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U.S. GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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 IPS by: L. HARRIS  
 Other Agency Action: \_\_\_\_\_

TO : NEA - Mr. Grant

FROM : NE - Harrison M. Symmes *HMS*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Mr. Killick (British Embassy) at 10:45  
Wednesday, August 14

*DEF 1*  
*ISR*  
*13 IALA*  
*KM/K*  
*RL*  
*8-15-63*

On instructions, Mr. Killick will ask about U.S. views of Israel's current intentions in atomic energy and will inquire whether we might not jointly do something more with France to keep Israel on a leash. In part, the British approach is motivated by a desire to keep in close touch with the U.S. on this problem, but they were disturbed by the recent conjunction of high-level U.S. and French expressions of concern as to Israel's intentions. Apparently, the Secretary spoke in terms of personal concern to Lord Home in Ottawa (no record was made of this). Subsequently, Couve de Murville said much the same thing.

In fact, we have sought to keep in close touch with the British on this at the working level (Crawford-Wright). After hearing Killick out, you might note this and comment as follows on the U.K.'s specific concerns:

We have no new information about Israel's intentions, and we assume they are interested in developing the technological competence which would allow them to switch to weapons production on short notice if some time in the future they felt this essential to their national survival. But so far there is no evidence that they are following a path leading specifically to weapons development. Were they to do so, we think they could reach the end of the path in terms of a crude explosive device in about two years. The estimate of this is of itself a matter of concern. We would not presume to judge what the Secretary had in mind; but the awareness of this estimate, coupled with the public clamor about foreign scientists and weapons developments on both sides, has heightened concern. Indeed, this deserves and receives our closest attention, and we remain glad to share our thoughts fully with the U.K.

At the moment, our efforts continue to be bent on regularizing arrangements with the Israelis for U.S. access to Dimona. There is reasonable hope that we will succeed. As the U.K. is aware, we do not regard secret unilateral U.S. inspections as a final solution. In that sense we share the U.K.'s view that our goal must be acceptable IAEA safeguards.

In another dimension, and both of these must be regarded as highly confidential information, we have sought high-level French comment on the nature of such French safeguards/inspection as go along with Dimona.

DEF 12 ISR  
XR AE 13 IAEA

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NW 49042

By PJRM Date 3/3/16

NEA:NE: WR Crawford ~~SECRET~~

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It will be interesting to see how forthcoming the French are. There may be factions in the French Government which are genuinely concerned about Israel's intentions, but there are also very strong ties with Israel in other quarters which probably place strict limits on the extent to which France under De Gaulle would see this in the same way that we and the U.K. do.

We look forward to continued contact with the British Embassy on this problem.

NEA:NE:WRCrawford:ebb 8/14/63

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