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INAME: ROGERS, Michael S. (Mike), VADM, USN

IPLACE: NSA, OPS 3 Building, Ft. Meade, Maryland

IVIEWER: (b)(3) NSA

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This is NSA Oral History 21-2014 ((OH-2014-21)). Today is 24 March 2014, and we are talking to Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers, currently Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, and Commander of U.S. TENTH Fleet—and recently nominated as the new Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of USCYBERCOM. This interview will focus on perceptions and concerns as he assumes command of the National Security Agency and USCYBERCOM. I'm (b)(3) NSA Oral Historian for the Center for Cryptologic History. Along with me is (b)(3) NSA United States Navy, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command and U.S. TENTH Fleet; and (b)(3) NSA Historian for the...for USCYBERCOM. The classification of this interview is TOP SECRET//COMINT. We will adjust this classification at the end if needed. Vice Admiral Rogers, the Center for Cryptologic History wants to thank you for taking time from your busy schedule to discuss your thoughts as you assume command of the National Security Agency and USCYBERCOM. Would you please provide us an overview of your academic background and military career?

Rogers: In ((he clears his throat)...Excuse me. In terms of academics, I have an undergraduate degree from Auburn University in Business, specifically Personnel Management/Industrial Relations. So if you ever need a contract negotiated, I'm ready to go. ((Chuckling heard.)) My master's is from the National War College, and it's National Security Strategy with a specific concentration in East Asia. So as General Alexander reminds me, "Hey, if you just had your technical side...education side Rogers, you'd be *perfect* for these prospective new duties. ((VADM Rogers chuckles.))

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So it is... That's one thing I always tell people: I enter this not with the technical background in terms of formal education that many do. I'll be honest and tell you, hey, that's not a factor in my mind. It's never been.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: I always used to urge when I was a detailer—a person responsible for the assignment of professional SIGINT and cyber officers with my own service—I always used to tell them, “Hey, I wish I could send you all to Naval Postgraduate School to get, you know, master’s level education in electrical engineering, mathematics, computer science. Hey, it’s not going to happen. We just don’t have the time and the resources. So what I think you need to do as an officer to be viable in our mission set in the 21st century: you must be technically proficient and you must be comfortable applying technology against a very technically focused target set. If you can do that, I think you have the relevant skill set for the future. If you can’t, then we need to think about how do we augment your technical background.” So in my case, I have always enjoyed the technical side of what we do. It’s something I have always been comfortable with, and never thought that my education was a positive or a negative either way. I just never thought it was a major factor for me.

The second part of the question you asked in terms of my professional background. I was commissioned in the United States Navy out of the NROTC program at Auburn University, August the 28th, 1981. I initially was commissioned as a surface warfare officer. I did that for approximately five years—three of which were spent on a destroyer for my initial sea tour on a destroyer out of Norfolk—during which I did... Unusual for them—this is the early 1980s: combat deployments to Grenada, Beirut, El Salvador a couple of times. So it was a fun time. I was very lucky I was on a ship that did a lot of stuff. Had nothing to do with me. It was just the luck of the draw.

At the time, that ship, also the *USS Caron* (DD 970), was a cryptologic platform. I had no clue that the journey was ultimately going to take me into cryptology, but I was a TAO, tactical action officer—the commanding officer’s representative down in combat in different tactical scenarios. So you would always go up to the (B% CES) to get your brief before you came on watch. Again, so I’m dealing with CTs and cryptologic professionals. I had no clue that I’d end up in their world. But I did that for three years. I had six months’ of training and I... to become a (B% surface) officer. And then I spent about 18 months on a shore tour in (B% Washington, DC) where I changed specialties.

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I then became what was then a cryptologist, November 1986. As a cryptologist, I first went to Rota, Spain, where I did... I started as a COMEVAL airborne reconnaissance trainee working with VQ-2. Unfortunately the ((USS)) *Stark* was hit by two Exocets ((missiles)) in the Persian Gulf in June of 1986. '86? June of...

(b)(3) NSA

'87.

Rogers: '87. And the decision was made: we're going to ramp up the Navy presence there. We're going to put... We're going to reflag tankers. So I got sent over. I got ripped out of the aviation program. Got sent over to do surface work, riding small (B% buoys). I did the first ten ((Operation)) Earnest Will escort missions through the Strait of Hormuz. Was there when we shot up the Rostam oil platform. Sank an Iranian frigate. So that was an exciting time. It was a lot of fun. Was there for ship attacks during the tanker wars, trying to stop the Iranians from shooting up tankers. So that was a lot of fun (1-2G) close quarters with those guys. ((Chuckling heard.))

Then got into... A little unusual in the cryptologic world: then I focused a lot of time on ELINT—more so than most of my peers. It just worked out this way. I ran the largest ELINT or electronic warfare segment in the Navy at the time for Europe. So I did all the Navy's reprogrammable libraries for all our automated systems: aircraft, ships, submarines, threat recognition systems. I ran the technical guidance unit that did all the training for all the electronic warfare for the Navy forward in Europe. I ran the analytic center for the largest SIGINT field site in Europe. I ran all the ELINT segments of that. So I... That has worked out very well for me. It's given me a pretty broad portfolio in my career, which I'm very grateful for. Most... Many cryptologists tend to be very COMINT-focused. I've done both the COMINT, but I've done a lot of the ELINT side—and EW, which I really liked.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm, supervised analysts as well.

Rogers: Yeah. And then... 'Cause they... Don't get me wrong, they do the work. I'm just there as the officer to take the credit. They do the work.

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Hmm.

Rogers: Then I went to a Fleet CINCPAC tour, where I ran... for the East Coast of the Navy. It was a Navy tour; four-star staff; senior, you know, waterfront guy

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in the Navy on the East Coast. I was the Cryptologic Plans and Policy guy. So my niche in life was to think about how do we need...? Coming out of the Cold War—this is like 1990 to 1993—my focus was: we're coming out of the Cold War. What's the future going to look like in...?

I worked for some great people. Five of the officers that I worked with in that organization... There were 19 officers. Five of us went on to be flag officers. It's among the highest concentration of really smart professional cryptologists I have ever been a part of then. Those guys were just phenomenal. And my niche was: "Okay Rogers. Work with the team, and let's figure out where we need to take cryptology and SIGINT for the United States Navy and, by extension, our joint partners. What are we going to do after the Cold War?" So that worked out really well. Got into some collection capabilities on non-traditional platforms. I argued that SPECWAR was the biggest investment area we needed to get into—that I thought the future was going to have a big (B% ground) component to it for us. And then counternarcotics was the other big focus of the next decade (B% from then). So I got involved in working on that.

From there, I went to Norf... up to Washington D.C., where I was the detailer for all of the O4 and below in my specialty. So my job was to determine what was the best fit for people. Where should they go? How I help them build their careers? I was also the Assistant Community Manager. So I got involved in: "Hey, how do you build the cryptologic work force, officer and enlisted... Primarily officers for me, but I also got involved in the enlisted side. How do you build a cryptologic workforce for the future? What are the skill sets you need? How do you train and educate? How do we give people the right set of experiences to optimize that training and education? How do we assess performance?"

Then I left there and was the Executive Assistant to the Senior Cryptologist in the Navy. So I go to sit, you know, and... by his side so to speak, just as the note taker, to see how the organization worked from the flag deck—which was very interesting for me. I learned a lot from that.

From there I went to command up at Navy Security Group Activity, Winter Harbor, Maine—which has subsequently closed down. It had a very traditional mission up there: HF, DF, (b)(1) USSC (b)(1) USSC. It was one of five mission ground sites in the system. That system has subsequently been retired. And I also ran the schoolhouse. At the time, the Navy ran one of the four major on-orbit intelligence constellations. We don't do that anymore, but we did that one.

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Mm hmm.

Rogers: And I also...The biggest challenge there was, I was...The base was going to close within two years of my departure. So I did the initial work, you know, with the governor, with the Congressional delegation, with the Navy, with NSA about: "Okay, how do we go through a closure?" So I learned a lot about that, which is really...Stood me in good stead. Now I find myself in a position where I have shut down installations in my current duties, knowing what that's like at the other end.

From there, I went out to 6th Fleet where I was the Senior Cryptologist. I ran all of the SIGINT, cryptology as well as all the information operations for 6th Fleet, which was the operational commander for Europe and Africa from a Navy perspective. Interestingly, during that tour, I was embedded in the (B% three vice the two), which I freaking loved. I was a Battle Watch Captain. At one point, they approached me about: "Hey, would you like to be the N3?" ((He chuckles.)) And I said, "I really can't...I would love to do it, but I really can't stay." I really loved it. I got very immersed in the operational side, even as I was working traditional intel kinds of things. And from there, I went to the National War College. Got a degree. Like I said, focused on East Asia. So I got to spend a lot of time focused on the PRC from a strategy and a policy/intellectual thought kind of perspective as well as North Korea—not realizing that this was going to pay off for me later in my career.

Then I went to the Joint Staff for my payback tour. And quite frankly, in some ways, that's where the wheels came off. What do I mean by that? I got totally out of the traditional experience set, which is one reason why I believe that I am...if I'm confirmed by the Senate, I'm going to be the next Director of NSA and the next commander of U.S. Cyber Command. Because I found myself...First, I started in very traditional areas. I ran the cyber effort of the Joint Staff. It was a very different time then. This is 2002. Or excuse me, 2003. I went to college at NDU from 2002 to 2003.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: This is now 2003. Cyber is still relatively immature. The J3 ran everything. We did all the policy. We did the operational piece. The J6

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(B% worked) the information assurance piece. But at the time, that was considered kind of a niche. We didn't really look at it in a comprehensive way. And so, as an O6, I found myself: "Hey, you are Mister Cyber for the Joint Staff." So I...Wow, man, I loved that now. I only got to do it for four or five months before I changed jobs. In fact, in that tour, if you looked (B% at) that very first order that we ever sent from the department to U.S. Strategic Command for Network Operations: the POC is Captain M.S. Rogers. That was one of my babies ((he chuckles)) when I was (1G).

(b)(3) NSA

Hmm!

Rogers: My predecessor did all the work. We took 18 months to get that order out. I was only there for the last four. My job was to get it across the finish line. My O6 boss...I was an O6, but at the time I was working for another O6. He got grabbed to go be General ((Richard)) Myers' Executive Assistant as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So I got asked would I move up and take his job. So I ran the STO ((Special Technical Operations)) side for the Joint Staff as well as all the Information Operations elements on the Joint Staff. That's what I did for...again three or four more months. Then General Norton Schwartz, who was the J3 at the time, asked me, "Hey, would you come be my EA." which I found very... Executive Assistant, which I found, again, a little different. I'm an intel guy in a J3 organization. We're in the middle of two war. And this when things were particularly going bad in Iraq.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: ((He chuckles.)) He says, "Hey, I'd like you to be my EA." And I said, "Sir, why don't you grab somebody who's been a k...I mean in the J3. (B% You got) carrier skippers. You got brigade posts Iraq and Afghanistan, brigade commanders. You've got wing commanders in the Air Force, you know. Why would you pick a guy like me? I wouldn't normally be in a 3." But he was a kind guy. From there, I went (B% up) to be the Director. I did that for six months. Then he was informed he was going to be the Director of the Joint Staff. I got asked to go up there. So I did. He asked me to go ahead of him 'cause he said, "I want you to understand the processes, learn the organization. So I was the EA to two different Directors on the Joint Staff. One of whom, Admiral Tim Keating, would subsequently be a big factor in my career.

From there...I'd now been on the Joint Staff about two years and thought I was going to be able to go back to the J3, when General Peter Pace, the Vice Chairman, had been nominated by the President to be the next

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Chairman. He asked me to come interview to be his Exec. I did that. He started the interview by telling me: "Hey, I'm going to be the first Marine Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I cannot have a Navy guy as my EA, Rogers." And I said, "Hey, I understand, Sir. I'll go back to the J3. You interviewed a Navy guy. This is good." He called me back for two more interviews, constantly telling me the same thing. And then said, "I have a job for you after I get confirmed, but I can't tell you what it is." ((Chuckling heard.)) So I thought he was just being nice.

Sure enough, he gets confirmed. The morning he gets confirmed, he grabs me in the E Ring passageway—'cause I'm just walking between offices. And he says, "I want you to be my thinker. I want you to do the things that I don't have the time to do, or the things that I'm not paying attention to that I should. I want you to travel with me where ever I go. I want you to sit in on all my meetings. I want you to build a small team to help me analyze situations." So I created a Chairman's Action Group for him, and then traveled with him everywhere for his two years as Chairman. Sat in, in all his meetings.

During that tour, I also got tapped to...ended up becoming one of the leaders of what they called the Joint Staff Working Group. Things in Iraq were going poorly. The Chairman and most of the Chiefs had come to the conclusion the current strategy is not working and we got to do something different. That was in September of 2006. August of 2006 because he came off his July leave. And I remember he came back, saying, "We got to do something different. I've come to the conclusion we got to do something different." They commissioned a group: four people from each Service, supposedly the best and the brightest of guys like (1G) (B% Masters). There were four Navy guys. All four of us went on to make flag officer. Again, I was just fortunate.

But we were tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do a strategic assessment of the current global strategic environment. And then help them...And then bore down specifically on Afghanistan and Iraq. Particularly with Afghanistan, it was to do a sense of where we are. And for Iraq, it was help us figure out what we ought to do differently. As a result of the work of this group plus many other people—and many other groups—ultimately after our presentation to President Bush, they came...they, for a variety of reasons, came to the conclusion: "Hey, the Surge..." What became known as the Surge in Iraq was the strategy they

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went with. ((He coughs.)) Excuse me.

Then I left that job. And Admiral Keating—who had been the Director I worked for for three months as EA—heard that I had been selected for flag officer, said, “Hey, why don’t you come out to PACOM and be the J2?” I said, “Sir, I have never served a day in the Pacific, and I got 27 years of commissioned service. And I’m not an intel officer. I’m a cryptologist. Are you sure you want to do this?” Then his comments...And I was very lucky. His comment to me was, “Hey...” ‘Cause I said, “If you want me to get off that plane at Pearl and be the duty expert on Beijing and Pyongyang, I’m just not your guy, Sir. I’ve never served out there.” ((He chuckles.))

Then his comment to me was, “Hey, I got a lot of people who are very smart about this AOR. That’s not...I don’t need more of that. What I need is somebody who understands the broader context, somebody who can think strategically, somebody who’s going to speak the truth to me as they believe it, and somebody who knows how to build teams.” I said, “Okay Sir. If that’s the caveat, I think I can maybe be of minimal value to you.” I did that for two yea...for like twenty months.

And then Afghanistan, meanwhile, has gone... has gotten much worse. And the decision is made to relieve the current commander. General McChrystal is selected to go in as the Commander on the ground. McChrystal decides he wants to take the Joint Staff J2 with him—a guy named Mike Flynn, now currently Lieutenant General Mike Flynn, the Director of DIA. So now, they’re trying to find a JCS J2. And I get a call one day out at Pearl Harbor: “Hey, the General wants to talk to you about coming back to be the J2.” And I’m...I had never worked for Admiral Mullin. I didn’t know Admiral Mullin. And I’m thinking, “We’re in two ground wars right now, and you want a Navy guy from the Pacific to be the J2? That doesn’t make any sense to me.” Mullin says same kind of thing: “Hey, look. I got tons of people that are focused on Afghanistan and Iraq. And it’s going to suck up a lot of your time, but I don’t want us to be totally (B% bore sighted) on this. Plus you got a pretty broad background in a lot of different areas. I want you to see what you can do.” So I came back and did that. I did that for two years.

And then, in September of 2011, I was asked by the CNO to come out and be the second commander of Fleet Cyber Command and U.S. 10th Fleet.

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(B% And) it's now two and a half years later, and I find myself having been nominated for the DIRNSA job and the U.S. Cyber Command job. And we're waiting for the Senate to...I've done my confirmation hearing from the Senate Arms Services Committee. And now we're waiting for the Senate to make up their mind about do they want this Rogers guy to get a four-star and take on these jobs. ((He chuckles.))

(b)(3) NSA Are we still thinking we'll get the vote in the committee tomorrow?

Rogers: I don't know. We'll see. I mean, the current hope...General Alexander is doing the ceremony on Friday, the 28th of March at 1500 either way—whether it's a retirement ceremony for him...

(b)(3) NSA Yeah.

Rogers: Or if it's a retirement and a change of command. We're hoping that in the next 24 hours, we're going to get a sense for can they do it by the end of the week. If they can, then the current thinking is we'll just do it all in one ceremony: change of command *and* retirement. If not, it'll be a retirement ceremony for him. And I'll just go over there if and when I'm confirmed.

(b)(3) NSA Yeah, (B% okay).

Rogers: Is that more detail than you...? Just to give me a sense for what you're looking for.

(b)(3) NSA That's great. That was great.

Rogers: Is that more detail than you (3-4G; faint)?

(b)(3) NSA That was good. What experiences in your background were important in preparing you to be DIRNSA and command USCYBERCOM? What do you think? I...One thing...Let me follow up and ask you.

Rogers: Sure, sure.

(b)(3) NSA I noticed throughout what you were talking about here is the fact that you have a broader background scope than a lot of people, and you seem to be able to use that—or people saw that as a real advantage during your career...

Rogers: Right.

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(b)(3) NSA

A command. And brought you in specifically because of that broader background as opposed to some specific expertise you had.

Rogers: Yeah, I'll tell you, I'm very fortunate. First, I started out in the operational world as a traditional surface warfare officer—or combined arms guy in any of the other Services. That very much shaped the way I view the world around me. It very much shaped my approach to doing things. Secondly, even as a cryptologist or SIGINT individual, I have spent...I've been...I got 32 and a half years commissioned service. I have probably literally spent half of my career in J3 or command echelon organizations not in "2" organizations. Between my two tours on the Joint Staff, for example, I have six and a half years. I spent my entire O6 time on the Joint Staff, and then I spent my entire two-star time back on the Joint Staff. So six and a half years. Eight different jobs across the Staff in that six and a half years. Only two of those years were spent in the J2, for example.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: The...Four and a half were spent in the J3 in the Director's Office, working for the Chairman. So I have a very unusual...I'm not going to argue if it's better or worse. But it's just a little different than most of my peers with the same kind of background. I've spent more time in non-traditional and in, you know, strategic kinds of things.

The other thing: I was very lucky. When I made flag officer...At the time, I happened to be working for the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was getting ready to leave. He, unfortunately from my perspective, only served one two-year tour vice the normal two two-year tours of most chairmen. And he pulled me aside when I made flag, and he said, "There's two things I want you to be thinking about. The first is, there are many people who will look at you and they will try to stovepipe you based on your background. I am going to work hard to try to fight that while I can. And secondly, I think you ought to be the Director of the National Security Agency one day." I'm like, "What?" ((He laughs.))

(b)(3) NSA

This is about 2010 when (3-4G) said that?

Rogers: This is like...No, this is 2006...

(b)(3) NSA

Wow.

Rogers: When I made flag.

(b)(3) NSA

Wow.

Rogers: So I have been very fortunate. Literally since I was a senior O6, I have had senior officers and policymakers in the department talking to me and trying to give me experiences that optimized me for these two jobs.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: One of the reasons why Keating wanted me to go out to PACOM was: "Hey, look. I want to broaden you and because I want you to get experience in the theatre that I think...If we look 10 years down the road..." I was there from 2005 to 2007. "Hey, as I look 10 years down the road, this is going to be the strategic imperative for the nation, I think. I want you to get you some experience." Admiral McConnell was always...Again, former Director of NSA. He approached then Admiral Mullin, who was the Chairman, about, "Hey, you got a chance to use Rogers to be your J2. I..." McConnell, who was a Navy intel officer, not a cryptologist. He was a Navy intel officer. McConnell had been the JCS J2 during the Gulf War...

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: Before he came out to NSA. And he told Mullin, "Hey, the JCS J2 is a great...It'll give Rogers a very broad perspective across the intelligence arena. He'll become a known entity across the leadership of the IC. He'll get the opportunity to work and interface on the Hill as well as in policy issues. Hey, I think you need to look at Rogers as a potential..." Again, I'm very lucky. I'm a one-star out in Honolulu.

(b)(3) NSA

Now, Sir, this is when McConnell was...

Rogers: (B% Sure.)

(b)(3) NSA

Director of National Intelligence? Is that correct?

Rogers: I don't remember if he was the DNI then or if he had left that job already. 'Cause, again, I never worked...(B% I didn't)...

(b)(3) NSA

Right. He left in early 2009, 'cause (B% I've)...

Rogers: I never worked for Admiral McConnell, but he knew about me. And he would reach out through others occasionally, just to say: "Hey, keep doing what you're doing." You know, "Hey, I think you're building a great career."

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Hmm.

Rogers:

I didn't know him. And then...So now, I'm the JCS J2. And the then Chairman says to me, "So, I think what we ought to look at for you is you...I think you ought to be the next Alexander." This is like 2009. "So here's what we're going to do. You're going to do this tour. And then we need to look at potentially getting you to command on the Navy component side for both U.S. Cyber Command..." And the other thing: I'm also the Service Cryptologic Commander for the United States Navy. So the Navy's the only Service that's organized this way. I mirror General Alexander's current duties, where he's both the cyber guy and the NSA guy. I mirror that in the United States Navy. I am both the cyber guy and the Service Cryptologic Commander. We're the only Service that is structured that way. And then General Alexander interceded to help me out.

When I was getting ready to leave the Joint Staff, they said: "Hey, Rogers, we want you to be a three-star..." This is the Navy, is saying, "But we think maybe we want you to go be the OPNAV in 2N6. We're trying to push this whole information dominance idea. You know, you're the senior information dominance guy *per se*. You know, this strategy and policy piece seems to be something that you enjoy or we've used you for."

Admiral ((Gary)) Roughead, then the CNO, says: "Hey, you really ought to go do that." And I pushed back arguing, "No, Sir. What I really ought to do is take this and apply it in an operational context to drive change at the deck plate level. And I ought to be the Fleet Cyber Command and the TENTH Fleet Commander. That's what I think is the best use. Because, Sir, look at what I have never been. I've never been a resource guy."

(b)(3) NSA

Hmm.

Rogers:

OPNAV N2/N6 fundamental mission is to align that policy and that strategic vision with the resource investments that we're making. You got to...It's all about programatics and money for them. Sir, that is not my world. And quite frankly, I love the fact that I have been operational almost my entire career. It's what I really enjoy doing." And then, Admiral...So then General Alexander contacts me and says, "What are they talking about for you?" I said, "Hey, Sir, you know, on the positive side, I think they're going to make me a three-star. I'm very grateful. I'm very fortunate. I think Admiral Roughead is talking about going to be N2/N6." And he says, "Let me get back to you." He calls Admiral Roughead and says, "If you want..." This is...Again, this is 2011 now. "If you want Rogers to potentially be my relief, then he needs to be an

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operational commander, not a staff guy. You need to put him in Fleet Cyber Command." And Roughead says, "Okay."

(b)(3) NSA

Yeah.

Rogers:

And so, they make the change. And then the decision is made to send me here. And now it's two and a half years later. So I don't say any of that to name drop. I say that to tell people that... 'Cause one of the reasons... one of the things I get asked is: "Given all the challenges that NSA in particular but as well as U.S. Cyber Command is dealing with right now, why in the heck would you ever want to go to that job?" I tell people because this... it's payback time for me. I literally, for the last eight years, have had seniors telling me, "We're going to try to optimize you to go in behind General Alexander." They gave me a set of experiences that were designed to do that. They gave me an opportunity that most people... In my particular specialty in the Navy, we had never had a three-star before I became a three-star. We had never had an operational commander before I became the Commander of Fleet Cyber Command and TENTH Fleet. ((He chuckles.)) We had never had an information warfare officer or cryptologist—information warfare being my designator title—who had ever been DIRNSA or ever been a four-star.

And so, I'm very mindful that a lot of people went out on a limb to try to give me an opportunity. And what kind of officer or leader would I be if I turned my back on that and just said, "Hey, look. It's been great. I'm going to go out and make a lot of money now on the outside." I just... I can't do it. I'm not wired that way. Now it's payback time.

(b)(3) NSA

Do you think one of the situations or one of the characteristics that you have that maybe was a catalyst for a lot of this is strong people skills?

Rogers:

Yeah, I... Probably, I guess. 'Cause there are certainly plenty of people... I mean, I always kid General Alexander: "Hey, Sir, you could be the Chief Engineer of this organization. Rogers can't be the Chief Engineer of NSA or U.S. Cyber Command. General Alexander is getting ready to leave his current duties with his name on six patents during his tenure as the Director. Sir, you're never going to find Roger's name on a single patent." ((He laughs.)) It's not that I can't do it and it's not that I'm not comfortable with it. But it's not my vision of what my strengths are.

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And if people ask me, "Why are you going to this job?" I'd say probably three things. Number one: because of my background and the set of experiences I was given. Secondly: because not only did those experiences pertain directly to the mission of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, but I was also given the opportunity to think much more broadly. And got involved in a lot of stuff that quite frankly you would not normally find somebody with my background doing. Again, I was very fortunate. The third thing is: because I do think that I work well with people and I've always been able to build strong teams.

And then finally: in some ways, the one that means the most to me...When I got hired by General Pace and I got this opportunity to travel with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff...I mean, I'm sitting (B% in him) with Karzai...with, you know, heads of state, talking about some pretty dicey issues. I'm just there as the note taker. ((He chuckles.)) But he took me everywhere he went. And I said to him one day, "Sir, you could have had anybody do this. If you follow history, I'm going to be, if I'm lucky and I'm lucky enough to make flag officer, Sir, I'm going to be a two-star and then I'm going home. You got guys who could be potential Chairmen in the future. You've got guys (B% that'd) be combatant commanders in the future on this staff that you could have picked. You could have taken anybody in DoD as the Chairman. Why would you pick a guy like me?"

And he said to me, "Because you will find, Mike, when you get more senior, as you get more senior, that which you value the most is people around you who are willing to speak the truth to you. You will find this increasingly rare the more senior you get. Mike, I hired you because I believe that you will speak to the truth to me."

(b)(3) NSA

Hmm.

Rogers: "And because, Mike, you know that if you don't, you won't be working for me." I have never, ever forgotten that. And so, one of the things that I pride myself on is I have always been honest and direct with my bosses, with my subordinates, with my teammates. I always try to talk to them in a forthright manner. I want them to do the same thing for me. I've never hidden bad news. I'm a big fan of: "Hey, you deal with challenges head on." That... So that would be the fourth thing, right, (B% say), "Hey, I think that's one of the reasons why they decided to go with Rogers." And I think

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you see that in the, you know, the challenges of (b)(1) USSC that we just went through, where I decided: "Hey, look. We're going to use this as a vehicle to drive change across the entire god damn department. I am *not* going to play whack-a-mole with we'll just fix it and make it go away." No way!

(b)(3) NSA

Let me ask a follow-up on this, if I may (b)(3) NSA Yes, on... Sir, I... General Davis, Deputy Commander of Cyber Command, asked me to do a narrative. It was his word: do a narrative on what happened in (b)(1) USSC He hit me with this late September, right after we did that (B% hot wire) (2-3B)...

Rogers: Right.

(b)(3) NSA

Over in the Director's large conference room. And so, I came up with that. And so I spent a lot of time, Sir, digging through this. And this could have played out differently...

Rogers: (1-2B)...

(b)(3) NSA

That whole thing could have played out... It could have gone this way; it could have gone that way. It could have been a whole lot worse than it did. How do you think that experience shaped you and shaped Fleet Cyber as well—and preparing *both*... and the Navy for the future?

Rogers: So specific to that set of experiences: in July of 2013, through NSA reporting, Fleet Cyber Command... Let's see. Personally—Mike Rogers—'cause I remember this. (B% And it was)... The first reporting was on, I think, Saturday the 22nd of July 2013. I'm in the office. I always work on Sundays 'cause nobody's around. I can get stuff done.

So I'm in the office on Sunday, and I see (B% this first) report. And I'm going: "Okay, guys. We got a game changer here." And what this reporting initially suggested was, hey, (b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: That led to a series of steps. First, it took us a while to identify exactly how bad the compromise was. What was the extent of their presence on the network. We took a couple of initial steps within about 10 days.

Those were based on an assessment that (b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC It turns out that they had

actually been able to move into a different section. And we made one mistake. We (1-2B)...

(b)(3) NSA

(B% That the password reset...That did it reset...)

Rogers:

(b)(1) USSC

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers:

One digit, one misplaced error, and you're totally off. Based on that, I then decided, "Okay, we have to assume that we've got a fundamental compromise on the unclass(ified) section of the network. And I don't just want to play "clean-up on aisle nine". I want to drive fundamental change. So I said, "We're going to use a very operational approach to doing business. I want a named operation. I want this operation to have phases with an (B% objective OR objected) time to each phase, with a set of steps designed to generate these outcomes. I want those outcomes expressed in operational terms that non-network, non-SIGINT, non-cyber people can understand. And I want to use this to not only reassess *that* segment of the network, but I wanted to look at the entire unclass(ified) infrastructure as well as the SECRET level networks."

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers:

So we then implemented what we called (b)(1) USSC which

(b)(1) USSC

(b)(3) NSA

Of August, yeah.

Rogers:

Of 2013. At the time, I predicted it would take 90 to 120 days to complete the evolution. (b)(1) USSC I went back to the department as well as General Alexander and my Service, and said, "I believe that we have (b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC

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And then the final part of the operation...Again, I was thinking longer term change. I wanted to get into what could we do on the classified systems, even though we had (b)(1) USSC (b)(1) USSC But I still wanted to do some things there. We completed (b)(1) USSC (b)(1) USSC. I ended it. If you ask me in my current two and a half years what am I proudest of? I would tell you that.

(b)(3) NSA

Hmm.

Rogers:

I believe that's another reason why I'm going to this next job—because while we could have used it as: "Oh, my God! The sky is falling," I told my team: "This is the Apollo 13 for us. What does that mean? You can either make it your worse day or it's going to be the best damned thing that we've ever been proud of. And, by God, we're making it the best damned we've ever done." ((Chuckling heard.)) We came out of that operation with a network in better shape than we had ever had with a fundamental level of knowledge that increased to a level we had never seen with a sense of buy-in from the operational commanders across my Service; with a buy-in across the department. I mean, I got..."Hey look, we're going to use this as the basis for changes we want to make to JIE; to how we're going to build the structure." I partnered with many other people—it wasn't just us: U.S. Cyber Command; (b)(1) USSC (b)(1) USSC my fellow Services, (B% say), "Look, I want to drive change across the whole department. So what do we got to do differently? Hey, U.S. Cyber Command, what does it really mean to be a subunified operational commander in this environment? (b)(1) USSC (b)(1) USSC And how do you make sure that the benefit of that gets out to operational commanders? (b)(1) USSC (b)(1) USSC

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers:

I got my intel teammates. We love to monitor. We want it to flow. The operational side of me is going, "Damn it. I want to stop it at the Tier 1 boundary. I don't want to have to deal with it at the Tier 3 and Tier 2 boundaries that I'm responsible for."

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers:

So I thought...And in the course of this, I had to go to the White House multiple times. I had to brief six different committees on the Hill multiple

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times. ((Chuckling heard.)) (I'm dealing with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman (1G) U.S. Cyber Command and NSA teammates, the OSD/CIO, my own Service CIO, my Service Secretary. I never met Secretary Mavis before. I got to meet him because of this. You know, I've always worked closely with the CNO 'cause he's my other boss aside from General Alexander.

But I thought it came across to the department in many ways—not... Don't take for one minute that I thought it was perfect. But it came across I thought to others as: "Hey, look. This is how you got to deal with things in the cyber network of the 21st century."

(b)(3) NSA

(B% Right.)

Rogers:

(B% That) "Hey, look. This is going to become much more..." This was one of the points I was trying to make: "Hey, guys, welcome to the new future. This is the norm. This is how we fight. Okay? This is how we maneuver. This is what you got to do." So there is no doubt—that experience is really...really shapes what I will bring to the table good and bad with U.S Cyber Command and NSA about: "Hey, here's [sic] some things I want to try to do a little differently."

(b)(3) NSA

Did you think it changed views (b)(1) USSC and, as you said, the new normal down in the senior levels of the Pentagon, even the White House?

Rogers:

I thought it did because, to them, it made it very real. I mean, example, As this is going on... So we first see this at the end of July. Our first steps in August don't work as I had hoped. (b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC

But I still remember... I'm over at the White House with Lisa Monaco, who's the Presidential Assistant for Homeland Security now—((John)) Brennan's old job.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers:

And it's the first... It's the end of August. Broader context: The President has come out and said: "Hey, look, we got a situation (b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC

I'm there telling him: (b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC

And our assessment— both us and U.S. Cyber Command... The assessment was: (b)(1) USSC

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(b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC And I'm at the White House telling them. "So you mean, Admiral, (b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC

"Yes, ma'am, that's what you need to tell the President." ((Laughter heard.))

(b)(3) NSA

Do you think that was a factor in...? Sir, do you think that was a factor in (b)(1) USSC?

Rogers: No, I don't think so because my comment to her was, "But the flip side is let's remember what we're talking about. We're talking about our CONUS unclassified segment."

(b)(3) NSA

Yeah.

Rogers: "I'm telling you, as a service, I can fight. If I have to, I can lose this and keep fighting. It's going to be painful, but I can do it."

(b)(3) NSA

Right, right.

Rogers: So I don't think it led them to (B% believe). But it certainly made them stop and think for a minute, "Ah, ooh."

(b)(3) NSA

Absolutely, mm hmm, yeah. Yeah, and they don't have your level of proficiency on these matters.

Rogers: (B% Something like, "Eeee!")

(b)(3) NSA

((He chuckles.)) (B% And so...)

Rogers: And we put some additional things... (b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC Because again, if were... that would be the organization on the Navy side that would be (b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: So I put some extra things in place over there to make sure, hey, (b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC

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They never did, but I put some extra things in place to make sure.
((Chuckling heard.)) So...

(b)(3) NSA

Sir, if I may...

Rogers: Sure.

(b)(3) NSA

Take you back to 2011, as you arrived here...Just to ask what your initial impressions were: where the command was and what you saw...where you saw it going (1G)?

Rogers: The command was...In...September 11, we were just under two years old. The command was stood up in January of 2010. So it's still new in the big scheme of things. To be brutally honest, I saw a command that—from my perspective—was overly focused on what had been, and was not focused enough on what should be. What do I mean by that? To create this command, we had blown up a couple other, so to speak...We had stood down and literally picked apart a couple of other organizations. Shifted their resources around and created this. So much of this workforce had been working in different organizations—doing much the same thing, but working in different organizations. Some of them had been down in (b)(1) USSC vice up here—(b)(1) USSC. And I saw a workforce that I thought was just way focused on: “Oh, my God. We’ve made all these changes. It’s terrible.” And I’m thinking: “Hey, we’re way passed that decision point. What are we doing to optimize mission outcomes here, guys? This is all about delivering effects and meeting our mission.” That’s what I care about, number one.

Number two, I thought I was joining an organization that had great...that had strong technical expertise, but didn’t have an operational mindset. What do I mean by that? I kept telling them: “You haven’t really thought through what it means to be a warfighter in the network age in the 21st century.” What are the implications for how we’re going to organize? What are the implications for what we value? How do we prioritize? How do we structure ourselves? Where should we be investing finite resources: people, money, expertise? We’ve got to create a warfighting organization here.

And we can’t be a “self-licking ice cream cone”. It’s not enough that we think we’re doing a good job. ((Chuckling heard.)) The measure of

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success to me ain't us. I could care less what we think. What I care about is [sic] the traditional, kinetic-based, operational commanders that we support, and who at times support us. *That's* who I care about. General Alexander is our U.S. Cyber Command and NSA boss. *That's* the metric I care about. What do *they* assess our proficiency? How do *they* assess what we're doing? Are we ever able to generate value? Are we able to get the mission outcomes? I don't care what we think.

Again, it was a very different mindset. And I will say it was tough on the organization for (b)(1) USSC ((He chuckles.)) Early on, as we're going through this, I sat down with the Chief of Staff, and said: "Okay, I normally pride myself on being a very collegial, very team-oriented, very personable individual. We're (b)(1) USSC right now, and it ain't time to be Mr. Nice Guy. ((Chuckling heard.)) I need to kick some ass now, and I'm going to be a very different leader than they have seen. Some will respond well to this. Some won't. But I need to get their heads on straight." And so, I changed my approach was..I choose...I chose to take some of public forms as vehicles to drive change; to say, "This is unacceptable," to ensure that everyone understood I was going to hold subordinate commanders accountable to a higher level of performance, a higher level of knowledge than they were used to. For some, that was a little unsettling. But I said: "Hey, look,..."

This...It remind...I love...Again, I love history. If you go back to the Second World War in the Pacific, post-Pearl Harbor environment. First campaign really for the United States Navy is in the southern Pacific Solomon Islands. You go back and you look at that campaign—in some ways, much of like we're doing here. Radar is integrated afloat and used on platforms and tactical combat situations really for the first time for us as a Service. You get people who don't understand how to...who know technology, but don't understand how to apply a technology. You get people who aren't...You're in a world war. You're in a combat scenario. What worked for us in the peace time Navy, ain't going to work out here.

So you look at like Admiral (B% Goreley) [sic] was Commander Southwest Pacific Operation (2-3G). ((TR NOTE: Admiral Rogers is probably referring to Admiral Robert Ghormley.)) He got relieved by Nimitz. And they put a guy named Halsey in because Nimitz felt not that Goreley's ((Ghormley's)) not a good guy, "but we got to drive change here. And I can't afford to spend a year getting people up to speed, you know? I need to drive change." So he put a guy in like Halsey, who was known as a nail-biting: "Hey, it's about us versus the other guy. And that other freaking guy's going to lose, not us. What don't you understand?" So, that was a big cultural change for us, but I thought it worked out in the end.

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(b)(3) NSA ((He chuckles.)) Mm hmm, hmm.

(b)(3) NSA We have seven minutes left, Sir. And I have a couple more questions...

Rogers: (B% Okay)...

(b)(3) NSA (B% Digging a little deeper)...

Rogers: And if you guys need to do more, I can...I'll go get something else.

(b)(3) NSA (2-3G)...

Rogers: 'Cause I probably talked longer than you wanted. So (B% I'll) (1-2B)...

(b)(3) NSA?: (B% Okay)...

(b)(3) NSA This is great, Sir.

(b)(3) NSA (B% Yeah), this is good. (B% We're good), (1-2B)...

(b)(3) NSA: Yeah, this is really good. And I should also note for the record that (b)(3) NSA wanted to be here. He's done this in the past, but was not available.

Rogers: (3-4B).

(b)(3) NSA Sir, so a little bit deeper into the mission set. Has the Central Operational Authority for the Navy for networks and cyber and IO and across the mission sets: how have you shaped that—which, as you noted when you arrived, you know, there was this organization. It was still fairly new. To take it across the mission sets into the future.

Rogers: (2-3B). So what the question really goes to is: my predecessor had worked out a series of Memorandum [sic] of Agreements [sic], written Memorandums [sic] of Agreements [sic], where this organization was designated as the Central Operating Authority for five or six different lines of operation—which you just heard in the question. Big cultural change for us as a Service.

I'd been in command two weeks. And we had a frigate out in the Atlantic, and which I'm watching on the network side...I'm watching this ship go out to a lot of IP addresses that they shouldn't have been going out to.

One...At least (b)(1) USSC [redacted] And I'm going, "What in the hell is going on?" And so, I said, "Okay, we got a Memorandum of Agreement that says as the Network Operating Authority for the United States Navy, (b)(1) USSC [redacted]

(b)(1) USSC [redacted]

(b)(1) USSC [redacted] So I did that in this case. I ordered an underway unit: "Hey, disconnect them."

(b)(3) NSA [redacted]

Was this (B% the) *Sullivan*, Sir? (XB)...

Rogers:

No, this was...What was the frigate? God dang it. Out of (B% Maine Port). I apologize. I should remember this, but I'm...

(b)(3) NSA [redacted]

I'll find it.

Rogers:

I'm blanking out of the frigate's name.

(b)(3) NSA [redacted]

Yeah, yeah. I'll find it.

Rogers:

I called down to ((U.S.)) Fleets [sic ((Fleet)) Forces Command—the four-star in the Navy that owns that ship, and said: "Hey, this is what I'm going to do." And they said: "Okay." The commander was not there. I talked to the deputy. Said: "This is what I'm doing." So we do it. The four-star commander comes back ((he chuckles)), and calls me the next day: "Hey, I'm not so keen about you deciding whether my ship should be taken on or off the GIG." And I said, "Well, Sir, you've...I got an MOA with your signature on there that says that's our operational concept, and that's what we need to do, Sir. Here's why." "Well, Mike, I'd like you to look at changing that". And I thought to myself, well, this is one of those opportunities you either going to be in command for a relatively short period of time ((chuckling heard))...I'd literally been in command two weeks. And I said, "Well, Sir, I respectfully don't agree. I believe that what we need to do is continue with the Memorandum of Agreement. I think this is a text book case of why you need that kind of unilateral authority. And it's my intent to continue this." And I'm waiting. There's a pause. He's clearly unhappy. "Okay, I'll think about it," and he never called me. He then, like two days later, said okay. He sends me a note that says "Okay."

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NSA [redacted]

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(b)(3) NSA

Has he since retired?

Rogers: Yeah, Admiral ((John)) Harvey, who was a...Again, it wasn't because Admiral Harvey was a bad guy.

(b)(3) NSA

(B% Right), but...

Rogers: But it's just an example of, "So what does it really...?" It's one thing to say all this stuff, but what does it really mean? I was a big fan. We're going to show people what it really means (2G). ((Chuckling heard.)) Now, having said that, I think we've done a really good job in the cyber and the network world; where we have *not* done the job that I wish we had—and one of the things I'll talk to my relief about is—In the electronic warfare area and the space mission sets for the Navy. We still have not driven that same level of change across the Navy. And I'm going to suggest to her, "That's an area you need to focus on." For a variety of reasons—probably 'cause the network had...was the biggest challenge at the time—I opted to focus much of my time on the network piece.

(b)(3) NSA

Hmm, (1G).

Rogers: (B% But)...

(b)(3) NSA

For the record, Sir, your relief is Admiral Tighe?

Rogers: Admiral Jan Tighe, right.

(b)(3) NSA

(B% Right.)

Rogers: Who has been confirmed by the Senate for duty as Vice Admiral and Commander, Fleet Cyber Command and Commander, TENTH Fleet. And now she's just waiting for this Rogers guy to get the hell out of the way.

(b)(3) NSA

Is she measuring the drapes? Is she...((Chuckling heard.))

Rogers: No, she's much more professional than that. ((More chuckling heard.)) But she's the Deputy now.

(b)(3) NSA

Yes.

Rogers: So she has been here as my Deputy for five months. So she's done great! What else?

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(b)(3) NSA

And I...If I can...

Rogers: Sure, come on!

(b)(3) NSA

Drill a little deeper into the...I've heard you talk before about NCWDG ((pronounced as "nic-widge"—Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group)) as a...the unique research and development arm for this command. And if you could just make a few comments about how that's aided you or your vision in implementing change here.

Rogers: (1-2G). When we created this Fleet Cyber Command and TENTH Fleet construct in the Navy, one of the things I liked about it was we came to the conclusion that to be successful in cyber/the network/the spectrum/EW/space/electronic warfare/information operations/SIGINT: we needed to build a construct that followed very traditional Navy war fighting lines that the rest of the Service could relate to. So we fight in the maritime environment through these things we call fleets and task forces. So we created in this organization a fleet with subordinate task forces. I was very adamant. I want the same structure the rest of the Navy uses. I want people to be able to understand this and relate to it in a way that they're comfortable with.

The one area...So every other numbered fleet in the United States Navy—and there are five others—is defined by its geography. We are unique in that we are defined by our mission set. Our geography is global, and we're defined by our mission set. The other thing that makes us unique is given the dynamic nature, particularly of the cyber and SIGINT mission sets, the decision was made—which I really like—to provide us with an organic R&D capability: a "skunk works", if you will. Again, no other numbered fleet in the Navy has that kind of thing. But for us, the Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group or NCWDG—currently down in (b)(1) USSC also known as (b)(1) USSC for us—was an R&D capability assigned (B% to) OPCON to us, that enables us to harness their engineering expertise and their knowledge of networks and signals that go after particular problem sets—whether it's developing tool capabilities on the cyber side, whether it's doing some...being able to work some signal sets in (b)(1) USSC mission set. That's worked out great for us.

(b)(3) NSA

(1-2G). Are they working (b)(1) USSC Sir?

Rogers: Yeah...

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(b)(3) NSA

(B% Yeah...)

Rogers: Although they're not the lead for (b)(1) USSC being a project that we're going to do in the summer of 2014, in which we, Fleet Cyber Command with...teaming with some others...We are going to, through the UNCLASS network, demonstrate our ability to (b)(1) USSC (b)(1) USSC.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: (b)(1) USSC

(b)(3) NSA

You're going to ruin some poor captain's day.

Rogers: It's alright. Somebody's going be unhappy when we say ((chuckling heard))...But. again. one of the things I always tell the CNO is, "Sir, as much as I love the United States Navy and I've dedicated my entire adult life to it—as have many—we're a bureaucracy. And you want to drive change in a bureaucracy? You got to drive it from the top down. And then, number two, you got to cause pain. Sir, I want to go to (b)(1) USSC because I want to cause pain." ((Chuckling heard.)) Just like we've used cyber inspections as a vehicle to cause pain to drive changes in behavior—which has worked out well for us.

(b)(3) NSA

On that... (b)(3) NSA last question that I leveraged here is fitting for (b)(1) And (b)(3) NSA might have something.

(b)(3) NSA

(B% Go ahead.)

(b)(3) NSA

Along the lines of (b)(1) what do you see the future for Fleet Cyber Command with the developments in IT and networking policy?

Rogers: I think we got a fundamentally sound vision for the future. I think the basic organizational construct, as highlighted (b)(1) USSC is fundamentally sound. But I think we need a (B% new working on)...You know, if I was the next commander, the argument I would make is you got to build on what we've done on the cyber and the network world. You got to overlay the cyber mission force capabilities that we're bringing online, because that's, you know, one of my other big things...(2-3G) during this

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two and a half years was: doing the initial conceptual work, partnering with U.S. Cyber Command and others about so how do you build a cyber mission force? How should it be constructed? What are the skills that you need? How should you organize them? Hey, what should the Navy do versus what should the Army or the Air Force do?

So we've come up with...Collectively between us, we've come up with a plan that tasks the Navy to do, you know, a series of things. There's a

(b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC. I'm not going to spend a lot of time on this one. ((Laughter heard.)) But that's our share. We're going to do this between 13 and 16. The next commander's got to build on that. The next commander's also got to figure out how do you make the JFHQ Cyber a true war fighting organization; and how do you put the J in JFHQ?

And then, I think how do you oper...? The same way we've managed to operationalize the cyber and the network piece in our Service" what do we got to do to drive that same kind of change, particularly in space and EW. And how do we maximize the synergies between the spectrum and the network world. Because they are converging. Handheld digital mobiles being the...at the forefront of this. Where we're using the spectrum to access networks down to the individual user level, literally wherever we are in the world. As a SIGINT officer, I lick my lips at that because I'm going, "Hey, I love going against RF-based challenge sets.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: That's opportunity. But (B% so much of that). Sir, did you have anything?

(b)(3) NSA

I have one last thing I want to ask you.

Rogers: Sure!

(b)(3) NSA

As becoming Director of the National Security Agency, what's your major concern?

Rogers: I have not conscious...Again, 'cause I'm not confirmed yet. I am not...I haven't sat down and put a single pen to paper yet 'cause I told myself, "Hey, I got to hold off until I'm confirmed." But in general, when I did my

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interview with the President in... I guess I did that in January. Yeah, in January of '14. 'Cause I was... You know I interviewed with the Chairman and the Secretary. And when I interviewed with Secretary of Defense Hagel, he said, "Okay, the President has indicated once they make the decision as to whether U.S. Cyber Command and NSA should be together/should be separated... Once they make that decision, the President has decided he wants to interview." And in December the decision was made: they're going to keep the organizations together—which I think was the right thing to do. When I got asked, I said, "Hey, look. Here's why I think that's the right answer." Now, I would argue that's not necessarily the long-term answer.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers:

My view is you want each organization, particularly U.S. Cyber Command, to generate enough capability and enough capacity where they don't have to be, you know, one organization that over time might... One of my goals, I hope, as U.S. Cyber Command, is to generate enough capacity so that, you know, if queried by the Secretary or the President, I can say, "Well, now, you got enough capacity where you could actually make it work if you separated them. I believe that where we are right now, Sir, we don't have enough capacity to separate these still. You've got to keep them together. NSA is so foundational to U.S. Cyber Command." I mean, the reality is NSA can do its mission without U.S. Cyber Command and it'll do fine. (b)(1) USSC

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers:

We need a partnership here. But when I think about the NSA side of the house, I'm struck by several things. Number one: the morale of the workforce. NSA has now experiencing what our CIA teammates have had to live with their entire career. It's very public.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers:

Often viewed in a very critical light by many of the citizens of the nation as well as many other foreign citizens and foreign governments. CIA has gotten used to that environment. And their view is, "Hey, you're a professional. You do what... You comply with all regulation and policy. Keep your head down and you keep working. And you don't worry about that kind of stuff." NSA... The workforce at NSA never had to deal with this before. They've always been somewhat anonymous.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

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Rogers: The mission not well understood by others outside of the profession. The flip side is the organization finds itself in a situation now, where many—I won't say all—but many individuals, to include average citizens, are asking, "What are they doing? Why are they doing it? And boy, I'm uncomfortable." You see that in foreign...many foreign citizens right now. Now, that's not to imply by any stretch (B% of the imagination) that everybody out there thinks that, "Oh, my God, NSA is some rogue organization that's, you know, acting unilaterally and without any care or thought to protect the rights and the privacy of our citizens." But, as my father always used to tell me when I was growing up, "Michael, focus on the way life is vice the way you wish it were. Because if you focus on the way you wish it were, you're going to waste a lot of your time and energy."

((Chuckling heard.)) And I have always been a big fan of, "Hey..." Again, it goes back to that truth to power question. Recognize the way things are. Be forthright and open about it. And deal with it. So I go into this job thinking to myself, "I'm not going to waste my time debating, well, is it fair? Is it true? Is it accurate? Is it right that citizens are questioning NSA?" My attitude is, "I'm not wasting one second of time debating that. I'm dealing with what is." And what is, is for a variety reasons, many of our citizens now question the role of the National Security Agency. So my view is we got to deal with that.

My first challenge is the workforce, I believe, because my concern is...So a workforce that's not used to this; a workforce that in many instances is composed of individuals who: highly technically proficient, incredibly gifted in what they do. But in terms of ability to express it to people who don't necessarily deal with this all the time...The ability to interface with people who don't have a clue about what we do: it's...that's a challenge for many people. It's a challenge for intelligence professionals. As I said in my confirmation hearing, "Look, I've spent...You know, I've been a cryptologist for 27 years now. And I spent my entire life in an SCI environment thinking, 'Okay, don't compromise this. Don't talk about that.' Hey, that ain't going to cut it as the Director in the 21st century, I don't believe."

The second challenge that concerns me is our relationships with industry and civilian and commercial partners. In the cyber and SIGINT world of today and tomorrow, you...we cannot operate in isolation, thinking NSA or U.S. Cyber Command's going to solve all the problems by itself. That is *never* going to happen. We have *got* to partner with others. And one of the implications of the Snowden revelations to me is now you got a lot of companies that are starting to say, "Yeah, I just can't take public knowledge of my connection with you." Even organizations that we have been working with for some measures of years, you now have their CEOs

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very publicly speaking about, "Hey, we can't do this. You're compromising our business position." I'm not going to get in a public discussion about, well, fill in the blank. You know what we've been doing together for the last few years—which I thought was to the benefit of both of us.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: I'm not going to get into a public outing. But if that expertise says, "I just can't work with you guys anymore," that has negative implications for the nation. It has negative implications for NSA's ability to do its mission. We have got to try to reverse that.

The third concern I have is I don't want to lose our foreign partners in all this. Some of been more vocal than others. But, again, we have got to make sure that on the NSA side, as on U.S. Cyber Command, we have strong partnerships with our foreign counterparts. Now, some of those partnerships, like in the FIVE EYES arena, are at one level versus pick another nation: (b)(1) USSC, where we have a very different relation...Not a bad relationship, but it ain't at the FIVE EYES level.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: I'm not arguing that that model should be "everybody should be in the FIVE EYES club." I reject that premise. But on the other hand, we have got to be able to have partnerships with a broad range of foreign entities out there. And the Snowden revelation, at the political level, has got some of our foreign intelligence counterparts—(b)(1) USSC going, "Well, I don't have a problem with you guys. But my government's really a little dicey right now about what the hell it is that you guys do. And so we've been told we got to back off a little bit."

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: (b)(1) USSC
(b)(1) USSC And so, I spent some time, even though I'm not confirmed yet...But I went down and talked to them anyways as...in my current duties. And in the course of the discussions, I'm listening to them. (b)(1) USSC
(b)(1) USSC

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(b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC

And then, finally, we have got to make sure that we don't lose the political support of the Administration and the oversight mechanisms on the Hill. Because if we lose those guys, now we're fighting with both hands tied behind our back. (2-3G) we got a nation that doesn't believe in us. Again, I'm not trying to argue that everybody. But the reality is there's a large segment of our population that just—based on what they've heard—has come to the conclusion that they are nervous about what the National Security Agency is doing. If you combine that with we lose the Administration or we lose the Hill...

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: (B% Then), man, we got real problems. Now we're really in a situation where potentially our ability to execute our mission starts to be significantly degraded.

(b)(3) NSA

Yes.

Rogers: That's a bad thing for the nation, I would argue most importantly. But it's also a bad thing for NSA.

(b)(3) NSA

Yeah.

Rogers: Anything else for me?

(b)(3) NSA

No, that's great, Sir.

Rogers: Oh! And then, lastly on the NSA side...In the midst of all that, we got to be asking ourselves, "So what investments, what changes do we make now? So that the guy...the men and women who are doing this mission set five, ten years from now: they're positioned for success. One of the things I love about what General Alexander did...You go back to when he first assumed the duties back in 2005 as the Director of NSA, he stepped back. And came to the conclusion that the fundamental vision that he inherited was not the right one. He came to the conclusion: we got to change what we're focused on. We've got to make some fundamental investments in things like...And these aren't in any priority order. We got to change what we're doing in terms of computing and analysis. We got to change what we're doing in terms of our ability to access and push information across this enterprise. And the ability to make information

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available from the SIGINT enterprise to non-SIGINT people—whether they be forward commanders in the battlefield. (b)(1) USSC

(b)(1) USSC We need to invest in the computing and analytic and mathematical foundations that are going to help us out as we're dealing with the cryptographic and encryption challenges that are going to be coming down the pike. Not now, but five, ten years from now, they're going to be here for us.

He really... We've got to do infrastructure. In his time in the job, we have totally rebuilt the power infrastructure here at Fort Meade.

(b)(3) NSA

Mm hmm.

Rogers: We have fundamentally rebuilt the infrastructure (B% to) every one of the major sites outside of the Fort Meade campus. We have fundamentally built a data network and a storage and defensive strategy that enables us to operate like a global enterprise and to access rapidly amounts of data, volume-wise, that were unimaginable, you know, five years ago.

And that all happened because of a director and a broader team that I think consciously sat down and said, "Okay, what do we got to be doing now that's going to pay off for us five, ten years from now?" I don't think General Alexander realized five, ten years from then, he was... would still be the Director. ((Laughter heard.)) So I need to be thinking about what are the things need to do now that are going to pay off five, ten years.

And then, the last thing that I'm interested in is: what do we need to do today, right now, that prepares us for the challenges in the next 12 to 24 months? And I believe those challenges include... We will see disruptive offensive actions taken against infrastructure in the United States in the next 18... the next 12 to 24 months. It's going to happen.

(b)(3) NSA

(B% Okay.)

Rogers: So are we ready—whether you're U.S. Cyber Command, whether you're NSA? The future to me is much more about integration, then creating cylinders of excellence. I see tons of cylinders of excellence at NSA, and I'm very grateful for that. But to really get it to the next level, to me it's about integration. So those are the kinds of things that I'm thinking about, as I get ready now.

(b)(3) NSA

Just a couple...

Rogers: Yeah...

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(b)(3) NSA

Or three things he's going to be worried about...

(b)(3) NSA

A couple, ah huh.

(b)(3) NSA

For the next couple of years. ((Laughter heard.))

Rogers:

And remember, in...that's...in the end, it's all about the workforce. Our advantage is the workforce.

(b)(3) NSA

Yeah.

Rogers:

It ain't the network. It's not the analytics. It's not the tools. Not that those aren't important! But our edge is our people. And that goes back to my very first concern: I don't want to lose the workforce, (B% you know OR no).

(b)(3) NSA

Well, Admiral...

Rogers:

Okay!

(b)(3) NSA

Thank you very much.

(b)(3) NSA

(B% Yeah.)

(b)(3) NSA

Appreciate it.

Rogers:

Oh, (4-5B).

(b)(3) NSA

Thank you very much, Sir.

(b)(3) NSA

Yeah, thank you.

Rogers:

Did you guys get what you were looking for? ((TR NOTE: Audio ends at this point.))

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