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The Arab-Israeli Problem

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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA.

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The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM

THE PROBLEM

To estimate present attitudes and future trends in the Arab-Israeli problem over the next few years.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Israel will probably retain its overall military superiority vis-a-vis the Arab states for the next several years. As long as the present balance of forces remains substantially unchanged, we believe that neither side is likely to initiate major hostilities. However, the possibility will remain that incidents growing out of such main points of friction as the Israeli-Syrian border and Israel's diversion of Jordan waters could escalate into serious fighting. (*Paras. 17-19, 21-23*)

B. In general, Israel will probably continue to pursue a hard policy demanding that any settlement be on the basis of essential maintenance of the *status quo*. Any easing of tensions in the Arab-Israeli quarrel rests primarily on the passing of time, developments in inter-Arab relations, and perhaps to some extent on the influence of the great powers. We believe that there is some chance that sufficient probing and pushing of the principals may in the next few years produce the beginnings of a refugee settlement. (*Paras. 10, 34-36, 38*)

C. The Israelis consider they have compelling reasons for developing a nuclear capability, which would vastly improve their military posture against the Arabs. While we do not have positive evidence that the Israelis are engaged in nuclear weapons production, their nuclear energy program could, if sufficient fuel elements and separation facilities are available, achieve a limited

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nuclear weapons capability, based on aircraft delivery, in about 1967-1968. Indeed, we believe that the Israelis, unless deterred by outside pressure, will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years. No Arab state will be able to develop a nuclear weapon capability for many years to come. (Paras. 24-29)

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DISCUSSION

I. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

In the Middle East

1. The Arab-Israeli problem has plagued the Middle East and the great powers for fifteen years now. The fundamental attitudes of both Arabs and Israelis are still bitterly antagonistic and mutually incompatible. The Israelis believe that the Jewish people have a moral and historic right to the land from which the Jews were dispersed some eighteen hundred years ago and that Israel has enforced this claim by arms and by building up a modern state in what was an impoverished land. They insist that the Arabs must recognize their right to an independent existence and feel that the return of any large numbers of Arabs would jeopardize it. The Arabs deny the right of Israel to exist and see the Israelis as Western-backed intruders who, by trickery and force, have conquered territory held by Arab-speaking peoples for many centuries and have driven a million Arabs into exile. They refuse to negotiate directly with Israel. In Arab eyes, no general settlement is possible unless it gives the refugees the option of returning to "Occupied Palestine."

2. The roles of the various Arab states differ considerably in the Arab-Israeli quarrel. The UAR, Jordan, and Syria bear the principal military burden; they share common borders with Israel and their armies have done most of the past fighting. However, cooperation among the three is seriously hindered by mutual antagonisms. Iraq and Saudi Arabia, while their hatred of the Jewish state is active and implacable, are also deeply distrustful of Nasser and, in any case, have little opportunity or ability to influence the quarrel directly. Lebanon, in this as in other Arab problems, attempts to follow a policy of non-involvement. The North African states, the Sudan, and the Arabian Peninsula principalities contribute to the propaganda campaign against Israel, for example, Algerian Prime Minister Ben Bella's threat to send 100,000 men to fight Israel, but these groups have relatively little direct interest or involvement in the problem. In general, each of the Arab regimes is concerned to see that its opponents in domestic as well as intra-Arab quarrels gain no political advantage from the Palestine problem.

3. The most important confrontation is that between Israel and the UAR. Each is convinced that the other will seize every opportunity to humiliate it or, if it were possible, even destroy it. Consequently, both have engaged since 1955 in an arms race. While scornful of past Arab military performances, the Israelis fear that some day the Arabs, under

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UAR leadership, will be able to use effectively the formidable weapons they have acquired. The Arabs remember their defeats of 1948-1949 and the Israeli "retaliatory" raids to which they have been subjected over the years. In the UAR especially, there is the fear that something like the Israeli-French-British attack in 1956 could happen again.

The World Stage

4. The role of the great powers is an important aspect of the Arab-Israeli quarrel. Britain and the US have been major sources of political and economic aid for Israel, and the Arabs, particularly Nasser, believe that the US would step in to save Israel if it were invaded. France has been Israel's closest collaborator among the Western governments since 1954, aiding Israel with modern arms and with nuclear technology and giving it close support in the attack on Egypt in 1956. West Germany has been a major source of financial aid to Israel through its restitution and reparation payments although it also has extensive commercial relations with the Arab states.

5. The Soviet Union actively encourages and assists Arab nationalist governments as a means of reducing Western influence and encouraging neutralism in the Near East. It is the chief source of arms for the UAR, Syria, and Iraq, but has refrained from committing itself to backing their use in a war to wipe out Israel. Most of the Arab states also receive economic and in some cases military aid from the West. However, neither the Arabs nor the Israelis have allowed acceptance of this aid to have any significant effect on their attitudes toward each other.

6. The UAR and the Israelis seek support among the uncommitted and underdeveloped countries to bolster their respective positions and to gain support in UN forums. The UAR appeals chiefly to neutralism, Islam, and nationalism, and provides some military and technical help. Israel pursues a vigorous policy of technical aid and education and promotes the theme that small but dynamic countries should help one another. Neither side has been able to score a clear-cut advantage over the other in this competition.

7. The UN has been deeply involved in the Palestine question ever since the vote for partition and the establishment of a Jewish and an Arab state in November 1947. Its truce supervision teams try, with monumental lack of cooperation in most cases, to maintain the *status quo* on the borders. Its Emergency Force along the Egyptian border in Gaza, Sinai, and the Gulf of Aqaba serves the purpose of providing the UAR with a plausible excuse for not taking aggressive actions. The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has carried the main burden of aid for the Arab refugees.

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II. POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS

Israel

8. Since independence, Israel has followed a hard line of claiming everything possible under the Armistice Agreements and the various UN resolutions, of selective retaliation with force against border incidents, and of pressing every opportunity to force the Arabs to recognize Israel and come to terms with it. For a number of years, Egypt has loomed as the principal enemy. Since the rise of Nasser and the arming of Egypt with Soviet weapons, Israel has seen a potential union of Arab states, under Nasser's leadership, as the main threat to be confronted. As a consequence, Israel has urged the Western powers to back Nasser's conservative Arab rivals, and has favored anti-Nasserist forces elsewhere.

9. The Israelis have learned to live, at least for the time being, within the limitations imposed by their physical boundaries. Israel's present population pressure is not such as to compel it to seek more land. New settlements in the Negev and growing industry appear adequate to absorb the growing population, which is augmented by a continuing inflow of immigrants. Despite a heavy influx from North Africa and Rumania in the last two years, immigration has been relatively moderate since 1952. There are now only two major concentrations of Jews outside Israel, in the USSR and in the US. The former has permitted no migration, nor do we believe it is likely to, and the Jews in the latter generally have shown no desire to migrate.

10. The government will continue to give top priority to a policy of preserving the state's integrity by maintaining sufficient force to deter any would-be attacker. The Israelis will continue to try to extend their control over the demilitarized zones,¹ which they regard as Israeli territory. However, we do not believe that in present circumstances they contemplate taking any initiative to acquire additional territory, e.g. the West Bank or the Gaza strip. While there are elements, such as the right-wing Herut Party and even some younger members of the Mapai Party, who would like to expand the state, they are not likely to have dominant influence in the foreseeable future. Should Ben Gurion pass from the scene, his place would probably be taken by a collective leadership drawn from the old-line Mapai establishment, a group which would continue the present attitude toward the Arabs.

¹ The Demilitarized or Neutral Zones (DZ) along the Israeli borders were established by the Armistice Agreements of 1949. Contrary to the provisions of the agreements, Israel claims sovereignty over all the zones and has gradually expanded its area of control and cultivation. The zone along the Syrian border has been the most troublesome.

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11. There may well be a strengthening of Israel's recurrent tendency to try to convince the West, and the US in particular, that Nasser and the Soviets are as one in the Middle East. As a support against the threat of Nasser-led Arab unity, Israel will probably endeavor to achieve the closest possible relationship with the US and to maintain a special relationship with France. The Ben Gurion government sees substantial long-term benefits in a relationship which would place it at the side of the US in the latter's worldwide confrontation with the Communist bloc in return for US reliance on Israel as a principal ally in the Middle East. On the other hand, mindful of the more than two million Jews in the Soviet Union, Israel will remain careful not to affront Moscow directly.

The Arabs

12. The antagonism to Israel remains so strong in the Arab world that no one who values his political life can openly suggest that the Arabs ought to come to terms with Israel. As a result of this attitude, Arab leaders continue to belabor each other with charges of being "soft on Israel." The Arabs direct virulent propaganda against Israel, and the UAR and Iraq have each organized small numbers of Palestinians into so-called "liberation forces." Syria is the most violent of Israel's Arab neighbors, and its truculent army, on the heights commanding the northern Jordan Valley, has been quick to shoot when there have been real or fancied Israeli violations of the Armistice lines.

13. One thing which bothers the Arabs generally is the Israeli policy of "ingathering of the exiles." Although we do not believe that, in fact, immigration will be so large as to pose a serious population problem for Israel, the Arabs fear that massive immigration will force Israel to conquer more land. The Israelis are aware of Arab fears on this score and have deliberately played down the currently sizable immigration from North Africa in order not to jeopardize the flow of immigrants.

14. Over the years the Arabs have recognized that Israel is not going to vanish just for the wishing and have given some thought to ways and means of adapting to this reality. It is within this framework that the various Arab states concerned agreed to the technical provisions of the 1955 Johnston Plan for division of the Jordan Valley waters, although none, for political reasons, could publicly and officially accept it, for this would have meant recognizing the existence of Israel. The long-standing Arab boycott of foreign firms doing business with Israel has been relaxed on occasion by one Arab state or another when such relaxation has benefited that state. Nasser has stated publicly that the battle against Arab reaction must be won before the Arabs can take on Israel. The UN Emergency Force patrolling between Israel and Egypt has con-

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tributed to six years of quiet there and the Egyptians, at least, would be loath to see it go. The Israelis and Jordanians have taken care to keep the Jordanian West Bank virtually free of incidents for years. The same is true of the Lebanese-Israeli border.

III. POINTS OF FRICTION

15. Within the general Arab-Israeli confrontation, there are a number of situations and developments which constitute particular impediments to any settlement and some of which could evolve into fighting of a more or less serious nature. One of these is the military balance which is discussed in section IV. Three important situations are: the Refugees, the Syrian Border and Jordan Waters.

The Refugees

16. The million or so Palestine refugees are one of the primary factors in exacerbating Arab-Israeli tensions. The Israelis feel they cannot accept any large number of returnees who, they believe, would constitute a major security problem for the state. They have, however, indicated a willingness to pay some compensation for property the refugees once owned in Israel. The Arabs insist that, as a condition for "not objecting" to a refugee settlement, the refugees must have the option of returning to their former homeland. The refugees themselves, especially those who live in UNRWA-supported camps, are subjected to all sorts of propaganda and it is doubtful if anyone knows what they would do if confronted with a choice of returning to Israel or resettling elsewhere. While not likely to be a direct cause of hostilities, the refugee question will continue for the foreseeable future to aggravate the Arab-Israeli situation.

The Syrian Border

17. The situation on the Israeli-Syrian border is more immediately critical. Here Syrian army bellicosity runs head on into Israeli determination to extend control over the entire demilitarized zone and to have unrestricted use of Lake Tiberias. The Syrians in the past have not resorted to raids across the border and we do not believe they will do so. The pattern of events usually has begun with an exchange of gunfire over a tractor working in an ill-demarcated and questionable area or a fishing boat on Lake Tiberias. If a series of such incidents results in Israeli deaths, the Israeli government has usually responded with a reprisal raid against Syrian positions. It is likely that clashes of this nature will go on from time to time and may involve more troops and more territory. Although Syria is irritating and troublesome, Israel does not consider it as the chief threat—especially since the breakup of the union with Egypt—and we do not believe that full scale hostilities are likely to arise out of these clashes.

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Jordan Waters

18. Israeli-Syrian differences will be aggravated by Israeli diversion of large quantities of the Jordan River waters, scheduled to start in late 1963. The Israeli Government has assured the US that it intends to keep its use of Jordan waters within the limits set by the Johnston Plan of 1955. For their part, the various Arab governments have announced that they would regard diversion of water from the river to areas outside the Jordan valley as a *casus belli*. The three Arab states sharing the Jordan waters—Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan—have also threatened to divert those sources of the Jordan which lie in their territory to prevent Israel from getting "Arab waters," but they have made no provision to date to finance the extensive construction which would be needed to do this job. All things considered, while the riparian states will make a great deal of propaganda and may move to take the question to the UN, we do not believe they will take more than token action to deny the Jordan River's sources to Israel. Jordan will be able to claim, for intra-Arab propaganda purposes, that its irrigation projects east of the River are denying "Arab water" to Israel.

19. However, the approaching deadline on this project will serve to accentuate the already tense situation along the Syrian-Israeli border. Especially if the withdrawal of water causes a demonstrable lowering of the Lake Tiberias water level, the chances that Syria might attempt to put the main pumping station at the Lake out of action by military means will go up. The Israelis will remain alert to this contingency and their military capabilities will tend to inhibit the Syrians. Nonetheless, conditions will be very tense along the border for the coming year or so, with a likelihood of more shooting affrays than usual and Israeli reprisals. While we do not think it likely that other Arab states would give Syria effective aid, it is possible that an incident could escalate to include other Arab forces.

Other Problems

20. There are a number of lesser controversies which will continue to engage the attention of Israel and the Arab governments from time to time, e.g. bickering over the appropriate alignment of a fence in the Jerusalem no-man's land, Israeli salt pan encroachments onto Jordanian territory south of the Dead Sea, Arab smuggling, and spying operations by both Arabs and Israelis. We do not believe that these problems are likely to result in fighting. More dangerous over the long term is the quarrel over the Strait of Tiran. Should the UNEF be withdrawn from the Egyptian side of the Strait, or should a new radical government come into power in Saudi Arabia, either Cairo or Jidda might try to reestablish a blockade of Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba.

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However, in view of the virtual certainty that Israel would act rapidly to reopen the Strait by force, we believe neither the Egyptians nor the Saudis would be likely to attempt such a move.

IV. THE MILITARY BALANCE

21. Individually and collectively the armed forces of the Arab states are inferior in quality to those of Israel, although they are superior in numbers and equipment.² There is no joint command machinery in sufficient state of organization to coordinate effectively Arab military effort in the event of hostilities with Israel. The Israeli ground forces can launch limited attacks simultaneously on all fronts or hold on three fronts while mounting a major offensive on the fourth. The Israeli air force is operationally superior to those of the Arabs but suffers from a shortage of airfields. We believe that overall Israeli military superiority will obtain for the next several years.

22. As long as the balance of forces remains roughly as it is at present, the likelihood of either side starting a major war is very small. We believe the several Arab states recognize that they could not attack Israel and win. We also believe it highly unlikely that there would be any effective cooperation if two or more Arab states happened to get into conflict with Israel. Israel, which in 1956 assured its access to the Red Sea but failed in its principal objective of unseating Nasser, has little to gain by an offensive war against any of its neighbors. In addition, both sides are aware of the likelihood of Western intervention to prevent the continuance or spread of hostilities.

23. During the next few years at least, we believe the most likely occasion of an outbreak of large-scale hostilities would be a major shift in the political structure of the area which brought one or more of Israel's neighbors into Nasser's orbit. In particular, should Jordan undergo a change of regime which brought a nationalist, pro-Nasser government into office, the Israelis would be greatly tempted to seize the West Bank of the Jordan.

New Weapons

24. *Nuclear.* The Arab-Israeli arms race has broadened with attempts by Israel and the UAR to acquire advanced weapons. The Israelis believe they have compelling reasons for taking every possible opportunity to strengthen their military posture vis-a-vis the UAR. Foremost among the steps which the Israelis might take, despite the high costs involved, is the development of a nuclear capability, an achievement which Cairo could not hope to match for a decade or more. Possession of a handful of weapons would vastly improve the military power balance, already favorable to Israel, and would give it an immensely valuable weapon

² See Military Annex A for details.

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of psychological warfare in its day to day confrontation with the Arabs. It would also have the advantage for the Israelis of making the Arabs feel they were in a permanent imbalance.

25. The French-designed reactor at Dimona is now expected to go into operation by 1964, but it is possible that it could become operational by the late fall of 1963.^a If operated at its maximum capacity for the production of weapon-grade plutonium, the reactor could produce sufficient plutonium for one or two weapons a year, starting one year after the reactor goes into operation. However, the availability of this plutonium for weapons production would depend on the construction of adequate separation facilities in addition to a supply of fuel elements. In regard to the latter, Israel has the capacity to produce some uranium concentrate locally and is endeavoring to buy concentrate from abroad without restriction on its use. We have no evidence to confirm or deny the existence of separation facilities, but the plant in Dimona is large enough to include them and Israeli industry is probably capable of constructing them.

26. The lack of space in Israel for conducting tests and the low rate of plutonium production would tend to slow down a weapons program. There are, of course, many technical problems, but Israel has significant technical resources. We do not know the full extent of French collaboration. Further, Israel's ability to acquire intelligence information on what has been done in other countries is considerable. On balance, however, we believe it unlikely that even a very limited nuclear weapons capability, based on aircraft delivery, could be achieved until two or three years (i.e. 1967-68) after weapon-grade plutonium first became available. This period could be shortened if Israel obtained from another country weapon testing facilities or weapons designs which obviated the need for tests.

27. While we do not have any positive evidence that the Israelis are engaged in nuclear weapons production, the size and secrecy of their nuclear energy program suggest that at least they intend to put themselves in a position to be able to produce such weapons relatively quickly after a decision to do so. Indeed, we believe the Israelis, unless deterred by outside pressure, will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years.

28. The Arabs, particularly the UAR, would be greatly alarmed if they believed Israel was about to acquire a nuclear capability. However, they would recognize that no satisfactory course of action was available to them. The UAR would realize that an attempt to destroy the Israeli complex at Dimona, e.g. by air strike, would call forth a vigorous Israeli military counteraction. The UAR would probably seek nuclear weapons from the USSR or any other potential source. It might also

^aSee Annex B for additional detail on the Israeli nuclear energy program.

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seek to establish facilities for developing a nuclear weapons program, but carrying it out would take many years. In these circumstances, the Arabs would be forced to turn to such unpromising devices as calling, in the UN or otherwise, for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, with inspection of Israeli nuclear facilities.

29. No Arab state now has any capability to develop nuclear weapons. While Iraq and the UAR each have a small nuclear research reactor and an associated research program, these are so small as to preclude their having any potential for nuclear weapons development

30. *Missile Programs.* Both Israel and the UAR are engaged in missile programs aimed at developing domestically produced surface-to-surface missiles. In the course of the July 1962 celebrations of the Revolution, the Egyptians fired four missiles and paraded twenty more of two sizes through Cairo's streets. The missile program is heavily dependent on private foreign assistance; German rocket specialists designed the missiles, German technicians supervised their construction, and many essential components were purchased abroad. The UAR is proceeding with development of a missile test range. We estimate that the larger Egyptian rocket could carry a 500 pound payload to a range of about 200 miles, and that the Egyptians might deploy a few by mid-1964.

31. The Israelis have test-fired only one multi-stage sounding rocket to date. They also appear to be working on a shorter range tactical weapon of some 30 n.m. range. Their program has so far been carried out largely with domestic resources. It is likely that the Israelis would choose to carry out a surface-to-surface program in concert with any planned nuclear developments. They are now trying to hire foreign technicians and acquire foreign technology. With such assistance and a major effort, they could probably have a few 200-300 n.m. missiles in three to four years but it would probably take longer to acquire compatible nuclear warheads.

32. For the near future neither of these programs appears likely to have a significant effect on the purely military balance. The number of missiles would be too few and the absence of nuclear warheads would sharply limit their effectiveness. The programs would, of course, be valuable to both sides for propaganda purposes and for psychological warfare.

33. Both Arabs and Israelis have turned to outside sources for other types of missiles. The USSR is in the process of supplying surface-to-air missiles (SA-2) to Iraq (5 battalions) and the UAR (8 battalions) and is training local forces in their use. The US has agreed to make available to Israel the Hawk surface-to-air missile and has offered to consider requests for it from the Arab states. The UAR has recently received from the USSR three Komar class guided missile patrol boats,

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equipped with 10-15 n.m. range cruise missiles. The Soviets have furnished FISHBEDS (MIG-21) equipped with air-to-air missiles to Iraq and the UAR and are training local forces in their use.

V. THE OUTLOOK

34. For this decade at least, an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute is virtually impossible. To be acceptable to Israel, a settlement would have to provide substantial maintenance of the *status quo*; for the Arabs it would have to include provisions for the refugees which would at least have the appearance of a concession to the principle of repatriation. It is highly unlikely that a formula combining these elements could be devised in the foreseeable future. In effect, however disguised, a settlement would be a defeat for the long-standing Arab position of total hostility to the existence of Israel, and the Arabs are not yet ready for this.

35. However, attitudes on both sides of the dispute are slowly beginning to moderate at least to the extent of a tendency to accommodate to the *status quo*. Within Israel there is growing recognition that it is necessary to improve the lot of the Arab minority. In the Arab world, as the older leaders who experienced the violence of the Palestine conflict are replaced by men interested in modernization and other immediate problems of the current world, much of the steam will go out of the drive to recover "Occupied Palestine." Accordingly, in the next several years, there may be some cautious moves toward easing specific irritants and toward creating conditions which would make eventual settlement possible.

36. The UAR, Lebanon, Jordan, and probably Syria are moving toward a recognition that they must eventually accommodate themselves to a solution of the refugee problem. This trend will be strengthened if they become convinced that the West intends to reduce or eliminate aid to the refugees. While the Israelis categorically rejected the Johnson Plan for refugees, the Arabs were less intransigent and showed interest in its possibilities. The Plan itself is unlikely to go forward, but some of the points it has made will probably be the basis for a start on the problem. We believe that there is some chance that sufficient probing and pushing of the principals may in the next few years produce the beginnings of a refugee settlement.

37. Both Israel and the UAR have compelling reasons to maintain large military establishments. However, modern weapons are becoming ever more costly and complex. We do not believe that Nasser and Ben Gurion would agree formally on an arms limitation. Nevertheless, there may be an outside chance, despite their mutual distrust and suspicion, that both could be brought to adopt some form of mutual restraint.

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38. Any easing of tensions in the Arab-Israeli quarrel rests primarily on the passing of time, developments in inter-Arab relations, and perhaps to some extent on the influence of the great powers. The Arabs, in particular, are not likely to take any initiative toward easing relations with Israel, but might respond, say in the case of the refugee problem, to a lead by the West. The US, through its assistance programs in Israel, the UAR and Jordan has only a modest ability to influence those countries. In no case is the Western capability such as to be able to force either side to do something to which it strongly objects. The Soviets cannot be expected to contribute to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli situation. Indeed, they have an interest in maintaining tensions in the area that can be exploited against the West and so produce more opportunities for displacing Western influence.

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ANNEX A

THE MILITARY SITUATION

A. General

Individually and collectively the armed forces of the Arab states are inferior in quality to those of Israel, though superior in total numbers and hardware. (See Charts I, II, III, and IV.) They trail Israel in quality and experience of leadership, in the level of general educational and technical background among the enlisted ranks, in mobilization capability, and in incentive to fight.

There is no joint command and staff machinery in sufficient state of organization to coordinate effectively Arab military effort in the event of hostilities with Israel. Proposals for the creation of a Joint Command put forward at Arab League Defense Council meetings have been unproductive. Persistent local interests and frictions, particularly between Egypt on the one hand and Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria on the other, preclude the likelihood of a workable joint command being established in the near future.

B. Israel

1. *Ground:* The average strength of the Israeli army is estimated at 50,000 but varies widely due to call-ups of reserve units, economic considerations and border tensions. In addition, the 5,000 man quasi-military NAHAL forms the first line of defense on the frontier. Israel remains capable of mobilizing to a strength of 250,000 troops within 48 hours.

The Israeli ground forces can maintain internal security, could defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts, launch limited attacks simultaneously on all fronts, or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth. Against a major power, they could offer effective delaying action.

2. *Air:* The Israel Defense Force Air Force (IDFAF) is an effective and capable air force in spite of limited resources and air facilities. In its combat aircraft inventory, Israel is presently estimated to have 162 French jet fighters—16 Vautours (all-weather), 26 Mirage IIIC's, 36 Super Mysteres, 54 Mysteres, 5 Meteors (all-weather), 25 Ouragans—and 24 Vautour jet light bombers. It is believed that about 80 per cent of these aircraft are combat ready. The Mirage IIIC supersonic fighters are the first of about 40 that have been ordered from France. Israel is estimated to have at least a 90-day level of POL stockpiled for emergency use.

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Israel, when compared to the UAR, continues to be at a disadvantage so far as numbers of aircraft and air facilities are concerned; however, the deficiency in numbers is counter-balanced by the superior quality of the Israeli air staff, pilots, and technicians. It is estimated that the IDFAF could defeat the Egyptian Air Force (EAF), if an effective defense of Israel's air facilities could be maintained.

Despite superiority in pilot and fighter quality, the Israeli air defense system has several major weaknesses. Capability to provide an effective defense against a night or bad-weather attack is poor because of a shortage of all-weather fighters. The radar network is vulnerable to jamming tactics and also has difficulty detecting low-level penetrations. Acquisition of the Hawk missile would improve Israel's air defense capability.

Israeli air defense doctrine also places major emphasis on using offensive air operations to ease defensive problems. Offensive capabilities are good; IDFAF pilots are well-trained to carry out all types of offensive missions, including close support of ground forces. About 700 paratroopers could be dropped in a single operation.

3. *Navy*: The Israel Defense Force Navy (IDF Navy) is a well-trained and efficient fighting force; combat effectiveness is superior to that of any of the Arab states' navies. Ship strength of the IDF Navy is 2 ex-British destroyers (DD), 2 ex-British submarines (SS), 1 ex-British patrol escort (PF), 1 ex-U.S. submarine chaser (large) (PC), and a number of lesser craft. Most ships are based at Haifa although a few are in the Gulf of Aqaba. All ships are normally maintained in active operational status and in a high state of readiness; their material condition is good to excellent.

Personnel strength is approximately 3,700. Ships normally operate with reduced crews, but in event of hostilities, about 5,000 trained reserves are available for mobilization within 48 hours.

C. Arab States

1. United Arab Republic (Egypt)

a. *Ground*: The UAR army, a conscript force numbering approximately 6,000 officers and 94,000 enlisted men, is the largest Arab army. Mobilization to an estimated maximum strength of 190,000 would require six months.

In addition to being re-equipped with Bloc weapons, the army has adopted modified Soviet tactical doctrine and has been partially re-organized along Soviet lines, significantly increasing organic firepower in the infantry formations. Bloc assistance in training and the supply of materiel continues. Training is intensive and has reached division level. Several combined arms exercises have been conducted employing

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large forces of all services, but, in general, combat efficiency remains low primarily because of weak senior leadership. Disaffection of some officers toward the regime and the military involvement in the Yemen have further reduced combat efficiency.

The army is normally deployed in the Cairo area, the Canal Zone, and Sinai. Sinai forces number between 15,000 and 20,000 and are deployed defensively with the heaviest concentrations in the El Arish-Abu Aweigila area and the Gaza Strip.

The UAR army is not capable of sustained offensive ground operations, but it could mount an attack of short duration by one to two divisions with the possibility of achieving limited success. In the event of a full-scale Israeli attack it would lose Sinai, but could probably contain the attack at the Suez Canal.

b. Air: The Egyptian combat aircraft inventory is estimated to contain 211 Soviet-origin jet fighters—45 FISHBEDS (MIG-21), with air-to-air missiles, 38 FARMERS (MIG-19), 98 FRESCOS (MIG-17), 30 FAGOTS (MIG-15)—46 BEAGLE (IL-28) jet light bombers, and 20 BADGER (TU-16) medium bombers. Twenty-eight of the FRESCO aircraft are equipped for all-weather operations. It is believed that about 50-60 per cent of these aircraft are combat ready. Although some Soviet personnel are currently employed in flying and maintaining the BADGERS (TU-16) and FISHBEDS (MIG-21), EAF pilots and aircrews are becoming fairly competent in the operation of these aircraft. Egyptian air facilities, the most extensive in the Middle East excluding Turkey, can easily support the combat aircraft. It is estimated that at least a 120-day supply of POL is stockpiled for emergencies, but only small stocks are immediately available to tactical units.

Despite improvements in the combat capability of the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) since the 1956 Suez campaign, the air defense system is not capable of coping with a determined large-scale assault because of the minimum scramble time available, the lack of a defense against radar jamming, and the inferior quality of EAF personnel as compared with the Israelis. The Soviets are in the process of supplying eight surface-to-air (SA-2) missile battalions to the UAR.

Offensive capabilities against fixed targets such as airfields, military and industrial installations, and transportation facilities are fairly good. The addition of more BADGER jet medium bombers in 1962 has increased the offensive striking power considerably. With its present offensive resources, the EAF has the capability to carry out a damaging surprise attack against Israel provided the EAF staff could plan and initiate such a move without Israeli detection.

About 1,800-2,000 troops could be airdropped in a single operation, if adequate fighter cover could be provided.

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c. *Navy*: The only significant Arab naval force is that of the United Arab Republic (Egypt). It consists of 6 destroyers (DD), of which 4 are ex-Soviet and 2 are ex-British; 10 ex-Soviet submarines (SS); 3 Komar class guided missile boats; 6 ex-British patrol escorts (FP); 18 to 27 ex-Soviet motor torpedo boats (PT); several minesweepers and lesser craft. Personnel strength of the Egyptian Navy is approximately 7,500; there is virtually no reserve of trained personnel for recall in event of mobilization.

In event of an attack by the Israeli navy—or any other well-trained naval force of comparable size—the Egyptians could offer only token resistance or some type of delaying action until outside assistance was received. The Egyptian navy poses no very serious threat to Israel and does not, at the present time, have the capability of initiating and sustaining a successful blockade of the coast of Israel or the approaches to the Gulf of Aqaba. It is capable of conducting fairly effective shore bombardment, but the Egyptian destroyers lack adequate antiaircraft self-defense armament and the submarines are capable of only harassing operations.

2. Syria

a. *Ground*: The Syrian army numbers approximately 4,000 officers and 56,000 enlisted men. Mobilization to a top strength of 96,800 would require 6 months. Organized reserves consist of 8 partially equipped infantry brigades totaling about 26,000 men. The army is approximately 85-90 per cent equipped with Soviet Bloc arms mostly of World War II design but including some more modern types.

The infantry and armored brigades have been reorganized along Soviet lines during the past three years and Soviet tactical doctrine has been adopted and tailored to the army's needs and capabilities. Organization and doctrine emphasize firepower, mechanization, and mobility, but the army has no sustained offensive capability. Its deficiencies spring from a weak, under-strength and inexperienced officer corps which is broken into a number of political factions, as well as from a shortage of personnel having sophisticated military skills; inadequate training; low maintenance standards; and inefficient logistical systems. It could mount limited objective attacks employing two or three brigades and achieve some limited success. The strength and depth of its defenses on the Israeli border, coupled with favorable terrain, would provide formidable obstacles to an Israeli attack.

b. *Air*: Syria has an estimated 48 Soviet-supplied FAGOT/FRESCO (MIG-15/17) jet fighters and 2 BEAGLE (IL-28) jet light bombers. Air capabilities, both defensive and offensive, are poor. Although an

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EW/GCI network equipped with Polish and Soviet radars exists, defense of the Damascus area against a sizable Israeli air assault is believed impossible, largely because of the short reaction time available to scramble fighters and to intercept an enemy force whose takeoff point is less than 100 miles away. To offset partially the aircraft losses and the decrease in air capabilities incurred upon the dissolution of the union with the UAR, Syria concluded a Soviet aid agreement in early 1962 which provides for FISHBEDS (MIG-21) during 1963, as well as surface-to-air missiles and possibly jet bombers.

c. *Navy*: The Syrian navy consists of a small number of ex-French and ex-Soviet vessels, many of which are non-operational. It does not have a significant combat capability.

3. Jordan

a. *Ground*: The total strength of the Jordanian army is 37,400. At present 14,000 regulars, supported by about 9,000 lightly armed National Guardsmen, mostly stationed within border villages, guard Jordan's frontier with Israel. The remainder of the army is deployed in East Jordan, with the largest concentration near the capital, Amman.

Disaffection of some army officers from the monarchy has made the reliability of the army questionable. It is incapable of sustained offensive combat. Defensively, it could probably contain attacks by any one neighboring Arab army but could not defend West Jordan against an Israeli attack for longer than six to ten days.

b. *Air*: Following the recent defections to Egypt of the Royal Jordanian Air Force Commander and two Hawker Hunter pilots with their aircraft, Jordan now has 21 Hawker Hunters and 8 Vampire jet fighters. The air force has virtually no combat capability with respect to Israel, and what capability there exists is limited by a shortage of pilots and poor morale.

4. Iraq

a. *Ground*: The strength of the Iraqi army (excluding the organic air forces) is about 70,000 organized into four infantry divisions and one armored division. Soviet equipment has been largely absorbed, resulting in some improvement in effectiveness.

Logistical limitations and internal security considerations preclude the commitment of more than 12,000-15,000 troops to the west for possible action in the Jordan-Israel-Syria area. The involvement of the Iraqi army in attempting to suppress the Kurdish rebellion makes even that commitment unlikely.

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b. *Air*: The Iraqi Air Force (IAF) combat aircraft inventory is estimated to consist of 90 Soviet-supplied jet fighters—16 FISHBEDS (MIG-21) with air-to-air missiles, 16 FARMERS (MIG-19), 29 FRESCOS (MIG-17), 12 Hawker Hunters, 9 Venoms, and 8 Vampires—10 BADGER (TU-16) jet medium bombers, (2 equipped with cameras) and 14 BEAGLE (IL-28) jet light bombers. Fifteen of the FRESCOS are equipped for all weather operations.

The Soviet military aid agreement negotiated by the Iraqi delegation in Moscow during October 1961 includes 3 BEAGLE (IL-28) reconnaissance jet light bombers, 8 MIDGEET (U-MIG-15) and 15 MAX (YAK-18) trainers for delivery during 1962 as well as 5 battallions of surface-to-air missiles and 8 P-30 radar units. Soviet instructors and advisors continue to participate in the domestic training program, and a number of Iraqi pilots are undergoing flight training in the Soviet Union. The IAF now has sufficient qualified pilots to fly all of the aircraft in its inventory with the possible exception of the FISHBEDS and BADGERS.

IAF is currently capable of attacking fixed targets such as airfields, military and industrial installations and transportation facilities. Acquisition of higher performance aircraft, additional electronics equipment and 5 battallions of surface-to-air missiles will increase Iraq's air defense potential. IAF capabilities are limited by the low standard of the average Iraqi pilot, a shortage of experienced maintenance technicians and poor logistic support. IAF transports are capable of airlifting 430-440 troops, and its helicopters could short-haul about 150.

5. Lebanon and Saudi Arabia

The armed forces of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia have no significant capability for offensive operations against Israel. The ground and air forces of Lebanon possess a limited defensive capability. The Saudi Arabian armed forces would be incapable of organized resistance against a modern army, except for desert harassing operations.

D. *UN Forces*: The United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) on the Israel-Sinal border have a total strength of about 5,000. (See Chart II for details.) Although border crossings and minor incidents continue to be reported, the situation along the Gaza and Sinal frontiers remains relatively quiet.

The presence of the UNEF is a psychological deterrent to a major UAR/Israeli conflict. The UNEF does not have the military capability of forcibly separating the two sides.

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CHART I
SELECTIVE ARMAMENTS INVENTORY *

	Arms.				ARTILLERY					Other		
	Tanks		Artillery		Anti-tank	Field			Antiaircraft		Recoil-less Weapons	Mortars 81-120 mm
	Light	Medium	Heavy	Anti-tank & Assault Guns		Field	75-105 mm	106-155 mm	20-57 mm	75-130 mm		
UAR (EGYPT)	30	574	60	200	433	20	276	614	148	2,000+	838	
SYRIA.....	...	392	...	140	160	40+	168	439	67	1,500+	477	
IRAQ.....	36	406	...	120	73	509	185	431	100	567	334	
JORDAN.....	...	186	...	33	80	134	18	52	...	323	130	
LEBANON.....	40	20	18	18	80	12	...	96	
SAUDI ARABIA.....	36	18	67	6	114	32	1,838	403	
TOTAL ARAB	142	1,586	60	493	746	977	671*	1,739	359	6,325	2,278	
ISRAELI.....	175	599	...	124	385	584	92	914	92	5,699*	1,534	

* Certain obsolete items have been omitted.

• Includes armored cars, personnel and weapons carriers.

• Includes 50 130mm rocket launchers (32 tube) in U.A.P. (Egypt), 24 in Syria, and 24 132mm rocket launchers (16 tube) in Iraq.

• Includes 850 SS-10 anti-tank guided missiles.

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CHART II

STRENGTH OF FORCES * DEPLOYED IN VICINITY
OF ISRAELI BORDERS

	Current	M+48 Hrs.
UAR (EGYPT)	16,000	35,000
SYRIA	16,500	31,000
JORDAN	23,000	45,000
LEBANON	2,700	7,500
TOTAL ARAB	58,200	118,500
ISRAEL	55,000	350,000

* Includes irregulars.

TOTAL STRENGTH OF ARAB ARMIES

UAR (EGYPT)	121,300*
SYRIA	70,200*
IRAQ	78,100*
JORDAN	46,000*
SAUDI ARABIA	14,850
LEBANON	10,500
TOTAL	338,950

* This figure includes quasi-military personnel
on active duty.UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, EGYPT
(AS OF 15 SEPTEMBER 1963)

BRAZIL	640
CANADA	925
DENMARK	559
INDIA	1,247
NORWAY	591
SWEDEN	421
YUGOSLAVIA	707
TOTAL	5,090

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CHART III
AIR FORCES
(As of 1 January 1963)

	FIGHTERS		BOMBERS		TRANSPORTS		OTHER		ESTIMATED TOTAL AF PERSONNEL	
	Jet	Pis-ton	Jet	Pis-ton	Jet	Pis-ton	Jet	Pis-ton		
UAR (EGYPT).....	211	..	06	72	26	111	486	7,100
SYRIA.....	48	..	2	8	8	23	89	3,000
JORDAN.....	29	3	..	16	48	1,550
SAUDI ARABIA.....	18	9	..	19	46	500
LEBANON.....	13	3	8	24	725
IRAQ.....	90	..	24	14	11	49	188	4,300
TOTAL ARAB.....	409	..	92	106	46	236	881	17,175
ISRAEL.....	102	..	24	30	56	67	339	4,150


* Non-flyable.

CHART IV
NAVAL FORCES

	DE-STROY-ERS (DD)	PATRS. VESSELS (PF PR PC PY PGM SC)		KOMAR CLASS GUIDED MISSILE BOATS	MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS (PT)	MINE WARFARE SHIPS (MSF, MSCO)	SUBS (SS)	AMPHIB CRAFT	OTHER	NAVAL PERSONNEL	
		4	(2)								
UAR (EGYPT).....	6	4	(2)	3	18-27	4	9	(1)	..	5	7,500
SYRIA.....	..	3	6	(9)	..	(2)	..	8	1,000
IRAQ.....	..	7	12	400
LEBANON.....	2	1	215
JORDAN.....	12	300
TOTAL ARAB.....	6	14	(2)	3	34-45	(9)	4	(1)	2	36	9,415
ISRAEL.....	2	2	7	(2)	1	(1)	10	..	3,700

NOTE: Figures in parentheses indicate inactive ships (both reserve and those in overhaul).

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
ANNEX B

THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM

1. Israel began its nuclear energy program in 1952 with the establishment of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister. The IAEC is closely related to the Israeli Ministry of Defense.


2. Israel has a small (1-5 megawatt) reactor, fueled with enriched uranium-235, in operation at Nahal Soreq (aka Nabi Rubin) on the Mediterranean coast near Tel Aviv. This was built by an American firm under a US-Israeli bilateral agreement. It is used for research, training, and the production of isotopes. It has no potential for production of weapons-grade fissionable material.

3. The larger Israeli reactor site is near Dimona in the Negev. Here the Israelis are building, with the assistance of the French (and presumably under the terms of the 1953-54 French-Israeli agreement, the terms of which are unknown to us) a 26 megawatt heavy-water moderated and cooled reactor, which is a modification of the French EL-3 design. The Dimona site includes laboratories for handling hot and cold—radioactive and non-radioactive—materials, a uranium-metal pilot plant, and associated facilities for workshops, health and safety, and administrative needs.



3.3(h)(2)

5. The Israelis have been very careful to keep the nuclear energy program out of the public eye as much as possible.



3.3(h)(2)

The Israelis have, from domestic production and from a small amount bought from Argentina, sufficient uranium concentrate for four or five loadings of the reactor, if they have facilities to produce and fabricate uranium metal. We know they have attempted to buy uranium concentrate from South Africa without restriction as to use. We have had reports that the French had agreed to supply large quantities of uranium. The Israelis have said that they have facilities for producing uranium metal in laboratory quantities at Dimona and will fabricate the fuel elements for the Dimona reactor at the site.

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6. We do not know that the Israelis have facilities for separation of plutonium from the irradiated fuel or whether they intend to build such facilities. US scientists visiting Dimona in 1961 were told that separation facilities were planned but in 1962 the Israelis stated they had no plans for constructing such facilities. The Israelis do have the technical and industrial ability to construct them, however.

7. The Israelis have shown an interest in the separation of uranium for the production of uranium-235, particularly by the ultra-centrifuge method. We know of no Israeli effort in the field of U-235 separation. The ultra-centrifuge method is in its early experimental stages and no country is expected to undertake large scale application for several years.

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