE ITSELF. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, TWO
ASPECTS TO PROBLEM OF GERMAN ADHERENCE FROM FRENCH POINT OF VIEW,
1) THAT THE TREATY WOULD FURTHER LIMIT POSSIBILITY OF GERMANY AC-
QUIRING NUCLEAR ARMS WITH WHICH THE FRENCH WERE IN COMPLETE SUP-
PORT. HE ADDED PARENTHETICALLY THAT IF GERMANY EVER ACQUIRED NU-
CLEAR ARMS, THAT WOULD RADICALLY CHANGE FRENCH POLICY TOWARDS IT.
2) THE SECOND WAS PSYCHOLOGICAL IN NATURE. FOR THE GERMANS, THE
NPT WOULD CREATE A SPECIAL AND DISCRIMINATING POSITION. THE U.S.,
USSR, UK AND FRANCE HAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO IN-
CREASE THEM, WHILE TREATY APPEARED TO CONDEMN GERMANY NEVER TO HAVE
ANY. THIS WAS A PURELY PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTION, AND HE MERELY NOTED
IT AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS IN THE EQUATION. BOHLEN
BT

ADVANCE COPY PASSED TO S/S-O, 4/7/67, 6:55 P.M.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 4/7/67, 6:55 P.M.

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