

#336-2

Date: 20021116

TO: ALEC

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DETAILS OF SECOND [] NOVEMBER 2002 INTERROGATION SESSION WITH 'ABD AL-RAHIM AL-NASHIRI

----- BODY -----

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TO: IMMEDIATE ALEC INFO IMMEDIATE [] DIRECTOR.

FOR: [] (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DETAILS OF SECOND [] NOVEMBER 2002 INTERROGATION SESSION WITH 'ABD AL-RAHIM AL-NASHIRI

REF: NONE

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TEXT:

COMBINE: COMPLETE

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE RELAY ON AN IMMEDIATE BASIS TO INVOLVED PARTIES THAT COB AUTHORIZES [] COPIES OF ALL POCKET LITTER SEIZED FROM OR WITH AL-NASHIRI (b)(1)

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[] IT IS OF POTENTIALLY CRITICAL IMPORTANCE THAT THE MATERIAL IS AVAILABLE ON SITE FOR INTERROGATIONS.

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2. SUMMARY: ON [] NOVEMBER, THE SECOND SESSION OF DAY ONE BASE AGGRESSIVE PHASE INTERROGATIONS OF SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE 'ABD AL-RAHIM AL-(NASHIRI), AKA MULLAH ((BILAL)) (SUBJECT) PRODUCED LITTLE ACTIONABLE THREAT INFORMATION, BUT PROCEEDED ACCORDING TO PLAN AND LEFT BASE OFFICERS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE AGGRESSIVE PROCEDURES MAY ALREADY BE HAVING AN IMPACT ON SUBJECT'S RESISTANCE POSTURE. AS OUTLINED BELOW, AS INTERROGATIONS WORE ON, SUBJECT SPOKE MORE READILY ABOUT HIS KNOWLEGE, AND APPEARED FATIGUED AND INTIMIDATED BY HIS ORDEAL. ALTHOUGH BASE HAS LITTLE DOUBT THAT SUBJECT IS WITHHOLDING ACTIONABLE INFORMATION, THE SHOCK OF HIS FIRST HOURS AT [] APPEARS TO HAVE (b)(1) SED HIM ON OUR INTERESTS AND ON THE SEVERITY OF HIS PREDICAMENT (b)(3) NatSecAct

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3. BASE OFFICERS BEGAN WITH A PLANNING SESSION []

[]

ALL AGREED THAT THE SESSION, []

[] WOULD BE FOCUSED ON SUBJECT'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMINENT AL-QA'IDA PLOTS AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS IN SUBJECT'S PRIMARY AREA OF OPERATIONS, THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.

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4. INTERROGATIONS COMMENCED AT 1703 LOCAL TIME, WITH [] TRANSLATING FOR BOTH SUBJECT AND INTERROGATORS. SECURITY TEAM, HVT INTERROGATORS, AND TRANSLATOR [] ENTERED SUBJECT'S CELL AND REMOVED HIM FROM THE LARGE BOX []

[] ADJUSTED HIS SHACKLES, BACKED HIM AGAINST THE SPECIALLY-DESIGNED "WALLING" PANEL IN HIS CELL, PLACED THE ROLLED TOWEL/NECK SUPPORT AROUND HIS NECK, AND SLOWLY REMOVED HIS HOOD. THE FIRST THING SUBJECT SAW WAS [] STARING AT HIM

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(b)(1) MENACINGLY FROM A FEW INCHES AWAY. INTERROGATORS WERE SILENT FOR 30 (b)(3) CIAAct SECONDS, THEN [] REPEATED WITH A HISS THAT BEFORE SUBJECT HAD (b)(3) NatSecAct PLACED IN BOX, HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT WE WANTED COMPLETE, ACCURATE, INFORMATION FROM HIM TO STOP ONGOING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S., THAT HE WAS TO TELL WHO THE OPERATORS ARE, WHAT THEIR PLANS ARE, WHAT TARGETS ARE. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT THIS WAS HIS CHANCE, AND THAT HE WAS TO START BY TELLING EVERYTHING HE KNEW ABOUT ATTACKS THAT WERE BEING PLANNED TO OCCUR DURING RAMADAN.

5. SUBJECT BEGAN STUTTERING A REPLY, BUT WHEN GIVEN SOME WATER AND TOLD TO SPEAK CLEARLY, FOUND HIS VOICE. HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE HAD DONE WORK FOR USAMA ((BIN LADIN)), HAD DONE THE USS COLE ATTACK, AND HAD SINCE SEEN WARSHIPS THAT HE HAD BEEN PLANNING TO ATTACK. HE SAID THAT WHEN HIS PLANS FOR AN ATTACK IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ HAD FAILED, HE HAD TAKEN IT UPON HIMSELF TO PLAN A DIFFERENT ATTACK ON A SHIP AT PORT IN DUBAI. SUBJECT SAID THAT HE COULD PROVIDE DETAILS ON THIS, BUT WAS NOT AWARE OF ATTACKS BEING PLANNED DURING RAMADAN. [] LEANED FORWARD INTO SUBJECT'S FACE AND SAID SUBJECT WOULD PROVIDE DETAILS ON THIS, AND EVERY OTHER PLOT.

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6. WHEN SUBJECT BEGAN TO SAY HE HAD TALKED ABOUT THE PLANS HE

KNOWS, HE WAS WALLED AND TOLD THAT ONE FALSE MOVE WOULD PUT HIM INTO THE SMALL BOX THAT SUBJECT HAD SEEN IN HIS CELL, BUT IN WHICH HE HAD NOT YET BEEN CONFINED. SUBJECT THEN SAID THAT HIS PLANS FOR ATTACKS HAD ONLY BEEN IN EARLY STAGES AND WOULD HAVE TAKEN ANOTHER THREE MONTHS TO GET READY. THESE PLANS HAD FAILED. [REDACTED] SHOUTED AT SUBJECT THAT HE DID NOT CARE ABOUT FAILED OPERATIONS AND OLD INFORMATION, AND THAT SUBJECT WAS TO PROVIDE ALL INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT PLANS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN SAUDI ARABIA, YEMEN, HORMUZ, OR ANYWHERE ELSE. SUBJECT BEGAN TO SAY THAT HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT OTHER OPERATIONS AND WAS IMMEDIATELY PLACED IN THE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX FOR 30 MINUTES, DURING WHICH TEAM RE-CONVENED FOR A SESSION, AT WHICH TEAM DECIDED THAT SUBJECT WOULD BE GIVEN MORE LATITUDE TO TALK IN ORDER TO SEE WHAT HE HAD TO SAY.

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7. SUBJECT WAS SOMEWHAT MORE FORTHCOMING IN THE NEXT SESSION. SECURITY AND INTERROGATORS RE-ENTERED THE CELL AT 1756 LOCAL TIME, BACKED SUBJECT AGAINST THE WALLING PANEL WITH THE TOWEL/NECK RESTRAINT IN PLACE, AND THE HOOD WAS AGAIN REMOVED. INTERROGATORS EXPLAINED QUIETLY THAT THEY WANTED SUBJECT TO TELL ALL HE KNOWS ABOUT CURRENT OPERATIONS, NOT OLD NEWS, THAT WE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN INDICTMENTS OR OLD CHARGES AGAINST HIM, AND WE WANT INFORMATION ABOUT THREATS TO US INTERESTS. SUBJECT WAS GIVEN A DRINK OF WATER, AND BEGAN TO TALK.

8. [REDACTED]

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9. SUBJECT REPEATED HIS STORY ABOUT HIS PLANS TO USE AN AIRPLANE TO ATTACK A SHIP IN PORT IN DUBAI. HE SAID HE HAD INVESTIGATED THE FEASIBILITY OF THE OPERATION, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] INTERRUPTED SUBJECT, SAYING THAT THIS SOUNDED DIFFERENT THAN WHAT SUBJECT HAD SAID BEFORE. SUBJECT REPLIED THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE HE WAS GIVING THE "HIGHLIGHTS" OF THE PLAN. [REDACTED] SHOUTED THAT WE DID NOT WANT HIGHLIGHTS AND THAT SUBJECT WAS TO

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PROVIDE DETAILS IMMEDIATELY.

10. SUBJECT'S COMMENTS OVER THE ENSUING HOUR OF HEATED INTERROGATION - WHICH WAS FOCUSED IN LARGE PART ON SUBJECT'S PLOT TO USE SMALL EXPLOSIVE-FILLED BOATS TO ATTACK LARGER CRAFT IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, AND HIS PLANS TO FLY A SMALL PLANE INTO A WESTERN NAVAL VESSEL AT PORT RASHID, DUBAI, WERE DISJOINTED AND APPEARED TO CONFLICT IN CERTAIN PLACES, BUT CONTAINED SOME INFORMATION THAT MAY BE ACTIONABLE. [REDACTED] PRODUCE COHERENT INFORMATION AS EXPLAINED IN PARA 11.

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- SUBJECT SAID THAT THE FIRST TIME HE HAD SEEN THE WARSHIP HE WANTED TO ATTACK IN THE PORT OF RASHID WAS ABOUT EIGHT MONTHS AGO.

- SUBJECT SAID THAT AHMAD ((AL-DARBI)) WAS "OUR REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE SHAYKH (BIN LADIN) BEFORE 9/11."

- SUBJECT SAID THAT HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES HAD PLANNED TO SELL THE BOATS THEY HAD PURCHASED FOR THE ATTACK IN THE STRAIGHT OF HORMUZ AFTER IT BECAME OBVIOUS THEY COULD NOT CARRY OUT THE ATTACK.

- SUBJECT MENTIONED THAT THREE YEMENI LABORERS WHO WERE "NOT PART OF OUR GROUP" HAD BEEN EMPLOYED TO MAINTAIN THE LARGER WOODEN BOAT AND TO TEACH SUBJECT'S MEN HOW TO OPERATE IT.

- ASKED WHERE THE BOAT TO BE USED IN SUBJECT'S PLANNED ATTACKS COULD BE FOUND, SUBJECT REPLIED THAT A "SMALL BOAT IS AVAILABLE IN DUBAI, WE DECIDED TO GO TO SOMALIA SO WE COULD MAKE USE OF THE BOAT" AFTER THE PLAN FAILED, FOR (NON-ATTACK-RELATED) "BUSINESS." AT ANOTHER POINT SUBJECT SAID THAT THE BOAT HAD BEEN DOCKED IN YEMEN BEFORE THE PLAN HAD BEEN ABANDONED.

- SUBJECT CLAIMED THAT AFTER THE PLAN FOR THE BOAT WAS ABANDONED, "WE DECIDED TO SELL IT BUT AL-DARBI DECIDED TO USE IT FOR BUSINESS." SUBJECT CLAIMED NOT TO KNOW THE CURRENT LOCATION OF THE BOAT(S), BUT SAID THE LARGER, WOODEN ONE WAS REGISTERED AS BEING NAMED "SHAMSHI," WHICH IS THE NAME OF A PERSON FROM DUBAI NAMED WHO OWNS A MARITIME OFFICE THERE.

- SUBJECT SAID HE AND OTHERS INVOLVED HAD NOT USED CODEWORDS FOR THE BOAT(S) OR THE TARGETS.

- SUBJECT SAID THAT ONE REASON THE PLAN HAD BEEN ABANDONED WAS BECAUSE THE OPERATIVES HAD NEVER LEARNED HOW TO "HANDLE" THE BOAT(S), AND WHEN PRESSED ADMITTED THAT THE MORE IMPORTANT REASON WAS THE INABILITY TO OBTAIN THE EXPLOSIVES IN PAKISTAN.

- SUBJECT REFERRED TO AN "INDIAN CREW" THAT HAD BEEN RECRUITED BY AL-DARBI TO OPERATE THE LARGER, WOODEN ATTACK-BOAT, AND FOR TRAINING HIS OWN PEOPLE - SOME OF WHOM WERE YEMENIS - TO DO THE SAME.

11. AT THIS POINT, SUBJECT STATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW

AL-DARBI'S LOCATION AND SAID HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO LOCATE HIM "FOR A
LONG TIME." [REDACTED]

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SUBJECTS COMMENTS THEREAFTER BECAME SOMEWHAT MORE COHERENT. ASKED ABOUT THE TARGETS OF THE PLOT IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, SUBJECT REPLIED THAT THEY WERE ALL TO BE OIL TANKERS, AND THAT HE UNDERSTOOD TANKERS OVER 200 METERS LONG - THE ONES HE HAD BEEN PLANNING TO ATTACK - WERE "AMERICAN". SUBJECT SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE NAMES OF THE VESSELS BECAUSE THEIR NAMES WOULD NOT BE IMPORTANT TO THE OPERATIONS.

12. SUBJECT WAS ASKED TO PROVIDE THE NAME OF EVERY PERSON WITH ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE DUBAI AND HORMUZ OPERATION. HIS RESPONSES ARE AS FOLLOWS.

PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE DUBAI OPERATION:

- ((ABD AL-RAHIM)) AL-NASHIRI;
- ((HAZIM)) FROM RIYADH;
- ((MU'AWIYAH)) FROM RIYADH;
- ((SALMAN)), WHO WAS A FRIEND OF HAZIM'S AND WAS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INVOLVEMENT;
- AL-((QAZIMI)) FROM TAIZ, YEMEN, WHOSE MISSION WAS TO PROCURE EXPLOSIVES. SUBJECT EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN PLANNING TO MEET AL-QAZIMI AT THE INTERNET CAFE LOCATED IN THE "GULF CENTER" IN DUBAI.

PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE HORMUZ OPERATION:

- ((ABD AL-RAHIM)) AL-NASHIRI;
- ((AHMAD)) AL-DARBI;
- ((MU'AWIYAH)) AL-SAUDI;
- ((HAZIM)) AL-YEMENI, WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF SAUDI ARABIA;
- ((ABU AL-RASHID)) AL-YEMENI;
- ((MUS'AB)) AL-YEMENI;
- ((SALMAN)) AL-YEMENI;
- ((GHARIB)), WHO WAS CONTACTED THROUGH ABU AL-((SHAHID)) FROM TAIZ, YEMEN. ABU AL-SHAHID WAS KILLED ACCIDENTALLY IN AUGUST 2002 BY AN EXPLOSION IN A HOTEL ROOM IN YEMEN.
- ((BADR))
- ((WALID)), WHO WAS KILLED ALONG WITH ABU AL-SHAHID IN THE AUGUST 2002 HOTEL ROOM EXPLOSION.

13. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT HIS PROVISION OF SUCH INFORMATION WAS A GOOD START, THAT WE KNEW HE HAD MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THESE OPERATIONS THAN HE WAS PROVIDING. SUBJECT WAS REMINDED THAT HE HAD EARLIER SAID ARMS WERE PLENTIFUL IN THE REGION; WHY, HE WAS ASKED, HAD IT BEEN SO DIFFICULT FOR AL-QA'IDA'S SENIOR COMMANDER IN SAUDI ARABIA TO FIND EXPLOSIVES FOR OPERATIONS HE HAD BEEN PLANNING? SUBJECT REPLIED "I WISH IT WAS SO" BUT THAT BIN LADIN WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE ARRANGED MONEY FOR THE OPERATIONS, BUT DISAPPEARED, AND THE OPERATIONS WERE CANCELLED.

14. SUBJECT WAS ASKED TO FOCUS ON THE "MOST RECENT" PLAN HE HAD. SUBJECT SAID THIS HAD BEEN THE PORT RASHID PLAN TO ATTACK A NAVY SHIP. SUBJECT STATED THAT THE NAVAL SHIP SUBJECT AND HAZIM HAD SURVEILLED AT PORT RASHID HAD BEEN BRITISH, BUT THAT HE HAD BEEN WAITING FOR AN AMERICAN ONE. SUBJECT DENIED KNOWING WHAT THE NAME OF THE BRITISH VESSEL WAS, AND REPEATED THAT THE NAMES OF SHIPS WERE NOT IMPORTANT IN PLANNING, AND THAT "ANY SHIP WOULD BE ALRIGHT, LIKE WITH THE COLE."

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SEIZED THE TOWEL NECK RESTRAINT AND SAID SUBJECT WAS LYING AGAIN AND THAT HE HAD BETTER THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT HIS ANSWERS, BECAUSE YOU ARE ANNOYING ME, AND BELIEVE ME, YOU DO NOT WANT TO ANNOY ME." SUBJECT WAS HOODED WITH THE BRIDGE THAT INTERROGATORS WERE LEAVING, WOULD BE BACK IN A FEW MINUTES, AND THAT WHEN THEY RETURNED THEY WANTED THE TRUTH, OR ELSE SUBJECT'S LIFE WOULD BECOME MUCH WORSE.

15. FOLLOWING A 15-MINUTE MEETING WITH THE TEAM, INTERROGATORS RE-ENTERED THE CELL AT 1922 HRS LOCAL. SUBJECT WAS UN-HOODED AND TOLD TO TALK ABOUT "THE WARSHIP OPERATION," AND TO BE VERY CAREFUL TO BE TRUTHFUL ABOUT HIS ANSWERS. SUBJECT SAID THAT "THE MOST IMPORTANT THING TO ME" REGARDING THE PLAN HAD BEEN HIS CONCERN THAT AL-QAZIMI THE YEMENI NEEDED TO GET THE EXPLOSIVES AND TRUCK READY. HAD SUBJECT BEEN "100 PERCENT" SURE OF THIS, HE WOULD HAVE PROCEEDED WITH FINAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH HIS MEN. SUBJECT STATED THAT "I HAD IT IN THE BACK OF MY MIND THAT MU'AWIYAH AND SALMAN WOULD RENT A HOUSE AND PUT MATERIAL THERE" AND THAT "IF WE WERE 100 PERCENT SURE WE HAD THE MATERIAL WE WOULD HAVE" RENTED THE HOUSE.

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[Redacted] SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT WHEN HE WAS NEXT QUESTIONED, HE WOULD BE ASKED ABOUT HIS KNOWLEGE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS AND PLANS THAT WERE STILL UNDERWAY FOR ATTACKS. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT BECAUSE HE HAD TOLD US SOME INFORMATION, HE WOULD HAVE A CHOICE OF BOXES TO STAY IN. SUBJECT ANSWERED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW, AND [Redacted] REPLIED, "SINCE YOU DON'T SEEM TO HAVE AN OPINION, I'LL CHOOSE THE SMALL BOX," AT WHICH SUBJECT REPLIED THAT HE WOULD PREFER THE LARGE ONE. SUBJECT WAS HOODED AND PLACED IN THE LARGE BOX WITH THE BRIDGE THAT WHEN HE NEXT SAW HIS INTERROGATORS HE WOULD NEED TO PROVIDE TRUTHFUL, SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT THREATS, OR THINGS WOULD BECOME MUCH WORSE. DAY ONE OF AGGRESSIVE PHASE INTERROGATIONS CONCLUDED AT APPROXIMATELY 2030 HOURS

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