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# Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

*Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program*

## Executive Summary

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	<p>psychologists as interrogators and raised conflict of interest and ethical concerns.” According to the Special Review, this was “based on a concern that the on-site psychologists who were administering the [CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques] participated in the evaluations, assessing the effectiveness and impact of the [CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques] on the detainees.”<sup>2586</sup> In January 2003, CIA Headquarters required that at least one other psychologist be present who was not physically participating in the administration of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. According to [REDACTED] OMS, however, the problem still existed because “psychologist/interrogators continue to perform both functions.”<sup>2587</sup></p>
<p>SENATOR SNOWE: “Did any CIA personnel express reservations about being engaged in the interrogation or these techniques that were used?” DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “I’m not aware of any. These guys are more experienced. No.”</p>	<p>This statement is incongruent with CIA records. For example, from August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002, the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah to its enhanced interrogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. The non-stop use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was disturbing to CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN. These CIA personnel objected to the continued use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, but were instructed by CIA Headquarters to continue using the techniques. The interrogation using the CIA’s enhanced techniques continued more than two weeks after CIA personnel on site questioned the legality “of escalating or even maintaining the pressure” on Abu Zubaydah. CIA records include the following reactions of CIA personnel expressing “reservations about being engaged in the interrogations” and the use of the techniques:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• August 5, 2002: “want to caution [medical officer] that this is almost certainly not a place he’s ever been before in his medical career... It is visually and psychologically very uncomfortable.”<sup>2588</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>2586</sup> Special Review, Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 – October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, p. 35 (DTS #2004-2710).

<sup>2587</sup> Special Review, Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 – October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, p. 40 (DTS #2004-2710).

<sup>2588</sup> Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August 5, 2002, at 05:35AM.

- August 8, 2002: "Today's first session... had a profound effect on all staff members present... it seems the collective opinion that we should not go much further... everyone seems strong for now but if the group has to continue... we cannot guarantee how much longer."<sup>2589</sup>
- August 8, 2002: "Several on the team profoundly affected... some to the point of tears and choking up."<sup>2590</sup>
- August 9, 2002: "two, perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer" away from the detention site if the decision is made to continue with the enhanced interrogation techniques.<sup>2591</sup>
- August 11, 2002: Viewing the pressures on Abu Zubaydah on video "has produced strong feelings of futility (and legality) of escalating or even maintaining the pressure." With respect to viewing the interrogation tapes, "prepare for something not seen previously."<sup>2592</sup>

The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez—via email—instructed the CIA interrogation team to not use "speculative language as to the legality of given activities" in CIA cable traffic.<sup>2593</sup> Shortly thereafter, circa December 2002, the CIA general counsel had a "real concern" about the lack of details in cables of what was taking place at CIA detention sites, noting that "cable traffic reporting was becoming thinner," and that "the agency cannot monitor the situation if it is not documented in cable traffic."<sup>2594</sup> The CIA's chief of interrogations—who provided training to CIA interrogators—expressed his view that there was

<sup>2589</sup> Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.

<sup>2590</sup> Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.

<sup>2591</sup> Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 9 August Update; date: August 9, 2002, at 10:44 PM.

<sup>2592</sup> Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; date: August 11, 2002, at 09:45AM.

<sup>2593</sup> Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002.

<sup>2594</sup> Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, Scott W. Muller, September 5, 2003.

	"excess information" in the Abu Zubaydah interrogation cables. <sup>2595</sup>
<b><i>Reporting Abuses</i></b>	
<p>DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Any deviations from approved procedures and practices that are seen are to be immediately reported and immediate corrective action taken, including referring to the CIA Office of Inspector General and to the Department of Justice, as appropriate."</p>	<p>This testimony is not supported by CIA records, for example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multiple individuals involved in the interrogation of CIA detainee 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri failed to report inappropriate activity. With regard to the unauthorized use of a handgun and power drill to threaten al-Nashiri, one CIA interrogator stated he did not report the incidents because he believed they fell below the reporting threshold for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, while noting he did not receive guidance on reporting requirements. The chief of Base stated he did not report the incidents because he assumed the interrogator had CIA Headquarters' approval and because two senior CIA officials had instructed him to scale back on reporting from the detention site to CIA Headquarters. The inappropriate activity was discovered during a chance exchange between recently arrived CIA Headquarters officials and security officers.<sup>2596</sup></li> <li>• There were significant quantitative and qualitative differences between the waterboarding of KSM, as applied, and the description of the technique provided to the Department of Justice. Neither CIA interrogators nor CIA attorneys reported these deviations to the inspector general or the Department of Justice at the time.</li> <li>• Additionally, CIA records indicate that at least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques for which they were not approved.<sup>2597</sup></li> </ul>
<b><i>Detainee Statistics</i></b>	

<sup>2595</sup> Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [REDACTED], April 7, 2003.

<sup>2596</sup> Report of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General, Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] (2003-7123-IG), 29 October 2003, p. 24 (DTS #2003-4897).

<sup>2597</sup> See Volume III for details.

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