

REVIEWS OF THE WORLD SITUATION: 1949-1950

HEARINGS
HELD IN
EXECUTIVE SESSION
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS
FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS
ON
THE WORLD SITUATION

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
(Executive hearings held on May 19, June 22, September 20, and October 12,
1949, and January 10, 13, 25, and 26, March 29, May 1, July 24, September 11,
November 28, December 9 and 22, 1950; made public June 1974)



HISTORICAL SERIES

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE



PREFACE

June 1974.

This is one of a historical series of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings held in executive session and relating to important historical topics during the early post-World War II period. The transcripts of these hearings, along with related material from committee files, are published in their complete form.

In executive session on February 6, 1973, the committee decided to publish this series. The transcript regulations of the committee read in relevant part as follows:

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In accordance with the committee's regulations, former Members have given their permission for this publication and the Department of State has indicated that it has no foreign policy objection to the publication of these hearings.

The hearings which are printed herewith have not been corrected for minor mistakes made by verbatim reporters.

J. W. FULBRIGHT, *Chairman*.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

**CONSULTATION PRIOR TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS'
CONFERENCE**

THURSDAY, MAY 19, 1949

**UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
*Washington, D.O.***

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in the committee hearing room, U.S. Capitol, Senator Tom Connally, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Connally, Thomas of Utah, Green, Pepper, McMahan, Fulbright, Vandenberg, Wiley, and Lodge.

Also present: Ernest A. Gross, Assistant Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Secretary. We are delighted to have you. We invited you somewhat on the understanding that you would give us a little preview, as it were, of the conference in Paris. Feel entirely free to discuss it in any way that you like.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE

THE BLOCKADE HAS NOT WORKED FOR THE RUSSIANS

Secretary ACHESON. Mr. Chairman, I think we might start out by saying that we are totally without any reliable lead of any kind as to what the purpose and attitude of the Russians is going to be at this conference. It seemed to us that they were willing to lift the blockade because the blockade was turning out to be a mistake from their point of view. The countermeasures were hurting them very much in Eastern Germany, causing a great deal of discontent among the East German population by bringing a great many economic activities to a standstill. The blockade was not working so far as preventing material from getting into Berlin or driving the Western powers out of Berlin. So the exchange of blockade and counter-blockade for the last 10 months had worked out to the Russian disadvantage.

In being willing to lift that, they clearly wanted some face saver, or some opportunity. They always had the opportunity of having a meeting of the Foreign Ministers if they lifted the blockade, so they put that forward as though this were a new concession, whereas it has been something which has been open to them for 10 months. We do not know whether they now expect to use this meeting as a field for a propaganda battle, or whether, as General Clay suspects, they are anxious to get some kind of a new arrangement because the present one

is not working to their advantage in Germany, or whether they just want to have it because they had to have something to lift the blockade.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not probable that they will strongly urge, for propaganda purposes, probably, a unified Germany? They want to make the German people think that they are their champions, do they not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. I think if they want to get into a propaganda battle they will take the position that they are the great supporters of a unified Germany. They may repeat the Warsaw suggestions of the withdrawal of all troops of all nations from Europe and other very extreme suggestions of that sort. In that particular exchange the obvious riposte is to ask them, before you go into discussing those proposals, where they stand on the eastern boundary question, where they stand on reparations, where they stand on the ownership of the properties which they have seized in East Germany, all of which are essential before you can really get at a viable and united Germany.

That might very well end in a stalemate in the propaganda battle which we certainly would not lose so far as the Germans are concerned.

RUSSIAN DEMANDS

The CHAIRMAN. Won't they probably insist upon a hand in the control of the Ruhr?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes. I think they will probably certainly start out with all the old demands of quadrupartite control with the Ruhr, their continued complete control of the Government of the Eastern Zone, a large voice in controlling German trade and exchange, a position on the Ruhr Authority, reparations, and the continued ownership of the East German properties which they have taken. All of those things they will probably demand. So we do not know what they are going to do.

We have every kind of intelligent guess that you can imagine from all conceivable sources, and each one is supposed to be right from the horse's mouth and each is absolutely different from the others, so all you can do is say you don't know.

ADVICE OF THE COMMITTEE SOUGHT

In approaching the meeting we have done a good deal of work within the Government. We have had several talks with the British and French, and Phil Jessup and "Chip" Bohlen are in Paris now continuing those talks, and I would like to go over with you a general outline of our position and approach to it, and have your advice and counsel about it.

U.S. CONCERN WITH THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE

We have started out by saying that the question of a united Germany is not a question by itself, and is not an end by itself. What we are concerned with is the strengthening and recovery of Western Europe and the extension of that strength and recovery as far eastward as possible. That is what we are trying to do. The German question fits into that scheme, and what you do about Germany must be judged from the point of view of whether it helps or hurts what you have done.

The second thing is that in the past year and a half a very great deal has been accomplished, both in Western Europe and in Western Germany. There has been very great economic recovery in both areas. There has been a great increase in the sense of confidence. The Atlantic Treaty has had an enormous effect on everybody's thinking and everybody's attitude. There has been very great progress with the Germans. The Germans have moved from a rather sullen acceptance of government by foreign military to a desire, a rather enthusiastic desire, to get on with their own government. For a long time we were worried that this meeting, and the suggestions that the Russians would throw out of a united Germany, with great big hopes, would slow the Germans down on the West German Government. Fortunately, and due in considerable part to the wise management of General Clay, it has had the opposite effect. The Germans are entirely cynical about these Russian proposals. They are entirely aware that you never get anything free from the Russians by going after a promise; that if you have something solid in your pocket you may be able to get something more. Without something solid you are nowhere.

Therefore they are enthusiastically determined to go on with this. There has not been the slightest bit of urging that the thing be slowed up for a moment. It looks as though the Bonn Constitution will be ratified even before we get to Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that ratification taking place by the legislatures of each of the states or by vote?

Secretary ACHESON. That is taking place by vote of the legislatures, and we think that the two-thirds will probably have ratified before we get there. I think several have already ratified. They will then draw up the election law, prepare the lists, engage in their canvassing, and probably have an election early in July and be ready to go ahead with the government by the middle of July.

TWO ALTERNATIVES IN GERMANY

That being the case, there were two alternatives. One was to draw up a program for discussion which would talk about the creation of a unified Germany as a step now, and that would necessarily involve the delay or postponement or abandonment of what we have done. The other was to go forward with what we have, under the Bonn Constitution, which provides for the accession of the Eastern Zone, and take the position throughout that we are as much for a united Germany as anybody, but that this is the way it has to take place. We have formed this government, and when we get it firmly established we will lay down with the Russians certain principles under which they can create Germans who can negotiate with our Germans, who will be as free as our Germans are, and when that is created, we will let the two groups of Germans get together and work out the conditions under which they will let these new people in.

All of this will take some time. If the conditions call for new general elections, supervised, throughout Germany, sometime at the end of the year, that is all right with us. It is whatever the Germans believe is to their advantage in the West.

Those are the two alternatives, and it seemed to all of us after careful analysis that the latter one was the only sound, sensible, and proper one. Therefore we propose to take the position that we are going

forward with this; it is perfectly simple to bring the other läender in, provided you take these essential steps first, which are, there must be elections held in their area either by all four allies or by all four allies plus the new German Government representatives. There must be perfectly free opportunity for candidates from all the political parties operating in the West. There must be freedom of discussion, and the actual election must be conducted by machinery other than Russian machinery, or other than machinery of the existing governments.

That is a pretty tough proposition to put up to the Russians, and it is a pretty hard one to expect them to take.

Senator WILEY. You are talking about the election for unification?

Secretary ACHESON. No; we are talking now about the elections for the state legislatures in the East.

You see, at the present time, if you should say to the Russians, "Well, we will let the state legislatures in the East appoint a committee to go and negotiate with the new German Government," what you are really doing is telling the Western German Government to negotiate with the Soviet Union, and that puts a burden on them which is unfair. It is hard enough for us to negotiate with the Soviet Union. It would be very difficult for them to do that.

Therefore, what we say is, "The people that the Western German Government shall negotiate with will be representatives of new state governments, freely elected." General Clay has not the faintest doubt that even with the presence of Russian troops in the eastern zone the non-Communist parties would sweep the election.

THE RUSSIAN AND WESTERN ZONE

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean in the present Russian zone?

Secretary ACHESON. In the present Russian zone. We are talking about creating legislatures now who can appoint representatives to discuss with the German Government coming into the present constitution.

Senator WILEY. How many states are there in the eastern and how many in the western zone?

Secretary ACHESON. There are 5 in the East and 11, I think, in the West. There are 45 million Germans in the West and a little under 20 million in the East.

General Clay believes that once you can hold those elections you will almost completely undermine Russian influence in their zone. He says already the secret police which the Russians organized are beginning to ease up. They are looking forward nervously to the day when there will be non-Soviet dominated state governments in the East. They think their positions as individuals will be very insecure if they have bullied people around and the day of reckoning comes.

They know what has happened to Soviet police in the past in areas such as Azerbaijan, where the Russians have pulled out. The police haven't survived the night, and they are not very keen about that. So they have taken a very much more quiet attitude. There have already been indications, quite unreliable from their point of view, that they will disband and be reorganized without too much difficulty. That is at least General Clay's position.

WITHDRAWING TROOPS

The only other position you could take would be to say to the Russians, "You must withdraw your troops." I think that is impossible. I do not see how we can say that the Russians must withdraw their troops without withdrawing ours, and it would be impossible and intolerable to think of withdrawing ours in any way at this time. So that would be the approach to it.

Senator VANDENBERG. What do you say if they voluntarily propose to withdraw their troops, knowing that you are a damned sight more interested in staying there than they are?

Secretary ACHESON. I think we would say "Fine. If you want to withdraw your troops, go ahead."

Senator VANDENBERG. But we cannot agree to it ourselves?

Secretary ACHESON. No, not at all. If they want to pull out, fine. I do not believe for a moment they would, and I do not think that we need to worry about the propaganda effect of that, or pussyfoot about it, or try to give some kind of obscure answer. I think you just say "No, we are not going to do that."

Senator VANDENBERG. I simply want to inject that I hope you are not obscure about anything. That is the last thing you ought to be.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is very sound.

The CHAIRMAN. You take the position, I assume, or our delegation does, that pending all of these changes in government, it will be necessary for us to maintain our troops there.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. It is absolutely necessary from every point of view. It is from the point of view of the Germans, and I think they would be utterly terrified if you were to withdraw one soldier 1 foot at this point. I think the same thing would be true of the French, Belgians, Dutch, Italians, Austrians, and everybody. The whole business would be thrown into complete terror, and you probably would have lost all the gains you made in the last 2 years. So I think that on that point there cannot be any doubt or hesitancy or compromise at all.

Senator WILEY. Is it true, as you say, that the Germans themselves would insist that you remain there?

Secretary ACHESON. General Clay has not the faintest doubt about it. He points out that there are all sorts of reasons why that is necessary. There has been for a considerable time trouble along the Czech-German border. There are Czech troops which keep coming over, and that is held in balance now by the fact that we have our troops right there. Nothing happens. He said, if you withdrew those troops there would be terror for hundreds of square miles in that area. Therefore we think we can't budge on that.

FREE ELECTIONS

Now, if the Russians in some way are able to accept that, which should not be too much—we have had free elections in our zone and they haven't—we can then say, "What happens after that we think ought to be, in the first instance, worked out by the Germans and submitted to us for approval," instead of our trying to sit down and work out with the Russians the detail of how these zones should be put together.

As I said, if the East Germans were free representatives and the West Germans should agree that at some future time, say December or January, there should be elections for the legislature on a new basis throughout Germany, that is acceptable. There isn't any reason why that isn't true. We would just as soon have the same inspections of elections take place in the West as would take place in the East. Our elections are free. Everybody knows it.

If the Germans don't want another election (and they have just had one) we support them in that. They know what they can push far better than we, and they know what is vital better than we. So we think we can allow those details to be left to them.

FOUR-POWER CONTROLS

As I said, if that were acceptable, you then get into questions of four-power control. The Russians will be entitled to be on the High Commission which we made up of four High Commissioners who would have whatever powers the allies would exert in this united area of Germany. They would demand that it be subject to their veto, and we would refuse to accept that. We would insist that it should be by majority vote.

PROBLEM OF A FRENCH VETO

Even majority vote is not too good for us, because it in fact leaves the veto to the French. You can expect that the British will be with us most of the time if not all the time, and the French probably a good deal of the time, but it gives the French the opportunity, if you have three out of four, that they can say "Well, we will have to vote with the Russians this time unless you make this concession."

That is inescapable. There is no mathematical computation known by which you can avoid that. You could not possibly say that when two agree to do something you will do it, because it might be the wrong two, and you could not expect anybody to accept the view that the British and ourselves should run it.

ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH

Senator LODGE. How about the attitude of the French toward this whole thing?

Secretary ACHESON. I think the attitude of the French is pretty good. They have come a long way in the last few months, beginning with the meetings here in Washington. They are still very nervous about some things, such as disarmament and demilitarization. They are quite nervous about that, and that leads them into a kind of split personality. They would like to have the veto on those things, because they would like to use it. They do not want the Russians to have the veto because the Russians might use it to allow the Germans to do something the French don't want them to do. So they have a little internal conflict on that.

Senator LODGE. Will they accept the idea that Western Germany should be integrated economically with the rest of Europe, with proper safeguards?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, they accept that. I think they accept it solely and only on account of the North Atlantic Treaty. That is the

thing that has made the difference between their total unwillingness to even consider the idea before and now their willingness to consider it. It has been pointed out that from the long-range point of view there is no gain to the French by insisting as an end in itself that you have this division in Germany. They cannot very long get anything out of that, because it is a problem which will continue to get worse. They are quite aware of the fact that Russian troops in the Russian Zone are a very short distance from Hamburg, and they believe that some day, as this German Government takes hold and is strengthened, it would be desirable to see those Russian troops getting farther from the borders of France than they are now.

A UNITED GERMANY CLOSER TO RUSSIA

Senator GREEN. Suppose Western and Eastern Germany are united. What is to prevent that government playing more and closer with Russia?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, there is nothing, theoretically, to prevent them from doing that. Of course there is, because the four-power control would have control over that.

Senator GREEN. Subject to that; but they can play it up gradually.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, they could, if their interests lay in that direction. That again is inescapable. You cannot continue forever to have Germany governed by foreign soldiers. It just won't work. It isn't working now. It is past the time when that is possible.

It seemed to us and the French and the British that the tremendous pull of the ECA program and of all the trade of Western Europe will pull this Germany to the West more strongly than they can be pulled to the East. We understand that there are powerful pulls in the other direction and that there are things which the Russians could do which would be important in any such situation as that. We have no doubt that at some time or other the Russians are going to get ready to sell the Poles down the river on the eastern boundary and give the Germans a larger area to live in than they now have, in the lower part, down toward Silesia. That is a vital question so far as Germany is concerned. But the only way you could deal with it at all is for us to be always demanding it, so that when the Russians do it they cannot really get any credit with the Germans. They will be doing it because it is quite obvious that they have been forced to do it.

TERRITORIAL READJUSTMENT

The reason that the territorial readjustment before too long is essential is that there are now between 9 and 11 million refugees from that area and the areas farther east who have been driven into the Russian zone, and most of them have come over into our zone, so that we have an overpopulated area which just simply cannot exist on the balance between agriculture and industry which it has, and on the density of population.

Senator GREEN. How large a population is taking its place?

Secretary ACHESON. In some cases no population at all. We got a very interesting paper the other day which our intelligence people picked up. There is no secret about it at all; it is a paper published in Czechoslovakia, and it advertised that in the areas which Czecho-

slovakia has taken over from Germany they wanted volunteers, Czech volunteers, to go and live in this area, and they said, "Here are towns, whole towns, with fine houses, 5,000 or 6,000 houses, in this town, in good repair, everything fine, and not a person living in the town."

Senator GREEN. They are afraid, I suppose. It is just temporary.

Secretary ACHESON. They do not know.

Senator WILEY. Was that part of the Sudeten German group? I thought that was in Bavaria.

Secretary ACHESON. No; this is some other area.

EAST VERSUS WEST PULL ON GERMANY

Senator LODGE. To answer Senator Green's question, your judgment is that the chances are that the pull on Germany will be toward the West rather than toward the East, although it is a contest.

Secretary ACHESON. It is a contest, and in the old days there was a great deal of German trade with Central Europe and the Danube countries, the Danube basin, and that is a natural area for German trade. It may be that the Russians can offer something there. But they have difficulty in offering it, because the way they have got those countries controlled and the way their economy is run, it is not as easy as it used to be.

Senator LODGE. You think from the standpoint of the Atlantic Pact it would be to our interest and the French interest to have the Germans oriented toward the West because they could support economically practically the whole expense of the Atlantic Pact, could they not?

Secretary ACHESON. They could do a great deal.

Senator GREEN. For the same reason it would be to our advantage not to have Germany united, but to have Western Germany playing with us and Eastern Germany playing with the Russians.

Senator LODGE. I think it would be better to have the whole of Germany playing with us, would it not?

Senator GREEN. I do not think that is possible.

Secretary ACHESON. The present situation in Germany is really an impossible situation, with the Russian Zone coming way out west of Berlin. You never can get any stability in Western Europe on the long-term basis with Russian troops 100 miles from Hamburg.

A RECENT ELECTION IN EAST GERMANY

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of that area, and I do not want to divert you at all, the reason the election went the way it did—and from which people are drawing so many conclusions that it is a great victory—was about 40 percent of the voters voted "No," and the other 60 percent that were briefed by the Russians.

Secretary ACHESON. That is the information that has been given out by the Russians.

The CHAIRMAN. How do we construe 40 percent being a great victory when they got more than we?

Secretary ACHESON. We believe that any announcement by the Russians that anything less than 90 percent voted for them is an extraordinary thing. That led our people to analyze this and see

what they think happened. One theory is that it was just simply a plant, that the Russians will say "Well, we will give the opposition 40 percent and we will publish this and wring our hands and say 'How dreadful it is'."

George Kennan and the people working on that think that is not really a tenable view. They think that what really happened was that the vote was very strongly the other way, that it was probably 60 or over 60 percent casting "No" ballots or invalid ballots, as they call them. The Russians can fake it but they didn't dare fake it any more than that, because they knew they would not be deceiving the Germans, because the Germans know what they did. If they all get together and whisper around and they say "The vote in our town was reported as 90 percent pro when we know it was 70 percent con," they would say the Russian announcement wasn't so.

Senator GREEN. Are they claiming a great victory?

Secretary ACHESON. They are not claiming much. What they are doing is saying, "This shows how fair it was." They claim they won, and that some of these people are unreconstructed and do not understand the advantages of democracy.

Senator VANDENBERG. It is the key to something, that they would either allow it to happen or announce it if it did happen.

Secretary ACHESON. It is the key to something, yes.

POLES AGAINST GIVING UP TERRITORY

Senator McMAHON. The Poles, be they of the right or of the left or in the middle, will be very much against giving up any of their territory, isn't that true? Aren't they unanimous?

Secretary Acheson. They are unanimous, and I had nine Polish Congressmen come to me and just have a fit about this.

The CHAIRMAN. About the election?

Secretary ACHESON. No, about whether the United States would take the position that we have taken in the past, that this border had to be rectified. These Polish Congressmen said that that was very bad.

The CHAIRMAN. That does not go up to the Elbe, that territory there?

Secretary ACHESON. No; it is in the lower part.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the northern part? Do you have to take all that territory and run the Germans out and put the Poles in?

Secretary ACHESON. They are run out now.

Senator McMAHON. What was the argument they presented to you?

Secretary ACHESON. Wholly emotional, that the Germans were bad people and had attacked Poland and the Poles had been defenders of democracy, et cetera.

Senator McMAHON. And we would be selling them down the river? That is their contention?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator LODGE. Has there been any official announcement of American policy on that?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes. General Marshall in the last two conferences has taken the view that it is very clear that at Potsdam it was said "This Polish area of administration is not a final fixing of the boundaries." The Russians claim it was, although they signed a paper

which said it was not. General Marshall has stated that in the southern part of this there must be a swing eastward, to give the Germans a greater area of agricultural land which they can occupy and did occupy in the past and farmed very productively. General Marshall's and the U.S. view was that the Poles have vastly more agricultural land than they need for their economy or can cultivate and use.

Senator McMAHON. How much is the area, approximately?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't remember, now. It is a substantial area, but is far less than half of the area which has been given to them.

Senator McMAHON. Griffis told me at one time that that was the one thing they had all agreed on, that they should have what they had, which is not an unusual reaction.

Secretary ACHESON. The Poles are entirely agreed on that.

Then, going further on the question of four-power control, one thing is clear, that there should be this majority voting. We should not have unanimity at any point.

CONTROL OVER GERMAN FOREIGN TRADE AND EXCHANGE

A matter which is open now, not altogether decided, is, should you reserve, as we have reserved in the three-power arrangement, control over German foreign trade and exchange? We in the State Department are inclined to think you should not. General Clay agrees with us very strongly in that view. It is fairly unimportant in the three-power arrangement, because we have said that we reserve it but we vote on it, and in questions of external aid made to Germany the United States controls it.

Our view is that you will have the greatest difficulty in the world in haggling about that or getting the Russians to agree to it, and that we would be in exactly the same position, and even a stronger position, to have no reserved power whatever on foreign trade and exchange, and rely entirely on our ECA control and agreement to take care of that until you get the pattern set. We doubt whether any occupation would be effective in that field after 1952 anyway. So that is not settled, but we are discussing it back and forth at the present time.

RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE CONTROL OF THE RUHR

One of the other questions which will be argued about a great deal is the one the chairman asked me about, and that is Russian participation in control of the Ruhr. We are all agreed that we do not want that participation. Whether, if everything else over a period of time worked out so satisfactory to us that we would consider that to the extent of allowing the Russians three votes out of 18 on Ruhr control is open. The French regard even that as a dangerous thing to do. Some of the rest of us think that three votes out of 18 is so far from causing any trouble that what you really have to consider is, whether the presence of a Russian mission in the Ruhr would be the source of Communist propaganda and activities among the unions and so forth?

For the time being we agreed on this position: "The thing has nothing to do with you. You never were involved in Ruhr trade. You participated in the control of demilitarization and disarmament. This whole thing has to do with the matter of domestic production."

Senator PEPPER. Are you thinking of the period prior to the possible coming into being of the new German State?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; that is what we are talking about.

Senator PEPPER. The period prior to that, too?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Your idea is that there will be a powerful control over the Ruhr economy after the German State comes into being and maybe after the peace treaty, or at least until the peace treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. The present plans go up to the peace treaty. The peace treaty is a thing that has to be negotiated. Whether you will be for it or not is a thing that you do not know now.

PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY

That brings me to the peace treaty. One of the things the Russians always spent a great deal of time at these conferences about is this talking about a German peace treaty. It gets into the most abstruse sort of ridiculous procedural questions: Shall four draw up a draft? Then who shall be consulted before you have a great conference? In the last argument I think 3 days was spent on whether Albania and Pakistan should be actually added to the group of countries who were engaged in war with Russia.

All of that seems to us to be utterly futile and a waste of time. One time in the discussions among the four powers it seemed that the drafting of a peace treaty was an important step that you had to get on with right away. It seems to us now that it is quite silly to argue with the Russians or anyone else about the theoretical terms of the peace treaty. What you want to do is to set this government up and get it going and see whether it is effective and strong, what its policies are as they develop, and the peace treaty can be molded to what you actually have, rather than be based on theoretical prognoses of the future.

So what we are inclined to conclude about it is that, we feel, the best thing to do if the Russians want to talk about it—if they don't want to talk about it we are perfectly happy to do it at his meeting; if they do, we will say, "Well, there is a very long and difficult thing. Let's appoint some High Commissioners for the negotiation of a treaty, and rent houses in Geneva or somewhere else and settle down for 2 or 3 years of discussion," and we will talk about this kind of problem.

NO MORE REPARATIONS

So far as reparations are concerned, the attitude which we propose to take is that reparations are finished, that with the agreement recently reached on the dismantling we will continue with that, dismantle the plants that are agreed upon, give the Russians their share if they come through with their agreement to supply certain material for it. We won't do it if they don't.

At any rate, that is finished and over with. There will be no reparations out of current production of coal.

Senator WILEY. How many plants are involved now?

Mr. GROSS. I thought it was 150-something.

Senator WILEY. Still remaining to be dismantled?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; that was it. The argument started out with whether 167 should be, and it was agreed on 157. It is somewhere in that neighborhood. Those plants are going to be dismantled.

Senator WILEY. What is the nature of most of them?

Secretary ACHESON. There are some steel plants and there are some chemical plants. There was a release put out the other day which lists all the plants and exactly what they do.

Mr. Gross. There is a lot of shipbuilding capacity.

Secretary ACHESON. Then you come to the vitally important question. The Russians, under the Potsdam agreement, so far as the majority part of their reparations is concerned, were given whatever they could take out of their zone plus external German assets in Eastern Europe. They pretty well looted their zone. They took everything that they could for a while, and then they discovered that that wasn't accomplishing anything at all. It was having a bad effect in their zone because it was throwing people out of work. Also, they got machinery pretty well damaged and rather mixed up in Russia, with vital parts turning up in odd parts of the country, so that the machinery wasn't much good when they got it.

They decided that that wasn't getting anywhere, so they decided to take the plants in place. Some of them they seized as reparations and others they bought with marks which they printed, so that they have acquired a very large ownership in the industrial properties of the eastern zone.

Our views are that that is illegal. It has to be given up in toto and they can not retain any of that. That was not contemplated at Potsdam, and, anyway, the German State can not be independent and free if a foreign government, organized as the Soviet Government is, owns the principal means of production in the whole eastern part of their country. There is just no other possible course.

So far as reparations out of current production is concerned, that means that whatever possibility—the possibility is somewhat distant at the present time—there is that Germany could be self-supporting is removed, any possibility that it could repay any of the advances which have been made by the Western Allies is removed, and you have Germany as a permanent satellite of the Soviet Union. They wanted \$10 billion of reparations. The idea was to say "No, all of that is over, but if you want to come into this four-power control business, you have to make a contribution to the total deficit of the German economy." That is a position from which you will probably have to withdraw, but it is at least where you start.

Senator GREEN. Do you mean by that that you are going to say the Russians have to pay reparations to Germany?

Secretary ACHESON. We are doing it. The moneys that we are now putting into restoring our defeated enemy is not reparations, of course.

Senator GREEN. They have another name.

Secretary ACHESON. What you say to the Russians is, "We are not going to pay your reparations." That is what we have come to. They have taken \$15 billion out of Germany in equipment and fixtures plus the product of the factories which they now own. Our best guess is it is between \$6 and \$7½ billion. But at any rate the attitude is, reparations stop now! They are through.

A SPLIT BETWEEN U.S., BRITAIN, AND FRANCE

Senator LODGE. You have not worried about splits developing between us and the British and the French?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, it is a thing you have to have in mind. I am not worried about it because I think the tremendous pull of the North Atlantic Treaty helps that very greatly. And the fear of the French of Germany and of Russia is such that I think that we can work out a very harmonious policy. But you have to have in mind all the time that if anything happens to France, then you have a very difficult situation.

Senator PEPPER. The Atlantic Treaty has given these Western European nations some confidence against a resurgent Germany as well as Russia?

THE 1946 OFFER OF A 25-YEAR PEACE TREATY

Secretary ACHESON. Yes. It works in all directions.

One thing I want to mention, Senator Vandenberg, that you mentioned to me some time before, is the 25-year treaty. What we think is the wise thing to do about that is to say to the Russians, "This proposal was made at a time when there was very great concern in France, Russia, and other countries about the possibility of a resurgent German militarism coming even before a treaty of peace. The treaty was an offer by us to make everything perfectly clear that that would not happen. The Russians would not join in that. They sabotaged that. In the intervening years we have now taken hold of this whole business, the British, French, and ourselves. The Russians can join if they want. We have complete control over the rearmament and remilitarization of Germany, and this treaty that was talked about in 1946 is something that you can talk about when you come to a final peace treaty with Germany, but not now."

It is just impossible for us to be talking in those terms, in terms of a 25-year peace treaty with the Russians, at this time.

U.S. CONTROL OVER GERMANY

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Mr. Secretary, how do you assume that we have complete control of the rearmament of Germany?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, in this way, Senator. We have what is now known as the control boards.

Mr. GROSS. I was just checking that title. I believe that is it.

Secretary ACHESON. That is an agency now of the Military Governors that will become an agency of the High Commissioners, and is made up of military personnel who inspect all plants, all building operations and production operations; who go about the country looking at everything that goes on. And they have authority at any time to move in—they will report to the High Commissioners—with our forces and stop anything that is happening in that direction.

Senator VANDENBERG. Does that continue after the new domestic government is set up?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes. That is the most important part of the reserved powers. That is the field in which we reserve all right to act administratively.

Senator VANDENBERG. Is that a four-power pact?

Secretary ACHESON. It is a three now. If the Russians want to come into that, they could either possibly join that or there would be another control board in the Eastern Zone. The really important possibility of rearmament is in our area.

BIRTH OF THE POST VERSAILLES GERMAN ARMY

Senator THOMAS of Utah. It is important on paper, but in 1922 we had about the same rights. The French went into the Ruhr because they were not satisfied with what Germany did. Public opinion of practically all Western Europe, and surely the public opinion of the United States, was against France.

Secretary ACHESON. I think, Senator Thomas, that if that happens and the other countries want to rearm Germany it would be a colossally foolish thing to do, but no kind of machinery would prevent that.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I think we put that kind of thing in the Versailles Treaty and then I think we tricked ourselves. I don't think the Germans tricked us with the 100,000-man army, because the 13-year term was imposed on them, just because of something said at the table that a 100,000-man army would be all right. Just to go ahead and train brigadiers and majors, they said, and then the bright boys decided that they would make that army a 13-year enlistment, on the theory that it would break any man's life, that he just couldn't do that sort of thing, or couldn't do it over and over again. However, it was the most effective army probably in the whole history of the world for making rearmament possible by quick action.

The Germans put it on a voluntary basis. They took their leaders, and the facts are that no matter what anybody says, in almost the course of months Hitler turned his 100,000-man army into an army of 4 million and lacked only noncoms. It is the most marvelous thing in the history of military science.

That can happen again if we are going to recognize the genius of the German people and not be on our guard against it.

Senator VANDENBERG. How would you prevent it, Senator?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. We could not prevent it then.

Senator VANDENBERG. How would you prevent it now?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I do not know enough of these details to have an answer, but I am thinking in terms, Senator Vandenberg, of our actual experience on this. We did absolutely nothing when the German people started marching.

Senator WILEY. They are marching again now, are they not?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. They went through their elections and carried about 85 percent the first time and 95 percent the second time. Then after Hitler sent his troops across the line nothing was done. Of course, we did not stay during the 15 years.

Senator GREEN. The only difference now is that you have the Atlantic Pact.

Secretary ACHESON. I think there is one difference. I think that we have learned the lesson Senator Thomas was talking about, that you do not get anywhere by permitting a small army. If you permit any army at all of any kind, you get into the difficulty that you spoke of, because what they do is to create a general staff for the Army. That is the first great error. Then they have those quick enlistments. If you have 100,000 men you keep turning that over and you train a vast number. But I think everybody is clear that it would be quite insane to make any sort of army of any kind whatever.

Senator GREEN. You cannot prevent their having a police force. Then they have gymnastic classes and crack military organizations.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. We denied them every kind of military plane, but they developed everything, of course.

A RESURGENCE OF A NAZI SPIRIT

Senator WILEY. We saw in the papers the other day great masses of Italians marching and giving that Fascist salute and so forth. Then I saw something in the paper of a German youth march. Is there any resurgence of the fact of a Nazi spirit?

Secretary ACHESON. I think the reports you have heard with regard to Italy were correct. There were those demonstrations, and I think the elections in Sardinia showed a growth in the old Fascist group. What happened there was that there was a growth in both the right and left, and the middle got squeezed.

The CHAIRMAN. This whole problem is in control of a Commission until the peace treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. It will be in control of the High Commission.

POWER OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

The CHAIRMAN. During that period, of course, the High Commissioners would have power to do whatever was necessary, would they not, to keep down a resurgence of a militaristic organization in Germany?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. The commanders would have troops, which now number probably in the neighborhood of about 350,000. It would probably be reduced over a period of years to 180,000 or 200,000, or something of that sort, so you would have plenty of troops to deal with any kind of matter that occurred of that type.

The CHAIRMAN. At the end of that period the presumption is that the peace treaty would take place?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the peace treaty it would be the function of those who make it to make adequate provision with respect to these matters, would it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, and at that time it might be essential in connection with the peace treaty to have something in the treaty against the new Germany rearming.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I was going to say. I would be up to the peace treaty to put such limitations on these matters as you saw fit.

GERMAN INTEGRATION INTO WESTERN EUROPE

Senator LODGE. We can get economic good out of Germany here, and bring her into the Western European economic complex, and at the same time not expose ourselves to a resurgence of German militarism. That is possible, is it not? Is it believed, in the light of all the experience we have had, that it is possible to do that now?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator LODGE. Even the French are convinced that that is a possibility and even a desirable thing, are they not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

A MODUS VIVENDI IF THE RUSSIANS SAY "NO"

Senator VANDENBERG. Before you get to that point, it looks to me as though you are going to put up a program to the Russians at this conference to which the answer is "No" unless there is total and complete repentance on their part with respect to their entire Eastern European policy. What happens if they say "No" at that conference?

Secretary ACHESON. Then I think you turn to the second thing, which is working out a modus vivendi so that you can live under the conditions which exist at the present time. That would involve clear determination of our rights with regard to Berlin, rights that you have specifically defined: unconditional rights by truck, by rail, by barge, into Berlin. It will be highly desirable if, in connection with that, you could get actual physical connection. The difficulty in the past with the physical connection is that if you get a corridor, then you spilt the Russian Zone, and the Russians have argued very strongly and quite reasonably against that. There is the possibility of a corridor which would not split it, and that is the automobile highway, because everything that crosses that goes over it or under it. It would not be the kind of a corridor that you could defend militarily if they wanted to move against you, but no corridor is of that nature. You could not possibly string out troops 100 miles in their territory. You have to stop it short of that.

At least you will get physical control so you can go without getting anybody's permission, and you would strive for that sort of control.

Then it is very important to work out some method for establishing trade relations between the Eastern and the Western Zones, because to a considerable extent they are complementary.

We think that one of the best ways of doing that is to let the Germans do it. They can negotiate better with the East Germans, even though those East Germans are Russian Germans. If we get into a series of complicated trade negotiations with the Soviet Union in which the whole question of the rate of exchange comes up, then you get into matters of national trade and position and all that sort of thing, whereas the Germans have no concern with either one of them, but are concerned only with getting as much goods out as they get in of equivalent value. So long as you have an export control so that you do not permit movement into the Eastern Zone, controlled by the Russians, of goods which we do not want to go to Russia, I think that is probably the best thing if the answer to the big proposal is "No," which is quite likely, in my judgment.

U.S. PROGRAM PROPOSES A NEGATIVE RESPONSE

Senator VANDENBERG. That is the point. As I listened to your program, it seemed to me you are building a program which projects a negative response.

Secretary ACHESON. I thought so. It is quite interesting that General Clay does not think so.

Senator VANDENBERG. It is interesting. I have talked to Clay, and I realize that he has some good reasons for it, and it may well be one of those dramatic things which they like to do in a spectacularly changed policy, but since it is your own opinion that the program you are contemplating putting up is calculated to bring a "No" answer, does that mean that the result of this meeting is going to establish to all intents and purposes the fact that there is a permanent cold war between the East and the East?

MORE STRENGTH NEEDED BEFORE FURTHER DISCUSSION

Secretary ACHESON. I should not think that it would mean that it was permanent, but I should think it would mean that it is not stopped, and that the next task is to see who develops more strength, and perhaps the next time you discuss it you can get further.

Senator VANDENBERG. Is there no sugar that you can put on this sour apple that you are presenting?

Secretary ACHESON. We have tried to find some, but the only kind of sugar you can put on it is so dangerous to what you are doing—

Senator VANDENBERG. I do not recommend any dangerous sugar, but for purposes of negotiation I would wish that there was something somewhere in the program which offered some sort of a safe concession. But you have not been able to find anything that is safe. If you do not find anything that is safe, so far as I am concerned I don't want you to do it.

THE SECRETARY'S PLANS ARE SOUND

Senator LODGE. May I say, Mr. Secretary, looking at it from the standpoint of American opinion in this country, and of course speaking only for myself as the way I judge it. I think to begin as the Secretary plans is a very sound way to do it. In fact, I think if you began with the modus vivendi and did not take in the overshadowing basic considerations you might lose a lot of support in this country, because I think the average American does not know the details and he looks at the thing in the big way. I think what you plan to do when you open up is something that American opinion will grasp and will approve of.

Senator VANDENBERG. I totally agree with that, and that is not what I am thinking of. I am just wondering whether there is anything that you can have up your sleeve in the event that there is some unexpected surrender on the part of the Russians to this rigid program you are laying down, whether you have found anything that you could use to encourage agreement.

IF THE ICE BEGINS TO BREAK

Secretary ACHESON. We have not found anything. I have not had a chance to talk as long as I should like to talk to General Clay, but I am going to ask him whether he would be available in case this ice begins to break up, and could get in a plane and come over. I think he would be willing to do that. There may be things that from his experience he knows would not be as dangerous as they look to us.

Senator VANDENBERG. Please do not have it in your head that I am recommending to you that you get off the fundamental line, because I think the fundamental line has to be pursued. Yet I could wish that there was something consistent with the fundamental line which offered some hope for an agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. May not something occur that would give you an opening along those lines?

Secretary ACHESON. It might.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you have to do. You have to await the opportunity, and then devise some system to meet it.

WOULD A REARMED GERMANY HELP?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. In connection with both Senator Vandenberg's and Senator Connally's statements, is there developing on our part any notion that a strong Germany is necessary to help us out, and by "strong" I mean a rearmed Germany, in this sour apple war that we have with Russia?

Secretary ACHESON. No, Sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I think that is the greatest danger that we have facing us, because no matter how Russia may act today, the history of Germany shows that you can beat her at every turn, diplomatically, militarily, economically, industrially, and in every way.

Now, there is just one more question I would like to ask, and I have already put the "No" down as a definite "No." You have not heard of anybody anywhere who is beginning to say that?

Secretary ACHESON. No.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Well, that is great.

The CHAIRMAN. You meant Germany could whip Russia at any time?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Build up a strong Germany, you see, as the kind of buffer thing we tried to do with some of the other States around Russia after the First World War.

Now, you said that Russia had no interest in the Ruhr. That depends upon what you call Russia. Some of these states which we call satellite states surely had an interest in the Ruhr, and a great deal of trade. And so far as what Germany always considered her pastoral back door, a lot of the southeastern part of Europe has intense interest in the type of supply which did come and would start coming again from the Ruhr. We could go up as far as Czechoslovakia, for that matter, so that I think Russia would come to this table as a spokesman for these satellites as well as herself. Can't she logically claim that?

Secretary ACHESON. I think you could argue that point, but this is something which I do not think would depend on logic. I do not care whether we won that argument logically or not. I think what you have to do is to say that is an essential bargaining weapon which the West has to have in dealing with the satellite states, and we must not use it to solidify the Russian position with the satellites.

A SCHEME FOR A CORRIDOR

Senator GREEN. Is it possible to devise any scheme for a corridor?

Secretary ACHESON. I think the East-West trade is most important.

Senator GREEN. Would it be possible to correct the mistake that was made by providing a corridor?

Secretary ACHESON. Only in the way I have indicated.

Senator GREEN. What was the mistake? Wherein did it lie? What could have been done that should have been?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not think there was any mistake. The Russians have never denied that we had these rights. What they say is that we breached the agreement by the London agreements of the spring of 1948, and so long as we had adequate quadrupartite control they say they did not question our rights. They say, "Very well. You met at London. Three of you decided you were going ahead with a Trizonia agreement that breached the agreement under which you have had these rights; therefore, you no longer have a position in Berlin."

Senator GREEN. Why didn't we set up our rights to use automobiles as well as to use airplanes?

Secretary ACHESON. We did.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Secretary, you do not mean in your answer to Senator Green to say that the Potsdam agreement was not very loosely drawn insofar as our right of access was concerned, and that it could and should have been written in far more definite contractual form?

FUZZINESS OF POTSDAM AGREEMENT NOT IMPORTANT

Secretary ACHESON. I entirely agree, but I think if it had been written like a corporate mortgage it still would not have had any effect on the Russian decision when they made the decision they did. This is just an opinion; it is a guess. Because the basic Russian attitude was not that under Potsdam we did not have the rights. They were fuzzy, surely. But what their view was was that we had breached Potsdam and no longer had a right to be in Berlin; that the only right we had to be in Berlin was as partners in Germany as a whole.

Senator VANDENBERG. Still, Mr. Secretary, when the argument was on you had to rely sort of circumstantially on one telegram as the basis for an alleged Russian consent to your interpretation of our rights. Isn't that true?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true.

Senator VANDENBERG. And that is pretty flimsy basis compared with the kind of basis that ought to exist in international relations. Isn't that true?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator VANDENBERG. All I am quarrelling with was that part of our answer to Senator Green which indicated that Potsdam was all "jake," and I don't think it was.

Secretary ACHESON. I did not mean that.

Senator GREEN. I was leading up to ask you whether that hole could be patched up.

Secretary ACHESON. That is what I was saying when I was talking about this *modus vivendi*. If you get nowhere on the solution to the whole German question, then we have to turn to an arrangement under which we can live, and that arrangement has two general parts to it. One is to negotiate our clear rights by truck, by rail, and by water. We have rights by air because nobody dares interfere with us.

INTERFERENCE WITH AIR AND LAND RIGHTS

Senator GREEN. Why shouldn't they dare interfere? That is my point. If they dare interfere with our rights on land, why do they distinguish? What was the reason for distinguishing between the two?

Secretary ACHESON. I think it is a pure difference of the physical situation. If they want to interfere with the airlift, they are taking on the most disadvantageous tussle with us that they can possibly take on. We are far better equipped to force ourselves through in the air than they are to stop us.

Senator GREEN. They are better equipped on land.

Secretary ACHESON. And that is why they stopped us on the land. When they stop you on the land you either have to say "I am going through," and then you get your troops and you start your train through and they may shoot at you or not, or you send engineers in with the intention to build a bridge and then you get into a fracas on that and you get into a very difficult mission, or you do not go through.

Senator GREEN. They did not distinguish in principle between the two?

Secretary ACHESON. No. They have always claimed the airlift was illegal and they tried to make us agree to certain rules which would have made the airlift impossible, that we go through only certain corridors and we could go only at certain times, and so on. We never paid any attention to that.

Then they started this business of having anti-aircraft practice, and that sort of business, in the corridor, and we told them we would have to reply to that with vigorous measures. If they went on, we would have to clear that out of the way. But we were in a superior position in the air.

Senator VANDENBERG. I do not think there is any disagreement between you and Senator Green, Mr. Secretary. If I understand your position, the point he raises is precisely the point I suggested to you by letter, that one of the things, the minimum, that we ought to get out of this affair is a contractual acknowledgment of the rights which have been in controversy with respect to access to Berlin.

Senator GREEN. It has always seemed extraordinary to me that it should not have been explicit in the agreement.

GETTING A BENEFIT FROM GERMANY

Senator LODGE. Mr. Secretary, in connection with Senator Thomas' point about the revival of the German military threat, surely it is possible, is it not, for us to get military advantage and benefit out of Germany without having Germany become a military threat again? Don't you consider that it is?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator LODGE. We can get the German economy integrated into the Western European economy, which is a great help, and if the worst came to worst, you can take the German manpower, recruit them, organize them and regiment them, not under the German flag. You don't need to set up a German General Staff and Army to get the military good out of Germany.

Secretary ACHESON. You could, but nobody has any intention of that.

So I think Senator Thomas has a sound point, that the great difficulty of keeping Germany disarmed and getting the benefits out of Germany without getting the benefits of resurgent militarism is that you have to have 150,000,000 Americans believing that that is the right thing and not getting misled and saying, "Oh, well, let's just forget about that."

THE U.S. APPROACH AT THE COMING CONFERENCE

Senator PEPPER. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry I missed the first part of your statement, but you started telling what your general idea of approach was at the conference. Have you any rough idea about the sort of general time table you can fix? In the first step the Paris Conference, at which you hope to clear up certain things, and to see what sort of attitude is manifested, I suppose, on the part of the Soviet Union? And then, I suppose, the first idea is as nearly as possible to integrate the German economy. Are we anxious to have the Eastern States that are under Russia's control integrated with the rest, or are we satisfied for the demarcation to exist for some time in the future, and to organize our three zones? What is sort of our general policy on that?

Secretary ACHESON. I was explaining before you came in, Senator Pepper, that our primary concern is that the great progress which has taken place in Western Europe and in Western Germany for the past year and a half should continue and not be impaired. If it is possible to bring a larger area of Germany into the same progressive field, which would contribute to the recovery of Western Europe, we are delighted to do it, but it all depends on the conditions under which you can bring it in.

If it comes in under conditions which would retard or destroy or set back in any way what we have done, then we would rather not have it in than have it in. So the point is in putting up to the Russians the minimum that we think they will accept.

Senator PEPPER. What really constitutes the threat and what makes all the problem in Western Europe is the intransigent attitude of the Soviet Union. If they should suddenly assume an attitude that we share, there would not be any problem in Eastern Europe.

Secretary ACHESON. We would not assume an attitude. It would have to be that this was the clearly accepted Russian policy.

ONE OF TWO CONCLUSIONS

Senator PEPPER. Now then, I suppose it looks to me like you have to come to one of two conclusions; either they are totally unprincipled, they have sinister designs that are dangerous in character, which means we simply have to remain an armed camp until we can establish as soon as possible an equilibrium of power and a little edge on our side so that there will be no danger of their aggression, and continue to maintain that situation until they change their attitude, or, the other side of it was what I inferred Senator Vandenberg was getting at, that they simply be treated with the fairness with which they are entitled to be treated. We would be willing to give them whatever their rights are, provided they show an attitude of conciliation and fairness and peace in their point of view.

Secretary ACHESON. That latter is not my attitude, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You mean you are not willing to give them what their rights are?

Secretary ACHESON. It is not a question of rights. The most dangerous thing in the world that we can do is to again enter into any agreement which depends for its execution upon Russian cooperation and Russian good will.

Senator PEPPER. You are just starting out with the hypothesis that that is an impossibility.

Secretary ACHESON. It is not only an impossibility but it is a danger of such great scope that we should not even consider it. The only agreements you can enter into with the Russians are agreements which do certain things. One is to recognize facts. Secondly, are as automatically operating as possible, so there is no opportunity to confuse or quibble about it. When you can get arrangements of that sort, surely we will go ahead and make them. But if you have something purely executive, which purely depends upon your belief that the Russians are nice fellows under the skin and they will cooperate, you have just laid your neck on a block and they will cut it off at once.

Senator PEPPER. I thought you said a minute ago that if they wanted to come in on the basis of majority vote in this governing group that would be all right.

Secretary ACHESON. That is all right.

Senator PEPPER. I did not intend to suggest that they have a veto. I am saying, neither do we have a veto.

VOTING ON NATO

The CHAIRMAN. Before you leave let me ask you one question. Do you think there would be any advantage to you folks over there if this committee, within the next 2 or 3 days, should vote out the treaty? We will not have the report ready for about a week.

Secretary ACHESON. I think it would be of tremendous help if you voted it out. I think it would be of even greater help if the Senate would consider it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate will not do that for the present.

Secretary ACHESON. If they will just get on with the thing as quickly as possible, that will be fine.

The CHAIRMAN. My point was whether or not it would be to your advantage in your sessions if we formally voted to report it out. That would carry the implication that we were all for it.

Secretary ACHESON. That would be fine.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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